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THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD

THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF
IN GOD completes, with
THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
OF THE GODHEAD and
THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL
FOR HUMAN SOCIETY, a
system of constructive
theology in three volumes.

THE CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD


IN RELATION TO RELIGION AND
PHILOSOPHY

BY

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TO
THE SACRED MEMORY
AND THE BLESSED PRESENCE
OF A
WIFE BELOVED

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PREFACE

THIS volume is the companion to the two books already published, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* (1925) and *The Christian Ideal for Human Society* (1930). These dealt with *Christian dogmatics* and *ethics*; this deals with *Christian apologetics*. The best defence of the Christian faith and the Christian life is the exposition of the truth concerning them; this is their apology. As I have conceived apologetics in this volume, its task is to relate the *Christian religion* to *religions* generally, as the *affirmation* of what truth they contain, and to relate this *affirmation* to man's other personal interests and activities for such *confirmation* as these may offer. While faith is the organ of apprehension, appreciation, and acceptance of the object of religion – God, yet as an exercise of human personality it must not be isolated from, but related to, all that has value for man. These three volumes, of which the last in time should be regarded as the first in order, are an attempt at a Systematic, or what I prefer to call it, Constructive Theology, not common in the English language.

These volumes gather together the study, reflection, and teaching of the last thirty years in connection with Hackney and New College, in the University of London; they are the works of a teacher of theology, and are intended as text-books for students of theology. From fellow-teachers at home and abroad I am glad to have had testimony of the usefulness for this purpose of the volumes already published; and I trust this volume will prove the same. The motive and the purpose of this as of the other volumes explain some features that may seem to need such explanation. The division and the arrangement of the contents, the numberings of the paragraphs, are intended to facilitate the use of the book in study. Although I have frequent access to German and French theological literature, I have almost entirely in my references confined myself to English literature, and to such as should be accessible to students. I have quoted freely from other writers to guide and encourage students to go to these writings for themselves. I have not myself read all the books from which I quote;

but I have endeavoured always to express my indebtedness for any quotations at second-hand.

The historical references and surveys aim at forming what I regard as a valuable habit for a thinker – the historical approach to the problems of thought and life. I desire to make the cumulative impression that the Christian Belief in God is no curiosity or novelty of human thought, but strikes its roots deep in the soil of religion and philosophy. I have too much respect for the human soul to treat any of its expressions with contempt. We are what we are because of what seers, saints, and sages have been in the past ; the bequest we make to the future will depend on how far we have valued the inheritance of the past. For this reason I have so fully traced the development of the conception of God from its lowliest beginnings, and have based my consideration of the approaches of the human reason to God on the, in my judgment, too frequently depreciated proofs of the existence of God.

I have tried to live fully and think freely in the present, without any bondage, but under a debt to the past ; and much of the superficiality, and even flippancy, of the treatment of these sacred themes concerning God and man in the ephemeral popular writing of to-day is due to an inadequate culture, a disproportionate development, an excessive scientific or philosophic intellectuality, a defective moral and religious discernment. The secret of the Lord is with them that hold Him in awe. He who does the will knows the doctrine. To challenge the Christian Belief in God may for some men be an inevitable necessity in their pursuit of truth ; to treat such a belief with all that lies behind its affirmation, and belongs to its confirmation, as this volume has tried, however imperfectly, to show, with indifference or arrogance, is a reckless offence against the human reason, conscience, and spirit, as the religions of the world on the one hand, and the philosophies of the centuries on the other hand, have disclosed them. As I draw near the close of my activity as a teacher, and as I complete my *magnum opus*, imperfect as it is, I venture to exercise my imagination, and to feel myself encompassed by a great cloud of witnesses, the succession of students whom it has been my privilege and responsibility to teach the deep things of God, the truth as it is in Jesus, the will of God for the works of men. Some of them have fallen by the way, and others have passed to the higher service within the veil,

but most are still running their course in the Christian ministry at home or abroad, and all of them, so far as my words can reach them, I would summon to look unto Jesus, the Author and Finisher of faith – “the name above every other name” because “the name in which is salvation.”

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

NEW COLLEGE,
LONDON,
August, 1932.

INTRODUCTION

RELIGION AND REASON

I

THERE are two dangers which the Christian theologian must avoid : (1) the isolation of Christianity from all other religions, and (2) the isolation of religion from the other interests and activities of human personality.

(1) As regards the first danger, it is true that, as Ritschl¹ insisted, he must place himself within the Christian community, and his theology should be, not an exposition of an historical phenomenon – Christianity – towards which he himself is a neutral spectator, but an interpretation of the faith in God mediated by the Lord Jesus Christ, which he holds in common with the Christian Church. *Pectus facit theologum* : he is expressing his own personal convictions regarding what to him is truth.

(a) This does not mean, however, a denial of the belief that the God who has revealed Himself to him in Jesus Christ is truly the God who is in all, and through all, and over all, who has not left Himself without witness in any land and in any age, who has manifested His power, wisdom, and goodness in nature and in history, whom men have sought after in divers ways and divers times, and who has suffered Himself to be found by the earnest and sincere seekers. His attitude as it should be has been with wide knowledge and fine insight expressed by a theologian, Dr. George Matheson (1842–1906), in the hymn, the refrain of which is “Gather us in,” of which three verses must be quoted, as they express better than I can what I believe in this matter :

*Gather us in, Thou Love that fillest all !
Gather our rival faiths within Thy fold !
Rend each man's temple-veil and bid it fall,
That we may know that Thou hast been of old ;
Gather us in.*

¹ “We can discover the full compass of His historical activity solely from the faith of the Christian community. Not even His purpose to found the community can be quite understood historically, save by one who, as a member of it, subordinates Himself to His Person” (*Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. trs., p. 3).

*Gather us in ; we worship only Thee ;
 In varied names we stretch a common hand ;
 In diverse forms a common soul we see ;
 In many ships we seek one spirit-land ;
 Gather us in.*

*Each sees one colour of Thy rainbow-light ;
 Each looks upon one tint and calls it heaven ;
 Thou art the fullness of our partial sight ;
 We are not perfect till we find the seven ;
 Gather us in.*

(*Congregational Hymnary*, No. 326.)

Such a wide-minded and large-hearted attitude towards the religions of mankind does not weaken the conviction that the name of Christ as Lord is above every other name, and that in His name is a salvation, the completeness, certainty, and satisfaction of which cannot be reached through any other name, among the religious mediators of God to man. Only when, with genuine sympathy, sincere justice has been done to what is true and right in other religions, can the superiority of Christ to other Masters of the souls of men be so convincingly presented as to win the allegiance of their followers for Him, as the fulfilment not only of Jewish law and prophecy (Matt. v. 17), but also of the religious aspirations and moral efforts of mankind.

(b) This is the attitude in which increasingly the missionaries of the Gospel are approaching their world-wide task of winning all men for Christ. They are seeking the points of contact, following the lines of least resistance, not merely as the tactics of a human enterprise, but as the strategy of the divine purpose. This method has, and ought to have, its reactions on the theology of the lands sending out missionaries. It is impossible to isolate any religion, Christianity included, from its environment. The Hebrew religion was affected by the Semitic religions ; Judaism itself did not escape Zoroastrian and Hellenistic influences. Paul, the Christian apostle, remained in many respects the Jewish rabbi ; and was influenced, though in my judgment to a less degree than some scholars maintain, by his Gentile surroundings in his missions ; and the latest literature of the New Testament, the Johannine, shows even more markedly the world in which it sought to find a home for the Christian faith. The history of the Christian Church still more

distinctly shows the same tendencies. Greek philosophy and Roman law have graven their distinctive marks very deeply on the face of Christian creed and polity. And the Reformation, great event as it was, did not wholly recover the "pristine purity" of the Gospel. The theologian may do his best to rid himself of the local and temporary in order to reach the universal and permanent in his presentation of "the truth as it is in Jesus" (Eph. iv. 21); and yet he finds it difficult, if not impossible, to emancipate himself from the history which has made the Church to which he belongs what it is, and himself as a member of it what he is. I shall not dare to apply Paul's forceful language, "whose glory is in their shame" (Phil. iii. 19), to the theologians whose boast it is that they are Anglican, Lutheran, or Reformed, as probably my own endeavours to be unsectarian may have some taint or savour of sectionalism. The appreciation of what is good in other religions, and of the ways other than our own in which men have sought and found God, may be a salutary corrective of the limitations imposed by the history of Christianity in Europe on what by its nature I believe to be the one universal religion for the race. Confucianism, Taoism, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Islam may teach us something that will enable us to apprehend Christ more fully in His unique greatness.

(c) What is being realised on the mission field is that, although the different religions of the world may at first sight appear formidable rivals to be overcome by Christianity, yet on closer scrutiny they are seen to have a common foe. At the International Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910 much attention was given to the religions of the world; as a member of the commission charged with the task of preparing the report on this subject, and as personally entrusted with the work of drafting the report on Islam, the most ruthless foe, I have a very lively recollection of what was the dominant attitude. The report for the Jerusalem Conference of 1928 on *The Christian Message* not only took into account its relation to Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Islam, but laid most emphasis on the Christian task in view of the *Secular Civilisation* which has spread from Europe to Asia and Africa, which has overthrown the authority of the ancestral faiths among the *intelligentsia*, and has become one of the most threatening obstacles to the advancement of Christianity. We have to recognise that there is being presented to the intelligence of

the race an alternative interpretation of the world and life to that which religion has offered, in which God in any sense which that word has borne in religion is discarded as no longer a necessary hypothesis to explain the universe. We must confront this spreading and growing godlessness with the world-wide and age-long facts of religion. We must vindicate the claims of religion in the interests of our own Christian faith.

(2) This consideration leads us directly to the recognition of the second danger to be avoided by the Christian theologian, the isolation of religion from the rest of human thought and life. Dogmatics, the exposition of the contents of Christian faith, has always had the predominant and pre-eminent place in Christian theology. To ethics as a guide to Christian living increasing interest attaches to-day, especially to the social applications of the Christian moral principles. Apologetics, as the defence and the commendation of the Christian solution of the problem of nature and man, is to-day an urgent need and imperative demand.

(a) The attitude of the fundamentalist, who regards the Bible as an infallible text-book of science and history as well as of religion and morals, is one of the most serious present perils of the Christian Church. The arrogant ignorance, which talks of "vain philosophy" and "science falsely so called," and is trying to impose on the knowledge and the thought of to-day the ancient Hebrew cosmology and anthropology, must in the interests of an informed and intelligent Christian faith be rejected and opposed. The attitude of distrust and suspicion towards modern science or philosophy, which some Christians, informed and intelligent enough not to be fundamentalists, still display, shows a lack of confidence in the Christian faith itself as able to justify itself at the bar of human intelligence. To accept the latest scientific hypothesis or philosophical conjecture as the last word to be spoken, and to base theology on the shifting sands of the discovery or the opinion of each day, is a sign of excessive deference to passing phases of human thought, and of an inadequate appreciation of the permanence of moral and religious discernment. The modification of Newtonian by Einsteinian physics need not involve any revision of the reasons why my faith can with Paul's affirm: "I know whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that He is able to guard that which I have committed unto Him against that day" (2 Tim. i. 12). Religion as a personal relation

to the Eternal is not involved in the temporal changes of man's thinking. For the man who recognises on the one hand the purpose of religion as relation to God, and of the Christian religion as offering the best mediation of that relation, and on the other hand the limitations which science imposes on itself by its methods – limitations which men of science who are also philosophical thinkers are prepared to recognise – will not seek any reconciliation of geology and Genesis, nor will the theory of evolution have any terrors for him.

(b) As theology deals with the relation of God to nature and man, it cannot be indifferent to what science can teach about the constitution of the one or the other. It may maintain rightly that science cannot as such challenge the belief in Creation ; it must be prepared to give heed to science in describing the mode of Creation. In dealing with man, the moral conscience and the religious consciousness may offer data of which science must take account in attempting its physical explanation of him as part of, and dependent on, nature. It is not so easy to delimit the frontier of philosophy and theology ; and much of the subsequent discussion of this volume must be directed towards this end. Suffice it here to say that, if theology will treat with respect the interpretation of the world and life, which as based on general knowledge philosophy may offer, in order to discover if the interpretation from the standpoint of faith needs correction and extension ; and if philosophy will recognise that in any interpretation it offers it should assign the value to the testimony of the religious consciousness, which it rightly claims, philosophy and theology need not be antagonists, but may be allies in the defence of the values in man's life and thought which both recognise.

(c) To base theology on divine revelation exclusively is to ignore the fact that the organ by which alone that revelation can be received and find any response is human religion¹ ; and that religion as one of the human interests and activities cannot be separated from all the others. This leads me to insist on a fundamental consideration. It is to narrow and to lower religion, to depreciate its value, and to decrease its authority, to treat it, as it is too often treated, as a thing apart, as a department of life, as a Sabbath of the soul, which has no connection with the other days of the

¹ A witty French preacher has described the Barthian theology as providing God with a great key, but not with a key-hole in man.

week. If God be indeed God in all, through all, and over all, the essential reality, the ultimate cause, the final purpose of the universe, the reality of all ideals, Creator, Preserver, Ruler, Father, then the relation to Him is the supreme relation of life, and should pervade and dominate all other relations. There is no interest and no activity of man of which we have a right to say that religion has nothing to do with it. The Christian religion at least claims to be universal intensively as well as extensively. It is the whole manhood of all mankind which it claims. We do not fully understand the function of religion if we confine it to present duty or future destiny, important as these interests are, and central as is their place in religion. Jesus Christ is not only Saviour from sin, but as such He is Lord of all life. As religion offers a knowledge of God, and not only a guide for life, its interest is not only ethical, it is intellectual also. Human personality, thinking, feeling, willing, functioning in science or philosophy, art, and morals is the organ of religion ; and, like the divided house, it will not stand (Mark iii. 25), if the function of religion cannot be harmonised with the other functions, not by making it the tyrant suppressing the others, but by making it the constitutional monarch, who preserves the liberty of all under laws. The Christian religion means all-round reconciliation, of man and God, of man and nature, of men with one another, of each man within himself. Recognising as we do that the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific are not successive stages, as Comte thought, but complementary phases of human thinking, theology must seek reconciliation with science and philosophy. With ethics, as directing the whole of man's practical activity, the realisation of his ideals, it is evident religion must have an organic and vital connection ; human standards of conduct must be raised to the level of the revealed perfection of God, and every conception of God must be subjected to ethical scrutiny, so that conduct morally lower than that required of man by his ideals shall not be ascribed as actual in God. Religion is concerned also, if the connection be not so generally recognised, with man's sense of beauty as well as his pursuit of truth, or endeavour after holiness.

(3) Enough has been said at this stage of the discussion to justify the opening statement regarding the two dangers to be avoided by the Christian theologian : the isolation of Christianity from other religions, and the isolation of religion from other human functions. The first part of this volume

will deal with the relation of Christianity to other religions ; it may be described as *historical*. The second part will deal with the relation of religion to these other human factors ; and it may be described as *philosophical*. As, in the common use of language, *reason* is the term generally employed to describe the organ of the ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Holiness, the purpose of this book may be simply and briefly expressed as concerned with the relation of Religion and Reason ; and in the remainder of this Introduction the relation may be presented in a brief historical sketch. No complete account can be attempted ; only some suggestive illustrations can be offered. As the history will show, reason has sometimes opposed itself to religion as a rival, and at other times it has offered itself as an ally ; and religion has here welcomed such aid as reason offered to it, and there has suspected it, even offering its gifts.¹

Before discussing the relation, it will be necessary, however, although in quite a tentative way, to give some account of what is meant here by religion and by reason, and to such an attempt at description we now turn.

II

(1) It will be the aim of the first chapter to discuss the definitions which have been given of religion. For the present purpose it will suffice to describe religion as it is familiar to us, making no attempt to get a definition which would cover all types and all stages.

(a) Religion is the relation of man to God, as revelation is the relation of God to man. The distinctive exercise of human personality in this relation may be described as *faith*, which is receptive and responsive to the *grace* of God (using both words more widely than in the special Christian sense). Faith is the exercise of the whole personality, intellectual, emotional, and volitional, but, if we were to lay stress on one of these aspects, it would be the emotional : there is belief, trust, surrender ; there is apprehension of reality produced by, or producing, an attitude to it, which results in corresponding action. Despite the apparent exceptions, which will have to be discussed afterwards, the object of belief, trust, surrender is, in the type of religion with which we are now solely concerned, God, more generally the super-human and supernatural (powers, spirits, gods). The

¹ See J. Y. Simpson's *Landmarks in the Struggle between Science and Religion*.

purpose of religion is practical – the securing and conserving the human *goods*, or, as they have been in more recent discussion called, *values*, the satisfactions of not only man's physical necessities, but also his personal aspirations after his ideals of truth, beauty, and holiness and God Himself. Conscious of his own insufficiency to get and to hold these values, man by the exercise of faith with confidence depends on the divine sufficiency. This contrast of human insufficiency and divine sufficiency indicates a significant feature of the conception of God. God is *beyond* and *above*, not only men, but the world around him, but He is *akin to*, and even *within*, men ; religion combines in the conception of God what theology describes as transcendence and immanence.

(b) Although the theoretical aspect is subordinate to the practical, there is, and must be, a theoretical aspect, a belief which corresponds to the trust and surrender ; it is possible that in the beginnings of religion man's response to reality was primarily emotional, an attitude, and only secondarily intellectual, an apprehension. The kind of response determined the content of the conception of reality. As man's relation to God is not apart from, but in, the world, religion involves a world view, and a use of the world corresponding to it. It is evident that a view and a use of the world, determined by faith, will differ widely from one into which faith does not enter as a factor. Here comes in the problem of the relation of religion and reason. Reason may confirm, and often has confirmed, the religious world view and use ; but it also may challenge, and sometimes has challenged, both, and affirmed a rival theory and practice. What in this connection is the meaning of reason ?

(2) There is an ambiguity in the use of the word *reason* which needs to be removed before we can continue its use here. The argument of Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution* and of Arthur (afterwards Lord) Balfour's *The Foundations of Belief* is based on a more restricted use of the word reason than that which is here adopted, for what they describe as non-rational would here be recognised as rational. Kant, in his epoch-making work, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, distinguishes *Verstand* and *Vernunft*,¹ and Coleridge naturalised

¹ " All our knowledge begins with our senses, goes from these to the understanding, and ends with the reason, higher than which nothing is found in us, to manipulate the material of intuition and to bring it under the highest unity of thought " (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, § 264, quoted Eisler : *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und Ausdrücke*, p. 843.

the distinction in English philosophical thought. We should express the difference as that of *understanding* and *reason*. In English philosophical literature the word reason has been used primarily in the first and not the second sense, which in a good deal of this literature has not been recognised at all. By reason, as we here use it, we do not mean only *reasoning*, the exercise of the logical understanding. Mill's *Logic* deals with the understanding; Hegel's *Logic* with the reason, in the specific sense. To avoid technicalities, the word reason will now be used to cover both.

(a) We exclude from the range of its meaning perception, memory, imagination, although reason could not be exercised without the material these activities provide. Concepts, such as *man* in contrast to percepts, or images, such as Tom, Dick and Harry, *judgments*, such as "honesty is the best policy" or "man is mortal," *sylogisms*, such as the well-known proof that Socrates as man is mortal, are to be included. *Inductive* reasoning, a generalisation from individual instances, such as Newton's law of gravitation, bringing together under one explanation the fall of the apple and the movements of the stars, no less than the *deductive* in the syllogism, is the exercise of reason. The categories of the understanding of the Kantian Critique – quantity, quality, relation, modality – these most general ideas which the mind uses in thinking its contents together, in making its varied experience an intelligible unity, whether they are or are not entirely, as Kant held them to be, *a priori* transcendental, synthetic, not derived from experience, but conditions of such intelligible experience, belong to reason. Even if Kant pronounced the ideas of reason – the idea of the soul as a thinking substance, the idea of the world as the totality of all phenomena, the idea of God as ultimate condition of the possibility of all things – as *regulative* of thought not *constitutive* of knowledge, "a canon for the simplification and systematisation of our collective experience," but "not an organon for the discovery of truth," yet consciousness for reason remains self-consciousness, although the self can never be apprehended apart from some content of its consciousness; and the impulse of science no less than philosophy is to what General Smuts has called Holism, the conception of the whole, the interrelation in one system of all phenomena, an impulse to which Tennyson has given a poetic expression in his lines about the "flower in the crannied wall." That reason itself leads to the idea of God we cannot

affirm now : that must be the subject of further explanation.

(b) Kant wrote two other Critiques, the *Critique of the Practical Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment* ; and in these he recognises a wider range of reason. What he calls *Practical Reason* we in common speech call conscience. To the judgment of reason – theoretical and practical – is to be added the judgment of reason æsthetic. Man has ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. These are now spoken of as values. With the study of these, logic, ethics, and æsthetics are concerned ; these disciplines are sometimes described as *normative sciences*, but sometimes by thinkers who will not admit that science can deal with norms are regarded as science so far as they are descriptive, and as philosophy so far as they are normative. It would seem to me that we should add two other values. One of them Croce has included in his philosophy ; he reckons *economics*, as with *ethics*, expressions of the practical reason.¹ Whether we be theoretical dualists in separating body and soul, we are becoming less and less practical dualists in ignoring and neglecting man's bodily needs. *Utility* might be recognised as a value, although it may be impossible to be as definite in describing it as we can the ideals. So also *Society* is a value. It may be that the ideal of Goodness can cover the whole field of social relations, but in that case it seems to me special emphasis should be laid on Love as self-imparting Goodness. These ideals cannot be held in watertight compartments. The pursuit of Truth and the appreciation of Beauty belong to Goodness in the widest use of the term to cover all human excellence, the realisation of the possibilities of human personality. The categorical imperative, the ought of duty, covers the whole life of man. When we speak of reason we include all that is embraced in science and philosophy, the recognition of ideals and values as well as the discovery of facts, causes, laws.

(3) While for practical convenience we are thus distinguishing religion and reason, in strict accuracy of thought we cannot and ought not to separate them. Religion has its ideal also ; there is an ethic of religion, what a man ought to be, as religious, in his relation to God. But religion is more than an ideal ; it recognises that all the ideals are reality in God, and that it is through faith in God that the realisation of the ideals in man becomes actual. It is a value, the supreme value, because it offers the assurance that the

¹ See *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, by H. Wildon Carr, p. 119.

other values are not illusive, will-o'-the-wisps of human fancy, but clues and guides to reality. Accordingly, when we here distinguish religion from reason, it is not because we do not regard religion as the highest exercise of human reason, but because we seek to show how close and inevitable is the relation between religion as one of the functions of human personality and the other functions in which reason is exercised. I avoid the phrase part and whole because of my conviction that no function can be fulfilled at its best unless it is pervaded by religion.

III

(1) Although Reason is one, yet there are differences in its exercise in accordance with the material with which it is dealing, and the consequent method that it adopts. (a) For our present purpose it is necessary to recognise the broad distinction of science and philosophy. Although the universe is one, and the earliest Greek thinkers tried to account for all things by one principle (water, air, fire – number, being, becoming), yet its content is so varied that it was very soon found necessary to *divide in order to conquer*. Aristotle, empirical in the character of his philosophy, was the founder of a number of separate sciences, such as natural history, empirical psychology, and ethics and logic. The difference between science and philosophy is not, however, merely in range, science dealing with departments of knowledge and philosophy essaying to interpret reality as a whole; there is a difference of purpose. Science seeks to explain in detail phenomenon by phenomenon; it observes facts, explores causes (we need not now concern ourselves with the qualification that modern physics would put on this term), and formulates laws; but it does not ask, as philosophy does, what is the ultimate nature of reality, or has it a final purpose? Philosophy, on the other hand, must explore the assumption that science makes that the mind of man can know reality; it must ask, not only, *what* do I know? but also *how* do I know *that* I know? This is the task of *epistemology*, which may be regarded as the necessary introductory enquiry of philosophy. Satisfied that man does know, philosophy can then explore what man knows, the nature of reality in a more fundamental way than any of the separate sciences can. The astronomer, for whom astronomy is becoming

more and more a mathematical discipline, may conceive God, if he believes in God, as a Mathematician. For the physicist, radiation and ether may be the limits of his thought. The theologian may find no difficulty in referring all reality to God, unless he has, as he ought to have, a wider outlook than theology has often had in the past. What philosophy has to do is to think things together. It has to take the ultimate ideas of the separate sciences and discover, if it can, their unity, that it may offer some conception of the nature of reality.

(b) In so doing it cannot be content with the data offered by the physical sciences ; it must take into account the testimony of mind itself. For a time the rough and ready method of division between science and philosophy was that matter was handed over to science, and mind was retained for philosophy, and sometimes even the term philosophy was used to cover both. In the Scottish Universities, physics is described as natural philosophy, and ethics as moral philosophy. And the producer of scientific apparatus calls himself a philosophical instrument-maker. Although, as has just been indicated, Aristotle already dealt with empirical psychology, yet only during the last century was the separate sphere of psychology as a science recognised. As a student I listened to lectures on metaphysics, which were largely psychological, and the two subjects made a bad mixture, for Kant's *Critique* was criticised from a psychological standpoint ; Comte claimed the study of society (sociology) as the crown of science ; and Mill in his *Logic*¹ put in a plea for the treatment of mental phenomena by the methods of science. No one will to-day dispute the inclusion of psychology as descriptive of mental processes, and of sociology as descriptive of social evolution among the sciences.

(c) There is, however, in the judgment of many thinkers, an intermediate region, where the frontiers cannot be so rigidly drawn. Mention has already been made of the values – truth, beauty, and goodness ; and in ancient philosophy we have already the studies – logic, æsthetics, and ethics. Can these be transferred entirely from philosophy to science ? They have been distinguished from the physical sciences, which are *descriptive*, as *normative*, as dealing with standards ; rules how to reach truth, how fully to appreciate beauty, how to act to realise goodness. Dr. John Baillie is convinced that there may be normative sciences. So important is this

¹ Book VI., chap. i.

question that a longer quotation from his book than would usually be given must be excused : " One frequent source of difficulty with regard to this whole matter is the prevalence of the confused distinction between the descriptive and the normative sciences. Now it is true that logic, ethics, æsthetics, and theology may justly be called normative sciences, but in this sense the opposite of ' normative ' is not ' descriptive,' but ' natural.' To say of a science that it is normative is not to imply that it is not descriptive, nor even (at least in the first place) that it is more than descriptive, but rather that the region of experience of which it is descriptive is itself concerned with norms. And the immediate business of science with respect to such a region of experience is simply to tell us what these norms are, and to explain to us how, in fact, they operate within that region ; and not either to provide us with new norms or to operate the old to new ends. Thus the primary and immediate business of logic is to tell us how we think, not to tell us how to think ; and the prime business of ethics is to explain conscience rather than to instruct it ; and the business of æsthetics is to bring to light the hidden principles inspiring artistic appreciation and creation rather than to guide such appreciation and creation ; and, similarly, the business of theology, regarded as a science like these others, is rather to bring to light the hidden grounds of our belief in the love and providence of God and in the immortality of the soul than to tell us *whether* we are to believe in these things."¹ If sciences which simply *describe* norms as actual are to be called *normative*, then assuredly they fall within the province of science. But does not the term *normative* itself suggest more, namely, that the task of these activities of the reason is not merely to describe *what is*, but, basing on such description, to determine *what ought to be* ? Namely, " to provide us with new norms *and* to operate the old ones to new ends." Dr. Baillie himself, by a number of qualifying clauses (" at least in the first place " ; " primary and immediate business " ; " prime business "), indicates that logic, æsthetics, and ethics may have some other task besides describing norms. I leave theology out of consideration as irrelevant to the point under discussion. To simplify the argument, logic as probably having stricter norms than ethics, and æsthetics as not allowing so definite norms, may be here set aside ; and the issue may be confined to ethics. The author's view,

¹ *The Interpretation of Religion*, p. 21.

apart from the qualifying clauses, seems to assume a *static*, and not a *progressive*, morality ; at least ethics is not expected to contribute anything to that progress. It was at one time in some social circles the norm that a gentleman should vindicate his honour at the point of his sword. Has ethics nothing to do but to describe that norm ? Is conscience always infallible, and must ethics simply record its dictates ? Is there not a further function for ethics, by reflection to reach new norms, or new applications of old norms ? Will not a personal judgment of values, not confined to the ethical, but including the metaphysical or theological spheres, affect such reflection ? Will the man who thinks death ends all judge in the same way as the man who believes in immortality ? Will the materialist and the theist have the same judgments of value ? Such determinations of values seem to me at least, despite all that this author contends, to lie beyond the region of science strictly defined. I am still inclined to maintain that logic, ethics, and æsthetics, so far as they are descriptive even of norms, fall within the province of science : but, so far as they seek to determine values, belong rather to the region of philosophy.¹

¹ Dr. Baillie, in a note on page 146, criticises my statement, in my book *Tutors unto Christ*, that "science knows nothing of values," and that such judgments should be "reserved for the philosophy of religion and excluded from the science" (p. 6). If his view is not correct, his criticism falls. He further seeks to convict me of inconsistency in that I deal with a standard of value, not in the last chapter, on "The Philosophy of Religion," but in one on "The Method of Judgment," and claim that "we are entitled to such judgments of value in the comparative study of religions" (p. 163). But I am not here dealing with the Comparative Study as a *science*, for on page 143 I distinctly state that in offering a judgment of value, "what may be required is that we do not claim that that judgment is a scientific conclusion, based only on the data before us, but frankly acknowledge that our personal convictions have affected our judgment." In my book, two chapters intervene between the chapter on "The Comparative Study of Religions," in which it is carefully shown that we are passing from the neutral standpoint of science to the expression of personal judgments of value, and the last chapter on "The Philosophy of Religion," in which the relation of religion to other mental activities of man is discussed. These intervening chapters form a transition from the strictly scientific to the strictly philosophical treatment, as the titles show - "The Standard of Judgment" and "Christianity and other Faiths." There is neither inconsistency nor is there any displacement. If a careful study is given to what I have written, the criticism will be proved unjustified. It has led me, however, to a much fuller discussion of the subject of *normative sciences* in the paragraphs above than I should otherwise have given. Further, the same author criticises my standards of judgment as *external* because (1) I state that "a striking proof of the insufficiency of a religion is its displacement by another, or more often the formation of sects within it" (p. 168) ; and (2) I offer this final summary : "The religions may be regarded as superior in the measure in which they seek the moral and spiritual rather than the natural goods, offer redemption to man, are literary and historical, look back to a great religious personality as founder, and have shown their universal

(d) We can distinguish science and philosophy in theory more strictly than we can separate them in fact. They act and react upon one another. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the most prominent science was physics ; and hence even theism conceived the universe as a machine, which God made, started, and kept going. The physicists, who in their researches are finding matter more and more an elusive mystery, are often less inclined to materialism than the biologists, who simply assume physical processes and chemical combinations as given as necessary conditions of vital phenomena. As regards the relation of soul and body, one wonders whether no personal equation enters into the dualism of Sir Oliver Lodge,¹ and the monism to which Sir J. Arthur Thomson seems to incline.² But, while we do recognise such mutual influence, it is convenient to maintain this distinction of science and philosophy.

(e) Two tendencies as affecting the relation of science and philosophy call for consideration here : (i.) When psychology and sociology are included, as they rightly are, in science, there emerges the danger of undue assimilation to the physical sciences without adequate recognition that difference of matter demands difference of method. There is a danger of mechanical explanations being offered of mental or social phenomena. The question may well be raised whether mental (that is, conscious and voluntary) processes can ever be as exactly defined as can physical. Further, we must urge that such phenomena, like Janus, have, as it were, two faces, one turned towards the observer (the objective), and the other to the experient (the subjective). The Behaviourist psychology simplifies the problem by ignoring the more significant and valuable aspect. So, also, as has just been argued, in ethics, logic, æsthetics, intention by their missionary effort " (p. 184). I must confess my inability to think of less external tests of the value of a religion than those which I offer. The historical supersession or modification of a religion, if due to failure to meet moral and religious needs, is a valid test. If each of the tests mentioned in the summary is examined as I have done, it will, I think, be found that they go to the root of the matter. I have at least failed to find anything less external in Dr. Baillie's book. My careful discussion of the Methods of Study is implicitly censured as an attempt to represent these methods as "so many parallel lines of study which can be separately defined and independently pursued." I am careful to state that when we have collected the data, then we may compare (p. 5) that the goal of the comparative study is the starting-point of the psychology (p. 7), and that the defect of the psychology must be corrected by the philosophy (p. 9). There is distinction, but no parallelism, no separation, and no independence. For not one of these criticisms can I find any valid ground.

¹ *Life and Matter*, pp. 107-117.

² *What is Man ?* p. 79.

when we deal with them as sciences, we must not forget that there is an ideal judgment beyond the actual norms to be considered.

(ii.) The tendency in philosophy has been to give to science as knowledge of what is a preponderant influence in determining the nature of reality. But the moral conscience and the religious consciousness are no less functions of human personality than the scientific intellect ; as they are actual in human experience, so must philosophy take full account of them in seeking to determine what ultimately is real. Morality and religion have been human activities as well as science from the beginnings of human history ; they have advanced, not always *pari passu*, together. Neither morality nor religion can be dismissed as surviving superstitions, while science is treated as the one progressive factor of civilisation and culture, for not only have all three their source in the same mind affected by, and acting on, the same world, so that distrust of any one of them should weaken confidence in the others, but also they have been found complementary to one another, when their functions are properly differentiated, and conflicting only when one has sought to usurp rule in the realm of the others. That there have been conflicts between religion on the one hand and science or philosophy on the other we must regretfully recognise, while maintaining our confidence that there may be more than neutrality, even amity. We now turn to glance briefly at the relation of reason, in this comprehensive sense, to religion.

(2) Reason is not, and cannot be, if properly exercised, the foe of religion, which has sought and found reality. The foe is *rationalism*, which makes an exaggerated claim for the theoretical reason as the only organ for the discovery of reality, or as an organ superior to religion in its own sphere. It may offer itself as a substitute for religion, or the predominant partner of religion. When it claims that reason is the only organ, we may describe it as *exclusive* ; when it allows religion a function, but a subordinate, we may speak of it as *comprehensive*, just as mysticism is the one or the other in its claim regarding access to God. There are three types of rationalism with which religion may be confronted : the *intuitionalist*, the *demonstrative* or *discursive*, and the *speculative*. (a) The first claims that there is a knowledge of God available in the very constitution of the human mind. The mind is furnished with a number of innate ideas. This Platonic

view found its advocate in modern philosophy in Descartes and its opponent in Locke. Under the name of "natural religion" this rationalism opposed, and offered itself as a substitute for, the Christian religion.

(b) The second does not make such a claim ; but it holds that reasoning on the basis which knowledge of the world affords can prove the divine existence. Its attitude may, however, be twofold as regards religion ; it may depreciate the value of any historical religion, and claim that reason is sufficient to provide all the knowledge of God a reasonable man may desire ; or it may simply offer itself as a support of religion, as making more intelligible the object of religious faith. This kind of rationalism has formulated the three traditional proofs for the existence of God, the sufficiency of which as proofs is now generally challenged, to which, however, as will afterwards be shown, a rôle subordinate to the witness of faith may be assigned. There is also the entirely negative rationalism which holds that the existence of God cannot be proved, and does not need to be proved, as the world can be satisfactorily explained without any such theistic conception. Thus rationalism may altogether deny God's existence ; it may offer its theistic evidence and conception as a substitute for the religious belief in God ; or it may regard itself as supplying a necessary support in reason for faith.

(c) Kant, who was the uncompromising opponent of this rationalism which claimed that it could prove God's existence, in his critical philosophy offered the starting-point for the speculative rationalism of which Hegel was the most influential exponent. Hegel himself claimed to be an ally of Christian theology, offering in his philosophy in a more adequate form the content of Christian theology. But his philosophy was afterwards developed by the Left wing of his school into a rejection of the Christian religion altogether. All these matters will receive consideration in Part II of this volume.

IV

(1) For the beginnings of science and philosophy we must go back to Greece ; and here we find reason exercised independent of, and even in opposition to, the popular polytheism. The earlier Ionic philosophers – Thales,

Anaximander, and Anaximenes – in opposition to current mythology, sought to explain the world by a universal material substrate. Xenophanes asserted “all is one” (ἐν καὶ πᾶν), and called the one God; but he poured contempt on the anthropomorphism of the popular religion.¹ To the Eleatic Being Heraclitus opposed Becoming, and represented this principle as fire. It was by Leucippus and Democritus that the world was resolved into atoms, and evolved out of them. The tendency of the Sophists was towards scepticism, extending to the belief in the gods. A positive contribution to what was afterwards known as natural theology was made by Plato. Not only did he condemn the mythology as of immoral tendency, and exclude stories about the gods from the education of his citizens in the ideal State; but he was, if with qualifications, a monotheist. Holding the animistic view of the distinction of soul and body, he accounted for the processes of nature, the evolution of the world, by the activity of the Supreme Soul – God. He also explained the orderly movement of the stars as due to an order-loving Intelligence. He thus anticipated the cosmological and teleological arguments. His doctrine of the ideas as innate, and of knowledge as recollection, was the basis of the movement, which named itself “natural religion.” But before dealing with this we must glance at Neo-Platonism, the last stand taken by the ancient philosophy against the advancing tide of Christian belief. The philosophy of Plotinus was made a religion by Porphyry; and Jamblichus “transformed it into a *dogmatic theology of polytheism*; with which the learned and political opponents of Christianity, such as the Emperor Julian, helped to revive the forms of worship of the heathen religions, then in a state of dissolution.”² Kingsley, in his *Hypatia*, has given a moving picture of that struggle. The ancient philosophy had already invaded the Christian Church. The Apologists sought to represent Christian belief as the true philosophy, and expressed its content in the ancient philosophical conceptions. The “acute secularisation” of Christianity in Gnosticism was averted; but the Alexandrian school did introduce a Christian Gnosticism. And in the ecclesiastical dogmas of the fourth and following centuries Greek

¹ He pointed out that each people assigned to its gods its own peculiarities; the Thracians represented their gods as red-haired, the Ethiopians as black; had oxen and asses gods, they would conceive and represent them in their own likeness.

² Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, Eng. trs., p. 215

philosophy was the dominant factor in the formulation of the contents of Christian faith. Even if Harnack's judgment¹ is unduly severe, and we must recognise a historical necessity in the process, it must be admitted that not only was an intellectualist tendency promoted, but that the content of faith was not adequately and without modification preserved. The influence of Aristotle on mediæval doctrine need only be mentioned. Anselm's saying, "*Credo ut intelligam*," indicates the combination of the Church's authoritative teaching to be accepted by faith, and the manipulation of it by philosophical conceptions in order to make it appear rational. Impressive and important as was the combination in Aquinas, it is one from which we to-day must seek emancipation, for the Reformation was not theologically a complete deliverance.

(2) There was an emancipation in that period, however, due no less to the Renaissance than the Reformation. (a) Modern philosophy may be said to have made a start with Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*; subjectivity displaced objectivity, the subject knowing came to the front, and not the object known. While Descartes asserted the doctrine of *innate ideas*, and claimed for the mind the possession of the idea of God, he represents in his Theism the demonstrative type rather than the intuitional, as he offers two proofs of the existence of God: (i.) because necessary existence is included in the idea of God; He necessarily exists; and (ii.) because the idea of God must have an adequate cause, as the human mind cannot be, God does exist as its cause. In contending against Descartes' doctrine of Innate Ideas, Locke had also in view the work of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, *Tractatus de Veritate*, 1624, who, in opposition to the claim made for Christianity as a supernatural revelation, sought to vindicate natural religion. "Herbert thought," says Caldecott, "that there are notions or ideas as to which all men practically agree, and he lays down six marks by which the admission of any idea to such rank could be guided; priority, independence, universality, certainty, utility, and self-evidence. Among these ideas he places as the five *communes notitiæ* of natural religion: (1) there is a God; (2) He ought to be worshipped; (3) virtue and piety are the chief elements of worship; (4) repentance is indispensable for men as they are; (5) there is a future life,

¹ See his *History of Dogma*, which offers the judgment on, in the history of, Dogma.

with rewards and punishments.”¹ This view has been very summarily, but with justice, criticised as neither “natural” nor “religion.” The history of religions disproves the view that these articles of belief can claim universality, as being “natural” to mankind. A long evolution lies behind them; indeed, they are but a mutilated torso of Christianity, with the supernatural elements removed – the elements which give Christianity its vitality and vigour – the person and work of Christ. It was an intellectual theory, and had no influence on heart and life; it offers truth without evoking faith.

(b) Herbert was the precursor of the deists, who, differing widely among themselves in their positive doctrines, were agreed on their opposition to “supernatural revelation,” “Christianity as old as Creation” was the summary of the position. This common attitude resulted in a close scrutiny of the Scriptures; and some of the deists were pioneers in biblical criticism. Blount argued against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; Toland advanced the theory of two tendencies in early Christianity; Collins advocated a Maccabæan date for Daniel. For most of them the denial of a divine intervention in history involved an assertion of the divine transcendence. “These men,” says Külpe, “set out to lay a new foundation for the contents of religion in a criticism of Christianity and the doctrines of the Church.” “The result of this effort was a deism, a purely mechanical conception of the universe, accepted under stress of the discoveries of modern natural science, and leaving no room for a God who should interfere with the destiny of the world.”² It must be added that not only was Toland the first to use the term pantheist, but he was for a considerable time himself a pantheist. In France this type of thought came to be represented by Voltaire and Rousseau, and in Germany by Wolff, Semler, Reimarus. This rationalism, belief in the adequacy of reason to afford in the belief in God as Creator a basis of religion, stood in a negative attitude to historical Christianity; but the defenders of Christianity shared with their opponents the belief in reason, and made their appeal to it as well as to the authority of the Scriptures.

(c) From “natural religion,” as represented by Herbert and the deists, we may turn to “natural theology,” an ally

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 98.

² *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 92, quoted by Caldecott, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

and not an opponent of Christianity. Natural theology invokes reason as a support of faith. It believes that proofs can be given for the divine existence. The two forms of such proof in Plato have already been referred to ; and the inference to God's existence as the necessary cause of the world, and as the mind which explains the order and purpose seen in the world, has been in various ways presented in the cosmological and the teleological arguments. Mention has already been made of Descartes' two inferences from the idea of God, which he claimed to possess, as conforming to the criterion of truth he had reached by his reflections. In the first of these proofs from the content of his idea of God as necessarily existing he had been anticipated by Anselm in what is known as the ontological proof. These proofs will demand subsequent consideration. They are here mentioned as instances of the assumption that by reasoning the divine existence can be proved.

(d) The starting-point of the speculative rationalism is in the third of Kant's ideas of reason – the idea of God as ultimate condition of the possibility of all things. In thinking the contents of experience together the mind reaches the subjective unity of the self and the objective totality of the world ; but can it rest in such a dualism ? Does not its impulse to think together compel as the next step the unification of the self as intelligent and the world as intelligible in a reality that is rational, and a reason that is real – that is, God ? This speculative rationalism has its classic expression in the philosophy of Hegel. *The real is the rational.* The universe is the evolution of Idea or Spirit, in itself, in its otherness, in its return to itself (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). This system has been called Panlogism rather than Pantheism, because the conception of God is so abstractly intellectual. Hegel himself claimed that he was giving the higher philosophical interpretation of Christianity, and especially of the doctrine of the Trinity. The honesty of his intentions need not be challenged ; but God in Himself, in the otherness of Himself, and in His return to Himself, is not a satisfying abstraction of the historical revelation of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, nor is the metaphysical unity of God and the human race an inspiring substitute for the Incarnation of God in Christ. This translation of the object of faith from the image (*Vorstellung*)¹ of

¹ “ With the Hegelians, *Vorstellung* means the memory-image ” (Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 856).

religion into the idea (*Begriff*)¹ of philosophy proves an over-valuation of abstract thought rather than an under-valuation of concrete fact. For the ends of religion the depreciated image has far more value than the over-estimated idea.

(e) With the "natural religion" of Herbert and the deists we need not have any further concern, as it represents an altogether discarded way of thought in the present time. What measure of value for religion there is in the "natural theology" – the theistic proofs – will be considered much more fully in the second part of this book, which will deal with the confirmations of faith which human thought and life may offer. What the defect and the danger of the speculative rationalism may be must be reserved for discussion, when we try to formulate the conception of God which most adequately meets the theoretical and the practical need of faith, as a study of the religious history of mankind will disclose that need. Against the rationalism which asserts the sufficiency of reason without religion, and denies the witness of religion to the reality of God, we can set the world-wide extension and age-long duration of religion as not only one of the functions of human personality, but as man at his highest and greatest because stretching out above and beyond himself, "his reach beyond his grasp."

¹ The idea, according to Hegel, is "not merely a subjective image (*Vorstellung*), but the 'essence' of the thing, what it is 'in itself'" (*Phänomenologie*, p. 68; quoted *idem*, p. 93).

PART I

HISTORICAL: THE AFFIRMATION

CHAPTER I

THE DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

I

(1) OWING to the variety of types, phases, and stages in which religion presents itself, when we survey it all over the world, and in every generation – for it is a universal and permanent function of human personality and factor in human history – it seems impossible to find a form of words which will be *inclusive* enough to state all that should be said to present fully its distinctive features, and *exclusive* enough to distinguish it clearly from other phenomena closely akin and allied with it. Of the definitions which have been given, it can be said, *quot homines, tot sententiæ*. The particular interest a man has in it will affect the special definition which he gives of it, for there are many approaches to the subject. The *anthropologist* is interested in the beliefs, customs, and rites of uncivilised peoples who have no literature and no history of their religion; and in his observation and research he is often guided by the assumption that, the savage being nearer primitive man, not in time, but in the stage of his development, he is discovering human origins, an assumption which we must examine in another connection. The *archæologist*, whose whole interest is in the exploration of the monuments of ancient civilisations and cultures, is often not concerned solely with what their religion was, but with confirmations of the biblical records. The *historian* of the religions, which have left records behind them in a sacred literature, is often specially attracted to one type of religion, and is in danger of letting his conception of religion generally be affected by its characteristics. The *student* of religion, who, following the methods of physical science, seeks by a *comparison* of religions to discover the uniformities and the diversities of belief and worship, is always running the risk of mistaking superficial for essential resemblances, of misinterpreting phenomena by isolating them from their immediate context in each religion, e.g. circumcision means something more for the Jew than for the Kaffir. The *psychologist* of religion, who attempts to track the roots of religion in the soul of man, to lay bare its motives, purposes, and processes in human nature, may

from his own standpoint exaggerate the subjective, and minimise the objective character, e.g. some psychologists use their science to discredit religion as a delusion unrelated to reality. The *philosopher*, who undertakes to deal with the significance and value of religion in the thought of human personality, can with difficulty only escape the danger of forcing it into the Procrustes bed of his own philosophical system, e.g. the Hegelian philosophy referred to in the Introduction. The *theologian*, who, in expounding a religion, is giving an intellectual presentation of what are his own personal convictions, will find it hard to exclude the personal equations, e.g. even within Christendom itself the Protestant will not easily school himself to treat Roman Catholicism with absolute objectivity. Not only is there the particular interest, but with it there may go, and has often gone, an individual bias. This is the danger to be avoided.

(2) Before the era when religion became the subject of as objective scientific study as possible, the subjective preferences appear in most of the references, of which it is interesting to survey some illustrations. For Socrates and Plato, religion was faith in divine providence. For the Stoics, men and gods belonged to the same world order. Varro is the first to distinguish natural and civil religion. Cicero boldly affirms that no people is so savage or senseless as not to have a belief in gods (*Tusc. Disp.* I. 13, § 29). In contrast to this the Epicurean school sought to ensure happiness in this life by ridding the mind of man of the fear of the gods and a future life. Epicurus himself regarded the popular religion as mostly false opinion; and Lucretius traced its source to fear. Familiar is his outburst against the many and great evils for which religion is responsible.¹ The Neo-Platonists offered the world not only a philosophy, but also a religion; we may say even a philosophy as a means of religion. According to Plotinus, by religion man is raised up to God. This religious philosophy was used by Porphyry, Jamblichus, and Proclus as a means of reviving paganism, the myths of which were allegorised. The Apologists regarded Christianity as the true philosophy, as giving the support of revelation to the belief in God, duty, and immortality. John Scotus Erigena, who stood in the Neo-Platonic tradition, also identified true religion and true philosophy. Agrippa of Nettesheim (1486-1535), as quoted in Ritter's *History of Philosophy*, IX. 347, gives what may be regarded

¹ "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" (*De Rerum Natura*, I. 101).

as one of the earliest objective and comprehensive definitions, which I translate from the Latin : " Religion therefore is a certain description of external sanctities and ceremonies by which we are instructed as by signs of internal and spiritual things, which is so implanted in us by nature that by that more than by reason we are distinguished from the other animals." It is worth noting that here the outward rites are described as symbols of inward dispositions, and that religion is regarded as not only natural in, but as distinctive of, man. Hobbes thought of religion as " fear of invisible powers," and claimed for the State the right to determine what the religion of its subjects should be. The views of Herbert and the deists have already been mentioned. Attention may, however, be called to Wollaston's identification of religion with morality. " By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do . . . what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done " (*Religion of Nature*, p. 26). However inconsistently with his system of pantheism, which treats man as only modes, *idealiter* and *realiter*, of God's attributes of thought and extension, and involves a denial of moral freedom and responsibility, Spinoza regards religion as at its best a knowledge, love for, and devotion to God, the Eternal : and he has rightly been described as a " God-intoxicated " man. For Leibnitz, religion is love for God based on knowledge of the divine perfection. His book, *Theodicée*, was an attempt to justify the ways of God to man.¹

(3) There are three statements about religion of so great importance that they demand a much fuller consideration.

(a) It is consistent with Kant's denial of the validity of the theoretic proofs, based on the Pure Reason, and his acceptance of the belief in God as a postulate of the Practical Reason, that he identifies religion and morality. Kant defines religion as " a recognition of our duties, as divine commands " (*Critique of Judgment*, II., p. 385). " Religion is that belief which sets what is essential in all adoration of God in human morality " (*Werke*, VII. 366). " Religion is the *law* in us, in so far as it obtains emphasis from a law-giver and judge *over us*. It is a morality, directed to the recognition of God " (*Werke*, VIII. 508). As Kant so strongly insists on the autonomy of the moral consciousness, and excludes from morality every other motive than respect

¹ For the contents of this paragraph I am indebted to the article on " Religion " in Eisler, *op. cit.*, pp. 646-647.

for this autonomous moral consciousness, it is evident that religion is not to be regarded as either the source of the divine commands or as investing our duties with any added authority. As God's commands are purely moral laws, "each man can for himself, through his own reason, recognise the will of God which is the basis of his religion" (*Werke*, VI. 201). The belief in God is itself a postulate of the practical reason, for God as world-ruler is necessary to harmonise moral character and outward conditions, holiness and happiness, law and good. Therefore Kant continues in this same passage as follows: "For actually the conception of the Godhead arises from the consciousness of these laws, and the need of the reason to assume a power which can bring about this effect, complete as far as possible in a world, and consistent with the moral purpose."¹ Religion is subordinate to morality, both as regards its source in this moral postulate and its purpose, the reconciliation of morality and actuality. It need hardly be said that there is an organic relation of morality and religion; that morality is one of the values, and the chief, which religion conserves (to use Höffding's term); that even at an early stage (how early we cannot say) the tribal god became the guardian of the tribal morals; that at the highest stage, when God is conceived as moral perfection, morality is an essential condition of communion with Him. But Kant depreciates religion in comparison with morality. Morality remains autonomous; and the belief in God comes in not in the interests of morality, but to assure the good man that God will make him happy. His definition cannot be regarded as adequate; it does not take all the data into account; it is limited by the interest of a moralist.

(b) If Kant's interest was in the Practical Reason, Hegel's was predominantly in the Pure Reason: he has already been referred to as illustrating speculative rationalism, as subordinating religion to philosophy. A further treatment of his view of religion is, however, here necessary. His description of religion as "consciousness of the supersensible" (*Phen.*, p. 509) is too general to be of any value. "Religion," he says, "is the kind and the way of consciousness, as truth is for all men, for men of all cultures" (*Ency.*, 2nd ed., p. 13).² This sentence suggests that there is a kind and a way of consciousness, in which truth is apprehended, superior to that of religion. An examination of the system

¹ Quoted Eisler, p. 647.

² Quoted *idem*, pp. 647-648.

proves this to be the case. In the Philosophy there are three parts : *The Science of Logic* deals with Reason or Spirit as it is in itself ; *The Philosophy of Nature* deals with it in its otherness. "Nature is the idea in the form of heterogeneity (otherness) – the notion that has issued from its logical abstraction into real particularisation, and that, consequently, has so become external to its own self."¹ Yet even here Spirit is, as it were, returning from the far country to its home. The full recovery by Spirit of its essential nature, as set forth in the third part, *The Philosophy of Spirit*, is in three stages, the Subjective Spirit, with which psychology deals, the Objective Spirit, Legal Right and Morality, and the Absolute Spirit. "Spirit is *absolute*, so far as it has returned from the sphere of objectivity into itself. . . . The first stage of the Absolute Spirit is *Art*, the immediate view of the idea in objective actuality ; the second *Religion*, the certainty of the idea as what is above all immediate reality, as the absolute power of being, predominant over all that is individual and finite ; the third *Philosophy*, the unity of the two first, the knowing of the idea as the absolute that is no less pure thought than immediately all-existent reality."² To put the matter briefly, truth, reality, is presented in art in sensuous forms, in religion, to which poetry forms the transition from art, in *images*, symbols, facts of history,³ and in philosophy in an idea, "thought that knows itself as all truth, as reality itself." In religion there are also three steps in the upward path. In the natural religions, God is natural power ; in "the religions of spiritual individuality," God is regarded as subject, although differently in the Jewish, Greek, and Roman religions ; in Christianity alone is the unity of the divine and the human asserted as the God-Man in whom God externalises Himself, yet as the Spirit returns to Himself. Whether this speculative construction of the doctrine of the Trinity can satisfy Christian theology is a question which need not be raised. Recognising as we must that we cannot know God unto perfection, that our conceptions must always be more or less symbolic, as is, for instance, the name Jesus has given us for God, "Our Father which art in heaven," that religion has always anthropomorphised, and, as Dr. Matthews has shown in his book on

¹ Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, Eng. trs., p. 332. ² *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

³ It is misleading when in Schwegler the term conception is used of this religious knowledge, while notion is used for the form of philosophical thought, as in the common use of the terms there is no recognised distinction. The difference is best brought out by the use of *image* and *idea*.

God in Religious Thought and Experience, has made progress as it has anthropomorphised,¹ and that theology must be always criticising the representations of popular religion to guard against misrepresentation, and to make the conception of God as adequate as our thought will allow, we may nevertheless maintain that, when corrected as far as can be by theology, the *image* of religion is as good as any thought we can hope to have to express what is at last ineffable. As Hegel regarded his own philosophy as the absolute philosophy, he appears to claim that God comes to full self-consciousness in himself. We can think God's thoughts after Him as He declares them to us ; we cannot think with the mind of God Himself. What is valuable in the Hegelian view is that religion gives the certainty of the dominance of God (the religious counterpart of the Hegelian idea) over all reality. The presentation is too intellectualist, as religion is more than knowledge, but it is religion to know that "the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth."

(c) As a reaction from the moralism of Kant and the intellectualism of Hegel, Schleiermacher defines religion as a feeling of dependence on the Universe, or on God. His upbringing among Moravians probably accounts for his emphasis on feeling ; but his speculative philosophy is far removed from their theology. "The Universe," he says, "is in an uninterrupted activity, and at every moment reveals itself to us. Every form, which it produces, every being, to which, in the fullness of life, it gives an individual existence, every event, which it scatters from its rich, fruitful lap, is a dealing by it with us. It is religion to take up into our life, and to allow ourselves to be moved in these influences, and what these beget in us, by every single thing not by itself, but as a part of the whole, by every limited object, not in its opposition to anything else, but as a representation of the Infinite" (*Religion*, 2nd ed., p. 75). "The one thing and everything in religion is to feel all that moves us in our feeling as its highest unity as one and same, and all the individual and particular as mediated by this unity, accordingly our being and life as a being and life in and by God" (p. 76).² God and the Universe are here identified ; to feel the multiplicity as unity is religion,

¹ "Anthropomorphism is the road along which the believing mind has travelled from superstition to noble creeds" (*op. cit.*, p. 31).

² Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 648. I am indebted to Eisler for the selection of significant sentences from Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher which are here translated.

whether we conceive the unity as God or as Universe, personally or impersonally. But the definition is self-contradictory. There is much more put into our relation to God or the Universe than can be merely felt. A great deal is here *thought* as well as *felt*. Still more so when that feeling is defined as a feeling of *dependence*. Dr. Baillie¹ points out that Schleiermacher, in the first edition of his book on religion, couples with feeling (*Gefühl*) another word, intuition (*Anschauung*); and although in the second edition the word is not used, there lingers in the first word some of the content of the second. What is really meant is that in the religious experience emotion is the essential element; and as a protest against either the intellectualist or the moralist limitation of religion it is necessary.

(d) Placing these three definitions side by side, we are led to a conclusion of some importance, namely, that in religion the whole personality must be exercised – thought, feeling, will; impression, affect, and expression form the complete psychic process. Important for human knowledge as has been the arrest of the process at the stage of impression, percept through image becoming concept, yet in religion thought alone yields a barren orthodoxy or heresy; the arrest at the stage of feeling gives the sentimentalist; and in religion an indulgence of emotion, as is so common in a religious revival, is injurious to the character, for emotion fulfils its end, not in itself, but as motive to action, whether it be within on self for improvement or without for the advantage of others. Let it be repeated, faith is belief, trust, surrender, the whole personality expressed in relation to God.

II

When we turn to those who claim to approach the subject from the standpoint of science, we find the same variety of definition. (1) The biologists, the anthropologists, the psychologists, do not speak with one voice. (a) “Animists,” says Edward Clodd, “in the germ, were our pre-human ancestors; animists, to the core, we remain. The ‘feare of things invisible,’ the ‘seed of Religion,’ is in the developed flower, which itself reproduces that seed.”² R. R. Marett recognises a pre-animist stage of religion; there was belief in mysterious powers in the world before these powers were

¹ *The Interpretation of Religion*, p. 204.

² *Animism*, p. 97.

thought of as spirits or ghosts, and the word he chooses to express man's religious feeling is awe. "Of all English words, Awe is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental Religious Feeling most nearly. Awe is not the same thing as 'pure funk.' '*Primus in orbe does fecit timor*' is only true if we admit Wonder, Admiration, Interest, Respect, even Love perhaps, to be, no less than Fear, essential constituents of this elemental mood."¹ He suggests *Teratism* as an alternative to *Supernaturalism* to express this attitude of mind. This view has affinities with Otto's conception of the *numinous* (from *numen*) as "a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion." Towards this object the "*numinous*" man has the "creature feeling," the sense of dependence. It is *tremendum*, awful, *mysterium*, wholly other; in current terms, supernatural and transcendent; and despite its awfulness and wholly-otherness, it is *fascinans*, it attracts. "These two qualities, the daunting and the fascinating, now combine in a strange harmony of contrasts, and the resultant dual character of the numinous consciousness, to which the entire religious development bears witness, at any rate from the level of the 'dæmonic dread' onwards, is at once the strongest and most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion." Not in its subsequent ethical reference, but in its original religious meaning, the *holy* is the same as the *numinous*. The holy is an *a priori* category of mind, and yet manifests itself in outward appearance. "Religion is only the offspring of history in so far as history on the one hand develops our disposition for knowing the holy, and on the other is itself repeatedly the manifestation of the holy."² While Otto recognises that in its development religion is moralised and rationalised, yet in his isolation of this non-moral and non-rational *a priori* of religion, he betrays a one-sided emphasis, as does Schleiermacher, for it is more probable that the rational and the moral are no less original elements of man's religious capacity.

(b) J. N. Leuba regards religion as one of three kinds of action. In "mechanical behaviour" there is recognition of a fairly definite and constant quantitative relation between cause and effect. "In the coercitive behaviour" of magic this relation is not recognised, nor are means of personal

¹ *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 13.

² *The Idea of the Holy*, Eng. trs., pp. 5, 12, 31, 181. The subject of the *a priori* of religion is discussed in Part II., chapter vii.

influence used as in "anthropopathic behaviour, which includes religion."¹ In religion man seeks to obtain the favour of the gods in the same way as of his fellow-men. "It is the Agent or the Power with which man thinks himself in relation, and through whom he endeavours to secure the gratification of his desires, which alone is distinctive of religious life. And so the origin of the idea of gods, though not identical with the origin of religion, is at any rate its central problem."² With the conclusion at the end of his book that "belief in a God seems no longer possible" we have no present concern; but his view illustrates the danger already mentioned of the psychologist's treating religion as a delusion. He does call attention to one element in religion which should not be ignored, viz. that it has a practical end – securing what man regards as his good; and uses practical means – the action believed most effective to that end. In contrast to this belief of a psychologist that science has killed religion as belief in God we may turn to the reconciliation of religion and science in the faith of one of our most eminent biologists, Sir J. Arthur Thomson. "Religion implies a recognition," he says, "practical, emotional, or intellectual – of a higher order of reality than is reached in sense-experience. . . . The aim of science is description. The aim of religious theory is interpretation. The two may clash in form, but in idea they are incommensurable. . . . Man's highest conception, his conception of God, must enlarge as his thoughts are widened. But it is surely interesting that the modern idea of a God – a God of evolution – brings us back to the God of our fathers, whose name Jehovah – the scholars tell us – meant, not 'I am that I am,' but 'I will be what I will be.'"³

(c) Two eminent German psychologists may be cited as suggesting other elements than those already mentioned. Volkmann (*Psychologie*, II. 4th ed., p. 368) distinguishes religion from morality, and asserts that "everywhere the basis of the religious emotion is principally the sense of being possessed by a higher, and indeed supersensible, power active beyond the sensible appearances. If one desires to call this feeling one of dependence, no objection need be advanced, so long as on the one hand one maintains the supersensible character of that ruling power, and, on the other, provisionally abstains from personifying it." Wundt (*Psychologie*, II.

¹ *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*, pp. 12–13.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 222–223.

3rd ed., p. 425) reckons the religious emotion among the intellectual emotions, and derives it "from the necessity of reconciling the appearances of outward experience and the moral impulses, or the emotions, out of which there arise the feeling for self and that for others." The result of this necessity is "to complete the connection of things and appearances by representations, in which the moral wishes and demands of consciousness find expression."¹ Religion develops from the natural to the moral stage; in religion moral postulates are realised. These opinions present a striking contrast, because different stages in the development of religion are in view.

(d) Dr. Oman, after quoting Windelband (*Præludivien*, 2nd ed., p. 357), states that "the substance of this is that religion is (1) an attitude of the spirit – a reverence and a trust; (2) a cult – an adoration and worship; (3) a social bond – an organising force; (4) a concern with the Supernatural – in some sense a theology."² While offering some criticism, he adopts this as a provisional description, but treats cult and social bond together as the cult is social. His own description is closely related to the analysis which he gives of knowing, of which he distinguishes *four types*, "awareness, apprehension, comprehension, and explanation."³ He also distinguishes four corresponding elements in "the world of religion, because, as with every other environment, there is (1) a reflection of it in a feeling of its own special quality; (2) an immediate judgment of worth of a kind different from all others; (3) a conviction of a peculiar kind of reality; and (4) a special way of thinking it all together as one experience. For the first two I propose to distinguish two words which are only vaguely distinct in our language, and, as is often necessary in the use of terms for more technical purposes, to differentiate them somewhat more precisely than is done by common usage. These words are the 'holy' and the 'sacred.' The 'holy' I propose to use for the direct sense or feeling of the Supernatural, and the 'sacred' for its valuation as of absolute worth. The special object I shall call the 'Supernatural,' and the thinking together 'theology,' both words, however, having a somewhat more specialised meaning than they have in popular usage. By the sacred, in particular, all religion is distinguished; and all religious thinking is right thinking only

¹ Eisler, *op. cit.*, pp. 648–649.

² *The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 15.

³ *Idem*, p. 120.

as it is about what is truly sacred. The Supernatural is not a further inference from it as from effects to a cause, but is felt and valued in it ; and, when separated from this manifestation, it is without content and deprived of all reality, because it no longer deals with an environment, but is mere abstract argument about the universe."¹ Although the correspondence is not so close, we may associate the pre-animistic stage with awareness, the polydæmonistic with apprehension, the polytheistic with comprehension, and the monistic with explanation. (In this last stage Oman distinguishes mystical from apocalyptic religions, and in the latter the ceremonial-legal and the prophetic type.)

(2) When we turn to those who are concerned with the history of religion, we do not find agreement. (a) No man did more in his own time for the study of this subject than Max Müller. In his *Hibbert Lectures*, 1878, he gives a definition he had given five years before : " Religion is a mental faculty which, independent of, nay, in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying disguises. Without that faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes, would be possible ; and, if we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God." To meet a criticism he expresses his willingness to substitute the phrase " potential energy " for mental faculty ; he maintains that the faculty of faith as something that develops is no more occult than the faculties of sense and reason, and he explains that he opposes this faculty to sense and reason only " if it is true that sense supplies us with finite objects only, and if reason has nothing to work on except those finite objects."² It has already been pointed out that we can, and should, use the word *reason* in a wider sense than that here indicated. If the word infinite be not taken in its developed philosophical or theological sense, but as disguised under the numinous, the mysterium, the above and beyond, the super-sensible, supernatural, superhuman, referred to in previous definitions, this definition falls into line with others given, although probably it is what is peculiar to Indian religion which has led to the use of this term.

(b) C. P. Tiele, after stating that religion is " considered generally as the relation between man and the superhuman

¹ *Idem*, pp. 58-59.

² *Hibbert Lectures on the Religions of India*, pp. 25-27.

powers in which he believes," adds that "the definition . . . is by no means philosophical, and leaves unanswered the question of the essence of religion."¹ But he does not himself discuss that essence. P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye excuses himself from defining religion on the ground that "such a definition is almost worthless without a thorough philosophical justification,"² and refers the reader to N. Siebeck's *Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie*, who regards religion as "the intelligent and emotional, practically active conviction of the existence of God and the supramundane, and in connection therewith of the possibility of a redemption."³ This is evidently far too definite to cover the whole range of religions. G. P. Moore, whose *History of Religions* can worthily be placed alongside of the work mentioned above, does not begin with any attempt at definition: and the following sentences indicate the reason. "In religions, as in civilisations, it is not the generic features, but the individual characteristics, that give them their highest interest and, we may say, value. It has accordingly been the author's aim, without exaggeration, to bring into relief the individuality of the several religions as it expresses itself in their history."⁴

(3) The many and great differences in these statements, even when we have allowed for particular interests and special bias, raise the question whether it is at all possible to give a definition. (a) Ritschl denies the possibility. "Language can furnish no terms sufficiently neutral and indeterminate to express the general conception of religion desired." But as "the observation and comparison of the various historical religions . . . shows that they stand to one another not merely in the relation of species, but also in the relation of stages, we judge them by the principle that Christianity transcends them all, and that in Christianity the tendency of all the others finds its perfect consummation." The objection that in so judging "the claim of the science of religion to universal validity may seem to be sacrificed to the prejudice arising from our own personal convictions" is rather peremptorily brushed aside, as "it is aimless and impracticable to attempt to prove the universal validity of the view that religions can be arranged in an ascending scale." Christianity, then, discloses the common *tendency* of

¹ *Outlines of the History of Religion*, p. 2.

² *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, I., 3rd ed., p. 5.

³ Quoted by Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 649. ⁴ *History of Religions*, I., p. vii.

religion. "In every religion what is sought, with the help of the superhuman spiritual power revered by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature."¹ While Herrmann² is in substantial agreement with Ritschl, he adds a valuable consideration in making clear that man as a spiritual personality is dominated by a moral law of absolute authority and universal validity. The moral law as constituting man a *spiritual personality* is the value which religion conserves.

(b) Kaftan criticises Ritschl's definition on the broad grounds that it includes in the common tendency what is altogether absent from many religions, that it makes prominent man's relation to the world rather than to God, that it emphasises the theoretical instead of the practical in religion, and that the conception of the self, as held by Ritschl and Herrmann, is ambiguous.³ He attempts what Ritschl had declined to do. He agrees with Schleiermacher that religion "before all else is experienced in peculiar emotions, that it has therein its core and centre."⁴ "The concern of all religion is life, and not – at once to name the contrary – perfect life, goods, or a highest good, and not ethical ideals."⁵ The motives of religion lie in "the feeling of man regarding the insecurity of his life and of the goods which he values highly," and his failure to find any "desirable satisfaction in his earthly enjoyment of life in the goods which the world offers him."⁶ Some religions seek the maintenance and increase of earthly goods; others seek a highest supramundane good. In the highest religion the pursuit of moral goods will be combined with the search for this highest good. This Christianity offers in the Kingdom of God. Kaftan does call attention to an aspect of religion which Ritschl and Herrmann do not adequately recognise – the delight of the soul in communion with God as Highest Good.

(4) In closing this survey, attention may be called to two books which deal expressly with the subject of this chapter: *Modern Theories of Religion*, by Dr. Eric S. Waterhouse, and *The Interpretation of Religion*, by Dr. John Baillie.

(a) As did Agrippa of Nettesheim, Dr. Waterhouse distinguishes "an inward experience and an outward

¹ *Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. trs., pp. 195–199.

² *Die Metaphysik in der Theologie*, p. 8.

³ *Das Wesen der Christlichen Religion*, pp. 83–94.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 29–30.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 52.

⁶ *Idem*, pp. 65–70.

expression," and regards the first as primary. "The essence of religion is to be sought in the experience : and this experience must, like all our experiences, be subjected to the scientific method. Religion, therefore, must be approached as a concrete fact of experience, and, when psychology and history have delivered their findings, a religious philosophy is necessary to deal with them." "If it be asked what common elements are to be found in religion as it is everywhere displayed, it would be difficult to name a single doctrine or a single act. None the less, some such common characteristic there is, and, stated in the most general manner, it would seem to be the belief in a higher order of things into due relation with which man must enter in order properly to adjust his life." By "higher" is meant superior to man, and, for "order," "power" might be substituted without serious inaccuracy. On this common basis which history discloses psychology throws further light ; even when it lays stress on feeling, "it none the less witnesses to religion as characteristically a mode of behaviour also." On such a view of religion a philosophy of religion can be based.¹

(b) Dr. Baillie finds the foundations of religion in our consciousness of value, and insists on the organic nature of the relation between religion and morality. "While all knowledge is relevant to *some* end of desire and action, religious knowledge has the distinguishing mark of always being relevant to our *ultimate* ends of desire and action." To the objection to this close connection of religion with morality that this is "to impoverish the religious consciousness" because of "the supposed narrowness of the moral outlook," he replies that "morality is after all but the art of living," and "our moral consciousness is but a convenient name for our awareness of those values which we feel bound to make ultimate in the guidance of conduct."² To the further objection from the supposedly non-ethical character of primitive religion his reply is that we must not apply our standards to these religions, and must recognise a morality corresponding to the religion.³ He suggests two alternatives to the simpler phrase which he prefers as a definition of religion. "We might say that what lies at the heart of religion is a *projection of our moral values into the real order of things* : and by so doing we would be doing justice to the deep elements of truth contained in the accounts of religion

¹ *Modern Theories of Religion*, pp. 1-7.

² *The Interpretation of Religion*, pp. 299-305. ³ *Idem*, pp. 307-311.

given by Feuerbach and Freud on the one hand and by the Comtists on the other. Or we might speak of religion as *an apprehension of reality through, and in terms of, our moral values*, and in phrasing it thus we should be bringing into clear focus the real element of truth which we saw to lie behind the rationalist assimilation of religion to speculative philosophy. Our present purpose will, however, be better served by a simpler phrase which will take in both of the above meanings, though we must ask permission to include in it one word, the further elucidation of which we must postpone to the next chapter – the word ‘trust.’ Here, then, is our definition. *Religion is a moral trust in reality.*”¹ The use of the adjective moral has been justified in the preceding discussion; the term trust is to be more fully dealt with in the next chapter; but concerning the word reality, an answer is offered to three questions: “Does primitive religion concern itself with ultimate reality? And need our religion do so? What character do we attribute to reality, when we put moral trust in it?”² To the first question a satisfactory answer is offered: “The Australian savage, no less than ourselves, strives in his religion to make connection in the interests of the things he values most highly with what is *for him*, and in a practical viewpoint, the most real and the most ultimate of envioning powers.”³ For the second he finds also a satisfactory answer in the words of Professor Pringle Pattison: “There remains, therefore, as the only valid form of worship, the worship of the ideal conceived as the eternally real, or (to put the same thing from the other side) the worship of the real conceived as good.”⁴ The third question is thus answered: “The central affirmation of faith may accordingly be expressed by saying that the inner core of reality must be *continuous* with the moral consciousness”; in other words, that the ideals are real in God. “While the Divine Reality must immeasurably transcend our highest glimpses of ideal goodness, yet it is from these glimpses that our truest knowledge of that Reality is won.”⁵ Criticising Höffding’s phrase, “the conservation of values,” as “*a little too narrow, and also a little too negative*,” he offers this alternative: “Historical religion has commonly summed up its sense of the gain that accrues to man from being religious in the conception of *salvation*,”⁶ especially salvation from sin. In the next chapter, on “The

¹ *Idem*, p. 318.² *Idem*, xiii.³ *Idem*, pp. 321–322.⁴ *Idem*, p. 325.⁵ *Idem*, pp. 325–329.⁶ *Idem*, pp. 330–331.

Foundations of Belief," the fundamental certitude is said to be that of Duty and Value – this is the *prius* of faith. These Values witness to what the structure of Reality is, "for no obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute."¹ Faith's *logic* is this: "If reality demands these things of me, then reality must be interested in moral values; it must have a stake in the moral issue; it must be on the side of the good and against the unworthy and the evil."² This faith is not developed by reasoning, but by love, which is "the ultimate organ of spiritual discernment," and thus "faith is not a probable hypothesis to be afterwards verified, but an ever-deepening personal trust."³

(c) This definition is so different from most of the others, and describes rather what religion ought to be than what it has generally been, that it demands closer scrutiny. *First of all*, in my judgment the author has not fully justified the use of the term *moral* as qualifying the trust. *Secondly*, it would have been better to have used the term *faith*, to which he does revert in the following chapter, as it seems to me to have a wider connotation. *Thirdly*, the term *reality* is too general to define the distinctive object of faith. If the term God is in a general definition too definite, the vaguer term the divine might have served better. *Lastly*, the purpose of religion is in no way indicated, unless the term *moral* is supposed to carry the whole burden "conservation of values," or "salvation." Although I should not myself attempt any so short definition, were I making it, I should amend his definition as follows: *Religion is man's faith for his own good in the divine as ultimate reality.* The subject is the whole personality; and the exercise of that whole personality in such a relation of confidence, dependence, and submission as is religion can be expressed by the term *faith*. The object to which faith is directed is the divine (powers, spirits, gods, God), of which such epithets as supersensible, supernatural, superhuman, numinous, infinite, are descriptive in different phases of the divine. The purpose of religion is the conservation of some human value or good. Without denying altogether this author's contention that a primitive morality accompanies a primitive religion, I should emphasise the fact that at this stage the predominant good is *earthly goods* (food, shelter, safety). Using the word *ethical*, as he does, in the wider sense to cover all the values, truth and beauty as well as goodness, we may recognise that the *ethical good*

¹ *Modern Theories of Religion*, p. 350.

² *Idem*, p. 352.

³ *Idem*, p. xiv.

comes more to the front at a higher stage of religious development, although the earthly goods do not fall to the background altogether, for even the good man offers prayers for them. With His loving insight Jesus recognised that anxiety about them might interfere with primary devotion to the Kingdom of God ; and He, therefore, added to the summons, " Seek ye first His Kingdom, and His righteousness " the assurance, " All these things shall be added unto you " (Matt. vi. 33). While the man of science or the artist must in his own personal life, as in his calling, recognise the categorical imperative of duty in all his relations, the pursuit of truth and the appreciation of beauty are values which religion conserves ; and the use of the word " ethical " must not exclude them. But we must surely add that the Highest Good is God Himself, not for values He conserves only, but for Himself. What I miss in this book on religion is that so little is said about God (the word is not even in the Index). Although Ritschl frowned on the idea of love for God, and would have us stop at faith in God, there may surely be not only adoration for God's perfection, but delight in God. The section on Love as the ultimate organ of spiritual discernment (pp. 363-369) of this book has disappointed me. In even the crude efforts of Hindu or Moslem mystics to reach in ecstasy union with God there is an indication that God Himself is man's Highest Good, that God so made man for Himself that man can find his rest only in Him. The truth of such a love is expressed in Francis Xavier's hymn, " My God, I love thee."¹ Valuable as is the treatment of the subject in this book, a wider outlook than the author's seems necessary.

¹ *Congregational Hymnary*, No. 403.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN SUBJECT OF RELIGION

WHEN dealing with the development of religion, the conception of the divine will very fully engage our attention, and no more need be added at this stage ; so also in comparing the religions we shall be brought back again to the subject of the good which is sought, and so the few sentences in the preceding chapter must meanwhile suffice. But to human personality as the subject of religion a fuller consideration may here be offered. Although we distinguish thought, feeling, and will, and in our consciousness one or another of these aspects may engage attention, yet there is never a state of thinking, feeling, or willing only. For further description we may, however, in a psychological analysis separate them.

(1) Some impression, some awareness, there must always be ; but we may probably regard a state in which feeling predominates as primary. The general and constant contrast in feeling is pleasure or pain, although there are many degrees and phases of feeling. When pain is threatened there is fear¹ ; when pleasure beckons there is hope. It is true that threatened or experienced pain may excite anger as well as fear. The instinctive action, where there is fear, is flight ; where there is anger, fight.² For our present purpose we can ignore these instinctive actions, as well as the emotion of anger, as not relevant to religion, and think only of the emotion of *fear*. Towards the objects which evoke fear or hope there may develop the sentiments of hate or love. The question to which we now address ourselves is this : Is it true that *deos fecit timor* – that fear is the source or motive of religion ? There is no doubt that in the child fear plays a great part, unless banished by loving care and training, and so also in the savage, beset as he is by dangers manifold from nature, beast, and man, and added thereto the dread of death and the dead. Even if we do not assume that either the child or the savage offers an exact analogue to primitive man (an assumption to be fully discussed in the fourth chapter), yet the circumstances of primitive man were such that he must have been beset by fears. In the world around him were objects so unfamiliar, occurrences

¹ See McDougall's *Social Psychology*, pp. 49-55. ² *Idem*, pp. 59-61.

so unexpected, that he might often feel his ignorance and impotence, and be afraid. But had fear dominated his life, he would have succumbed ; and no progress would have been made. "There is justification for concluding," says J. Arthur Thomson, "that primitive man was clever, kindly, adventurous, inventive, and very variable."¹ It seems absurd to generalise about the place of fear in religion. When the world was frowning, man would fear ; when it was smiling, hope. The tone of religion would be affected by the total conditions of life, adverse or favourable. That the general attitude was a trust prevailing over fear of the mysterious powers affecting his lot may be inferred from the fact of worship. Prayers and sacrifices were offered to avert displeasure or secure favour ; there was the belief that the spirits could be won to be less hostile and more amiable. Even the so-called devil-worshippers believe that by proper means the evil powers can be prevailed on to stop short of their worst. The development of religion has been along the line of pleasure, hope, love, and not of pain, fear, and hate ; for, apart from any assumption of any inherent quality in religion tending towards *faith*, although such may be assumed, since, as Luther said, God and faith go together, the course of nature is beneficent rather than injurious, and the relations of men to one another tend towards co-operation rather than conflict.

(2) What is perceived can be remembered and recalled ; the percept leaves behind its image ; and *images* can be combined with a freedom which perception does not allow. In dreams there seems to be even licence ; and dreams no doubt played a large part in the growth of religious ideas.

(a) Experience may furnish all the material ; but the imagination builds out of that material what it will. Man and horse were never perceived as one body, but the centaur is half-man, half-horse. Woman and fish never appeared as one in nature, but the mermaid is both. No voice was ever like the sound of many waters, but so its majesty can be symbolised. Earth is not *mother*, and heaven not *father* ; and yet the crops of the field can be represented as their offspring. The imagination delights in analogies ; and thus natural processes are represented as resembling human activities (anthropomorphism), and limited human power may be raised to an equality with nature's mighty forces (physiomorphism). Not only must we recognise what may

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

be called the manipulative and reproductive imagination, but even the creative. What has been only imagined is believed to have been perceived. The senses are easily deceived, and men have seen and heard, as they believed, what they wanted or expected to see and hear. We know how active the imagination of the child is ; how an unwise parent or teacher may charge with lying the child who has not yet learned to distinguish fact and fancy. So must it have been with man at the beginnings of his evolution. Imagination had long been active before intellect bestirred itself. Men think in concrete images before they have learned to use abstract ideas. In the realm of religion, in trying to picture the unseen, or to express the ineffable, imagination has a very large place, and must have. Christians address God as " Our Father which art in heaven," and poetry can often express truth better than prose could. Jesus spoke in parables, and not in syllogisms. He described a prodigal's return and his father's welcome, and did not define repentance and forgiveness. It has been noted that He never speaks of God's love or grace ; He lived it.

(b) Recognising the appropriateness of the use of the imagination in religion, we must realise its dangers and injuries. Human analogies of natural processes in pagan mythology involved the ascribing of immoral conduct to the gods. The amours of Zeus were not suited for moral edification. Hence Plato's exclusion of such tales from the education of his ideal State. When we are inclined to judge hardly the morals of the gods in mythology, we must remind ourselves of the free play of the imagination without moral restraint, but also without immoral intent. In Greece and Rome, literary art developed the mythology which had once expressed religious belief in imagery until vital contact with religion was lost. To recognise the activity of imagination is not, however, to challenge or deny the reality of the object of faith. There is, as we shall try to show afterwards, a contact in religion with reality, which gives religion its significance and value as a function of human personality and a factor in human history. The imagination is exercised in picturing, symbolising, apprehending that reality, in expressing it for, and conveying it to, others ; and, whatever progress men may make in knowledge and in thought, the concreting imagination will never be altogether superseded by the abstracting intellect ; truth will still be told in a tale.

(3) The complete psychic process is impression (percept or image), affect (emotion), and expression.

(a) This expression may, however, assume two forms : it may be reflective action, practical, directed towards an end, or it may be spontaneous gesture, a relief of the emotions. "Certain recurrent situations in the social life," says Marett, "— and, as for the individual, it is wholly subordinate to the social so long as mere gregariousness prevails — induce states of emotional intensity. The emotions must find a vent somewhere. This they do either through activities directed to practical ends, such as hunting, fighting, and love-making ; or else through secondary activities such as are not immediately practical in their object but serve simply as outlets of superfluous energy, such as the dances which simply play at hunting, fighting, or love-making. In either case, habit entwines with the activities in question all sorts of more or less functionless accidents ; and the presence of these unaccountable details helps to make the whole performance seem mysterious to the performers and still more so to the civilised onlooker."¹ As regards the practical activities, their customary adjuncts will be justified on the ground that they have "power," that they "work," that they contribute to the success of the activity. Still more will this be the case as regards the secondary type and its accompaniments, which will be in this case less restrained by hard fact than in the other. Although these secondary activities give relief to the feelings as rehearsals of the practical activities, as is the play of children, when they are thus endowed with power, it is the resemblance of the secondary to the primary which will be offered as an explanation. Not originally imitative, but spontaneous gesture, this feature does afterwards become prominent. "It is putting the cart before the horse to say, as Frazer seems to do, that the belief that 'like produces like,' or what not, generates symbolic ritual."² Thus *ritual* emerges from these secondary activities ; certain acts and words are invested with efficacy.

(b) We may call this the *magico-religious* stage, for the distinction has not yet been made. The difference can be briefly expressed, although a long process lies behind it. When the ritual is regarded as effective in its own inherent power — *coercitive*, to use Leuba's word — it belongs to magic. When the ritual is effective only as an appeal to, as persuasive

¹ *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII., art. "Magic," p. 247.

² *Idem*, pp. 247–248.

of, spirits or gods, when a personal agency is invoked, the ritual becomes religious. Further, as the belief in spirits or gods becomes dominant over it may be the earlier belief in mysterious powers, magic becomes discredited relatively to religion. Religion as public, social, beneficent comes to be opposed to magic as private, anti-social, injurious. The outward forms may be similar, but the motives and purposes differ. "In the evolution of thought," says Frazer, "magic, as representing a lower intellectual stratum, has probably everywhere preceded religion" (*Golden Bough*, I., p. xvi).¹ While common to magic and science is the "general assumption of a succession of events determined by law" – that is, a necessary connection of cause and effect – magic is more akin to religion in that the power used is conceived as mysterious, as supernatural.

(4) Closely akin to gesture, and yet capable of a fuller development than gesture, is *language*: and the importance of language for the development of the religious consciousness cannot be exaggerated.

(a) Even if we hesitate about admitting, with Max Müller, the identity of language and thought, as the Greek word *logos*, which means both reason and word, suggests, we must acknowledge that without language the mind of man could not have developed as it has done. "Speech," says Dr. Georg Runze,² "arises first of all from the attraction of imitation of natural sounds and expressions of others, then from the need of communication with others, lastly from the effort to release impressions, which move the soul, as well as indistinct representations, which otherwise would trouble and disturb the self-consciousness: it is a means of spiritual self-maintenance." The origin of language has been much debated. Some words are evidently exclamations, cries of pain or shouts of joy; others are (as is above indicated) imitations of natural sounds (*onomatopæic* elements). Although Max Müller, with an undoubted touch of irony, described these as the *pooh-pooh* and the *bow-wow* theories, and, as an explanation of the origin of language, describes them as "now dead, never to rise again, I hope,"³ yet he says also, "That a certain number of words in every language has been derived from interjections and imitations, no one has ever denied."⁴ The lower animals have

¹ Quoted *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII., p. 245.

² *Katechismus der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 105.

³ *The Science of Thought*, p. 27.

⁴ *Idem*, p. iv.

perception and memory (and that involves imagination) ; they can associate pain or pleasure with a percept, or an image ; as when a dog wags his tail not only when he sees a bone, but even the person who usually gives him the bone. Apart from cries, however, they have no language ; they do not think in *concepts*, or general ideas, such as, to repeat an illustration already used, *man* as combining in one the common qualities of Tom, Dick, and Harry. Man thinks in concepts, and concepts are preserved in words, whether we hold with the Nominalists, that concepts are only sounds, or with the Conceptualists, that they remain in the mind as a mental deposit. We are not concerned with sounds which express emotions, but with words that name concepts. Max Müller's theory may be stated. As words are used not only to express individual thought, but to convey it to others, "roots, to be intelligible to others, must have been from the very first social sounds – sounds uttered by several people together. They must have been what he [Professor Noiré] calls the *clamor concomitans*, uttered almost involuntarily by a whole gang engaged in a common work."¹ But if these sounds were not merely exclamations, what did they express ? "The majority of roots express acts, and mostly acts which men in a primitive state of society are called upon to perform ; I mean acts such as digging, plaiting, weaving, striking, throwing, binding, etc. All of these are acts of which those who perform them are *ipso facto* conscious, and, as most of these acts were continuous or constantly repeated, we see in the consciousness of these repeated acts the first glimmer of conceptual thought, the first attempt to comprehend *many things as one*. Without any effort of their own, the earliest framers of language found the consciousness of their own repeated acts raised into conceptual consciousness, while the sounds by which these acts were accompanied became spontaneously what we now call conceptual roots in every language."² We want, however, to get behind that word *spontaneously*, and we ask : Why did this sound accompany this act, and that sound that act ? Was there some necessary organic connection between the muscular movements and the movements of the vocal organs ? It has been suggested in a recent theory that these movements of the vocal organs were imitative of gestures which might have been made had the hands been free : but this theory has met with some ridicule. What is to be

¹ *Idem*, pp. 28–29.² *Idem*, p. 30.

observed is that, according to Max Müller's theory, the roots described acts, not things ; were verbs, not nouns. The roots have to be supplemented by demonstrative elements, "These were at first intended to point to whatever was meant to be the subject of a predicative root. If there was a root meaning to strike, then '*strike - here*' might be a striker, '*strike - there*' might be 'wound' ; '*strike - it*' might be 'sword.' After a time these demonstrative elements became differentiated and specialised, and they stand now before us as suffixes, and terminations of nouns and verbs."¹ Interesting as this theory is, all that can be claimed for it is probability ; certainty may be unattainable.

(b) Whatever the origin of language may have been, the influence on thought, and not least religious thought, is evident. If the root expresses an action, and, when applied to an object, action related to that object, as, for instance, striker, he who strikes, there are other aspects of the striker, and some other verbal root might be necessary to express each of these other aspects. In use one name suffices for an object, and all the aspects of it we know are recalled, or could be recalled by that name, while very probably the aspect which the name describes may have fallen into oblivion. We use most of our words without visualising them, recalling the picture which the root conveys. To give an instance, we might understand better the difference between *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* (the Hegelian contrast) if we remembered that *Vorstellung* is what is placed before us, *Begriff* is that which we firmly grasp ; similarly the Kantian contrast of *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. Words originally conveyed one aspect of an object, and that aspect might belong to many other objects. Accordingly, to use the logical terms, one word may *denote* many objects, and many words may *connote* one object. The first may be called *homonymy*, and the second *synonymy* (or *polyonymy*). Further be it remembered that in religion the words are *metaphors* ; the divine has to be described in the terms of the human, the super-sensible of the sensible, the abstract of the concrete. These characteristics of language inevitably react on thought. "The language," says Runze,² "involuntarily by the combination of homonymy and synonymy (polyonymy) brings about an alteration in the customary primitive representations of nature and of the activity of men. For the same object the language of the Vedas sometimes offers about

¹ *The Science of Thought*, pp. 24-25.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

fifty, even a hundred, different synonymous words, each of which in turn served as name (homonymy) for numerous other objects perceived. The river is described as the runner, as the roarer, as plough, as flier, as arrow, as mother, as protector." . . . "To this polyonymy there allies itself the also metaphorical homonymy. As is the river, so also is the earth, the mountain (as source of the river), the 'land' described as 'mother.' As the smoke, the cloud, the arrow, so also is the river called the 'flier.' What a fullness of association of ideas must have resulted from such a combination in the structure of language, if accompanied by a lively perception of nature."¹ As long as the etymology was not obscured, the imagination remained free ; but when the original sense of words was forgotten, the possibility of misunderstanding arose. "Descriptive were taken as proper names, so Helios, Uranos, Hestia : proverbial combinations of obvious predicates and not obvious subjects were handed on as mysterious traditions of ancient wisdom, and thus the fluid metaphorical associations of ideas became a *constant* combination of conceptions."² Metaphors became dogmas, as in the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. "Thus myth arises, as the result of the obscuration of the original meaning by the changing action of speech ; the myth is the shadow which speech throws on thought, an 'inherent necessity of speech' the power exercised by speech on thought, and indeed in every only possible sphere of spiritual activity."³ Max Müller, in *The Science of Thought* echoes this same judgment. "In my lectures on Comparative Mythology," he says, "I tried to show the irresistible influence which language, in its growth and decay, has exercised on thought, not only on what is commonly called mythology, the stories of gods and heroes, but in any sphere of knowledge." . . . "In order to make my meaning quite clear, and to provoke, if possible, contradiction – that is, independent thought – I called mythology a disease of language, though adding at the same time that it was to be considered as an infantine disease, as a natural crisis through which our intellectual constitution must pass in order to maintain its health and vigour."⁴ Mythology does not, however, explain religion, much as it has affected the expression of religious belief, for even in the myth are combined not only these changes in words, but an imaginative contemplation of nature, which is independent of language,

¹ *Idem*, pp. 82–83. ² *Idem*, p. 83. ³ *Idem*, pp. 83–84. ⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

and has been described as "mythical apperception." And here even we have not reached the root of the matter. For this mythical apperception is one of the means of evoking what has been here described as the core of religion, man's sense of, and answer to, what is above and beyond his world and himself, yet akin and even within himself – that is, the presence of the God in whom man "lives, and moves, and has his being," and of whom he "is offspring" (Acts xviii. 28).

(5) In discussing language we have to pass from images to concepts, and thus to the next factor to be considered, the *intellect*. (a) We shall see, when tracing the evolution in the conception of God, that as man became more intelligent he made his world more intelligible; as he observed resemblances and differences in natural objects he began to classify; as he became familiar with the usual course of nature he began to distinguish the ordinary from the extraordinary, the expected from the unexpected; as he exercised his powers and discovered what he could and what he could not do, there did emerge in his religious thought the distinction of natural or human and supernatural or super-human power; as he became more self-conscious, the personal power would increasingly supersede the impersonal; spirits and gods would take the place of *mana*, and magic would be discredited in comparison with religion; for to coerce spirits or gods by rites would be regarded as less fitting than to persuade them.

(b) At a later stage of reflection the limitations in space and the successions in time would give birth to the contrasted conception of *infinite* and *eternal*. The sense of the *numinous*, the *mysterium*, the *tremendum*,¹ would be rationalised in the conception of the divine. As departments of nature came to be recognised, the spirit confined to and controlling one natural object would give place to gods controlling such departments as, for instance, vegetation, waters, winds, etc. We are anticipating what must be much more fully dealt with in a subsequent chapter. This is here only an illustration of the function of intellect in the development of religion.

(c) As the principle of causality was applied in man's practical endeavours, as volition was followed by action, and the world appeared as a unity, the question of a world-creator would emerge. As society became more organised under the tribal chief, a ruler among the gods, a ruler over the world would be thought of. This need not at once lead

¹ See Otto's *Idea of the Holy*, Eng. trs.

to monotheism, but it was on the way to it. It must be admitted that religion has often not been patient of reason's efforts to correct its beliefs, and has clung tenaciously to superseded views. Superstition is the shadow which often accompanies religion. Nevertheless, we can in religion detect reason at work.

(6) Not less so the practical reason or conscience. At the earliest phases of human life man was *gregarious*: the individual was subordinate to the society, and no society can cohere without a morality, however rudimentary it may be. And, as has already been indicated, very soon the tribal god became the guardian of tribal custom. And, as morality advanced, there emerged a moral criticism of religious beliefs and rites to which some reference has already been made. Religion has been more conservative than morality; and so conflict has not seldom taken place. For this two reasons can be suggested, as religion is concerned with what is exalted above human change, change of thought or action would seem inconsistent with the permanence and the constancy of the objects worshipped. Again, moral changes are the results of changes in the social conditions; and morality is more directly affected by these than is religion. Even in morals the adjustment has often been very slow, but usually slower in religion. How religion and morals are mutually related, and what are the moral tests to be applied to a religion to discover its comparative moral value, will be more fully discussed in subsequent chapters. The opposition which has often been insisted on between morality and religion results from the application of a more advanced moral standard to a religion at a more backward stage of development. Myths and rites appear immoral, when surviving the phase of both moral and religious development to which they belong. To make this qualification is not to deny that religious conservatism has often been a check on moral progress. "Fundamentalism" is a moral handicap to any religious community. Religion has, however, also promoted morality. The authority of conscience was reinforced when regarded as the voice of God within. When the conception of the gods was moralised, not only did they present a pattern for imitation, but were trusted to give help in man's moral endeavour. Christianity presents not only the perfect ideal, but offers the conditions of its realisation.

(7) Moral conduct is a necessary expression of religion;

but it is not the only expression religion seeks. Attention has already been called to the connection between ritual and spontaneous action, gesture, which gives relief to intense emotion, and is directed by vivid imagination. Whatever rationalisation or moralisation there may be, worship remains a necessary expression of religion. Agrippa of Nettesheim, in his definition of religion, already quoted, recognised this connection of inward experience and outward ordinances. To begin with, and for the most part of its history, worship has been an activity, not of the individual, but of the social group. The Hebrew religion was national, and Yahveh's covenant was with the people. Not till Jeremiah and Ezekiel does the individual emerge as having a direct relation to God. So marked is this social implication that M. Durkheim has given to religion a purely sociological interpretation. "The god of the clan," he says, "the totemic principle, can be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem."¹ In this view he is treading in the footsteps of Comte, who substituted humanity as the source of all benefits men enjoy for God. While this is a misrepresentation, and even Durkheim has, however grudgingly, to admit that there was "the creation of mythical personalities," the social character of religion is a world-wide, age-long fact. In China, for instance, the Emperor offered the worship to Shang-ti on behalf of the Empire. As has been already indicated, in dealing with magic, its practice was directed towards individual ends, and so suspected as anti-social. In dealing with fetishism, which he describes as "a degeneration of religion," as the attempt of an individual to secure command of some supernatural power for his own ends, Dr. F. B. Jevons writes as follows: "A god, we will repeat, is not a supernatural being as such, but one having stated, friendly relations with a definite circle of worshippers, originally blood-relations of one another. It is with the clan that his alliance is made, and it is the fortunes of the clan, rather than of any individual member thereof, that are under his protection. Consequently, if things go ill with the individual clansman, he must do one of two things: he must either commend himself specially to the protection of the god of the community, or he must seek the aid of some other supernatural power. The latter course, however, is

¹ Quoted by Baillie, *op. cit.*, p. 303, from *Elementary Forms*, Eng. trs., p. 206.

disloyal to the community, and, if the community is vigorous and strong enough to suppress disloyalty, such infidelity is punished by outlawry.”¹ We must, then, remember that in dealing with worship we are concerned with a social function : it is offered either on behalf of the community or by the individual in special need in the forms provided by the community. While Christ in His teaching and by His actions further advanced the individualism of a Jeremiah, yet He too, by calling disciples to Him, at once formed a religious community ; and that community, by calling itself the *ecclesia*, claimed continuity with the national religion of Israel as possessing in Jesus the Christ as Lord the fulfilment of the promises made to that nation. Since the Reformation, the Protestant Churches have often suffered from a divisive individualism ; but to-day the movement is again towards the vision of one community. While this social character of religion does not exclude, but in any religion where personality has been developed must include, individual piety and devotion, yet man can realise his relation to God fully only in his relations to his fellows, those who are so related to God as he is. Benjamin Kidd, in his book *Social Evolution*, insists on the social function of religion as providing a non-rational sanction for the subordination of egoism to altruism. Lord Balfour, in his insistence on authority as *The Foundations of Belief*, is asserting the social character of religion.

(8) Having thus recognised the dominantly social character of religion and the worship in which it expresses itself, we may glance, without going into any detail, at the fundamental forms of worship. (a) As speech is the most direct and comprehensive medium of human intercourse, so is prayer in the relation of man to God.² Prayer is faith’s language, and it can convey all the thoughts, feelings, desires, purposes, fears, or hopes, the total experience of man in this relation. In the lower phases of religion it will be largely petition for earthly goods ; the plea for forgiveness will be added, as the moral conscience becomes more sensitive ; the development of the religious consciousness will inspire the desire for a clearer vision and a closer communion with God. Man’s sense of his need, and his belief in the grace and goodness of God, will be the measure of the contents of faith. Fear of God’s displeasure, or hope for His favour,

¹ *An Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 169–170.

² For brevity we may use the term God to include all objects of worship.

may move to prayer. But petition does not exhaust prayer. Adoration and gratitude will, as the religious life advances, displace mere petition.¹ Religion has not, and never will accept the limitation that there should be no prayer for anything which falls within nature's order, or is subject to natural law ; for (1) without expecting or desiring miracle, for faith nature is but the constancy of God's activity, not a power alien to, uncontrolled by Him ; (2) there are psychical and ethical sequences also, that might hinder prayer for personal good, if God were not conceived as in, and through, and over all, without and within ; and (3) prayer would lose its spontaneity were there a need of a constant discrimination between what may and what may not be asked for. Man's insufficiency in prayer is brought to God's sufficiency. Submission to the divine will, whether the specific petitions are granted or not, is prayer at its best. A. Sabatier has somewhere in his *Philosophy of Religion* said that the fetish worshipper who beats his fetish if his wishes are not granted represents prayer at its lowest ; Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane, "Not My will, but Thine, be done," is prayer at its highest ; and the whole range of prayer lies between these two extremes.

(b) Just as in human intercourse favour may be sought or gratitude shown, anger may be appeased, and pardon secured by a gift, so it was believed it might be with spirits, gods, or God. *Sacrifice*² is a constant element in religion. Even the Christian religion knows the sacrifice of the contrite heart (Ps. li. 17) and of the consecrated life as acceptable to God, and man's reasonable service (Rom. xii. 1). Many theories have been advanced to explain this institution.³ I have elsewhere⁴ dealt with this subject in detail ; and for the present purpose only a brief summary is necessary. Setting aside the view that sacrifice was instituted by God in a primitive revelation, or by man with the deliberate intention of expressing dependence and gratitude or repentance and desire for pardon, we must be content to assume simpler motives. Probably sacrifice was made as a pleasing

¹ On this subject there are two great books, Heiler's *Das Gebet*, now translated into English, and Ménégoz's *Le Problème de la Prière*.

² Of many books on the subject mention may be made specially of W. Robertson Smith's *The Religion of the Semites*, Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, and W. Buchanan Gray's *Sacrifice in the Old Testament*.

³ See *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., art. "Sacrifice," where a number of theories is discussed.

⁴ *The Christian Certainty Amid the Modern Perplexity*, pp. 75-91. The Murtle Lecture delivered in Aberdeen University, February 24, 1907.

gift to secure favour, or to avert displeasure. In the second case it would easily pass into being regarded as an expiation of sin. We have both conceptions combined in the passage in Micah vi. 6, 7 : " Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God ? Shall I come before Him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old ? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, and with ten thousands of rivers of oil ? Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul ? " The first view finds expression in the classic phrases : " Δωρὰ θεοῦς πείθει " (" Gifts persuade the gods ") ; " *Do ut des* " (" I give that thou mayest give ") ; the second idea is expressed in the word ἀντίψυχος (for the life). The conception implied in that word is made explicit in Homer and Virgil. " Even the gods themselves can be moved from their purpose, even these when anyone may transgress or err do men move from anger by sacrifice " (Iliad IX.). " *Unum pro multis dabitur caput* " (" One is given for many " : Æneid V. 815). The gift may express gratitude as well as ask future gifts. In presenting the firstfruits the Basutos say : " Thank you, gods ; give us bread to-morrow also." ¹ Herbert Spencer's theory, which connects sacrifice with funereal rites, may be set aside as quite inadequate to explain the importance attached to the blood of the sacrifice, and sacrifice as a common meal. The fact that in this form of sacrifice the worshipper partook of part of the flesh of the animal offered has led to the *table-bond* theory of sacrifice. As men showed friendship, or formed compacts by eating and drinking together, so sacrifice as a common meal served to renew or strengthen fellowship with the god and to confirm a covenant. Since among many peoples animal flesh is not the usual food, this theory does not explain why it should be used in the common meal of gods and men. The late W. Robertson Smith developed this theory of the common meal, on, as some scholars hold, too slender evidence, into the theory of a *materialistic sacramental communion of the deity and his worshippers*. The members of a clan or tribe were bound together by common blood. Plants and animals seemed also to be clans or tribes. Man had not yet so asserted his superiority as to separate himself from the life around him, but recognised an affinity, a common blood with a kind of plant or animal, supposed to possess supernatural power. This natural kind was the totem ; as the

¹ The quotations are given in Macculloch's *Comparative Theology*, pp. 163-170.

plant or animal was kinsman to the members of the tribe, so could these claim kinship with the totem ; a share in its supernatural power could be secured by the transference of the common blood from the totem to the worshipper. (We may use the word even if we do not regard the totem as a tribal god.) When the supernatural power of this totem as ally was desired, a totem animal must be sacrificed ; its blood must be shed, but on no account spilt on the ground, but received on a stone, a pole, or a pillar – the primitive altar. Part of the sacred rite was the consumption of the victim there and then ; and essential to it was the presence of every clansman. By eating the flesh the supernatural power of the totem was assimilated. In this communion with, there was a communication from, the supernatural ally. As the primitive annual feast became more frequent, the repetition robbed the ordinance of some of its solemnity. Usually it was regarded as a festival of rejoicing, except the original annual sacrifice, which came gradually to be regarded as an atonement for the sin of the people ; and as such the whole victim was burnt, and conveyed to the gods into which the totem had been transformed, as the pastoral passed into the agricultural stage. When men more fully distinguished themselves from animals, a human might even take the place of an animal victim. The prevalence of such ideas is now less confidently affirmed ; that these totem sacrifices were primitive and universal, and can be regarded as a complete explanation of sacrifice, is denied.¹ Dr. Jevons later admitted this.

(c) In stating the last theory of sacrifice a conception has

¹ W. Robertson Smith mentions " the payment of a sacred tribute " to the Baal of the land at the agricultural stage (*op. cit.*, p. 244). He insists on the inadequacy of the gift theory as belonging to the stage of the development when " the comparatively modern idea of property had taken shape " (p. 390). The judgment of G. Buchanan Gray deserves quotation : " It is not so certain that the influence of his fascinating theory and persuasive argument has not tended to give a wrong impression of the relative strength of the two ideas of gift and communion in historic times, even although his theory of the complete priority of the idea of communion in prehistoric times could be admitted in all its rigour." The conditional character of the last clause should be noted, even although Dr. Gray states that " it is not my purpose to examine the validity and sufficiency of Robertson Smith's theory of the *origin* of sacrifice." His own purpose is " to examine the extent to which, at various periods in the history of the Hebrew religion, the idea of gift was consciously associated with sacrifice, the extent to which sacrifice was subsumed under the general class of sacred gifts, and the depth and variety of the belief that gifts, whether sacrifices or not, could be, and ought to be, made by man to God " (*op. cit.*, p. 2). For the present purpose it is not so important to determine the first motive of sacrifice as to ascertain the varied motives which have sustained and modified the institution.

emerged which is of great importance in religion. Men seek in the ritual of worship not only to express their own attitude towards the objects of that worship ; they seek to enter into so close a communion with them as will secure a communication of some desired good from them ; and the media of such communion and communication are sought in material objects and physical acts, by eating and drinking with the god. This is what is meant by a *sacrament*, a sensible channel for supersensible reality. Even in Christianity there remain the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, recognised by all Christian communions except the Society of Friends. Roman, Oriental, and Anglo-Catholics add five others. In justification not only of the extension, but of the distinctive conception of sacraments, appeal is often made to an alleged sacramental principle, viz. that nature can be the vehicle of Spirit. Wordsworth did find in the beauty of the world "a presence which disturbed *him* with the joy of elevated thoughts," and in this sense nature was sacramental ; but to Peter Bell nature conveyed no such meaning. A poet's sensitive imagination was needful to make nature thus sacramental. Even the natural relation of husband and wife as expressing, and by expressing increasing, their mutual affection and devotion may be said to be sacramental ; but only if love of a high type is present can any such significance be attached to such physical acts. Hence the sacramental principle seems to support the Protestant contention that the faith of the recipient can alone make the ordinance effective for good. Again, so general a principle, where a multitude of natural objects or physical acts may be made significant and valuable spiritually, is too wide to justify the exclusive sanctity which is attached to the sacraments, still less when that sanctity is made to depend on the person celebrating, or the mode of celebration. It must be admitted that there is a touch of nature which makes all religions akin. Far removed in moral and religious content as is the Lord's Supper from pagan sacrifices, there may be a striking outward resemblance. Of a rite of Ancient Mexico Albert Réville writes : "At the third great festival in honour of Uitzilopochtli (celebrated at the time of his death) they made an image of the deity in dough, steeped it in the blood of sacrificed children, and partook of the pieces."¹ Two similar instances follow. The Fourth Gospel puts on the lips of Jesus words which not only His Jewish

¹ *Hibbert Lectures on Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, 1884, p. 102.

opponents might find "a hard saying": "He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath eternal life" (John vi. 54), if taken with the literalness of the doctrine of transubstantiation or consubstantiation. Sacraments express, often very crudely, the desire of the worshipper to share the life of the divine object.

(9) The considerations which have emerged in discussing sacraments lead us to the very core of religion. Religion is not only a sense of dependence; it is a desire for union with God. Even when men are seeking other benefits, earthly goods and moral goodness, it is this, which I believe to be the deepest motive of religion, which not only turns them towards the object of their worship as the source of such benefits, but which, as we have already seen, moves them in their mode of worship to seek a share in the divine life, with the supernatural virtue which attaches to it.

(a) We may call this, if you will, the *mystical* element in religion, although, as the word carries with it historical associations which would narrow its meaning to abnormal experiences and artificial methods in seeking this immediate contact and intimate communion with God, I prefer to call it the *spiritual*.¹ While using the term that the biblical psychology provides, I do not at all commit myself to the view that the Scriptures supply us with a scientific account of human personality. The dispute about the dichotomy or the trichotomy of human nature, its bipartite or tripartite character, rests on an unhistorical dogmatic method of using the Scriptures. Man is not to be divided into body and soul or spirit, or into body, and soul, and spirit. Whether dualism or monism be the solution of the problem of the relation of soul and body is not a matter which concerned the writers in the Bible. Both the Old and the New Testament view man as a unity, but distinguish two or three aspects of that unity: flesh as the perishable, feeble creature, soul as the individuality, spirit as the relation to God. We may, then, without even suggesting a faculty of religion, use the term *spirit* as expressing this core of religion.

(b) In so far as mysticism affirms that God can be known *only* by a special organ (the *Fünklein*, the spark, the Inner Light), or in a special psychic state (ecstasy or trance), or even in so far as it maintains that it is *mainly* thus that God can be known (the exclusive or the comprehensive type), I cannot accept its claim. The greatest mystics have

¹ See Part II., chapter vii., for a full discussion of Mysticism.

admitted that visions and voices are not necessary for communion with God. Paul, though he did attach value to what may be described as mystical experiences, did not base his claim to apostleship on them (2 Cor. xii. 1-10). The mystic way by which the soul, distant from God, can return to Him : purification, illumination, and essential union – this technique worked out in detail – seems to me too artificial. God has too many cords of love by which He draws men to Himself to justify such formal descriptions of it. The truth of mysticism is in the aspiration and the endeavour to realise God's presence, and to live in Him. But that is what all spiritual religion seeks and strives for, although in mystics the desire may be more intense, and the effort more constant. What I cannot accept in mysticism is what the previous discussion has aimed at disproving, viz. that it is a special organ or a special state which is necessary for the knowledge of God. The more freely and fully a man exercises his whole personality Godwards the surer and truer will his knowledge of God be. This seems to me the psychological error of mysticism. A theological error has also often accompanied it. If God's Infinitude be conceived as the negation of man's finitude, and He be thought of in negative terms as undefinable and ineffable, then the ascent to Him must leave the world and self as concrete reality, and the soul must lose its definite finitude in His indefinable infinitude. Religion, then, is not the highest valuation possible of world and self, but the depreciation of both. The aspiration after unity with God, absorption in God, whether it be regarded as an actual process of unification or just as a discovery that the difference was illusion, and the unity alone real, betrays a pantheistic tendency ; and in my judgment pantheism, when carried out with logical consistency, annuls both morals and religion.¹ Much popular religion is deistic ; it not only distinguishes, but separates, God from man ; but the alternative to it is not a pantheistic identification of God and man. It is a union, all the richer in content because of the difference of God and man, conceived, as far as human thought is able, in their full reality.

(c) What such union involves demands fuller explanation. What I am here contending for may, baldly stated, seem a paradox, namely, that there may be an immediate contact with God which does not exclude, but depends on, a process

¹ See my article on "Pantheism" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IX., pp. 609-613, and Part II., chapter ix.

of mediation. But an analogy may help us. When we see the objects around us, or hear the sounds, for our consciousness the sight and the hearing appear an immediate contact with that world ; but psychology will disclose to us a complex process, physical, organic, psychic, and philosophy may even make it doubtful for us whether such a process of mediation can really yield us so immediate a contact as we are conscious of. In human intercourse by word, gesture, smile, or frown, we seem to be in immediate contact with others, sharing their thought and life.¹ Can we not claim that there is such immediate contact with God, although it is secured as regards the content of our consciousness by a process of historical mediation, such as God's revelation of Himself in Christ? May we not claim more? If God is "in all, through all, and over all," if in Him "we live and move and have our being," does He not so pervade the world and ourselves that we cannot escape His Presence, and need only to become conscious of it? Tennyson, in a misnamed poem, "The Higher Pantheism" – for it does not describe a pantheism – expresses the truth :

*Speak to Him, then, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit may
meet,
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.*

Such a statement rises far above pantheism, and should not be so described. It may be called panentheism : "All in God – God in all."

(10) This experience carries us beyond the borders of religion as a psychic activity to the reality to which it relates. If man can and does apprehend God's presence, comprehend His nature, subordinate himself to His purpose, can man alone be active in the relation? As my teacher, Dr. Fairbairn, used to insist, religion involves revelation ; *wherever religion is sincere, there revelation is real*. In the subsequent discussions it will be seen how, with the progress of religion, the revelation of God becomes more rational, moral, and spiritual. But even in the crudest conceptions and the rudest worship we must recognise the divine presence, often tragically obscured as to its real nature not only by human limitations, but also by human errors and sins. We cannot treat religion as a subjective delusion which wider knowledge will expose as what it is ; but it has proved itself

¹ See Part II., chapter ii., on Perception, p. 238.

in history what it claims to be – an apprehension of reality. To use a distinction Robertson of Brighton made, it may often have appeared as a subjective illusion, an imperfect apprehension of that reality, but it is not a delusion, an apprehension of what is not at all real. Religion and revelation condition one another ; as God by revelation becomes more intelligible, man in religion becomes more intelligent ; the objective content further develops the subjective capacity. The pure in heart (that is, those of unmixed motive) see God (Matt. v. 8).

(11) Is there a word which describes what is characteristic of the knowledge of God man can through the revelation find in religion? The word *intuition* has been suggested. This does not mean a return to the intuitionism of Lord Herbert of Cherbury ; that is disproved psychologically. But Bergson has used the term to express the concrete experience of reality before intellect has resolved it into abstract notions. Without committing oneself to his views about intellect, one may admit the use of the word for this immediate contact with reality in religious consciousness, which does not, as has already been shown, exclude mediation. In this connection may be mentioned what Newman says about the *Illative Sense*, as the organ of the Knowledge of God. It “ passes from point to point, gaining one by some indication ; another as a probability ; then availing itself of an association ; then falling back on some received law ; next seizing on testimony ; then committing ourselves to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory ; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends, how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule.”¹ While there seems to me a good deal in this statement of rhetorical elaboration and psychological confusion, yet what it does illustrate is that this religious knowledge has a manifold mediation, demands the exercise of the whole person, and yet reaches reality.

(12) To draw the whole matter to a conclusion : We may recognise in religion, not as individual piety, but as organised in a community, its *creed*, when the intellect has taken the place of the imagination in supplying the content of its belief ; its *code*, when moral obligations as divine commands are brought into close association with it ; its *ritual* to regulate

¹ Sermon XIII., quoted by Caldecott, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 261.

its worship, for even those who protest against ritualism have usually some regular modes of worship ; and its *polity*, the constitution which it has as a society.

(a) About this last a few sentences must be added. As a rule there is a distinction made between laity and clergy, to use convenient terms belonging to a late phase, or between priests and people. The priests often are the only persons competent to perform many of the rites ; they may claim a mysterious knowledge and power which reduce the people to an abject dependence upon them. When such exclusive competence is claimed and acknowledged, there emerges *sacerdotalism*, priestcraft. When certain rites performed by this caste come to be regarded as exclusive channels of divine virtue or grace there arises the twin evil of *sacramentarianism*. As long as this competence or this virtue or grace is ascribed to divine appointment, and submission is rendered as obedience to God, we are still in the realm of religion. But if the value of priesthood and rite is placed within themselves, religion is fast lapsing into magic. In this priesthood there may be an elaborate organisation, e.g. high priest, priest, and Levite, or bishop, priest, and deacon ; but it is not necessary for us to follow this development further.

(b) One of the important questions in regard to polity is the relation of the religious organisations, whatever it is, to the political. As has already been often indicated, religion in its early phases was tribal ; there was a tribal god, there were tribal rites, and the tribesman could exercise his own religion legitimately only by the means provided by the tribe. An individual relation would have been suspect as anti-social. When tribes coalesced in nations, religion still remained national, although, as we shall see, the problem of relating the tribal gods to one another was solved in different ways, and the national worship was further removed from individual life. Isaiah recognises within his nation a remnant of disciples as holding the promise of the future. In Jeremiah and Ezekiel the individual emerges. But with individualism there arose also universalism. Jahveh, the covenant God, is recognised as God over all, Judge of all men. Within the pagan religions of the Græco-Roman world these tendencies too appeared, and cults, the membership in which was voluntary, found favour. Christianity from its beginning combined this individualism and universalism. Buddhism as dominantly a monastic order was detached from the political order. Islam, though also

a founded religion, aimed at being not a Church only, but a State. Within Christendom Churches have arisen in close relation to the State. But the tendency is increasingly to dissolve that connection, and to allow religion to make its own independent organisation, the spirit creating its own body.

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

I

(1) THERE is an ambiguity in the use of the word *origin* in this connection which at the outset must be removed. It may mean : What is the source of, and the reason for, man's being religious in his own nature or in the conditions of the world in which he finds himself? Or it may mean : What is the earliest form in which religion has appeared, so far as we can trace back its development? On the assumption that the beginnings of religion will disclose its nature, that the acorn will yield up the secret of the oak, the earliest form of religion may be regarded as showing the origin in the first sense of the word. This view I cannot accept ; just as we do not understand a human personality at a first meeting, but need a continued intimacy with him, so we must follow the course of the development to discover what the source of and reason for religion are. It is the end, and not the beginning, that tells us why man is religious, and how he came to be religious. Hence the term origin is used here only in the first of the two senses.

(2) In trying to discover the origin, we must recall the distinction, already made, between the *experience* and the *expression* of religion. In the experience we may assume that there is something universal and permanent, something rooted in, springing up out of, human nature ; the expression will depend on local and temporary conditions, physical, mental, moral, and social. To ignore or to neglect this difference is to lay hold on the accidental instead of the essential, the contingent instead of the necessary. To explain how and why men conceived the gods in a certain way is not to explain how and why they conceived gods at all ; and yet many theories of the origin of religion, as we shall see, are content with this superficial treatment of the subject, probably because their authors had not made the distinction for themselves between experience and expression. In reviewing the theories, however, this distinction must always be kept in view, and any theory that floats on the surface and does not dive to the depths in human personality may be regarded as inadequate.

(3) Many as have been the individual theories, they can be distributed in two classes – the *rationalistic* and the *anti-rationalistic*. The aim of the first class really is to explain religion away – that is, by resolving it into something else that is not religion. It tries to account for the expression without admitting the experience. “Rationalism,” says Runze, “seeks to explain the origin of religion by conscious intention, and intelligent reflection of individuals.”¹ The aim of the second class is to find some general source in the nature of man for his being religious. These anti-rationalistic theories again fall into three classes. What Runze calls *nativism* corresponds to the Platonic theory of ideas and Lord Herbert’s intuitionism already discussed. *Supernaturalism* affirms that there has been a revelation of God to man as the basis of religion ; but this revelation may be conceived in a more or less external way. *Evolutionism* seeks to explain religion by displaying its development as part of the general human evolution. “If objective religion is not a product of rational reflection or voluntary invention, then it must be either *innate* to man, or *revealed* by a higher power ; or, since adequate traces cannot be found, which indicate that the religious customs and ideals were given as completed from the beginning, then it must be assumed that the same involuntarily arose and gradually *evolved* out of a co-operation of the innate capacity and manifold external impressions from nature and history.”² As the above quotation shows, neither nativism nor supernaturalism need engage our attention long ; and we are left with only the various *rationalistic* theories, and the varied views as to the evolution of religion. We may, however, first dispose of the two theories for which there is no adequate evidence.

(4) As regards *nativism*, what has been said about Lord Herbert’s “natural religion” may be recalled – that it is neither natural nor religion, for neither did *nature* furnish man with such a creed, nor is assent to such a creed *religion*. More generally we may affirm that the *content* of man’s religious consciousness, the articles of his belief, are not *innate*, but have *evolved*, and we can trace their evolution. But the *capacity* for religion is *innate*. The universality of religion in mankind – for no tribe, no nation, no race has been discovered without some forms of religion – and the necessity of religion to manhood – for if a man forsakes the fountain of living water, he is almost sure to begin hewing

¹ *Katechismus der Religionsphilosophie*, p. 36.

² *Idem*, p. 53.

out a cistern, a broken cistern for himself – these two facts conjoined warrant the assertion that the capacity for religion is innate in man. German thinkers have been discussing the question of the *a priori* in religion, what is underived from, and yet developed in, experience. Otto, for instance, asserts that “the ‘holy’ is a *purely a priori* category,”¹ so that “religion has its own independent roots in the hidden depths of the spirit itself.”² However we conceive the nature of religion, so must we think this capacity for religion to be. Without such a capacity, neither nature nor history could *evolve* religion, nor could *revelation* be received, even if God gave it.

(5) Since religion is a mutual relation with God, it follows that not man only is active, but God also acts. In dealing with the nature of religion, the principle has been laid down that religion implies revelation; it is a consciousness of the divine presence and activity. To affirm that man’s innate capacity for God has evolved is not to deny that God’s Spirit has been directing and controlling the process. “If we may,” says Runze, “understand by revelation the continued illuminations which man wins concerning himself, the world, and the conjectured problematical realm of the supramundane by pre-eminent spirits, their history, teaching, and divination, then no serious objection against it can be made.” If we hold, as I do, that this illumination comes from God through inspired men, we can give the word revelation a fuller meaning still. What is here set aside as unproved is that to primitive man was given a supernatural revelation – monotheism itself. For such an assumption some evidence, but not conclusive, can be cited. Hindus and Greeks alike claim a previous (golden) age in which the gods were in closer communion with man. Some African tribes have a tradition that the supreme god and creator was once nearer men, teaching them wisdom, but that he had now withdrawn to heaven.³ While Jevons concedes that “monotheism may have been the original religion,” he also maintains that the anthropologist cannot start from this assumption but “from the facts provided by his science, namely the religious customs and institutions of the various peoples of the world.”⁴ Later in his book Jevons, after working on quite another assumption, sacrifices his consistency

¹ *The Idea of the Holy*, Eng. trs., p. 116.

² *Idem*, p. 140. For further discussion see Part II., chapter vii., p. 388.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

by saying, "We cannot maintain it to be impossible or even improbable that such revelation may have been made even to primitive man."¹ But if man's development has been at all as all our available evidence leads us to assume, such a beginning of man's religion will not appear possible or probable. Apart from these traditions about a better former time, which can be otherwise accounted for, there is no adequate evidence to justify such a conclusion. Another difficulty is this: how are we to explain the loss of that primitive revelation in the subsequent history? If we maintain that sin has so perverted the development that the original revelation has been lost, we must answer the question: if such a revelation was deemed necessary, why was it not renewed from time to time? The conclusion to which all the facts lead us is this: that the gradual evolution of man's innate capacity is God's gracious method of raising His creatures by His revelation till they are fit and worthy to know themselves as His children. Paul, with the insight of genius, catches a glimpse of this principle. "Howbeit that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; then that which is spiritual" (1 Cor. xv. 46). If we conceive the evolution as of an innate capacity under the guidance of divine revelation, the lowly beginnings and the slow course of this progress will not lead us to the depreciation of religion into which evolutionism has misguided some of its exponents.

II

The *rationalistic* theories aim at getting rid of religion as an original endowment of human personality, with its independent contribution to the knowledge of reality, so that reason, as expressed in science and philosophy, may have the field all to itself. Religion is accordingly reduced to something else than it actually is – an invention or device from a more or less worthy motive, and serving a more or less useful purpose according to the standpoint of the exponent of the theory which is offered as accounting for it.

(1) The crudest form of this rationalism is found in *Euhemerism*. (a) Euhemerus, a Sicilian, who belonged to the anti-religious Cyrenaic school, which taught that pleasure is the moral good, professed to have discovered on a sacred pillar an inscription to the effect that the origin of

¹ *Idem*, p. 397.

the gods of mythology could be traced to the deification, more or less intentional, of individual men. Some of these deified persons had been genuine benefactors, and owed their exaltation to gratitude. Others had raised themselves to that dignity. Chance, custom, calculation, had combined in this process. While Euhemerus himself advanced his theory in ridicule of the apotheosis of Alexander, and the pretensions of his successors, it gained so general acceptance that Cicero found it necessary to oppose it on the ground that in allowing the immortal gods to die and be buried, religion itself was destroyed. This theory could find support in the claims made for themselves by Egyptian rulers, and in a later age the Roman worship of Cæsar, as also in the cult of heroes, and the divine descent claimed for some men, as for Plato and Alexander. To the Christian Apologists and Fathers the theory was welcome, as discrediting pagan beliefs. But the danger to religion of such a view was discerned by Varro as well as Cicero. It is the sceptic Sextus Empiricus who puts the crucial test of the theory in the question, "Whence did the men who made the claim to be gods derive the conception of gods, among whom they include themselves?"¹ Offering a partial explanation of some of the contents of mythology, this theory does not explain the whole; it assumes the conception of the divine, but does not account for it; and it ignores what religion as a human experience really is.

(b) A similar, but older, explanation is that offered by the sophist Critias, who regarded religion as a cunning device of rulers, who, able to control outward conduct, yet unable to discover and direct inward motive, persuaded their subjects that the gods above, discerning even the secrets of the heart, would execute judgment on hidden transgression. Here again the conception of the gods needs to be accounted for; and some point of contact in human minds for such a conception must be assumed. A similar rôle of deception in their own interests has been assigned to priests. Sabatier, in his *Philosophy of Religion* (p. 5), offers an effective reply: "Not the pious deception begets religion, for without religion there could never be a pious deception. When I hear it said that the priests have made religion, I content myself with the question: Yes, who then made the priests?"² That rulers and priests have used religion for their own ends history in many instances attests; but religion had to

¹ Quoted by Runze, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

² Quoted *idem*, p. 38.

be there as a most potent factor in human life if it was to be so exploited. Intended to discredit religion, such theories serve as a boomerang, and discredit the intelligence of those who offer them.

(2) A more worthy explanation is offered by some Greek philosophers, especially the Stoics, who carried back the worship of the gods and the mythology on which it rests to an endeavour to give a reasonable explanation of the course of nature, and yet to preserve that explanation from clumsy desecration by the multitude. What the thinkers knew of the reality of natural forces and laws was allegorised as the activity of gods, who were humanised and yet exalted above men. This form of presentation ensured its attractiveness. The Gospels offer a parallel. Jesus taught in parables to reveal the truth to the discerning and to conceal it from the indifferent, while holding their attention (Matt. xiii. 13). This view had also been anticipated by the Sophists. Sextus Empiricus represents Prodicus of Cos as teaching in the fifth century before Christ that "in olden times the sun, the moon, the rivers, and the springs, and all that is useful for man's life, because of its usefulness had been regarded as gods; thus the Egyptians had regarded the Nile as a god, thus had bread been called Demeter, wine Dionysos, and fire Hephaistos."¹

This explanation does not give any reason why the useful should thus be deified; indeed, as familiar it would be less likely to excite the interest than the mysterious, which is a feature of religion. The Stoics worked out this interpretation of nature systematically; but they had been anticipated by earlier thinkers, who, however, even when using the mythological terms, as when Empedocles speaks of fire as Zeus, and air as Hera, aimed at discrediting mythology by offering a natural explanation. The Stoic attitude was more indulgent; their pantheism allowed them to regard the gods as a popular representation of the natural functions of the world-soul. They tried to show that the names of the gods were originally descriptions of natural phenomena. Some of their interpretations were correct; others mistaken and arbitrary. Zeus (Sanskrit, Dyaus) was originally a name for heaven. More doubtful is the explanation meteorologically of the birth of Athena from Zeus's head. Fanciful seems the explanation of the lameness of Hephaistos that fire needs wooden crutches, and of his fall from heaven, that man's

¹ Quoted *idem*, p. 41.

first knowledge of fire was in lightning. Where the Stoics most erred was in ascribing to the poets and priests the rational intention of allegorising, in these myths, the physical and metaphysical knowledge they possessed, whereas, as has been already suggested, and as will afterwards be much more fully shown, mythology is no intentional, but a spontaneous product of imagination as expressed in language. By their explanation the Stoics turned poetry into prose, an imaginative contemplation of nature into a rational explanation of it, and ascribed to conscious intention and deliberate invention what must be regarded as an inevitable reaction at that stage of his mental development of the mind of man to his environment.

(3) A third explanation of the origin of mythology among the Greeks turned from nature to man, from the *physis* to the *psyche*. If the previous explanation may be called the *natural philosophy* rationalism, this may be called the *psychological*, for such an explanation of phenomena was recognised along with the *historical* and the *metaphysical*. As man desires to know himself as well as to understand nature, he objectifies his own human qualities in the representation of the gods ; he *anthropomorphises* the objects and forces of nature. Conceiving the gods as possessing human character, he, though mortal, endows them in his thought with immortality. In so objectifying he exalts his own nature. " More accurately," says Runze, " we may distinguish two forms of the symbolising imagination ; on the one hand nature is caught up in the mirror of humanity and reflected in human colours, the lifeless made living, the subhuman personified. As when the sea is thought of as Poseidon, and heaven as Zeus ; on the other side the human is found again in nature as its contrasted or mirrored picture, what is typical in man, man as such (not, as in Euhemerism, the individual actual man), is endowed with superhuman attributes, corresponding to the forces which are manifested in the great phenomena of nature ; thus arises the hero myth ; Heracles, Achilles, Theseus, Prometheus, betray more than the divine figures of the nature-myth the necessity to reflect human existence with magnified rays emanating from the radiant source of its mirror in nature."¹ So long as this process of *anthropomorphising* nature and *physiomorphising* man is recognised as a spontaneous product of the creative imagination of man, we may admit that it does correspond with what did take

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

place in the formation of mythology. It is only when it is traced to conscious invention that we may refuse to accept it, as such a theory introduces an artificial and arbitrary factor into what is rooted deeply in, and springs freely out of, the soil of the religious consciousness. Two questions at once arise. How has this process been so general, if it is artificial, arbitrary and not natural, necessary? Why does man thus reach above and beyond himself in conceiving these *suprahuman* beings? The transcendence which attaches to the conception of the divine is not accounted for.

(4) A fourth theory Runze describes as *critical rationalism*, and gives the following account of it: "A modern counterpart of this Ancient Greek uncritical rationalism is the theory of myth of the German philological school at the beginning of the nineteenth century, of which the scholar of Göttingen, Heyne, and the poet Voss were the pioneers, which was especially represented by Gottfried Hermann, Lobeck, and Lehrs, and which found adherents in the English Hellenist Grote, and also in his earlier period in the Frenchman Ernest Renan."¹ (a) According to this theory, mythology is an interpretation of world and man, and differs from philosophy only in its mode of presentation, pictorial, personifying, imaginative. It is not allegorical, as is the Stoic interpretation, for it recognises only one meaning, and may be described as *homogorical*. For these scholars the Greek seemed to have such a close affinity and intimacy with nature that nature could directly mirror his own soul. "Demeter means solely the motherliness of the human mother. Calypso, the goddess of the concealing grotto, is an expression for the secrecy of human love. Ares signifies 'the ferocity of war' and Aphrodite 'the graciousness of love.'"² This theory, as it rationalises the process still more than the preceding, has even less probability. Men did not think of the gods as natural phenomena or abstract ideas; they *worshipped* them; the worship is the distinctively religious element, and for that such a rationalising theory does not offer any explanation.

(b) To recall a distinction made, even if such a theory were adequate explanation of the *expression* of religion in myth, as it is not, yet it leaves the *experience* of religion of a divine presence to be adored quite unexplained. True as it is that man anthropomorphises in his conception of gods or God, and cannot do otherwise, representing them as the

¹ *Idem*, p. 47.

² *Idem*, p. 48.

realisation of his ideals, the actuality of his values ; yet the religion of which these ideas are an expression is a natural necessity for man, no artificial product by man (it is *φύσει* and not *θεσει*). This anthropomorphism can be rationally justified, so that the *expression* of religion does not discredit the *experience*. Although this matter will need to be much more fully discussed when dealing with the conception of God as personal, as bearing on the preceding theories generally a few sentences may be quoted from Dr. Matthews's book, *God in Religious Thought and Experience*. "It is often said that religion is essentially an 'anthropomorphic' way of interpreting reality, and the statement is undoubtedly true ; but this is not a peculiarity of religion, for anthropomorphism is a characteristic which it shares with every other 'form' of the spirit."¹ "Anthropomorphism is the road along which the believing mind has travelled from superstition to noble creeds."² For "even in polytheism man appears to be seeking for some perfection in the beyond which is above the achievement of his ordinary state."³ As man develops personally, his conception of God is purified and elevated, until He finds in God absolute and eternal perfection. G. Runze approves J. G. Hamann's saying that since God had made man in His own likeness (theomorphised), man could not but think God in his own likeness (anthropomorphism).⁴ To think of the divine as infra-human, as beast or bird, as at one stage men did think, would now be a degradation of religion. To think of God as suprahuman is to exalt religion, so long as the difference from does not negate the resemblance to man. To think of God as altogether suprapersonal is to exclude Him from human conception altogether.⁵

III

Two of the Anti-Rationalist theories – *Nativism* and *Supernaturalism* – have already received attention, and we can at once pass to the third – *Evolutionism*. (1) Having set aside the view that man had a complete religious endowment at birth, or that God made Himself fully known to man at the beginning of his history, we are committed to some form of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

² *Idem*, p. 31.

³ *Idem*, p. 35.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵ See Part II., chapter ix., for a discussion of the conception of God as *personal* and *suprapersonal*, p. 439.

evolutionism, namely that religion, even as all other human functions, has developed from very lowly beginnings, and has been affected by changing historical conditions. An innate capacity for religion set the limits to that development ; a continuous divine guidance directed its course ; but as every part of the life of man is affected by the whole, so was religion in its growth. This does not mean, however, that religion is the inevitable product of a natural evolution. The divine presence and activity in religion as a mutual relation of God and man has already been insisted on. Further, while the rationalistic explanations, deriving religion from deliberate invention, have been rejected, that does not involve the denial of the rationality of religion. The capacity for religion which has been recognised as innate may truly be described as the *spiritual reason*, and may be co-ordinated with the theoretical, the practical, and the æsthetic reason. Just as man's intelligence is exercised, and by exercise is developed in making the world intelligible, and man's conscience in making society moral, and his sense of beauty in the appreciation of nature, or the creation of art, so is it reason that from the very beginning in religion, as in these other spheres, is being exercised and developed in apprehending the divine reality, and in rationalising and moralising the conception of that reality. We accordingly must reject the view of Lévy Brühl, which ascribes to the savage another mentality than to the civilised man. The data of his knowledge are less adequate ; the methods of his judgment are less accurate ; imagination often dominates intellect in him ; and his thinking is more affected by his emotions ; but it is the same human mind, although less fully developed, which is his and ours. A similar mentality is often found among the peasantry in civilised countries.¹

(2) The theories of the origin of religion, which identify it in all its range and reach, as history has displayed its promise and potency, with what is assumed to be the earliest form, and seek to discredit it because of the crudity of that form, must be set aside as an illegitimate method of treating a part of man's development, which is not equally applied to the whole. Science, morality, and art had just as crude beginnings ; but these are not cited to discredit their value to-day. Why should religion be made an exception ? Frankly and fully accepting *evolutionism*, I refuse to accept some of the theories of the origin of religion which seek to

¹ See statement by Dr. C. S. Myers in *Inter-Racial Problems*, p. 73.

reduce it to a survival of savage superstition, and treat faith in God as no better attested than is the belief in ghosts. Subsequent chapters will sketch the development of the conception of God – the object in religion, as man is the subject – as my own studies have led me to rethink it. While this chapter will refer to early forms of religion, which may again reappear as stages in that development, all that will here be attempted will be to notice only those which, being regarded as the earliest, are cited as affording a historical basis for a theory of the origin of religion.

(3) The rationalistic theories offered an explanation of mythology, the mythology of peoples which had reached an advanced stage of development, and were confined to the *expression* of religion in the conceptions of the divine. But the present tendency is to turn from these to what may be regarded as popular religion, the religion of the savage, and what survives of an older stage of religion in the superstitions of the common people in a civilised community. From philology enquirers are turning to anthropology and folklore. The result of this tendency is that animism has been regarded as the primitive philosophy, the basis of religion in its earliest form. In recent years a pre-animistic stage has been insisted on, and to this subject we must return in the next chapter for fuller treatment. For the present purpose we need not go behind animism.

(a) Animism is not itself religion : the belief in spirits becomes religion only when men think of them as endowed with mysterious power, and thus feel fear or trust towards them, as helps or hindrances to their own life, and by worship in prayer or offerings seek their alliance and assistance. There must be not only an emotional attitude, but also a practical activity, before the belief can be regarded as belonging to religion. Not only do the religions of savages offer abundant evidence of animism, but there are survivals in civilised religions, especially the superstitions of the uneducated, which confirm that evidence. Not only so ; we may say confidently that it was inevitable that man should pass through such a stage of thought. "It was characteristic of man," says Dr. Galloway, "that he gave a meaning to his world, and this he did by the involuntary projection of his experience into things. Conscious of power, will, activity in himself, he could not conceive of effects in the surrounding world save as brought about by the same principle. Living himself, he saw living beings acting and

working everywhere around him.”¹ At this point it seems necessary to call attention to a distinction of some importance, although Dr. Galloway does not mention it. Did man feel himself alive before he made the distinction between soul and body, and associated life more closely with soul? Did he accordingly think of things around him as alive before he endowed them with soul? If so, *animism* would properly describe the second stage. For the first stage the term *animatism* has been suggested; but that suggests *anima* no less. It may be *vitalism* would be a more fitting name. Probably the distinction would not be so clear to the early mind as it is to us, and there would be a good deal of wavering between the less and the more definite conception. Despite the assertion of Edward Meyer that man from the beginning distinguished animate from inanimate objects, Galloway seems right in challenging such dogmatism. “Does not a fallacy,” he asks, “lurk in the supposition that distinctions which have become the mental furniture of civilised men must have somehow existed from the first? Surely it is the experience of life and activity which is primary; the idea of the inanimate is secondary and derivative, and is reached by a conscious exclusion of qualities.”² Would man regard all objects around him as alive? Rightly Dr. Galloway argues that “selective interest would set certain things more conspicuously before him as endowed with functions like his own. The most primitive elements of language, the verbal roots,³ suggest that man was first attracted by objects in which movement and change were very evident. These would naturally force themselves on his attention. The rushing river and the springing fountain, the waving tree and the howling wind, were all beings possessing power and manifesting energy like his own.”⁴

(b) But had man regarded these objects which attracted attention as only like himself, animism would not have become the basis of religion. The religious attitude assumes that these living beings had powers incalculable by, and superior to, the power of man. To use such a term as supernatural or superhuman may be an anachronism at such a stage of development; but the germ of religion even requires that something beyond and above man’s knowledge

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 71.

² *Idem*, p. 72. Cf. G. C. Robertson, *Elements of General Philosophy*, pp. 173-175.

³ Cf. the discussion of language in previous chapter.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 71.

and power should be recognised. To a fuller analysis we must return in the next chapter. What here must be emphasised is that animism as a mode of thought does not in itself account for either the emotional attitude or practical activity of man already referred to as belonging even to rudimentary religion, nor for the distinctive divine element (using the term in a wide sense as is Otto's *numinous*). Religion is not merely animism.

(4) The theory which derives religion from animism, and refuses to recognise any other source of it, does not admit that the conception of the divine in the rudimentary form already indicated belongs to the reaction of man as capable of religion to his environment. (a) The theory, which Runze¹ describes as *Naturism*, does not assume the mediation of animism, but asserts a naïve deification of nature as the original form of religion; the disposition to deify is innate, and needs no mediation. Réville, in his *Histoire des peuples non-civilisés*, makes this the exclusive basis of religion; but Max Müller, in his *Natural Religion*, 1889, treats it as the primary, but not exclusive, source. As for him religion is "a subjective faculty for the apprehension of the infinite," there is a discernment of that infinite in the finite, and worship advances from semi-tangible to intangible objects.² He sets aside *fetishism*, or the worship of tangible objects, such as stones, shells, bones, and the rest, as not a primary form of religion. The semi-tangible objects, such as trees, mountains, rivers, the sea, the earth, "supply the material for *semi-deities*. Intangible objects, such as the sky, the stars, the sun, the dawn, the moon," are "the germs of *deities*."³ Max Müller's representation is influenced by his special study of Indian religion. What we have to recognise, even if we accept this view, is the greatest possible variety in the objects of nature which attract attention and receive adoration. The sun is prominent where the regularity of nature is observed; the weather where the irregular arrests wonder. Although we must generalise here with caution, we may assume that the observation of regularity belongs to a more advanced stage of development than the arrest of attention by the irregular. The savage and the child are most ready to ask questions about the unfamiliar. That worship of nature has a large place in religion needs no proof, and is not open to question.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

² *Hibbert Lectures*, 1878, Lecture IV.

³ *Idem*, pp. 180-181.

(b) But we may ask whether it is the primary phase of religion, whether it is not likely that *animism* preceded it, dæmons coming before gods as not so far removed from man in the development of the conception of the divine. It is, further, an inadequate conception of religion which this theory of naturism yields, since other demands of human personality, such as the social and the moral, find expression in religion, and probably at a very early stage of development, if not as early as the relation to nature. Again, inasmuch as there is a deification of natural objects, and a worship of them as divine, a consideration already urged in regard to animism, needs to be here repeated in this form : that nature affords the occasion for the expression of religion, but is neither the source of it nor the motive for it. It is in the whole human personality in all its relations to the human as well as the natural environment as reacting in a distinctive way that the origin of religion in the full range of its historical manifestation must be sought.

(5) Reverting to animism, we must recognise that, as man endowed natural objects with soul because he himself possessed soul (I purposely omit the article to allow for a vagueness of conception), there were for him two kinds of soul, however similar they might be – the human and non-human. How he came to the conception of his soul as distinct from his body will be discussed in the next chapter at length. All we need here to state, in passing to the third theory which we must consider, is that he thought of the human soul as in some form surviving death. I add this qualification, as so trustworthy an authority as Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson insists that it is spirit as embodied which is living soul in the Hebrew psychology, and that what survives death is but a shade (*skia*, *umbra*).¹ There are spirits in natural objects ; and the dead become ghosts. Unsubstantial as disembodied souls may seem, yet they are endowed with some powers, and so can be believed to affect for good or ill the lives of men, even as do the spirits in natural objects. Hence there arises a form of religion, the cult of the dead, later the worship of ancestors. Whether the term religion or worship should be applied to the kind of respect for, or service to, the dead which we find not only among the lowest human types, but even in so advanced a people as the Chinese, may with good reason be doubted.

(a) Nevertheless, this worship of the dead has been

¹ See *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, pp. 17–18.

regarded as the origin of religion. While other thinkers have favoured this view, it is Herbert Spencer who has most thoroughly developed it. It is in funereal rites that he finds the beginnings of the forms of worship afterwards offered to the gods. These rites have a twofold object : first to render to the dead the kind of service which they desired on earth, and which they are assumed still to need, and second to secure that, being thus satisfied, they will not return to their former home to trouble or to injure the living. The motive, therefore, is either affection or fear, as the dead are regarded as either friendly or hostile. From the deification of the hero, a cult which is generally recognised, Spencer extends his theory to all the dead ; he writes : "Using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion" (*Principles of Sociology*, I. 411).¹ Grant Allen accepts the theory with some modification. Even if it is possible to derive all religious rites from ancestor-worship, this does not prove that ancestor-worship is the basis of all religion. For man would use the same means to avert the displeasure or to secure the favour of beings capable of helping or hurting, whether these were spirits in natural objects or dead ancestors.

(b) This theory shows the same one-sidedness as Comte's contention that man owes all benefits to humanity ; for it ignores the fact that man had just as much ground for fearing hurt from nature as from the dead, or hoping for good from the one as from the other. The natural environment would probably at just as early a stage of development evoke the religious reaction as would the human as represented by the dead ; and man's dependence on nature was even more obvious than his dependence on the dead. If religion did begin with the belief in spirits as affecting human life, both kinds of spirits must be taken into account. Dr. F. B. Jevons does suggest a connection between the cult of the dead and other kinds of worship, although not accepting Spencer's theory. "The conjecture offered is that he (primitive man) was ordinarily and naturally engaged in maintaining such relations with the spirits of his deceased clansmen ; that he was necessarily led to such relations by the operation of those natural affections which, owing to the prolonged helpless infancy of the human being, were

¹ Quoted in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, I., p. 427.

indispensable to the survival of the human race ; and that the relations of the living clansman with the dead offered the type and pattern in part, though only in part, of the relations to be established with other, more powerful, spirits."¹ To me the conjecture seems unnecessary. Why should not friendly relations with the living just as well suggest how friendship might be secured with the non-human spirits? Jevons holds, however, "that it was to another quarter altogether than ancestral spirits that man looked in his attempts to locate the supernatural in the external world."² For "the general feeling is that it is the dead who are dependent on the living for their comfort, and even for their continued existence."³ Only when the conception of supernatural spirits had been gained on other grounds might the dead be, as in some religion, endowed with supernatural power. The theory is too simple for all the facts.

(6) From these theories, which trace the origin of religion to an early form of it, we may turn to a theory which applies to religion the two principles of Darwinism, namely, "(1) the more instinctive, unconsciously – teleological 'transformation' of an original form into variety of species by means of natural self-completion by breeding and heredity ; and (2) the more obvious and therefore comprehensible objective adaptation."⁴ This has been done by Gruppe in his theory of *Adaptationism* or *Adoptionism*. "The origin and the development of the primitive religious forms was an accidental, locally restricted, and positive one, and, indeed, preferably the joyous festival of the preparation of the intoxicating soma drink among the Indians."⁵ "By colonisation and intercourse of peoples, particular nations adopted the ideas and customs of others as their own."⁶ To explain the development of this accidental variation in human thought and life Gruppe has to appeal to a variety of human motives, some of which might be regarded as themselves original motives of religion. The diffusion of religion indicates a disposition in man towards it, for "that only can become universal custom which in some way meets universal needs."⁷ Such a theory does not deserve to detain us further.

(7) The last theory which now needs to be mentioned,

¹ *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 54–55.

² *Idem*, p. 56.

³ *Idem*, p. 55.

⁴ Runze, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 90.

⁶ *Idem*, pp. 89–90.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 91.

Symbolism, combines the anti-rationalist tendencies, and also accepts the modern evolutionary standpoint. Reason, with its ideas of the infinite and supersensible, here is allied with the imagination. The appearances of nature symbolise these ideas ; nature becomes the garment of God by which we can see Him. This theory was represented by Creuzer at the beginning of last century. That this theory has partial truth in relation to the expression of religion may be admitted, for the nature of language involves the use of images of ideas ; but it does not account for the origin of religion, for it presupposes religious ideas, which are seeking their symbols. Religion also here appears as the product of the thought of the few, and not the need of all men. With this view Auguste Sabatier's insistence on theological dogmas as only symbols of the spiritual realities, which faith apprehends as a means of escape for the soul from the hindrance and oppression of its earthly surroundings, has some affinity. It has already been conceded, in discussing Hegel's view of religion, that the content of faith must needs be expressed in images and symbols. This must be added, however, to show that religion is not an idle play of the imagination. A symbol serves its purpose only as it conveys and effects what it signifies. Accordingly, however inadequate and imperfect man's conceptions of God may be, yet they do bring man into contact with the reality of God as present, interested, and active in the thought and life of man. The expression of religion serves the experience.

(8) In concluding this brief survey of theories of religion a few general considerations may be offered. *First of all*, it is evident that religion is too universal and permanent a feature in the human race, and has been too potent a factor in human history to be explained away by being reduced to an arbitrary invention. It is a necessity to the nature of man, and any explanation of it must dig deep into the soul of man for its roots. *Secondly*, as it has had a development, and as the next chapter will seek to show a progressive development, its origin in the nature of man cannot be discovered by the assumption that an early form, even if it could be proved to be the earliest, discloses its secret. Its varied and continuous history is necessary to any adequate conception or estimate. *Thirdly*, as the previous discussion has shown, the choice of what is regarded as the earliest form, by which it is to be explained, has been often arbitrary, not based on any adequate psychological analysis of its

psychic content, on which alone such a choice could be justified. Personal preferences or prejudices can be detected under what appears a scientific procedure. *Fourthly*, it must be recognised that religion is so much a personal attitude to reality that he who does not feel constrained by his own experience to assume that attitude must necessarily regard religion as a superstition, faith as credulity, grace as illusion, and so necessarily disqualifies himself from an unprejudiced estimate of it. His account of its origin will inevitably be affected by *the personal equation*. The religious man is exposed to the danger of partiality. If, however, he has cultivated a sensitive conscience and an exacting reason, he will be aware of that danger, and alert in all his studies to guard himself against being misled. Impossible as it may seem to secure an absolute neutrality, it does seem to me that objective science will be less endangered by the partiality of the religious than by the prejudice of the irreligious man. The one may not be able to convince the other ; but both must pursue the common task with a mutual tolerance and respect. It is then in the nature of religion, as described in a previous chapter, and in the development of religion, which is to be narrated in the following chapters, that we shall best find an answer to the philosophical question regarding the origin of religion : Why is man religious ? and not in any theories that rest on a narrower basis, such as those reviewed in this chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE DIVINE OBJECT OF RELIGION

A. Pre-Animism and Animism

I

(1) "As there seems to be no one elementary religious emotion," says Wm. James, "but only a common storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act."¹ If this were so, it would be impossible for us to distinguish religion in any way from other human functions. A wide variety in the feelings there is, also in the acts; but what is common to them is that they are associated with an object, which, however variously conceived, is unique enough to be distinguishable from other objects. It is the infinite, the *numinous*, the supersensible, supernatural, superhuman, that which is above and beyond man and his world, and yet akin with, and even within, man – in the fully developed conception, God.

(a) We shall in subsequent parts of this book see how men have tried to prove the existence of this object, starting from the subject of religion, and seeking from data within and without that subject to gain the certainty that God is. This futile endeavour, when it assumes the separation of God and man, as the deism of Kant does, reducing God to a *regulative* but not *constitutive* idea of the pure reason, and a *postulate* of the practical reason, ignores the witness of the religious consciousness to the divine presence, however variously conceived, with, and even in, man. The experience ascribed to Jacob at Bethel is not isolated, but typical. "And Jacob awakened out of his sleep, and he said, Surely the Lord is in this place; and I knew it not. And he was afraid, and said, How dreadful is this place! This is none other but the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven" (Gen. xxviii. 16, 17). The recent tendency in philosophy, *phenomenology* (represented by Husserl), urges

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 28.

that the object is no less real than the subject of consciousness. Knowledge is awareness of an object. The *intentionalism* of Husserl's philosophy means that "every act of knowledge reveals itself by its very essence, a movement to an object which transcends it." "It belongs generally to the essence of every *cogito* to be consciousness of something." "Experience is the consciousness, to be with things themselves."¹

(b) Here epistemology, insisting on objectivity, comes in to correct any psychology, which, in describing the subjective process, tends to subjectivism, the resolution of the object – God – to a projection of the ideals and aspirations of the subject – man. "It must always be admitted," says Dr. Selbie, "that the study of the psychology of religion brings into prominence the subjective element. It is a study of the religious consciousness and of religious experience. But this does not mean that it resolves all religion into mere subjectivism and makes it the product of auto-suggestion, though the treatment of religion by the new psychology seems often to carry us no further than this. It is sometimes argued that the idea of God is but the outcome of man's idealising propensities. He projects himself and his personal qualities upon things in the first instance, and later upon one imagined person whom he calls God. His God takes different aspects according to the standpoint from which He is conceived."² The history of religion, its universality in the race, the necessity most men feel of it, the progressive development corresponding to man's general advance, the influence it has exerted on morals, society, art, human culture generally, make it incredible that it should be a delusion, its object a vain imagination. Dr. Selbie meets the psychologist on his own ground. "The psychologist may indeed argue, with some show of justification, that his study of the religious consciousness gives him good ground for assuming the reality of the spiritual world with which it purports to bring men into contact. The assumption is based on much the same grounds as that which leads us to believe in the reality of an external world for whose existence we have no evidence beyond that of our senses. It is the part of wisdom in both cases to trust our faculties until we have clear evidence that they deceive us. Pure subjectivism, in one case or the other, is very difficult to

¹ Quoted by Fernand Ménégoz, *Réflexions sur le Problème de Dieu*, pp. 21–22. See Part II., chapter ii., for a full discussion of realism, p. 238.

² *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 15.

reconcile either with humansanity or a rational interpretation of the universe.”¹ In a course of lectures which I heard, Prof. Lovejoy of Baltimore² insisted that every *knowing* implied an object and a subject, and that in the presentation there was a reference to the past or the future of the subject, or to the past or present or future of another subject, or to the past or present or future of an object in the world around, or it might even be to the transcendent source of reality.

(c) The religious man can speak with an even greater confidence than the psychologist as such can. As regards his inward illumination he can use the words of the man born blind, whose sight Jesus restored: “One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see” (John ix. 25). It is necessary to insist on this consideration here, as in the subsequent discussion we shall be dealing with conceptions so inadequate to the object, from our present standpoint of knowledge and judgment, that we shall often be tempted to regard these conceptions as savage superstitions, having no relation whatever to the reality. To use a distinction Robertson of Brighton applied to the history of Israel, they are not *delusions*, apprehensions of the unreal, but *illusions*, inadequate apprehension of the real. Even our truest thought must be inadequate to the reality; it must be largely symbolical, limited by, to be adapted to, our apprehension. The reality of the object apprehended does not, however, depend on the adequacy of the conception. Though man must ever see God “in a mirror in a riddle” (1 Cor. xiii. 12, R.V. marg.), it is God, and no other, whom he does see; although he knows only in part, it is knowledge, measured by his capacity, that he possesses.

(d) Although the mind of man is primarily directed outward, and so he apprehends God as an object other than himself, yet even in religions of a relatively low type there is the consciousness of God within, the mystical experience, as such words as *enthusiasm* (ἐν, in, and θεός, god) or inspiration show. The more fully developed a religion is the less occasional and abnormal will this divine indwelling be. The Apostolic Church was *filled with holy spirit* or the *Holy Spirit* (the phrase occurs in Acts without, as well as with, the definite article). In such experience there arises the danger of a confusion of the subject and the object of the religious consciousness, an identification of God and man.

¹ *The Psychology of Religion*, p. 16.

² Cf. his book, *The Revolt against Dualism*.

The goal of Brahmanic piety is to discover that the difference is *maya*, illusion, that the subjective *atman* is one with the objective *Brahman* (*tat tvam asi*, thou art that). Hegelianism seems to identify the divine self-consciousness with philosophy, especially the Hegelian as the absolute. In a recent Roman Catholic philosophic work, *Le Problème de Dieu*, by M. Edouard Le Roy, based on Bergsonism, the error does not seem to be avoided. "God is known to us by His very life in us, in the labour of our own deification. In this sense we can again say that, for us, *God is not, but becomes. His becoming is our own progress.*"¹ Although our experience of God enriches and our conception enlarges, God in His eternal reality is the same, while in His manifestations in time He may adapt himself to the developing mind of man.

(2) Having made clear that it is God himself, different from man, yet present to and in man, unchanging Himself although man's conceptions of Him change, who is the object of the religious consciousness, we may trace the evolution of the idea of God. (a) Accepting this as our guiding principle, that as man does not know God apart from his world and himself, but as in that world and himself, although he has always the sense of the above and beyond world and self in God,² we may expect that there will be a close and a continual correspondence between man's general knowledge and his knowledge of God, between his moral discernment and his conception of the character of God. This is in accord with the psychological principle of apperception; the mind cannot receive new thoughts which it cannot assimilate to what it already has. Progress lies in his turning from the world around for his analogies for God, to the world within; from *physiormorphism* to *theriomorphism*, and thence to *anthropomorphism*. We may, therefore, be confident that what we may call the morphology of religion will follow more or less closely, if not always keep step with, the advance man makes in the varied aspects of his life, individual and social. By such considerations we may with a considerable degree of probability assign this or that religious phenomenon to its appropriate stage in general human evolution. Not that the development has been everywhere uniform, but that a general course may be traced.

¹ Quoted by Ménégos, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

² I have worked out this principle in my article on "Revelation," Hastings's *Bible Dictionary*, extra volume, pp. 321-336.

(b) Although at first sight Hegel's Logic may seem a mere play of abstractions, "an earthly dance of bloodless categories," yet on closer scrutiny we discover that there is a correspondence with the development of human reason in history. We find that his categories are guiding principles of successive philosophical schools. The Eleatics make Being, and Heraclitus Becoming, the clue to reality; Pythagoras finds significance in Number. The Aristotelean Logic is concerned with Quality. Causality is the ruling idea of modern science. In the same way, in what follows there will be a constant regard to actual phases through which the religious consciousness has passed, or which still survive, often earlier along with later phases. There will be thinking together of these phases in a continuous evolution, in which will be seen the gradual development of man's native capacity for religion: a constant action of the whole environment on human personality, and its appropriate reaction to it. There need not be excluded the belief in a directing and restraining divine truth and grace, God's condescension in man's education.

(3) The data from man's religious history which we must think together must be gathered from all the sources which in a previous chapter have been indicated: anthropology for the savage peoples, archæology for extinct cultures, folk-lore for survivals of earlier beliefs in a more advanced community, the literature and history of the religions of the civilised peoples. In rethinking the evolution, and so giving to each datum its proper place, there are three auxiliary studies to which we may turn. I pass over, with a mere mention, Edward Clodd's endeavour to include religion as part of man's animal inheritance, to find in a dog's fear of a moving bone "all the elements which constitute religious sentiment in its crudest form."¹ Beginning with primitive man, it is assumed on the one hand that we can discover in the savage what he was, and so how religion must have begun; and on the other that, as the child's development recapitulates the evolution of the race, we may identify the beginnings of religion in the child with its beginnings in the race. That both of these studies are valuable auxiliaries is not to be denied; but their testimony is not to be accepted without qualification and, if need be, correction by the use of the third auxiliary: reflection on

¹ Quoted from E. P. Evans, *Evolutional Ethics and Animal Psychology*, p. 355, by E. Clodd in *Animism*, p. 23.

the developed religious consciousness, which does supply a guide in the interpretation of each of these witnesses.

(a) We must not take for granted that the savage so closely resembles the primitive man that we can simply transfer the contents of his religion to the early days of the race. Evolution does not necessarily mean progress, nor even only stagnation, but admits retrogression, degradation ; and in the traditions of barbarous peoples there are indications of retreat instead of advance. As many generations separate the savage as the civilised man from the primitive man. In the primitive man were the capacities which under favourable conditions were developed for progress ; under unfavourable conditions were deteriorated for retrogression. The testimony of so distinguished a naturalist as J. Arthur Thomson has already been quoted against the identification of the savage with the primitive state.¹ If we exercise our imagination to make real and vivid to ourselves the beginnings, however lowly, of man's culture and civilisation, of all that marks him off from all animals, we shall not think meanly of primitive man ; we shall not ascribe to him a bestial start on his forward path. Making this necessary qualification, we may learn much from the religion of savages, for elements have been there preserved which have been left behind in human progress, and which survive, as folk-lore shows, in popular superstitions even among the more advanced peoples.

(b) That there should be an analogy between individual development and racial evolution is highly probable, and we do find, in children, features which we may confidently ascribe to the early stages of man's thought and life. The emotions are strong in children ; their imagination is active before their intellect ; their conscience emerges later than the appetites and impulses which it should control. But to push the theory of *recapitulation* to the extreme to which some writers have pushed it is to ignore two crucial facts. The circumstances of the ordinary child are not those of primitive man ; he is protected and provided for as man at his beginnings was not. The social, moral, and religious environment of the child in a civilised, cultured, and Christian community is altogether different, and does exercise an influence on his development. The nature may be the same ; but how unlike is the nurture !

(c) These two studies do confirm one another in many

¹ See chapter ii., p. 67.

results. Modes of thought surviving in savage religions are to be detected in the child. For instance, the child is an *animist*, ascribing life and mind to inanimate objects. The task of distinguishing fact from fancy is for many a child difficult ; his wish is often father to his thought. But in studying either the savage or the child we must recognise that we cannot completely recapture the mind of the one or the other. The savage will not disclose fully what for him is mysterious and sacred ; and the mere observer cannot always catch the secret. How much many theologians would give if they could certainly discover just what each sacrifice meant to the pious Israelite ! The savage may deceive to ward off curiosity, or state what he thinks will be expected from him. Even the missionary may find it difficult to get his convert to narrate accurately what were his beliefs before the decisive change ; the new faith affects his judgment of what he remembers. "Thinking black" is no easy achievement. So also, do even parents always understand their children ? How often must the grown-ups seem so stupid to the little child ! It is well that we should not be over confident in the interpretation of minds unlike our own. On the other hand, we must not unduly depreciate the value of these studies, for there is the same human mentality, although at different stages and phases. Only, the adult student must exercise a rigorous self-scrutiny : he must analyse his own mind ; resolve his sentiments or complexes ; trace his own mental history, recalling as far as he can his childhood ; rise above his own individuality to rethink the thoughts of others. He must try to recapture the race in evolution.

II

(1) It has already been indicated that a pre-animistic stage of religion is now being generally recognised ; and, if we consider that the conception of soul as distinct from body is by no means a simple conception, it will seem very probable that some development of thought went before ; and this probability is turned into as near a certainty as can be by some evidence which savage religions have more recently yielded to us. But, attempting to get even further back than that evidence carries us, we may conjecture what was the rudimentary consciousness from which this

development began. Recalling the basal consideration that the psychic process consists of impression, affect, and expression, we may for our immediate analysis leave out emotion, and lay stress on man's knowledge of the world and his action upon it. What, at the beginning, he must have been aware of was his limitation in both respects, his ignorance and his impotence. As he essayed to know and to do he would often be baffled and beaten ; but he held on, for he had, as McDougall shows, *the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder on the one hand, and the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger on the other hand*. The former of these instincts cannot have been "relatively feeble" in man as in "most of the higher animals,"¹ for he would not have made progress in knowledge as he did. Of the rôle of curiosity as a force in the life of societies, the same author writes : "Although it has no doubt played, largely under the forms of wonder and admiration, a leading part in the evolution of religion, and in so far has been one of the conservative forces of society, it has played also a no less important part of a very different tendency. The instinct of curiosity is at the base of many of man's most splendid achievements, for rooted in it are his speculative and scientific tendencies."² Of the instinct of pugnacity, McDougall states that "the condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the activity to which the creature is impelled by anyone of the other instincts."³ In his anger at any obstruction he might show fight with nature, animal or man. But, on the other hand, unable to overcome, he might fear, and take flight,⁴ literally or by some other action, to avert the danger apprehended. Limited in knowledge and power, man found himself surrounded by powers⁵ he could not understand and could not control. The sense of wonder and the feeling of weakness brought home to him the consciousness of finitude, however rudimentary, and the contrasted consciousness of reality above and beyond himself, his first glimpses of infinitude. Regarding such ununderstood and unsubdued powers, he had a sense of mystery and of

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57-61.

² *Idem*, p. 315.

³ *Idem*, p. 59.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 49. While quoting this eminent psychologist, I do not necessarily commit myself to his wide use of the term *instinct*, as in some cases I prefer such a term as impulse.

⁵ If, as Dr. Oman maintains (*op. cit.*, p. 120), awareness precedes apprehension, a general consciousness particular attention, we should perhaps speak rather of mysterious *power*, not yet differentiated as *powers*, that general consciousness of which traces may survive in what is claimed as primitive monotheism.

efficiency. That they effected what he could not, he knew ; but how, he did not know. We find these two aspects in the conception of *mana*, the investigation of which has led Marett and others to assert a pre-animistic stage in the development of religion.

(2) Codrington, in his book on the *Melanesians*, states the conviction that "all Melanesian religion consists of getting *mana* for oneself" – that is, a mysterious power all pervasive and yet supersensible. His account of it, as given by Marett, must be quoted. "Codrington defines *mana*, in its Melanesian use, as follows : 'a force, altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good and evil, and which it is of the greatest advantage to possess or control' ; or, again, he says : 'It is a power or influence, not physical, and in a way supernatural ; but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power or excellence which a man possesses.' It is supernatural just in this way, namely, that it is 'what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary power of men, outside the common processes of nature.'"¹ The same conception is found in Polynesia, as Tregear, in *The Maori Polynesian Comparative Dictionary*, witnesses. "He cites," says Marett, "copious instances from the various dialects to exemplify the supernatural mode of *mana*. Thus the word is applied, in Maori, to a wooden sword that has done deeds so wonderful as to possess a sanctity and power of its own ; in Samoan, to a parent who brings a curse on a disobedient child ; in Hawaiian, to the gods, or to a man who by his death gives efficacy to an idol ; in Tongan, to whoever performs miracles, or bewitches ; in Mangarevan, to a magic staff given to a man by his grandfather, or, again, to divination in general ; and so forth."² While the *mana* may adhere to persons, it is not in its own nature conceived as personal. The Huron *orenda* is a "nearly equivalent notion,"³ for it "is power to bless or to curse ; and the same holds good of a host of similar native expressions – for instance, *wakan*, *qube*, *manitu*, *oki*, not to go outside North America."⁴

(a) The attitude of mind here disclosed Marett describes as *supernaturalism*. As an alternative he suggests *teratism*, but this indicates only one aspect of the matter, *wonder* ; the other aspect, *power*, might be expressed by the term *dynamism*. The term supernatural embraces both, for it

¹ *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 118–120.

² *Idem*, pp. 121–122.

³ *Idem*, p. 115.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 130.

may mean beyond man's knowledge and above his power. Lovejoy blames Marett for wrong emphasis, in dealing with *mana*, "on the aspect in which it stands for the supernatural, rather than on that in which it stands for the efficacious"; and Marett replies that "for the purposes of general theory" he would not "care to emphasise either aspect at the expense of the other," but maintains that there are instances, e.g. the fear of a corpse, in which the mystery is the source of the potency.¹ It is interesting to note that both Greek words, *τέρας* and *δύναμις*, are used of our Lord's miracles; but significant, too, that there is another term, *σημείον*, sign. "Supernaturalism," says Marett, "might, as such, be expected to prove, not only logically, but also in some sense chronologically prior to animism, constituting as the latter does but a particular ideal embodiment of the former."²

(b) That such a conception is not merely antecedent to animism, but may coexist with it, is shown by the Rev. Edwin W. Smith in his book on *The Religion of Lower Races as illustrated by the African Bantu*. "When we think ourselves back into their minds," he writes, "we realise that, while they recognise a more or less personal Supreme Being and recognise, too, personal spiritual beings of a lower grade, they expend a very large proportion of their religious feeling on a power that is impersonal. One of the technical names given to their belief is *dynamism*, the belief in an Energy or Potence which is immanent in all things, something as intangible and all-pervasive as the ether. It is everywhere; it flows through all things; but it draws itself to a node or focus in certain conspicuous objects. In itself it has no moral quality, but it can be tapped and turned to good use or bad, according to the intention of the user. Not everybody, however, can manipulate it; its use must be fenced in by many precautions, for it is dangerous, just as electricity may be dangerous to those who do not understand how to use it. It is akin to the *mana* of the Melanesians and other Pacific islanders, the *orenda* and *watan* of the Red Indians."³

(3) Before dealing with *Animism* as on the high-way of religion, we must glance very briefly at what may be called by-paths, in which this general conception of a mysterious power may find further illustration. First of all we may refer to *Magic*. As this volume is concerned with the belief in God, it is not necessary to deal with the subject in any detail, only sufficiently to distinguish it from religion. As

¹ *Idem*, pp. xv.-xvi.

² *Idem*, p. 11.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

psychology teaches us, cognition is subordinate to conation ; mankind does not live to think, but thinks to live. Action comes before reflection ; " the primæval savage acted before he thought about his action."¹ From action we may start. We may recall Leuba's² differentiation, already noted in a previous chapter, of three types of behaviour : (1) the mechanical, (2) the coercitive, (3) the anthropopathic. In (1) man acts, in using physical forces, in accordance with natural laws, and this type of action results in *science* on the one hand and *industry* on the other ; (2) corresponds with *magic*, in which men by rites or formulæ seek to control the mysterious powers, such as *mana* and others mentioned in the last paragraph ; (3) corresponds with religion, in which personal agency is recognised, and means of personal influence are used. To which of the two, (1) or (3), has (2) most kinship ?

(a) Sir James G. Frazer regards magic as sharing with science the view of nature " as a series of events occurring in an invariable order without the intervention of personal agency," in opposition to the religious view which recognises personal agency. Not only are the two opposed in principle " in the evolution of thought ; magic, as representing a lower intellectual stratum, has probably everywhere preceded religion." As magic is based on false assumptions, it is " the bastard sister of science," or *pseudo-science*. When men failed in this attempt " to force the great powers of nature to do their pleasure " they turned to religion to win their favour or avert their displeasure by prayers and offerings. Two varieties of sympathetic magic are distinguished : the *homœopathic*, based on similarity, " like produces like " ; and the *contagious*, based on contact or contiguity. With theoretical magic as pseudo-science is associated the practical as pseudo-art ; and the practice is either positive (sorcery) or negative (taboo).³ Dr. Marett

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. VIII., art. " Magic," p. 247.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

³ *E. R. E.*, Vol. VIII., pp. 245-246. In *The Golden Bough*, abridged edition, the Principles of Magic are stated, as above, on p. 11 ; illustrations of Homœopathic Magic are given on pp. 12-37, and of Contagious on pp. 37-45. The Magician's Progress is described on pp. 45-48, and the Relation of Magic and Religion is discussed on pp. 48-60. A summary statement of the relation is to be found in the following passage (pp. 711-712) : " If then we consider, on the one hand, the essential similarity of man's chief wants everywhere and at all times, and, on the other hand, the wide difference between the means he has adopted to satisfy them in different ages, we shall perhaps be disposed to conclude that the movement of the higher thought, so far as we can trace it, has on the whole been from magic through religion to science. In magic,

contests these views both in this article in the *E. R. E.* and in his book *The Threshold of Religion*. He denies that tabu is negative magic, and affirms that it is to be regarded as a negative *mana*, "if *mana* be somewhat liberally interpreted," "because what is dreaded is essentially a mysterious power, something arbitrary and unaccountable in its mode of action."¹ He also denies the affinity of magic with science, and brings it into closer association with religion. He assumes a stage in man's evolution when rites preceded reflection, and when in these rites the magical and the religious elements could not be differentiated, for the virtue of these rites was based, "not in any philosophy about like producing like, and so on – ideas that appear quite late in the history of thought – but in vague notions of the *mana* type."² One cannot read the astonishing array of evidence, which Sir James G. Frazer displays with so masterly a hand, without being impressed. I do not myself feel competent to offer a definite judgment; but his reasoning is not altogether convincing; and I incline rather to the view advanced by Dr. Marett.³

man depends on his own strength to meet the difficulties and dangers that beset him on every side. He believes in a certain established order of nature on which he can surely count, and which he can manipulate for his own ends. When he discovers his mistake, when he recognises sadly that both the order of nature which he had assumed and the control which he believed himself to exercise over it were purely imaginary, he ceases to rely on his own intelligence and his own unaided efforts, and throws himself humbly on the mercy of certain great invisible beings behind the veil of nature, to whom he now ascribes all those far-reaching powers which he once arrogated to himself. Thus, in the acuter minds, magic is gradually superseded by religion, which explains the succession of natural phenomena as regulated by the will, the passion, or the caprice of spiritual beings, like man in kind, though vastly superior to him in power. But, as time goes on, this explanation in its turn proves to be unsatisfactory. For it assumes that the succession of natural events is not determined by immutable laws, but is to some extent variable and irregular, and this assumption is not borne out by closer observation. On the contrary, the more we scrutinise that succession, the more we are struck by the rigid uniformity, the punctual precision, with which, wherever we can follow them, the operations of nature are carried on. . . . In short, religion, regarded as an explanation of nature, is displaced by science."

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.

² *E. R. E.*, Vol. VIII., p. 248.

³ Dr. Oman, in one of his appendices (*The Natural and the Supernatural*, pp. 483-485), criticises the views both of Sir J. G. Frazer and Mr. Marett. He rejects Frazer's derivation of science from magic thus: "All savages have scientific devices as well as magical, and keep them apart. What requires explanation is the creation of an attitude of mind which could become scientific." (Cf. Leuba's three types of action.) Marett's explanation of magic rites as "vents for superfluous emotion," only afterwards by "the introduction of the ideas of the *mana* type . . . regarded as having power," he criticises on two grounds: "in the first place, when were such ideas absent? – and, in the second, it is far from being apparent why, if this were all, they

(b) Defining "the object of religion to be whatever is perceived as a mystery and treated accordingly," Dr. Marett would include magic "within the sphere of religion." In his essay entitled "From Spell to Prayer," in his book *The Threshold of Religion*, he seeks to show how magical practices may pass into religious. "It seems quite certain," he says, "that reflection on the occult working of a spell will generate the notion of external divine agency, and this notion in its turn give rise to prayer." Objects accompanying such a spell may also acquire religious significance. "There is fairly crucial evidence," he says, "to show how naturally and insensibly the charm-symbol may pass into the idol. All that is needed is that there should be sufficient personification for prayer to be said."¹ This statement indicates that, while refusing to distinguish magic and religion in their rudimentary phases, he does recognise a difference emerging in the development. The mysterious power is in religion increasingly ascribed to personal agency (the pre-animistic passes into the animistic stage). Further, he recognises that "it is certain that religion cannot be identified merely with the worship directly generated by magic. Religion is a far wider and more complex thing."² He seems later, however, to draw the distinction sharply. "There will always be in every society a number of ceremonial practices, to which a certain amount of magico-religious value attaches, that fall most naturally under the category of folk-lore, having no place in the official cult, yet being too insignificant to call for much notice, favourable or unfavourable, and, on the whole, tending to be despised rather than condemned. In short, for certain purposes of science it is best to treat all magico-religious rites as generically akin, even while making due allowance for their tendency to group themselves round the opposite pole of beneficence and maleficence, of social service and individual greed

should be, as he holds, of the greatest practical value in giving 'hope, courage, and confidence.' Mere working off emotion is, on the contrary, apt to be a waste which 'gives too cold a breath to action.' To have this value the ritual must surely generate the right emotion. This it does by staging the situation as is desired, with the traditional setting in which the experiences of higher emotions are fixed, and with a solemn assembly to give them resonance" (p. 484). But does not this description apply to the later stage? Would not the desired situation be vividly imagined, and intensely felt, and expressed in spontaneous gesture, which only later was stereotyped in reflective action? I find Marett's view very attractive, and cannot regard this criticism of it as conclusive.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 35, 78-79.

² *Idem*, pp. 82-83.

or spite.”¹ Religion tends to become a beneficent social activity, magic a maleficent individual action. The difference Leuba recognises may be here emphasised. Magic seeks to coerce, religion to conciliate. While magic is primarily concerned with impersonal mysterious powers, religion, when developed, is addressed to personal agency. When a rite or a formula is assumed in religion even to have an inevitable effect apart from divine activity, or when it is used to constrain that activity, we may regard religion as sinking to the level of magic. Even in the Christian religion, sacramentarianism may fall to a magical tendency; if the priest is regarded as making God on the altar there is magic, and not religion.

(c) Marett’s treatment of *taboo* rests on the same basis as his treatment of magic. Regarding both Frazer’s view of taboo as negative magic, and Dr. Jevons’s view of taboo as “a ‘primitive’ sentiment” about “some things which categorically and unconditionally must not be done”² and thus akin to morality, he contends that “taboo belongs, and belongs wholly, to the sphere of the magico-religious. Within that sphere . . . man always feels himself to be in contact with powers whose modes of action transcend the ordinary and the calculable. Though he does not on that account desist from attempting to exploit these powers, yet it is with no assurance of limited liability that he enters on the undertaking. In short, dealings with whatever has mystic power are conducted at an indefinite risk; and taboo but embodies the resolution to take no unnecessary risks of this indefinite kind.”³ While I cannot here reproduce the argument of the essay, “Is Taboo a Negative Magic?” – a question to which a negative answer is given – I may express my judgment that Dr. Marett makes out his case as against Sir James G. Frazer, that the reason why objects are regarded as taboo, and thus dangerous, is because they are believed to possess *mana*, or some such mysterious power.

(4) It is debatable whether the subject to which we now turn – *fetishism* – should be treated in this section or that which follows. For the latter case the reason may be advanced that it involves the belief in spirits, and so implies animism, and cannot be properly placed among pre-animistic phenomena. But against this contention it may be urged that in character and reputation it has more

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. VIII., p. 249.

² Quoted, *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 88.

³ *Idem*, pp. 90–91.

affinity with magic than with religion proper. (a) The connection in which it is being here treated may be justified by the fact that A. C. Haddon, in the title of his small book, associated *Magic and Fetishism*. The Essential Characters¹ that he ascribes to it show how indefinite the conception is. "The fetish may be any object" which for any reason "attracts attention." It "consists of a queer-shaped stone, a bright bead, a stick, parrots' feathers, a root, claw, seed, bone, or any curious or conspicuous object." It may be marked by peculiar behaviour, as when a stone trips up a man ; or it is revealed in a dream, if a man sees, on waking, an object of which he has dreamed. "It is a symbolic charm with sympathetic properties" – that is, there must be some suggestion in it of the object aimed at, as in magic, or it must be regarded as having some sort of connection with the spirit which is invited, as it were, to occupy it. If it is "a sign or token of an ideal notion or being," it is difficult to distinguish it from an idol. "A fetish is credited with mysterious powers owing to its being the habitation, temporary or permanent, of a spiritual being." "Sometimes the fetish is merely the vehicle or means by which the spirit communicates with the worshippers, and only acquires a temporary personality when thus inspired." When the fetish becomes only "an instrument by which the spirit acts," it may come to be "regarded merely in the light of a charm or an amulet." In the measure in which the object is identified with the spirit occupying it, "it possesses personality and will, it has also many human characters." The connection of the objects and the spirit may be so intimate that we may say that it acts "by will or force of its own proper spirit" ; or it may be casual, "a foreign spirit entering or acting on it from without." A fundamental conception in West Africa regarding the fetish is that the connection is not necessary, for "the spirit and the material object can be dissociated." Nevertheless the connection is so real that "the fetish is worshipped, prayed to, sacrificed to, and talked with," and yet it may be treated according to its supposed deserts, "petted or ill-treated with regard to its past or future behaviour." Haddon recognises its dual character : "it includes conceptions which are purely magical, coercion of the supernatural by means of natural objects ; and it also includes conceptions which persist into higher forms of religion, such as the worship of the symbol

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 72-91.

of an unseen power." Nevertheless he regards it as "a stage of religious development associated with a low grade of consciousness and of civilisation, and it forms a basis from which many other modes of religious thought have developed, so that it is difficult to point out where fetishism ends and nature-worship, ancestor-worship, totemism, polytheism, and idolatry begin, or to distinguish between a fetish, an idol, and a deity."¹

(b) Both Max Müller and Dr. F. B. Jevons refuse to regard it as a stage of religious development. The first rejects the theory that fetishism is a primary form of religion, because the objects of worship – stones, shells, bones, and such-like things – would never in themselves suggest "something supersensuous, infinite, or divine," while there are aspects of nature which would. "That some of the negroes," he says, "are aware of the degrading character of fetish-worship is shown by the people of Akra declaring the monkeys only to be fetish worshippers."² The second objects to the extension of the Portuguese term *feitiços*, which means charms, by De Brosses to anything worshipped, and by Bosman to objects of worship, known to be inanimate. With Marett, he finds the term to be so ambiguous as to be useless for scientific purposes. He gives an instance of the kind of belief and worship to which the term fetishism may be applied, and describes it as "a degeneration" of religion. A West African acquires for himself an individual (not communal) tutelary deity, or *suhman*, in the following way. The object – wood, stone, or earth – is chosen from a spot haunted by a Sasabonsum, who is not a god at all. A priest is employed or consulted by the man, and offerings are made privately, as public opinion does not approve, for the *suhman* is not used beneficently in the social interest, but against any persons who have injured or offended the possessor. He may make a profit out of it by selling charms to which the mysterious power has been transferred. If the *suhman* disappoints him by not affecting his purposes, he may discard it after propitiating it by some offering. "Dealings with Sasabonsum and the manufacture of *suhmans* are in the nature of 'black art,' as Sasabonsum is not one of the community's gods."³ From the descriptions given of fetishism it is evident that we need not take any further account of it in dealing with the evolution of the conception

¹ *Idem*, pp. 91–92.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 63, 112, 121, 127.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 165–167, 247.

of God in religion, although it must be admitted that in the case of Max Müller and of Jevons there are individual reasons for their unfavourable judgments. The first defines religion as a sense of the infinite, and is largely determined in his view of religion by the Indian religions. The second thinks "monotheism may have been the primitive religion."

III

(1) We may begin the study of animism with what may be accepted as an authoritative and comprehensive definition. "In the language of philosophy, animism is the doctrine which places the source of mental and even physical life in an energy independent of, or at least distinct from, the body. From the point of view of the history of religions, the term is taken, in a wider sense, to denote the belief in the existence of spiritual beings, some attached to bodies of which they constitute the real personality (*souls*), others without necessary connection with a determinate body (*spirits*)."¹ Animism in religion assumes "three forms : (i.) worship of the souls of men and of animals, manifesting itself above all as worship of the dead (*necrolatry*) ; (ii.) worship of spiritual beings who are not associated in a permanent way with certain bodies or objects (*spiritism*) ; (iii.) worship of spiritual beings who direct the permanent or periodically recurring phenomena of nature (*naturism*)."¹ The significance of animism is indicated in the following statement. "Animism, in the sense just stated, represents an attempt to explain in a rational way all the facts of the universe. It is the religion and the philosophy of all non-civilised peoples. It predominates at the commencement of all the historical forms of worship. Finally it still shows itself, in its complete development, among the survivals of folk-lore."¹

(2) Before discussing the development of theism out of animism, we must try to answer four questions regarding it, the answer to which will determine whether we must dismiss it as a barbarous superstition or accept it as the beginning of a true development of religious thought. We must vindicate it as a philosophy before we can assign it value as the cognitive basis of religion. These questions may be stated as follows. (i.) How did man become aware of the distinction

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. I., p. 535.

of soul and body, and form the conception of soul?
 (ii.) Is the distinction valid for our thought now? (iii.)
 Can we still believe in the survival of the body by the soul?
 (iv.) Is the transfer of soul or spirit to natural objects at all
 justified?

(i.) In giving an account of the psychic process by which man became aware of soul as distinct from body, we are not anticipating the answer to the second question, whether the distinction is still valid for us. The discovery need not be a *delusion*, an apprehension of the unreal; it may be an *illusion*, an inadequate apprehension of the real (to use again the distinction previously made). We may quote the view of one who is explicitly anti-religious, treating it as a surviving superstition (Edward Clodd), and of another, who recognises its value (R. R. Marett). (a) "Anthropologists are agreed that the impulse to man's conception of his personality and to that of a general doctrine of spirits comes from dreams, the inference from these having support in the phenomena of shadows, reflections, and echoes, and in the abnormal mental states of hysteria, swooning, epilepsy, and allied disorders. Hobbes acutely anticipated modern theories of animism in the twelfth chapter of *Leviathan*: 'And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancied, they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other concept, but that it was the same as that of the Soule of man, and that the Soule of man was of the same substance, with that which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines call them *Imagines* and *Umbræ*, and thought them Spirits, that is, these aëreall bodies, and these Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them save that appear, and vanish when they please.'"¹ Clodd also quotes "the striking words of Lucretius (*De Rerum Natura*, Book IV., 453-468): 'When sleep has chained down our limbs in sweet slumber, and the whole body is sunk in profound repose, yet then we seem to ourselves to be awake and to be moving our limbs, and amid the thick darkness of night we think we see the sun and the daylight; and, though in a confined room, we seem to be passing to new climates, seas, rivers, mountains, and to be crossing plains on foot, and to hear

¹ Edward Clodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

voices, though the austere silence of night prevails all round, and to be uttering speech, though quite silent. Many are the other things of this marvellous sort we see, which all seek to shake, as it were, the credit of the senses ; quite in vain, since the greatest part of these cases cheat us on account of the mental suppositions which we add of ourselves, taking those things as seen which have not been seen by the senses. For nothing is harder than to separate manifest facts from doubtful which the mind without hesitation adds on of itself.' ”¹

(b) A much more sympathetic tone marks the other writer. “No anthropologist, of course, has ever supposed himself able fully and finally to explain the origin of the belief in souls and spirits. . . . Dr. Tylor and others, however, have with great plausibility put forward a view as to the specifically formative source of the idea, in what has been nicknamed ‘the dream-theory.’ This theory asserts that the prototype of soul and spirit is to be sought especially in the dream-image and trance-image – that vision of the night or day that comes to a man clothed distinctively in what Dr. Tylor describes as vaporous materiality ; or, as the Greenland *Angekok* puts it, ‘pale and soft, so that if a man try to grasp it he feels nothing’ – *par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno*.² Perhaps it is only due to Mr. Lang’s latest research (*The Making of Religion*, 1898) to say with regard to this theory that its centre of gravity, so to speak, has of late shown signs of shifting from dream to trance, so that ‘the hallucination theory’ might possibly now prove the more appropriate descriptive title. . . . It is enough for my present purpose to assume that animism, the belief in the existence of visionary shapes, whether of the dead or *sui juris*, became with the savage, at a certain stage of his development, the typical, nay almost the universal, means of clothing the facts of his religious experience in ideas and words, and the typical and all but universal theory on which he based his religious practice.”³ The last sentence indicates a very important distinction which in the present connection must never be overlooked. We must recall

¹ Edward Clodd, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29.

² Compare the words of the dying Hadrian :

*Animula vagula, blandula,
Hospes comesque corporis.*

(Quoted, *E. R. E.*, Vol. I., p. 536 note.)

³ *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 6–8.

Leibnitz's mediation between *empiricism* and *rationalism*, when to the empiricist dogma, *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, he added the rationalist qualification, *nisi ipse intellectus*. Experience evokes reason. Had not the distinction between body and mind been *implicit* in the constitution of the reason of man, would any kind of experience have made it *explicit*? If the distinction be a valid one, the mode of its emergence in consciousness, determined as that necessarily was by the stage of development reached, when sense and imagination were dominant, and not intellect, does not detract from its validity. Further, the distinction must be recalled which has already been made between *experience* and *expression*: the reality of the experience does not depend on the adequacy of the expression. We may, therefore, address ourselves to the second question.

(ii.) What was temporary in the expression was the representation of soul as a less substantial *duplicate* of the body, as something that could be seen. Sometimes the soul is thought of as the shadow of the body (the shades) or the reflection in water, most often as the breath: Lat. *anima*, Greek *ánemos*, Sanskrit *prana*, Heb. *ruach*. What is permanent is the distinction of soul and body. That distinction has survived all the changes of thought, not in religion only, but in philosophy also. A materialist only necessarily disowns it, and regards thought as a function of the brain, and may repeat the well-known epigram, "*Der Mensch ist was er isst.*" "*Man is what he eats*" (the German pun cannot be reproduced). But the common consciousness is supported by psychology and philosophy. The biologist recognises that life cannot be resolved into chemical and physical processes, and the psychologist that physiology cannot solve his problems. The working hypothesis of the psycho-physical parallelism recognises the distinction as one that our knowledge does not enable us to resolve. The criticism of the conscious automaton theory, in which mind is reduced to a "collateral product" or *epiphenomenon* by Ward in his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Lecture XII., seems to me conclusive; and I must refer readers to it. James recognises that the brain in relation to the mind has, not a *productive*, but a *permissive* or *transmissive* function.¹ William McDougall has written a book on *Body and Mind*, the very title of which indicates that it is a defence of the distinction. In reply to Haeckel's monism, which, despite its profession

¹ *Human Immortality*, p. 32.

that it recognises the two aspects – mind and matter – of the one substance, was in its detailed formulation essentially materialistic, Sir Oliver Lodge wrote his book on *Life and Matter* to assert the distinction. The Christian Church so fully took the distinction for granted, that what it did discuss was the origin of the soul, and formulated three theories ; two of these emphasise the distinction ; either the soul was pre-existent, or was specially created ; and the third, *traducianism*, which might, in asserting that parents generated the soul as well as the body of the offspring appear to minimise, yet maintained, the distinction. It is true that there are theistic monists, who think the relation so intimate that they are not prepared to admit any duality. But it can be said that the general and permanent judgment of mankind has confirmed the distinction, however crude was the mode in which it was first of all apprehended.

(iii.) If the distinction has not lost its validity, we may go on to the third question : Is there ground for believing that the soul survives the body ? If materialism were true, then the dissolution of the body would necessarily involve the extinction of the soul. The rejection of materialism removes one of the most formidable objections ; but we must ask for reasons for the belief. The universality and the permanence of the belief, and the influence which the belief has exercised, raise a presumption in its favour. That men have in all ages sought to find reasons for the belief is itself a reason, for it shows that the belief is a necessity for, if not all men, yet many men, and these the most thoughtful and best. The reasons can only be mentioned. The argument of Kant in support of the postulate of the moral consciousness that there is a God to adjust condition to character, so that the righteous shall secure the Good, which it is reasonable for them to desire, has been applied to this belief. Men in this life do not get their deserts, the good the reward, the bad the penalty which is their due ; a future life will redress the balance. Of a higher order is Kant's own argument for the postulate of immortality : that man in this life does not complete his moral task, does not reach the goal which conscience sets before him, and that, therefore, the race will be continued on another course, even the future life. Love does not acquiesce in the separation of death ; it intensely desires, and more or less confidently expects, hereafter the continuance of the communion which has been here the greatest good. Where religion has been

a personal relationship to God, a personal experience of His goodness and grace, a personal satisfaction, greater than any other, in communion with Him, dependence on Him, consecration to Him, the interruption by death becomes incredible; God's companions cannot believe themselves death's victims.¹ Jesus confirmed this aspiration of the saint, in His reference to God as "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," for such a description of God indicates such a relation to man as assures the continuance of the life in God (Mark xii. 26-27). The revelation of God as Father gives certainty to the hopes of men as the children of God, that theirs is eternal life in the eternal God. The resurrection of Christ for Christian faith gave the pledge that death had been vanquished. For Paul, because to live was Christ, death was gain (Phil. i. 21), and to be absent from the body was to be present with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 6-8). The Christian faith thus sets its seal on the savage's belief in survival as not a vain hope.

(iv.) The last question can be fully answered only in the course of the subsequent discussion, which will show that, however lowly the starting-point of man's thought has been, it has followed an upward path to a conception which it will be the purpose of the second part of this volume to show can still be credible because intelligible to the thought of to-day, despite the progress of man's knowledge. Man can think only with his own mind, and can speak of world and God only in the terms which his own mind supplies. He must *anthropomorphise*, and, as the argument reproduced in a previous chapter from Dr. Matthews's book *God in Religious Thought and Experience* has shown, he was justified in anthropomorphising, as his own development meant progress in his conception of God.

(3) Without raising the question whether necrolatry or its more advanced form, ancestor-worship, is to be regarded as religion or not, for our present purpose – the progress in the conception of God – we shall not deal with it in any detail, unless in a necessary reference to the deification of men, and to ancestor-worship. But there is one aspect of this subject which is relevant to the discussion at this point, and it is this: was belief in the survival of the souls in the dead antecedent to, or parallel with, the two types – spiritism and naturism? Was worship of the dead a stepping-stone to worship of spirits or gods? Herbert Spencer's theory of

¹ See my article on "Immortality" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

the origin of religion in such worship has already been adequately discussed. Runze seems to me to be right when he insists that this is too narrow a basis for religion ; and that beliefs and rites which are cited in support of this thesis occupy too subordinate a place in religion to be taken as conclusive evidence. "The naïve emotions of admiration of nature, the sentiments of joy and humility in the contemplation of the glory and the greatness of the universe, the presaging question as to the origin of existence – these motives of the religious view of the world and life are left out of account in that theory. The representation of a special mode of existence of a definite group of persons who had been is far too one-sided an object of the imagination, and the emotional and volitional life, as that out of it so universal a structure as is religion could always and everywhere have grown. Indeed, man is also a natural being ; how should not the assumption of spiritual personal existence in other natural objects be just as original (primitive) as the assumption of special spirits of men ? Why should not the contemplative admiration of nature be just as original (primitive) as the practically personal honouring of men ? The still at present customary funeral mode of the Parsees is to be explained by reverence for the elements, especially for the earth and the fire, which one did not want to defile by burial or by burning. Animism in the wider sense, not only the spiritist but also the fetishist and naturist, yon diffused representation of an animation of all natural objects, can be derived from ancestor-worship only artificially ; rather is it adequately explained from the general character of the life of the imagination, the formation of representations, the reflexinfluence on thought of language."¹ To this convincing statement of the case against this theory I should venture to add two considerations, of the cogency of which the readers must be the judges. In the first place, if, as the development so far as we can trace it from surviving evidence shows, man only slowly detached himself in his human self-consciousness from nature and from the other animals, and if the distinction of animate and inanimate, human and animal, was only gradually won, this emphasis on ancestor-worship seems an anachronism. Secondly, would not living nature, the movement and the change constantly witnessed in the world around, offer a stronger motive for ascribing spirit to natural objects than the corpse

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

lying inactive, in contrast to the activity of previous life?

(4) We have now reached what may be regarded as the starting-point of the conception of God in religion as distinguished from magic and taboo, and such other kindred phenomena. Animism, however, is a philosophy, and not religion, and, as has already been indicated, there must be added to the intellectual the emotional and the volitional element. The *spirits* must be regarded with fear, awe, reverence; there must be a sense of dependence on them, a recognition that by their action they can help or hinder the human good; and there must be the consequent action to secure their favour or avert their displeasure before we can speak of religion. This seems the proper point at which to close this chapter, reserving the account of the further development of animism into the conception of God for the next chapter; but as a transition to it three considerations must be added. (a) The conception of the spirit develops into the conception of the god; and it is convenient to make that distinction. As man came to know the world around him and himself better, he gained a more definite conception of the powers he recognised; the god is less closely associated with the natural object than the spirit, his action is more constant; he controls a department of nature, and does not act only through one object; he wields higher power; he is more distinctly conceived, receives a significant name, and the worshipper enters into a closer alliance with him.¹ (b) There is an alternative term to spirit of which we must take notice. It is *demon*. The term in its earlier use does not necessarily signify an evil spirit. The Greek *δαίμων* "originally denoted either 'apportioner' or, less probably, 'apportionment,' 'destiny' being connected with Greek *δαίωμαι*, 'divide' 'apportion,' and Eng. *time*. . . . It had a good connotation, which was changed into an evil one when Christianity condemned the deities and spirits of paganism – a change quite analogous to that by which the Avesta *dæva*, 'demon,' is the precise etymological equivalent of the Skr. *deva*, god."²

In the compound word *polydemonism* – belief in, and worship of, many spirits – the change of meaning has not taken

¹ The first step towards raising spirit to the dignity of God is taken, according to W. Robertson Smith, and F. B. Jevons agrees with him, when a spirit is selected as clan or tribal deity. "A supernatural being as such is not a god; he becomes a god only when he enters into stated relations with man, or, rather, with a community of men" (*op. cit.*, p. 119).

² *E. R. E.*, Vol. IV., p. 565.

place ; and we can use the term in contrast to *polytheism*, as in the title of the next chapter.

(c) That this distinction, although it cannot be rigidly applied, as none in the sphere of thought and life can be, is not arbitrary will appear, when it is shown, as it must be afterwards shown, that the distinction does correspond to important advances in man's comprehension of nature, in his social organisation, in his sense of his own personality as different from other living beings – plant or animal – in the world around him. At first glance much in man's religious history may seem madness, but on closer scrutiny we discover not only method in the madness, but the sure, if slow, emergence of rationality.

CHAPTER V

THE DIVINE OBJECT OF RELIGION

B. Polydemonism and Polytheism

I

(1) AT the conclusion of the previous chapter it was pointed out that it is not easy to distinguish the terms *demon* and *spirit*, as the frontier is not rigidly drawn in the confused thinking of this stage of human development between malevolent and benevolent beings, and one spirit may be the one or the other at different times. "Although a rough distinction may be drawn between demons and spirits by considering the former as malevolent and the latter as benevolent, actual study of the subject soon shows that there is, to the primitive mind, no clear line of demarcation between the two allied classes. Their modes of operation are identical, and the same being may often be either beneficent or maleficent, as circumstances may dictate, though some are normally kindly disposed towards man, while others are almost or quite invariably hostile to him. The very terms 'spirit' and 'demon' are colourless."¹ As the term *spiritism* is sometimes used as an equivalent of *spiritualism*, and as the compound word *polydemonism* does not carry the sinister associations which the word *demon* has acquired, we shall here use it as the general term for this phase of religious thought. In certain circumstances and at a certain stage of development the demons who haunt the imagination of the uncivilised man are much more numerous than are the beneficent spirits; and he is more concerned about propitiating the malevolent than he is about showing his gratitude to the benevolent spirits. The spirits which, as we shall later see, have become attached to a family or clan, are usually good, the unattached bad. "The spirit is, therefore, much in the position of an unattached ghost; and as to the primitive mind, with its intense concept of kinship – whether real or artificial – all that is not akin is hostile; a spirit thus unattached, and consequently unakin, would naturally tend to be regarded as hostile and malevolent."² At this, as at

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. IV., p. 565.

² *Idem*, p. 566.

all other stages, man anthropomorphises, whether in conceiving spirits or gods ; and the character of the worshipper will be reflected in the character ascribed to the objects of worship. Human qualities and functions generally are also ascribed – sex, parenthood, etc. Adverse circumstances are explained by the hostility, favourable conditions by the amiability, of spirits or gods.

(2) We must deal with necrolatry, the worship of the dead, in so far as it is more than the attention which love or fear might prompt to those who are felt to need human service still, and becomes in any measure identical with the worship of spirits or gods as beings who can exercise a potent influence in human life. Here, again, there is no rigid frontier between ghosts and the spirits which are not regarded as human souls that have survived death ; and there is what may be regarded as one kind of worship, offered in different proportions to both. In Africa, in which “*fetichism* is *par excellence* the type,” the two worships are held to exist side by side, although Nassau “ regards all the spirits worshipped in West Africa as originally ghosts.”¹ “ In Oceania, on the other hand, the two types of religion are mutually exclusive. In Polynesia, Australia, and Micronesia, spirits are practically unworshipped as compared with ghosts, while in the Ellice Islands and the Union Group (Tokelau) the reverse is the case (Waitz Gerland, V. ii., 139–142, 194–199), and in Melanesia ‘ religion divides the people into two groups ; one where, with an accompanying belief in spirits, never men, worship is directed to the ghosts of the dead, as in the Solomon Islands : the other, where both ghosts and spirits have an important place, but the spirits have more worship than the ghosts, as is the case in the New Hebrides and in the Banks Islands ’ (Codrington, p. 123).”² Edwin W. Smith, in his book *The Religion of the Lower Races as illustrated by the African Bantu*, who, he holds, can be taken as typical, agrees with Nassau, and places in the forefront the *Cult of the Dead*. “ With some exceptions the Bantu have a common name for the departed who are held in reverence. This name, which is found in slightly different forms in the various languages, is *Muzimo*, plural *Mizima*. The best translation for the word is ‘ divinity ’ or ‘ divinities. ’ Let us think of these spirits as graded in four concentric circles. The inmost circle is occupied by a man’s own personal divinity, his tutelary

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. IV., p. 567 note.

² *Idem*, p. 567.

genius ; the next is occupied by his family divinities, i.e. the ghosts of his father and mother and other near relatives ; the third circle is occupied by the communal divinities, which probably are the ghosts of the family of the head of the village ; finally, the outmost circle is occupied by the tribal or national divinity or divinities, the ghosts of ancient eminent chiefs.”¹ The tutelary genius here mentioned is evidently something different from the *suhman*, which is described by Dr. Jevons, and has been referred to in a previous chapter. It is not anti-social, and not disapproved by the community. Here also ghosts usurp the sphere elsewhere assigned to non-human spirits, and are the divinities worshipped. About these divinities Smith also makes the following assertions under the heading “ Communion with the Divinities ” : “ (a) They often come in dreams ; (b) They appear in the form of animals ; (c) They cause sickness ; (d) They speak through mediums and prophets ; (e) They take up their abode in certain objects.”² It is evident that Jevons’s generalisation about attached spirits being friendly, unattached hostile, does not strictly apply to these ghosts. So prominent and important is the Cult of the Dead that Smith raises the question : “ Have they any idea of spiritual beings apart from the spirits of men, and do they in any sense worship them ? ” “ According to the testimony of many writers, the Bantu do believe in such nature spirits, but it is very difficult to define them properly.” His own conclusion seems to be negative : “ The more one investigates the spirits believed in by the Ba-ila, the more they resolve themselves into spirits of human beings.”³ While he calls these ancestral spirits *divinities*, he does not call them gods, but devotes a short chapter to the subject of *Tribal Divinities passing over into Gods*. “ If one asks,” he writes, “ what difference there is between a divinity and a god, it must be admitted that the difference is one of degree and not of kind ; both classes are varieties of the species ancestral spirit. I use the word ‘ god ’ to indicate that variety which is of the greater importance, is revered over a wider area, and of which the human origin is quite forgotten, or almost forgotten.”⁴ Although he states that “ the Bantu are vividly conscious that the world around them is not merely material but is shot through and through with spirit,”⁵ he tends to resolve this belief in

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 35-36. ² *Idem*, p. xii. ³ *Idem*, pp. 49-51.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 52. ⁵ *Idem*, p. 51.

"spirit" into belief in ghosts ; for he offers this caution : "He who sets out to enquire into Bantu religion, and especially into their idea of God, must be on his guard, lest he take a deified ancestor for the Supreme Being."¹ In spite of his own warning, he answers in the affirmative the question whether the Bantus "have any belief in a Supreme God, a Creator, an overruling Providence."² He sums up what he claims to have discovered about this belief in the following propositions : "(a) God is intimately associated with the sky and what comes from it ; (b) God is the Creator ; (c) God is the Determiner of Destiny ; (d) Yet there is some idea of God as benevolent ; (e) Morality is ascribed to God ; (f) God is a person."³ These conclusions he bases on "the three most common names for God and their meanings." He admits that this belief "plays an unproductive part in Bantu life."⁴ I do not find his argument for the origin and value of the idea conclusive. His admission has probability : "One might conjecture, but could not prove, that the ancestors of the Bantu were in touch perhaps with some monotheistic people, Semitic or other." Not so probable his further statement that "this contact was sufficient to crystallise their ideas on the subject," nor yet that we must assume in the origin of this conception "the guiding Spirit of God who wills to be known of His children."⁵ A belief which he himself admits to be so ineffective practically in religious thought and life must be regarded rather as a foreign intrusion, whatever the source may be, than a native product. The psychology of the development of religious consciousness seems to be against our regarding it otherwise ; and Christian theology does not demand any other assumption, as the working of God's Spirit is conditioned by the laws of human development.⁶

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

² *E. R. E.*, II., p. 363.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 58-61.

⁴ *Idem.*, p. 54.

⁵ *Idem.*, p. 63.

⁶ A similar claim is made in the following passage : "How can the existence of such pure and lofty conceptions of God and statements about the Supreme Being be accounted for among the little civilised inhabitants of Central Africa ? The science of religion is abandoning more and more its earlier position, namely, that religion develops upwards, not downwards. People are beginning with increasing seriousness to discuss the possibility of an original monotheism, even in investigating religious history, and many scholars admit that possibly there may be seen in the close connection of the religious with the moral the inderivable response of mankind to the living God. It seems as if all Bantu tribes believe in an Original Cause and Creator of the World, and sayings similar to those which I have collected above are also to be found in their heritage of legend" (Dr. E. Jobanssen, Lecturer on the Science of Missions in the University of Marburg, in the *International Review of*

We need not regard this belief as contributing anything of value to the history of the evolution of monotheism. On another question raised by the discussion in this volume a comment must be added. Despite the author's references to nature spirits and the conception of the Supreme Being, the religion of the Bantus, according to his account, resolves itself almost entirely into the Cult of the Dead. Even if this be so, this cannot be accepted as the general character of religion. And we are justified in maintaining that there is a distinction made between spirits, human and non-human, and that worship is in varying proportions offered to the one or to the other.

(3) We may now turn to the relation of the conception of the supernatural to this belief in spirits. Jevons states quite categorically that not all spirits are endowed with supernatural power. "If, then," he writes, "for the phrase 'life and will' we substitute the word 'spirit,' and say that in the view of primitive man all things which possessed (or seemed to him to possess) activity were animated by spirits, we must also add that those spirits were not in themselves

Missions, XX., p. 545). There has been undoubtedly in recent years a revival of the theory of a primitive monotheism. In some cases it is due to a fundamentalist attitude in theology, and a consequent opposition to the doctrine of evolution. To give some recent instances. Dr. P. Wilhelm Schmidt's *Handbuch der vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte: Ursprung und Werden der Religion* has been translated into English by J. H. Rose under the title of *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, and is reviewed in the *Moslem World*, Vol. XXI., pp. 422-423. He rejects all theories of evolution as due to unbelief, and insists that "the idea of God did not come by evolution, but by revelation." To this work Dr. J. J. Fahrenfort has replied in his book *Wie der Urmonotheismus am Leben erhalten wird*, and "claims that the arguments of Dr. Schmidt are vitiated by his preconceived idea of 'degeneration' in the history of religion." To this the editor of the *Moslem World* replies that this critic "fails to note that those of the evolutionary school of anthropologists are similarly biased by the dogma of evolution." The view of the Roman Catholic theologian is endorsed by the American Lutheran, Dr. Stolee, in his book on *The Genesis of Religion*. He rejects the view held by most competent scholars with arrogant confidence. It is too simple a solution of the problem to make a charge of bias. Dr. Oman thinks the question one deserving of a special appendix in his book *The Natural and the Supernatural* (pp. 485-488). He admits the facts on which this assumption is based, but offers an explanation of them. "Facts, of course, are not to be answered by argument. In some form this belief in one power in the main just and beneficent does exist, and we may not dispose of it by saying that it is unlikely, or that, as it had no cult, it cannot have been important." "The real starting-point of them all is a unity of awareness, in a simple, communistic State not disturbed by individual possessions. But it is not a reflective monotheism. Two unities of reflection, however, develop from it - the pantheistic, with its essential element mystical, and the monotheistic, with its essential element moral." He adds a shrewd remark which will explain much of the evidence produced. "A native, speaking from a standpoint given him by a Christian missionary, is a very different person from one speaking from his own" (pp. 486-487).

supernatural spirits. They only became so when man was led to ascribe to them that supernatural power which he had already found to exercise an unexpected and irresistible control over his destiny. The immediate causes of this identification are easily conjectured. When a startling frustration of man's calculations brought home to him the existence of an overruling power, man would eventually cast about for means of entering into relations with that power. The first thing to do for this purpose necessarily was to locate the power ; and when primitive man was on the look-out for some indication as to the place of origin where this power emanated, it would not be long before he found what he was on the watch for."¹ Any sickness following on a bathe, when heated, would be ascribed to the supernatural power of the water-spirit, or malaria after descent from the hills to the low-lying sea-shore would be ascribed to the supernatural power of the sea. (I have abbreviated his two illustrations.) We may here, however, raise the question whether primitive man did thus generalise about natural processes, whether it was not only the unfamiliar, the incalculable and unexpected, which arrested his attention and led him to assume spirit agency, and whether accordingly there was ever a time when he thought of any spiritual agency which he did not conceive as supernatural, in the sense at least of being beyond his knowledge and above his power. When he extended this spirit agency to familiar phenomena as well, this supernatural character would still attach to it. This seems to be the more probable course of development than that which Jevons describes as taking place. "When once one exceptional action of the river-spirit had been put down as the outcome of supernatural power, then in course of time its ordinary operation, and the customary flow of the water, would also come to be regarded as having a supernatural cause, and as being the manifestation, not only of a spirit, but of a supernatural spirit. Thus in course of time all the phenomena of nature, even the discharge of the storm-cloud and the movement of the stars in their courses, came to be regarded as due to supernatural power."² We cannot think again the primitive man's thoughts ; but in his ignorance and impotence would not all the world seem to him mysterious ? The exceptional would call for explanation before the ordinary, and the explanation to which he was led of the one he would

¹ *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 23.

² *Idem*, p. 24.

extend to the other. When he came to understand the world around him enough to gain some control over it, he might in *practice* distinguish between the natural – the sphere in which the *mechanical* action Leuba speaks of was possible and effective – and the *supernatural* – the sphere in which he felt compelled to invoke divine agency ; but in *theory*, when the religious explanation had got the start of the *scientific*, even natural processes were still ascribed to supernatural agency. So much truth may be conceded to Comte's Law of Three States. Only very slowly did science banish the gods or spirits from nature.

II

Having discussed these three questions – the distinction between demons and spirits, and between spirits and ghosts, as also the relation of spirits to the supernatural – we may next consider the question of how, out of a multitude of spirits, some concentration of belief and worship took place on some or one object as a stage in the religious development. (1) While in some parts of the world, as in Oceania and Africa, there has been little advance from the multiplicity of objects of worship to unity of cult, and accordingly the spirits are worshipped in animals, rivers, mountains, forest, and trees, etc., there has been an advance in some religions. Dr. Baillie gives this account of the development of the thought of God among the Hebrews as a branch of the Semitic race : “ Their general outlook seems to have been a fully developed animism. The world for them was full of spiritual beings who were all localised as being associated with some particular spot in the desert, usually an oasis ; and especially with some striking natural object in the oasis – a boulder, an evergreen tree, a grove of date-palms, the life-giving well itself,¹ or sometimes a mountain. This object was, as we might put it, the spirit's body, and the spirit was regarded as the owner, or *Baal*, of the locality where the object was situated. Many of the spirits were regarded with religious awe and made the objects of religious

¹ “ Of all inanimate things, that which has the best marked supernatural associations among the Semites is flowing (or, as the Hebrews say, ‘ living ’) water ” (W. Robertson Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 135). The reason is obvious : life in plant, animal, and man depends on water. At the pastoral stage the water of well or stream is the more important ; at the agricultural stage the rain from heaven acquires the greater importance.

attention ; they were given the honorific title of 'El (Assyrian, *ilu* ; Arabic, *ilah*, etc.), which seems to mean the possessor of supernatural power, that is, of the Semitic equivalent of *mana* ; and the locality where each resided was called a *beth-el* – to mention only the Hebrew form of a word, meaning the abode of a mighty one, which has near parallels in other Semitic languages. . . . The tribes were small, being really 'clans,' strictly based on the principle of kinship, and the evidence is that each tribe came in the end, as a general rule, to worship only one spirit."¹ The belief in other spirits survived, and a change of locality meant a change of divinity. Although Yahveh was originally associated with *Sinai*, yet, as the ark was the sign of His continued presence, He wandered with His people in the wilderness, and entered Canaan with them. His worship was combined with that of the local Baal, as the prophecy of Hosea shows (ii. 16), and yet He came to be so localised in Canaan that David (1 Sam. xxvi. 19) complained that, driven into exile, he must change his god. Ruth (i. 16), in accompanying Naomi back to her own land, also accepted her god ; and Naaman took some soil with him that he might worship Yahveh when he returned to Syria (2 Kings v. 17). This localisation thus continued long after the earliest phases of religion. It was natural that a clan should localise the spirit it worshipped in its own home, and that tribal unity and the authority of the chief should influence the religion towards the worship of one object. Jacob's experience at Bethel (Genesis xxviii. 10–21), or Hagar's (xxi. 19), legendary though the narratives may be, suggest occurrences which may have led to such localisations. When one spirit was thus exalted above the other spirits, the existence of which was not denied, and which might even, on what seemed a necessary occasion, be worshipped, we may regard it as having attained the rank of a god. Such exclusive worship has been described by the term *monolatry*, or *henotheism*. The term monolatry explains itself : *worship* (λατρεία) was to be offered to this God *alone* (μόνος). The difference between *henotheism* and *monotheism* lies in the difference of the words *one* (εἷς, μία, εἶς) and *alone* (μόνος).

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 417–418. Cf. W. Robertson Smith : " That the gods haunted certain spots, which in consequence of this were holy places and fit places of worship, was to the ancients not a theory but a matter of fact, handed down by tradition from one generation to another, and accepted with unquestioning faith " (*op. cit.*, p. 115).

To affirm that Yahveh is the *one* God to be recognised by Israel does not deny the possible existence of other gods, as *Chemosh* (the god of the Moabites), or *Milcom* or *Molech* (the god of the Ammonites), but to affirm that Yahveh is God *alone* excludes that possibility, for it ascribes to God a nature, character, purpose, which involves that there can be this God only and beside Him there can be no other. Probably Moses was a henotheist and not a monotheist, and this assumption is not improbable regarding even Elijah ; it was with Amos and Hosea that the prophetic succession began, in which a rigid, consistent, ethical monotheism was developed. We have anticipated the matter to be discussed in detail in the next chapter ; but it was necessary thus to show the issue of the development which has just been sketched which is worth noting as an illustration of the influence of social organisation on religion ; the unity of the clan or tribe leads to a unification of its worship, its god being regarded as, if not necessarily its ancestor, yet as its kinsman, sharing its blood.¹

(2) The industrial development no less had an influence on religious belief and worship. At the earliest stage of human evolution man, like other animals, was *predatory*. He not only lived by such plant food – fruits and roots – as nature provided, but he obtained flesh food by the chase. The hunter (and the fisher) belong to the beginnings of human industry. This stage survived in the next, the pastoral, which also was nomadic ; and the difference of the two stages is suggested by the interesting statement of the contrast between Esau and Jacob. “The boys grew up ; Esau was a skilful hunter, a man who lived in the open ; Jacob was a quiet man, living in tents ” (Gen. xxv. 27, Moffatt’s translation). The future lay with the shepherd and not the hunter. An important step in human progress was taken with the *domestication* of such animals as seemed to be capable of it. This domestication, however, was not primarily, as was the chase, to obtain *flesh* food, as only in exceptional cases, as we shall see, was a domestic animal slaughtered, but for the milk, etc. A further step was taken when the *pastoral* passed into the *agricultural* stage, when plants began to be cultivated for food and other uses ; when necessarily the nomad settled down to a fixed dwelling, and the house replaced the tent. Again a Scripture statement

¹ W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 40 : “As father the god belongs to the family or clan, as King he belongs to the State.” See also pp. 54, 90, 287.

presents the change : " Abel was a shepherd, while Cain was a farmer. In course of time Cain brought some produce of the ground as a present to the Eternal, while Abel brought some of the first-born from his flock. . . . The Eternal favoured Abel and his present ; he did not favour Cain and his " (Gen. iv. 2-5, Moffatt). Such a statement carries us back to the conflict between the two types, the pastoral and the agricultural ; and assumes that the earlier was better in God's sight than the later. There can be no doubt that the settlement in Canaan of the pastoral tribes was followed by moral and religious deterioration. This prejudice, not without some reason, reappears in the words of the Rechabites to Jeremiah when he offered them wine. " We will drink no wine ; for our ancestor Jonadab, the son of Rechab, gave us the order : ' Never drink any wine, neither you nor your sons, never build a house, never sow seed, never plant, never own a vineyard ; live in tents all your days, so that you may live long on the earth, where you are but passing guests ' " (Jer. xxxv. 6-7, Moffatt). As we have already seen, for some reason or other mountains, rivers, trees, might be connected with a spirit, acting for good or ill in the experience of man, and so receiving some kind of worship ; but in these developments animal and plant life was brought into more constant and intimate relations with human life, and, as was inevitable, these relations affected the religious development.

(3) We are thus brought to the study of the interesting and important subject of *totemism*.¹ (a) The characteristics of totemism could not be more briefly or clearly stated than in the definition given in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* : " Totemism, as exemplified in North America and Australia, where it has been found in the fullest development, is a form of society distinguished by the following characteristics : (1) it is composed of clans or bands of men each united among themselves by kinship real or fictitious, a kinship frequently extending beyond the limits of the local tribe ; (2) the clan is distinguished by the name of some species of animal or plant, or more rarely of some other natural phenomenon, such as the sun, rain, etc. ; (3) the species or object which gives its name to the clan is conceived

¹ " The word *totem* is derived from *otoleman*, which in the Ojibwa and cognate Algonquian dialects means ' his brother - sister kin.' Its grammatical stem *ote*, meaning the consanguine kinship between uterine brothers and sisters who cannot intermarry, is never used alone " (*E. R. E.*, Vol. XII., p. 393).

as related to the clan, and to every member of it, in some mystic way, often genetically ; and in this case every individual specimen of the object, where it is an animal or plant, is regarded as belonging to the clan ; (4) such species or object is usually the subject of a religious or a quasi-religious emotion, and every individual specimen is the subject of taboos or prohibitions ; subject to certain limitations, ceremonial or in self-defence, it may not be injured or killed, or (where eatable) eaten ; (5) moreover, as in all societies organised on the basis of kinship, the members of the clan are entitled to mutual defence, protection, and resentment of injuries. They may not marry or have sexual intercourse within the clan.”¹ These general features are modified from tribe to tribe.

(b) As human kinship was recognised in clan or tribe, so also in plant or animal ; a classification was thus begun. Man became conscious of his difference from the life around him only slowly, and so he could think of some kinship between his kind and some animal or plant kind. As this type of social organisation and corresponding religious belief belong rather to the predatory or the pastoral stage than the agricultural, the relative infrequency of plant totems can easily be understood. That some other natural phenomenon is still more rare as totem seems to be also explicable ; *naturism*, to which we must give fuller attention at a later stage of discussion, seems to me to belong to a more advanced stage of human evolution than does totemism, although we cannot fix rigid frontiers between one phase of thought and life and another. In the above statement *totemism* is presented as primarily a social phenomenon, but so inter-related is religion with society at this stage that its religious significance must not be disregarded.

(c) Typical examples of totemism are found among the aborigines in America, Australia, Africa (negro and Bantu races), India (the non-Aryan tribes), and Melanesia (including New Guinea and the islands of Torres Straits). As totemism “arises in a low condition of savagery and is connected in its typical forms with matrilineal descent . . . even before contact with Europeans, it had begun to assume forms very divergent from what we understand by normal totemism, leading in some cases to degeneration and disintegration.”² It is not necessary to enter into any details. What is worth noting is that in regions where “totemism

¹ *Op. cit.* Vol. XII., p. 394.

² *Idem*, p. 398.

is now unknown . . . among many of the peoples certain beliefs and practices have been reported which seem to bear traces of a former prevalence."¹ Two factors in the development of totemism may be emphasised : " It assumes a community of nature between man and other creatures, and the existence of the individual is ignored, except as a small and subordinate part of a group, thought of as a whole." It must consequently decay as man distinguishes himself from the other animals, and as the individual is recognised, with his own rights and duties, within the society. " In strict acceptance," E. S. Hartland maintains, " totemism is not a religion. The respect of the clan for its totem arises out of the attitude of mind just explained. The relation of the clan to its totem assumes a mystical aspect and generates an intense feeling of kinship. This frequently is expressed in the belief that they are descended from the totem species. As civilisation evolves, this belief becomes modified into the shape of a story of the adventure of a human ancestor with the totem species. Although regarded with reverence and looked to for help, the totem is never, where totemism is not decadent, prayed to as a god or a person with powers which we call supernatural. In fact, in that stage of culture totemism usually co-exists with the cult of the dead and often with the worship of other spirits and gods accurately so called."²

(d) The account that Dr. F. B. Jevons gives of totemism, however, invests it with a more strictly religious character, as the supernatural powers of the totem are asserted. " It is not surprising if man can have blood-feuds with animal clans as he has with human, that he should seek to establish an alliance with one of these kinds of beings, in the same way and on the same principle as with one of the various human kins with which he came in contact. It is to be presumed that in the choice of an ally he would prefer the kind which he believed to possess supernatural powers, or, if several possessed such powers, then the kind or species which possessed the greatest power."³ This alliance was conceived as so close that " as the totem animal becomes a member of the human clan, so the human clansman becomes a member of the animal's clan."⁴ " It is at the great crises of life that the totem dress is especially worn, for thus the wearer is placed under the due protection of the totem " " At death

¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. XII., p. 403.

² *Idem*, p. 407.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 102.

the clansman was supposed to join his totem and to assume the totem animal's form."¹ As has already been noted in the previous paragraph, descent from the totem was assumed. Possessed of such an ally, man's attitude to the world around him became less abject, and more confident. "His ally's place in nature was also changed by the alliance; this supernatural power was distinguished from all others by the fact that it was in alliance with him. It became a permanently friendly power; in a word, it became a god, whereas all other spirits remained evil, or at any rate hostile powers, by whom a man could only expect to be treated as he was treated by – and as indeed he himself treated – members of a strange clan."² This statement directly challenges the view of Hartland; not only is the ally supernatural, but he becomes a god, and the only god of the clan or tribe. This does appear an over-statement, as Hartland's is an under-statement.³ Where there is so bewildering a variety in the evidence, it is unwise to dogmatise.⁴ What is deserving of special attention in Jevons's statement is that man became aware of possessing a friendly supernatural ally, and so could confront more boldly any hostile supernatural powers. So important is this consideration that a statement from Robertson

¹ *Idem*, p. 103.

² *Idem*, pp. 104–105.

³ Frazer offers another explanation of totemism. As the belief was held that a man could for safety transfer his soul to an individual plant or animal, the relation was at first individual, and only at a later stage was the totem associated with the sex or the clan. "When a savage names himself after an animal, calls it his brother, and refuses to kill it, the animal is said to be his totem. . . . The assignation of a totem to a sex is comparatively rare, and has hitherto been discovered nowhere but in Australia. Far more commonly the totem is appropriated, not to a sex, but to a clan, and is hereditary either in the male or the female line. The relation of an individual to the clan totem does not differ in kind from his relation to the sex totem; he will not kill it; he speaks of it as his brother, and he calls himself by its name. Now if the relations are similar, the explanation which holds good of the one ought equally to hold good of the other. Therefore the reason why a clan revere a particular species of animals or plants (for the clan totem may be a plant), and call themselves after it, would seem to be a belief that the life of each individual of the clan is bound up with some one animal or plant of the species, and that his or her death would be the consequence of killing that particular animal or destroying that particular plant. . . . Though each man spares all the animals or plants of the species, they are not all equally precious to him; far from it, out of the whole species there is only one which is specially dear to him; but as he does not know which the dear one is, he is obliged to spare them all from fear of injuring the one. . . . That totem is the receptacle in which a man keeps his life. . . . From the primitive point of view, it is perfectly possible that a savage should have one soul in his sex totem and another in his clan totem" (*The Golden Bough*, abridged edition, pp. 689–690).

⁴ See W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–289, where the kinship of gods and men, and the sacredness of some animals, are advanced as grounds for "the conjecture that sacrificial animals were originally treated as kinsmen . . . whose lives were ordinarily protected by religious scruples and sanctions."

Smith's *Religion of the Semites* may be quoted : " However true it is that savage man feels himself to be environed by innumerable dangers which he does not understand, and so personifies as invisible or mysterious enemies of more than human power, it is not true that the attempt to appease those powers is the foundation of religion. From the earliest times religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred or friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins."¹ One clan or tribal god as kinsman, one spot as his chosen abode, and one kind of animal or plant as akin both to the god and the clan or tribe – these three factors combined in the unification of belief and worship. The sense of kinship with the totem so strengthened the sense of kinship within the tribe that religion reinforced morality, e.g. " murder becomes not only a moral but a religious offence."² As man became more self-conscious of his distinctiveness " the god tended to be conceived – and, when the time for art came, to be represented – no longer in animal, but in human form."³ While the relation was permanently friendly, an offence against the god might incur punishment ; and these offences were not ritual only, but moral also. Totemism led, as has already been indicated, to the domestication of animals and plants, and so was a factor in the transition from nomad to settled life, a first step in civilisation. Although Jevons devotes a chapter to this subject, it must be passed over ; and the bearing of totemism on animal sacrifice must be considered.

(4) As human kinship was seen in common blood, and as in the initiation ceremonies the blood of the older member flowing over the younger member of the tribe made him partaker of the common life of the tribe, so the soul or spirit of the totem might be imparted by the blood of any individual of the species. " When, therefore, a totem clan required the presence of its supernatural ally, the procedure, we may say the ritual, to be adopted was obvious : the blood of a totem animal must be shed."⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 54–55.

³ *Idem*, p. 109.

² Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 131.

(a) As the sacred blood must not be spilt upon the soil, as contact with it would render taboo, it was applied to a heap of stones or a monolith. This is the primitive altar ; a pole might also be used for this purpose. At a later stage the two were differentiated. "The two are found side by side at the same sanctuary," says Smith, "the altar as a piece of sacrificial apparatus, and the pillar as a visible symbol or embodiment of the presence of the deity."¹ The pole, when shaped to some resemblance to what the god was imagined to be, became the wooden idol, and the monolith the statue of the god ; but the altar remained and, when the representation of the god in wood or stone became more artistic, alone received the blood of the sacrifice. A covering was found for the idol, and this became the temple ; but the altar still remained outside. Nevertheless the totemist did not identify his totem god with the wood or stone representation, although such identification may at a later stage have taken place, when the original conception of the totem had faded ; and then the idol would be more carefully fashioned to resemble the god as imagined by the worshipper, or later as a symbol of the conception of his nature.

(b) This is the point at which an interesting development may be mentioned ; and in dealing with which we cannot separate the polydæmonic and the polytheistic stage. In totemism any specimen of the kind is revered ; but at a later stage, as in Egypt, an individual animal may become sacred, and be worshipped. "At Memphis the bull Apis was regarded as the body of the god Ptah, whose spirit resided in the beast, or as a son of Ptah, or of Re, or of Osiris."² The god may in the idol be represented by a wholly animal form, as Yahveh was represented by calves at Bethel and at Dan (1 Kings xii. 28-29). "There can be no doubt that in early Egypt the animal was the manifest god ; Khnum of Elephantine was a ram, Hathor a cow, Nekhebt a vulture, Bast a cat, Horus a falcon, Anubis a jackal, Sebek a crocodile, Thoth an ibis, and so on." This is the *zoomorphic* stage. As man anthropomorphises, he may give the god a human body and an animal head, such as the goddess Bast in Egypt. This is the *therianthropic* stage. In Greece the *anthropomorphic* stage is reached, in which the gods are presented in human form with matchless art. Nevertheless, "many of the Greek gods also were associated

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

² Moore, *History of Religion*, I., p. 197.

with certain animals, but . . . these animals were little more than conventional attributes – the eagle of Zeus, the owl of Athene, the dove of Aphrodite.”¹ There can be little doubt, however, that the animal companion survives from a stage when the god was represented in animal form. An eminent anthropologist told me in private conversation, with great glee, that he had proved that Zeus was once a woodpecker. If man has had an animal ancestry, and if his distinctively human endowment, although present from the beginning, was only gradually made patent in his own consciousness even, we can more readily understand how he so long felt his kinship with animals. Their crucial importance to his life as friends or foes also helps us to understand their place in his religion.

The representation of the god by the idol must not be regarded as necessarily a retrogression so long as there is not an identification, as a quotation which Jevons² gives from Howard, *Trans-Siberian Savages*, p. 202, would indicate : “My personal enquiries amongst almost every variety of heathen worshippers, including the most degraded types in India, in China, and also the devil-worshippers in Ceylon, have never yet secured from them the admission which would justify me in thinking that the red-bedaubed stone or tree, or any image in front of which they worshipped, was supposed to contain *in esse* the god to which that worship was addressed.” This testimony might be discounted on the ground that the speaker was accommodating his answer to what his questioner would be expected to approve ; but the two facts – that the totem was a kind or clan of animals or plants, and not one individual of the species, and that a blood-kinship between the totem and his worshippers was assumed – afford a presumption against such identification. In fetishism, where such an identification takes place, there is a retrogression in religion.

(c) The digression into the discussion of altar, idol, and temple was relevant to the matter, but we may now return to the subject of sacrifice, from which it started. In a previous chapter reference has already been made to different theories of sacrifice : in connection with totemism the aspect of it which emerges is the *sacrificial meal*. W. Robertson Smith has formulated a theory, which Jevons reproduces with further illustrations ; but we may now briefly summarise

¹ Moore, *History of Religion*, I., p. 147.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

his own presentation of it in *The Religion of the Semites*, Lectures VIII.-XI.: "The god and his worshippers are wont to eat and drink together, and by this token their fellowship is declared and sealed." This common seal is a sign of kinship. "The idea that kinship is not purely an affair of birth, but may be acquired, has quite fallen out of our circle of ideas. . . . In ancient times the fundamental obligations of kinship had nothing to do with degrees of relationship, but rested with absolute and identical force on every member of the clan."¹ The customary law which determined a man's clan varied in the stages of society; in the matriarchal society a man belonged to his mother's clan, in the patriarchal to his father's. Of this law the essential idea of kinship was independent; for "a kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together, in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts of one common life."² The religious significance of this idea lies here. "The god himself was conceived as being of the same stock with his worshippers. It was natural, therefore, that the kinsmen and their kindred god should seal and strengthen their fellowship by meeting together from time to time to nourish their common life by a common meal, to which those outside the kin were not admitted."³ Even when clans had united in a nation, and the national unity was consecrated by a common worship of one god, this clan sacrifice might be maintained, as in the days of Saul and David (1 Sam. xx. 6, 29). This common meal always involved the sacrifice of a victim. "Conversely, every slaughter was a clan sacrifice; that is, a domestic animal was not slain except to procure the material for a public meal of kinsmen."⁴ But only for so sacred a purpose was an animal slaughtered, for the animal is just as much a kinsman as is the human clansman, and his life as sacred; that life cannot be taken to gratify individual appetite, but only for the interests of the religious community. The reason for the sacrifice was its *sacramental efficacy*. "The notion that, by eating the flesh, or particularly by drinking the blood, of another living being, a man absorbs its nature or life into his own, is one which appears among primitive peoples in many forms."⁵ This idea is applied in the institution of blood-brotherhood; "In the simplest form of this rite, two men became brothers by opening their veins and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 271.² *Idem*, pp. 273-274.³ *Idem*, p. 275.⁴ *Idem*, p. 281.⁵ *Idem*, p. 313.

sucking one another's blood."¹ When the compacts were between whole clans, an animal sacrifice was made ; thus a sufficient supply of blood was obtained. The relation of the clan to its god, however, was not one of contract, but of kinship. The physical unity between the god and the clan might sometimes seem to need renewal, as when the god showed his displeasure by some calamity suffered by his worshippers. And the common meal, involving the sacrifice of a victim, was the natural way at this stage of religious thinking. At this common meal the whole clan must be present ; the whole victim must be consumed ; and the god shared the meal with his worshippers. In this common meal, however, there was not only eating *with*, but *of*, the god, hence the need and the desire to consume the whole victim, in which the god offered himself to his worshippers to be fully appropriated by them.² This idea reappears in the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. It appears spiritualised in Paul's conception of his identity with Christ (Gal. ii. 20). We need not follow the development of sacrifice further, as what we are here concerned with is the conception of the divine which sacrifice, especially as the sacrificial meal and its sacramental efficacy, involves. The affinity of God and man, the community of life between God and man, the communication of the life of God to man, the participation of man in the life of God – all Christian ideas – have their crude yet real beginning in such sacrifice.

(d) As within the clan the family realises its separate unity, and as within the family the individual gains any independence, religion becomes correspondingly modified. "Though both guardian spirits and family gods may be obtained from the ranks of the community's gods," says Jevons, "it is quite possible for the opposite process to take place." If a family has its own totem god, as well as the clan, on fusion of clans, a family or clan god may become the highest god. So also a guardian spirit may become hereditary, that is, a family god, and in time the god of a clan. This is, however, the exception. "The community is prior chronologically to the family, and the emancipation of the individual . . . is later even than the segregation of the family, the flow of gods has its source in the gods of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 314.

² If not consumed, the remains of the victim had to be disposed of in some other way, as, e.g., by being "burned or cast into a stream" (*idem*, p. 405).

community originally."¹ It is only as the family becomes consolidated that *ancestor-worship* fully develops. The establishment of the family is probably closely associated with the transition from nomad to settled life, from the pastoral to the agricultural stage. To this, too, possibly corresponds the emergence of the matriarchate instead of the patriarchate,² as in most peoples agriculture is specially the function of the women, and the business of the men still remains hunting, raiding, fighting. The keeper of the home gains in importance. It has been conjectured that plant totems belong to this stage of transition ; and that their comparative infrequency is due to the fact that when this stage was reached, totemism as representing a cruder form of belief and worship was being superseded. It has also been suggested that plant totems may have been adopted by the women of a tribe, and afterwards by the whole community. Enough has in several sections been said about the association of spirits with other natural objects, and their localisation in mountains, caves, springs, rivers, groves,³ etc. ; and we can now pass to consider the third type of animism, which is generally called *Naturism*.

(5) The principle which is guiding our thought in trying from the data at our disposal to rediscover the course of religious development, with special reference to the conception of God, may be recalled ; it is this : that man's knowledge was acquired, not from intellectual curiosity, but from practical necessity. (The disinterested pursuit of science belongs to a stage of human evolution, when the struggle of life had been eased, and energies could be diverted from the means of living to the claims of thinking.)

(a) The knowledge, thus directed to practical ends, was affected by the social organisation and the industrial advance. It is obvious that agriculture involves a wider interest in, a closer observation of, and an increasing insight into, the processes of nature than does the pastoral, and the pastoral than does the predatory. "For the nomad," says Jevons, "dependent on roots, berries, and the chase, the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

² This is what some anthropologists maintain, while others regard the matriarchate as more primitive ; the second assumption would seem to involve, however, that the group preceded the family, and even that promiscuity or polyandry prevailed.

³ A general principle seems to be that spots were chosen which by their fertility afforded nourishment to men and animals (especially those regarded as sacred, e.g. *totem*), or by their natural position shelter and security ; caves would be regarded as offering access to the nether world.

computation of time has no inducement. For the herdsman there is an evident advantage in being able to calculate in how many months he may expect his flocks to bring forth their young. Thus there are several natural forces with which, and on which, the herdsman has to reckon : streams, fountains, clouds, the sky, and the moon. . . . For the agriculturist, even greater powers of prevision are necessary.”¹ The observation of the moon is not now enough ; he must take account of the seasons, and these depend on the course of the sun. “Hence the four great festivals of the agricultural stage of civilisation are the winter solstice (*brumalia*, Yule, Christmas), the vernal equinox (Easter ; A.-S. Eostra, a goddess), the summer solstice (the great festival of Olympian Zeus) and the autumn equinox.”² But the agriculturist even more than the pastoralist depends on the weather, sunshine or shower ; he lifts his eyes often from earth to heaven³ ; but of the earth also he must think, for the soil may by its quality give or withhold increase. The tempest may lay low the standing grain, or the breeze dry the cut corn after rain. Earth, air (the winds), fire (sun and moon), and water (streams, springs, showers) – the four elements affect his life. Sun and moon and earth are deified as powers on which man constantly depends.⁴ Instead of each stream having its naiad, or the sea its nereids, or each tree its dryad, there came to be gods of the waters, vegetation, the winds, etc. While nature is not completely unified, departments of nature are recognised, with their controlling deities. This increase in man’s interest in, and observation of, nature, combined with the loosening of the clan or tribal bond, would tend to counteract the movement towards unification which has been previously described. Thus *polydemonism* passes into *polytheism*. This transition has been well expressed by Goblet d’Alviella : “The souls of natural objects endowed with the character of permanence or of periodicity, such as the sky, the earth, the heavenly bodies, the elements, vegetation, etc., often tend to assume a special importance. They are, none the less, regarded as distinct from their visible garb, and likewise have a proper physical form assigned to them, which is ordinarily the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 227. ² *Idem*, pp. 227–228.

³ Rain from heaven now acquires an importance which it had not at the pastoral stage, when the relation of the waters above and below would not yet be recognised.

⁴ The same connection with the course of the seasons belongs to the Jewish festivals, Passover, Pentecost, Tabernacles.

human form or that of one of the higher animals.¹ The genii so conceived of may temporarily leave their domain, and even intervene in a number of affairs that have no connection with their original function. They thus tend to encroach upon the sphere of the souls of ancestors and upon that of ordinary spirits. When we look at them from another side, we note that, while the majority of spirits are regarded as malevolent, and are dreaded and treated accordingly, the genii of nature are sometimes ill-omened and at other times propitious, like the phenomena over which they preside ; and hence they tend to awaken in their worshippers a mingled sentiment of fear and of affection, corresponding to this double aspect of their nature. We frequently note a disposition to exaggerate their benevolent side, and, above all, their power by the use of flatteries, unconscious or deliberate, which in the end are brought forward as the expression of the truth. Certain genii tend thus to outstrip the other superhuman powers, and to become man's allies in his conflict with the hostile forces of nature."²

(b) I have written the article on "Polytheism" in the *E. R. E.*, and may here repeat some of the distinctions between spirits and gods there mentioned. The god is conceived more definitely than the spirit, he has more individuality, and bears a name. With more of "a name" he has less of a "local habitation" ; he is less confined to any natural object or process which he controls ; his functions are more departmental and constant, less individual and occasional ; hence his power is greater, superhuman in increasing degree. "Speaking generally, the relation to the gods is more definite, intimate, and confident than that to the spirits."³ For the reasons indicated, more attention was given to the works and ways of the gods ; and stories were told about their doings towards men, and relations to one another. This activity on the objects of belief begets mythology rather than theology ; and this mythology

¹ Cf. discussion of *idols* in a previous paragraph.

² *E. R. E.*, Vol. I., p. 537. A sentence from Dr. Oman (*op. cit.*, p. 393) may here be added as indicating another factor : "The rise of polytheism is specially related to man's realisation of himself as a concrete individual, and, in particular, by the possession of private property as the special sphere of his rights and responsibilities." This leads to a more distinct differentiation of the characters and the functions of the gods.

³ *E. R. E.*, Vol. X., p. 112. Exception must be made of the one clan or tribal god, who had been exalted above the multitude of spirits.

has presented an aspect of religion which discredits it to reason and conscience. "The personification of natural processes, the endowment of those gods with human qualities, passions, relations, and activities, the free play of the imagination with this varied material, the reflex influence of language on thought, metaphor begetting myth, the absence of any control of this development by scientific knowledge, moral sense, and religious reverence – these factors combined explain the luxuriant, extravagant, and sometimes grotesque and even offensive mythology, which connects itself with polytheism in the religions of mankind."¹ It has to be remembered, however, that in most religions belief is subordinate to worship ; no creed is imposed, while a ritual is prescribed.

(c) As has in a previous chapter been already mentioned, the analogy between natural processes and sexual acts of reproduction, and the description of these processes as the personal acts of gods and goddesses – i.e. the fertilisation of the earth by heaven in rain – opened the door to a play of fancy which represented the gods in attitudes offensive to a growing moral sense. As religion is more conservative than morality, conscience condemned creed, if we may so describe the mythology. Plato's attitude is too well known to need to be stated in detail. But two less known instances may be given. "Homer and Hesiod," says Xenophanes, "ascribe to the gods everything that among men is a shame and a disgrace – theft, adultery, and deceit." More defiant is Euripides in *Amphitryon's* address to Zeus in the *Herakles* : "O Zeus, in vain I shared my wife with thee, in vain I called thee father of my son ; thou hast not proved the friend thou dost pretend to be. Mortal that I am, I am much better than thou, a great god ! For I did not betray Herakles' children, but thou understandest how stealthily to find thy way to men's beds, taking possession of others' couches without their consent, but how to save thine own friends thou dost not know. Thou art a stupid god, if not an honest one."² The defenders of the ancient beliefs had recourse to allegorising, a not unjustified method in view of the process of the formation of many of the myths, although in others the lower moral standards of the time of their invention were reflected. By the same method Philo sought to harmonise Hebrew piety and Greek philosophy ; and the

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. X., p. 113.

² Quoted by Moore, *History of Religions*, Vol. I., pp. 458, 488

Christian Fathers tried to show as *latent* in the Old Testament what was *patent* in the New. Augustine states that the more offensive the literal sense the more need of seeking for its spiritual meaning. This dilemma of progressive morality and conservative religion still remains. Dean Mansel must needs defend such doctrines as that of eternal punishment by the assertion that what is wrong for man may be right for God, and that God can suspend moral as He can physical laws.¹ Thus also did a Scottish minister, after putting up the best defence he could for the lower morality of the Old Testament, confess his own dissatisfaction: "It may be that God must do in His official capacity what He would be ashamed to do as a private individual." This matter has been carried beyond the immediate occasion, as this is one of the permanent difficulties in the relation of religion and morals, coming down from the days of mythology to our own time. The advance of the theoretical no less than the practical reason involves the same difficulty for any religion which clings to a mythology or a theology which the human mind has outgrown. These questions will need to be much more fully discussed in subsequent chapters of this volume.

(6) National or social differences show themselves in the development of thought about the gods; some religions have a luxuriant, others a penurious mythology. (a) The Chinese are little interested in the nature of their gods, whereas the Japanese tell many tales about them. Of the Chinese gods Moore writes: "These powers have no plastic, dramatic individuality, like the gods of Greece. No mythology recites their exploits. They have definite functions, and by these alone they themselves are defined. In this, as in other respects, the religion of China strikingly resembles that of the Romans; for a practical people it is enough to know what the gods do, and what their worshippers have to do to secure their favour, without trying to imagine what they are like."² But above all the gods there ranks *T'ien*, the sky, an impersonal name more characteristic than its personal variant *Shang-ti*, at least as Confucius represented the ancient native religion. For this depersonalising Legge mildly blames Confucius. "I would say that he was unreligious rather than irreligious; yet by the coldness of his temperament and intellect in this matter his influence is unfavourable to the development of true religious feeling

¹ See Flint, *Agnosticism*, pp. 566-568.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

among the Chinese people generally.”¹ But was not Confucius himself typically Chinese? Had he not been so, could he have so altered the disposition of a people? His reticence regarding the nature of spirits and of the future life is equally characteristic. T’ien is even more the guardian of the moral and social order than the natural. The questions Confucianism left unanswered about spirits and the hereafter have been answered in the popular Taoism and the imported Buddhism. Ancestor-worship has probably so large a place in Chinese religion because of the lack of mythological or theological interest.

(b) The Japanese religion, Shintoism, on the contrary, shows little (if any) interest in morals, although Japan had, as every people has, a customary morality even before the adoption of the more fully developed ethical system of Confucianism. Rich as is the Japanese mythology, a feature in which it resembles the Greek, yet it does not in its representation of the gods go in the way of anthropomorphism. In the temple the spiritual presence of the deity (*mitama*) dwells in a holy object (*shintai*); e.g. the sun-goddess, holding the highest place among the gods, is present in a mirror as her symbol. Veneration of the State in Japan corresponds to the ancestor-worship of China, and bears resemblance to the emperor-cult in Rome.

(c) An interesting illustration of the practical character of Roman religion is afforded by the *Di Indigetes*. “It seems probable,” says Jevons, “that there were four classes of these functional deities: the first consisted of those indwelling in articles of food, clothing, and other necessities of life; and the second of those in certain parts of houses (door, hinge, threshold, etc.); but the other two classes are the most interesting, because the *di* comprised in them are all immanent, not in material things, but in processes (1) of farming, (2) of human life – and they showed that the Romans had reached the conclusion that anything whatever to which a class-name could be given had a real existence, affording a sphere for the functioning of a spiritual being. Examples of *Di Indigetes* are the spirit of sowing (*a satione Sator*), harrowing (*ab occatione deus Occator*), dunging (*a stercoratione Sterculinius*), of doors (*Forculus a foribus*), hinges (*Cardea a cardinibus*) of the threshold (*Limentinus*), of talking (*Locutius*), of the cradle (*Cunina*), etc. The most probable derivation of the word *indiges* is from *indu* (cf. *ένδον* and

¹ *Life and Teaching of Confucius*, p. 100.

indu-perator = im-perator) and *ag* (the stem of *agere*), in the sense of the god that acts, manifests himself, or is immanent in a thing.”¹

(*d*) It is the Latin and the Greek mythology which has been incorporated into the culture of the Western world, owing to the incomparable Greek genius in literature and sculpture. Originally the parallelism was not so complete, as the literature makes it appear ; the Latin and the Greek deities, which have been identified with one another, had not all the same religious development behind them. Nowhere has *anthropomorphism* been carried further than in Greek art and literature ; the gods have not only the forms of men, but also their passions (*anthropopathism*). One may say that the Greek was too familiar with his gods, brought them too thoroughly within his human finitude. The sense of mystery finds expression in the conception of fate. Of Zeus and fate Dr. Moore writes : “ The poets knew the old myth of Zeus’s birth, and how he supplanted his father. A like fate may one day overtake him ; but in the age that now is, he alone is supreme over gods and men and nature ; his will is law and destiny. Sometimes, however, there rises, behind and above Zeus, the vague and but faintly personified power of fate (*Μοῖρα Αἰσα*) or of the moral and social order (*Θέμις Δίκη*), something like the Vedic Rita and the Avestan Asha.”² (I should here add the Indian *Karma*, and the Chinese *Tao*.) Browning, in one of his poems, has shown his insight in comparing the perfection of Greek with the imperfection of early Christian art. The one achieved because it aimed at the finite ; the other fell short because it had the sense of the infinite. For Greek religion God is more akin and within man than above and beyond him ; and yet these two aspects are complementary.

(*e*) The mention of Zeus leads us easily to the Indian religion in view of Max Müller’s equation : *Jupiter* = *Zeús πατήρ* = *Dyaush-pita*, an evidence of the common Aryan inheritance. But the history of Dyaus is less glorious than that of Jupiter or Zeus. “ Even in the Veda,” says Max Müller, “ Dyaus is already a fading star. The meaning of the word is generally given as sky, but its truer meaning would be ‘ the bright or the shining one,’ for it is derived from the root *div* or *dya*, to shine, to lighten ; and it was this activity of shining and illuminating the world which was embodied in the name of Dyaus. Who the shining one was.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 246.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 431.

the word by itself did not declare. He was an *asura*, a living one ; that was all. Afterwards only, Dyaus became the centre of mythological stories, while in the ordinary language it dwindled away, just like Savitri, the life-giver, into one of the many traditional and unmeaning words for sky." The Greek Zeus and the Latin Jupiter gained the supremacy among the gods. "In the Vedic Dyaus, too, we can watch the same tendency ; but it was there counteracted by that tendency inherent in almost every Deva to assume a superlative character."¹ To the tendency referred to in the last sentence (*henotheism* or *kathenotheism*) we shall in the next chapter return, but meanwhile the words *Asura* and *Deva* direct our attention to an interesting feature of Indian religion. "The root *as*, which still lives in our *he is*, is a very old root ; it existed in its abstract sense previous to the Aryan separation. Nevertheless we know that *as*, before it could mean to be, meant to breathe. The simplest derivation of *as*, to breathe, was *as-u* – in Sanskrit, breath ; and from it probably *asu-ra*, those who breathe, who live, who are, and, at last, the oldest name for the living gods, the Vedic *Asura*."² The origin of the term *Deva* is in the root *div* already mentioned, which means bright. "Afterwards this word *deva* was applied, as a comprehensive designation, to all the bright powers of the morning and the spring, as opposed to all the dark powers of the night and the winter " . . . then "*deva* came to mean 'god.'"³ The Devas superseded the Asuras as the gods worshipped, and the Asuras became demons. "In the Atharva-Veda and later the Asuras are demons who are mythical antagonists of the gods and enemies of men. In the Rig-Veda the name usually designates the gods, or a group of gods, of which Varuna is the chief, as, in the Avesta, Ahura is the highest god ; seldom, and almost solely in the tenth book, they are opposed to the gods, and are combated by them. Indra is invoked to scatter the godless Asuras ; Agni promises to make a hymn by which the gods shall vanquish the Asuras."⁴ In Persia we find exactly the reverse process. "The Dævas are the gods of the popular religion and of the tribes who did not embrace the Zoroastrian reform." "It is a tempting conjecture," adds Dr. Moore, "that the ancestors of the Iranian tribes among which Mazdaism arose were more

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 276–277.

² *Idem*, pp. 191–192.

³ *Idem*, pp. 4–5.

⁴ Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

intimately connected with the Aryo-Indian tribes, whose greatest god was Varuna, than with the Indra-worshippers, who in the invasion and conquest gained for themselves and their gods the leading place ; but the conjecture that a religious conflict between the Mazda-worshippers and those who adhered to the old nature religion preceded the separation of the Indian and Iranian branches of the race, and was one of its causes, has not found general acceptance."¹ Whether the resulting difference was due to climatic conditions or to historical circumstances, the Iranian branch of the common Aryan stock advanced to a vigorous moralism, the Indian lapsed to a demoralising ritualism.

(f) The saying is familiar that a metaphor may become a dogma : in India ritual begat its own divinities. Passing over the development of Agni and Soma, we may confine ourselves to the story of Brahma. "This subtle, almost magical energy," says Geden, "subsisting in the formula employed or the mantra spoken, was termed *brahman*, a word often used in the Veda to signify prayer, hymn, or even spell ; and which has had a long and interesting history. Derived probably from a root *vr̥ch* or *br̥ch*, meaning to grow, increase, it indicates properly the religious feeling of reverence or devotion, as growing and developing within the soul, and later the outward expression of this devotion in prayer or hymn or praise. . . . The word is then employed to denote a sacred text, or *mantram*, used as an adjuration to dispel evil influences, or a formula securing good. . . . It is then further extended to signify in general the inspired word, the sacred text, the Veda itself. From this meaning of the sacred text it passed to its contents, religious knowledge or theology, especially the higher theoretical or speculative wisdom as opposed to the lower and practical, the merely external life of works of the unenlightened lay worshipper or the mendicant, which at its best consisted only in formal observances, or in self-mortification and austerity. And finally, in its loftiest, most abstract signification, the word was used to express the great object of religious knowledge, Brahma, the self-existent supreme being, from whom all souls come, and to whom all souls return."² We shall revert to the development into pantheism, and also the compromise of that pantheism with the two popular

¹ *Idem*, pp. 367-368.

² *Studies in the Religions of the East*, pp. 235-237. Cf. Max Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-360 note.

cults of Vishnu and Siva in the next chapter. In closing this reference to one of the most interesting of religious developments, an explanation must be offered of a feature of Hindu religion which appears most repellent – the grotesque hideousness of the idols. “It should be remembered, however,” says Moore, “that all this ugliness is symbolical; the supernatural powers of the deity are intended to be expressed by these unnatural forms. The Hindu gods are less beautiful than the purely anthropomorphic gods of Greek art because of the effort to make them more manifestly divine.”¹ An illustration from Christian Apocalypse suggests itself: “A Lamb standing, as though it had been slain, having seven horns, and seven eyes, which are the seven spirits of God sent forth into all the earth” (Rev. v. 6. The seven horns symbolise absolute power, the seven eyes perfect wisdom). The Egyptian religion expressed its sense of infinitude by vastness of size.

(7) Much has already been said on the influence of industrial and social development in religion, and may at this point be recalled. Even political changes are reflected in the mythology. (a) In Egypt the common device is a representation of a family relationship among gods brought into a common worship. “The gods form natural family groups,” says Moore. “In the commonest type, the chief god of a canton has a wife and a son, who are associated with him in worship as subordinate figures. The spouse is often a goddess whose seat was in another town in the district, or in the capital of a neighbouring nome, and the son is borrowed in a similar way. Thus, Amon of Thebes makes Montu (who, as the god of the older capital, Hermonthis, had been the god of the canton while Amon was still a local nobody) his son, thus emphasising Amon’s newly established superiority; Amon’s consort is Mut, a vulture goddess, who was by that sign identified with Nekhebt, the goddess of the original capital of Upper Egypt, Eleithyiaopolis. Another name is Amont, a deity created by the simple device of adding a feminine ending to Amon. In his character of sun-god, Amon-Re, however, took the moon-god, Khonsu, as his son, and Montu was thus supplanted. If the cantonal deity was a goddess, she took a husband from among the neighbouring gods, but in her own temple kept him in a position of masculine subordination.”² Re (or Ra) was the sun-god, worshipped at Heliopolis, and rose to be the

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 345–346.

² *Idem*, p. 172.

supreme god of the Middle Kingdom; but the gods of provincial cities, as they grew in importance, were in turn identified with him. When the Theban Empire, ruling all Egypt, was established, Amon and Re became one god as Amon-Re.

(b) Marduk, the local deity of Babylon, became the chief god when his city became the capital. He superseded Enlil of Nippur, claimed to be the son of Ea of Eridu, noted for his wisdom, and adopted Nabu, the god of Borsippa, as his son and prophet, but Sayce says of him: "He remained essentially local in character; if he was the lord of the other gods, it was only because the King of Babylon was lord also of other cities and lands. It is not until Babylon ceases to be an independent power that this local conception of the great Babylonian divinity tends to disappear." It was Cyrus, the conqueror of Babylon, who, though a foreigner from Elam, by becoming a worshipper of Bel-Merodach and his favourite "enlarged the old conception of Bel and gave to him a universal character."¹ Similar is the story of Assur: "He was the god of Assur (now Kaleb-Sherghat), the primitive capital of the country. But several causes conspired to occasion him to lose this purely local character, and to assume in place of it a national character. The capital of Assyria was shifted from Assur to Nineveh, and the worship of Assur, instead of remaining fixed at Assur, was shifted at the same time," and as Assyria "was not divided into separate States, as was so often the case with Babylonia, a national feeling was permitted to grow up."²

(c) A recent writer on the subject of the fear of God in the Koran gives an interesting illustration of the influence of temperament and government combined on the conception of the divine. "This attitude" (of fear), says Professor Lee Vrooman, Smyrna, "has its explanation in the Semitic conception of God. Man judges the unknown by the known and gives it the name derived from this. The great authority to the Bedouin in earthly affairs has always been the Sheikh, a ruler possessing absolute power, and entirely without responsibility in its exercise. He conceives God as the great Sheikh. It is the infinite power of God and the inscrutability of His methods that impress him most in the solitude of the desert. Before the awful power of God, man is no more than a mere insect; God does with him

¹ *The Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians*, pp. 107-108.

² *Idem*, pp. 113-114.

what He will. To resist God is impossible, to question Him absurd. And to love Him is an idea which would never occur to the Bedouin. To transpose the words of the Apostle, perfect fear casts out love, renders it impossible and inconceivable."¹ The early conception of Yahveh was also of the desert, and in Rom. ix. even Paul rebukes Jewish arrogance by an *argumentum ad hominem* – the exposition of so arbitrary omnipotence. The description of the divine as father is not uncongenial to the Aryan mind ; to the Semitic, it has been contended the conception of Lord, Baal, Bel, is more natural ; but W. Robertson Smith discounts "the natural tendency of Semitic religion towards ethical monotheism,"² and states that "Baal" does not mean "the lord of the worshipper," but "the possessor of some place or district."³ He would possibly not have endorsed the quotations given above.

(8) Religious belief and worship must also be recognised in their influence on mythology as it developed towards a theology. In Babylon there was in the thought of the priesthood the beginnings of theology. The universe was partitioned among three gods : Anu rules in heaven, Enlil in earth and air, and Ea in the waters. The Vedic gods, too, are classified as of the sky, the air, and the earth. In Egypt, local gods, whose worship could not be suppressed, are represented as manifestations of the national gods. An instance of the influence of ritual in the creation of the deities Brahma, Agni, and Soma has already been given. How the accident of language may affect religious conceptions appears in Egyptian mythology. Generally speaking, heaven is conceived as father, and earth as mother ; but the grammatical gender of earth (*Geb*) is masculine, and the heaven or sky (*Nut*) is feminine ; and thus the relation has been reversed.⁴

(9) No attempt has been made to give a systematic account of polytheism in the various religions of the world. Illustrations have been chosen, interesting in themselves, but also important as showing the workings of the mind of man in religion as reacting on environment in space and time. This survey has led me to the conclusion that Dr. Jevons in his most valuable book tends to simplify unduly what was, and must have been, a very complex development. That all peoples passed through an *animistic* stage

¹ *The Moslem World*, Vol. XXI., p. 245.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

³ *Idem*, p. 94.

⁴ See Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

seems to me as nearly certain as in such a matter we can be ; for if there be the distinction of soul and body, in some form or other it must sooner or later have emerged into consciousness. I am, however, by no means convinced that every religion must have passed through just the kind of *totemistic* stage which our present knowledge allows us to describe, or that the theory of sacrifice, based on *totemism* alone, holds the field. (I have in an earlier chapter dealt more fully with this question.) To call the worship of the totem spirit a crude *monotheism* seems to me an inexact use of language, as the existence of other powerful spirits was recognised. Ascribing polytheism to *synoikismos*, the fusion of several tribes into a single State, and regarding polytheism as the penalty for such political progress, Jevons modifies that to me untenable position by the admission that "the sky-god, whose favour is essential to the herbage which supports the herdsman's cattle, as well as to the farmer's crops, may be worshipped conveniently with the totem plant or animal, and retain his independence, as the Dyaus, Zeus, Jupiter, of the Aryans, did."¹ In preceding sections of this chapter other valid reasons for polytheism have been offered.

To summarise what has been discussed in this chapter : polydæmonism preceded polytheism ; at the predatory and the pastoral stage, while the existence and potency of many spirits was recognised, the tribal worship was generally given to the spirit which may be described as the tribal god ; this *henotheism* or *monolatry* (relative and not absolute) was not reached only by the way of *totemism* ; such another way as Dr. Baillie indicates, the choice of the spirit of a locality must be recognised as probable, although it is not improbable that both ways might converge. With the transition from the pastoral to the agricultural stage, we may associate the development of the worship of ancestors out of the more general Cult of the Dead, as the family then assumed a more stable form ; and *naturism*, the wider recognition of the order in nature, on which the life of man was seen to depend, and the exaltation of some of the spirits associated with natural objects or phenomena to the rank of gods ; the *synoikismos* would enlarge the pantheon, where *syncretism* did not take place : but polydæmonism would still survive along with polytheism. This evolution was at every stage affected by the total conditions of thought and still

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 239.

more life. Polytheism is, however, not the consummation ; within the evolution, even up to this stage, there are motives and tendencies and endeavours which point beyond to the goal – belief in one God. The consideration of this movement must be reserved for another chapter.

CHAPTER VI

THE DIVINE OBJECT OF RELIGION

C. Polytheism and Monotheism

I

(1) POLYTHEISM is so varied in its aspects, and so varying in its phases, that much more of interest and importance might be written about it, were the primary object of this volume the general discussion of the religious consciousness, but as its main purpose is to show the world-wide background in the religions of the Christian belief in God – the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets, as confirmed and completed in the revelation of God as Father in Christ as Son – attention must now be concentrated on the one tendency within polytheism towards the unification of the object of belief and worship. Some indications of this tendency, and the reasons for it, and the motives of it, have already been given, but for the sake of completeness of treatment must be recalled.

(a) While I am in agreement with Dr. F. B. Jevons that monotheism was not evolved out of polytheism by what may be regarded as a natural process, yet I cannot agree with him that monotheism may have been the original religion, and that this revelation may have been made to primitive man¹; nor can I in all points follow the argument by which he counters the presumption that monotheism was evolved out of polytheism.² As has been shown in chapter iv., I cannot regard *totemism* as the lowest form of religion known to science; as, if religion does go back to the beginnings of human development, there were earlier and even cruder forms, *preanimistic* and *animistic*, in which it is difficult always to distinguish religion and magic. Totemism, or, if we are not warranted in assuming it as primitive or universal, the belief in, and worship of, a tribal deity such as is found in totemism, may be regarded as one of the earliest forms of the unification which as a common tendency in the religions may be regarded as at least pointing towards the goal of

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 6–7, 396–397.

² *Idem.* Summary under *Monotheism* in Index, p. 430.

monotheism. To call such belief and worship monotheism would be only confusing, since the existence of other spirits or gods, and their potent interference in human life, was at the same time theoretically and practically recognised. We have called it *henotheism* or *monolatry*. It is a spontaneous tendency due to two causes – the sense of tribal unity expressing itself in religion, and the recognition of the analogy of life in man and in plants and animals, their natural kinds corresponding to his clan or tribe. Each of these causes presupposes a considerable development.

(b) There are two causes which may be assigned for the next tendency to be mentioned, viz. *syncretism*. When two tribes were brought into a political unity; one method of unification in religion was the fusion of worships and the combination of names, e.g. Amon-Ra in Egypt. While generally the deities were localised, so that change of abode involved change of worship¹; yet, if the bond between a tribe or people and its god was strong enough, there might be a transfer of this object of worship to the new home. But then a difficulty emerged. The local deity in his potency and authority must receive some recognition. This is the kind of *syncretism* which we find in the popular religion of Israel, in which the worship of Yahveh and of the local Baal were combined, which the prophets denounced.²

(c) Where the deities had too distinctive a character to be thus fused with one another, or the attachment of the worshippers was too strong to be thus modified, another tendency emerges, which has been described as *monarchy* – the god of “the predominant partner” in the political combination is exalted as head of the pantheon, or assemblage of gods. Marduk in Babylon and Assur in Assyria have been mentioned already as instances. More familiar, and to us more interesting, is Zeus, and what came to be regarded as his Latin equivalent Jupiter. To this instance we may give fuller attention. “The relations of the Greek dialects,” says Dr. G. F. Moore,³ “show that the invaders of the successive waves of invasion were of different tribes, and it is a natural surmise that certain gods were peculiarly favoured by one tribe, others by another; but the attempts to prove this in particular cases – for example, that Apollo was originally a Dorian divinity – have not been permanently

¹ Several instances have been given in the previous chapter.

² This instance has already been discussed in the previous chapter.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 413–415.

convincing. . . . The greatest god in all branches of the Hellenic stock was Zeus, and his pre-eminence undoubtedly dates from the remotest antiquity. He is not only a god of the Greeks universally, but stands in close particular relation to the smaller political and social groups." Various local functions are assigned to him. "It is probable that in such cases Zeus has usurped the office of the functional deities whose names became his titles in these specific aspects ; but this makes the fact more significant ; it was not beneath the majesty of Zeus to be in religion an everyday god and serve very common uses." At Dodona, in Epirus, "Zeus was associated with Diōne, whose name marks her as the feminine counterpart of Zeus, presumably the oldest of his partners." Here "it is probable that Zeus and Diōne succeeded an older pair of powers whose presence was recognised in the springs, and who may already have been resorted to for omens. The same thing repeated itself in many other places ; the Greek immigrants identified their own chief god with the greater powers, whom their predecessors called by different local names, taking over the peculiar rites with which the *numen loci* was worshipped, and borrowing or inventing myths that explained the strange features of the worship." The process of syncretism was a factor in Zeus's monarchy among the gods. "The epics," says the same writer,¹ "also enabled men to conceive how the many gods, with their different characters and functions, their conflicting wishes and purposes, could consist with the unity of the divine government of the world. The Olympian State, like the Mycenæan kingdoms, which doubtless served as models for it, is a monarchy, with a factious aristocracy who often try to circumvent the sovereign and carry through their designs without his consent, but, when he chooses to assert himself, are powerless to escape his knowledge or resist his will." These quoted sentences serve to exhibit the process of unification. With the advance of civilisation and culture the demand for the divine unity became more insistent ; and thus we find in the development of Greek mythology an attempt to fit the inherited tales about the gods into the new intellectual framework.

(d) These tendencies to unification are due to causes which are not strictly religious ; we now turn to an instance in which the motive is explicitly religious – the absorption of the interest of the worshipper in one object of his devotion.

¹ *Idem*, p. 430.

This is what Max Müller calls *henotheism* or *kathenotheism*. The second term is the more appropriate, as his description will show, and the first should be reserved as an alternative to *monolatry*. "In the Veda," says he, "one god after another is invoked. For the time being, all that can be said of a divine being is ascribed to him. The poet, while addressing him, seems hardly to know of any other gods. But in the same collection of hymns, sometimes even in the same hymn, other gods are mentioned, and they also are truly divine, truly independent, or, it may be, supreme. The vision of the worshipper seems to change suddenly, and the same poet who at one moment saw nothing but the sun as the ruler of heaven and earth, now sees heaven and earth as the father and mother of the sun and of all the gods."¹ No contradiction or inconsistency was felt, because the different characters and the separate functions of the gods had not yet been distinctly defined as in later mythology. It was "by many steps, by many names, the infinite was grasped, the unknown named, and at last the divine reached."² Max Müller's definition, already noted, of religion as "a subjective faculty for the apprehension of the infinite"³ must in this connection be recalled. He maintains that it is not confined to India. "We see traces of it in Greece, in Italy, in Germany. We see it most clearly during that period which precedes the formation of nations out of independent tribes. It is, if I may say so, anarchy as preceding monarchy, a communal as distinct from an imperial form of religion."⁴ The sketch he gives of the further development of *henotheism*⁵ is not relevant to our present purpose. Without putting undue significance into this phase of devotion, we may say that mythology has made the conception of the gods more definite for thought than the reality was felt by piety to be; for piety cannot dissipate itself over a multitude, but must concentrate itself on one object. Having some likeness to this phase is the modern Indian *bhakti*, directed towards Krishna. "'Bhakti' is a word difficult to translate," says Dr. S. Cave. "Perhaps 'devotion' is the best English rendering. This devotion to the Lord may be directed to other gods. With the tolerance so characteristic of Hinduism, Krishna is said to receive all forms of worship. It is in this way that the most degraded indigenous cults have been absorbed into Hinduism. It is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 271.² *Idem*, p. 273.³ *Idem*, pp. 22-23.⁴ *Idem*, p. 286.⁵ *Idem*, pp. 289-294.

in this way, too, at the other extreme, that many Hindus to-day praise Christ through worshipping Kṛishna, and describe the worship Christians offer to Christ as acceptable to their Lord Kṛishna."¹ "For the Vaishnavite, this devotion gathers round the cycle of legends connected with the heroes, regarded as the two chief of Vishnu's incarnations, Kṛishna and Rāma. The Saivite devotion is directed to no incarnation of Siva, but to Siva himself, in his various forms and attributes."²

(2) Before passing to the conceptions of the divine in which the divine unity is explicitly recognised – pantheism, deism, and monotheism – and the consideration of what may be regarded as an intermediate stage – dualism – we may give attention to certain impersonal cosmic principles which give a unity to reality. (a) We may begin with the Chinese conception *Tao*. In dealing with Taoism as one of the three religions of China, Dr. W. E. Soothill gives the following account of it: "One fascinating word puzzles the student at the very outset – the word *Tao*. . . . The word itself was no new word in China, for it is quite clear that there were thoughtful men before Laocius who were searchers into and followers of *Tao*. Its meaning, in brief, is Way – THE WAY. In sound and meaning it bears so close a resemblance to the great word of Buddhism, Dharma, or Law, that the surmise of early Hindu influence in Taoism is worthy of respect. But *Tao* was used before the days of Laocius to describe the operations of nature, and may be interpreted as meaning the Course or Way of Nature, or Natural Law." . . . "If you can also conceive of the idea, in the pantheistic sense, of a Power, 'a Power that makes for righteousness,' immaterial, indefinable, eternal, ubiquitous, which finds differential expression in multitudinous forms or powers, then you will have some conception of the idea which Laocius seems to be striving to exhibit. In this sense, translating freely by using the word Power instead of Way, we might interpret the opening phrase of the *Tao Tê Ching* thus: 'The Power which can be defined is not the eternal Power; the name by which it can be named is not its eternal name. When nameless, it is the origin of the universe (literally the heavens and the earth); when it has a name, it is the genetrix (mother) of all things. Therefore (only he who is) ever passionless may behold its mystery. (He who is) ever subject to his passions may (only) see its

¹ *Redemption, Hindu and Christian*, p. 110.

² *Idem*, p. 116.

external manifestations. These two things (i.e. the mysterious or immaterial, and the manifestation or material) differ in name, but are the same in origin. Their unity is a deep, a deep of deeps ; it is the portal of all mystery.'"¹ This principle has an ethical as well as a cosmic significance. "It represents also that ideal state of pristine perfection in which all things acted harmoniously and spontaneously, and when good and evil were unknown ; the return to that condition constitutes the *summum bonum* of the philosophy of Laocius."² Soothill mentions the Buddhist *Dharma* as having some connection with the Chinese *Tao* ; but what seems to me to bear a closer resemblance is the Hindu as well as Buddhist *Karma*.

(b) The conception of *Karma* is not cosmic, but ethical. It concerns the destiny of man. In it two conceptions, which were originally distinct, are combined – that of transmigration, and that of future recompense. "The thought of a return of the soul to the earth, to inhabit another human or animal body," says Dr. Geden, "or even that of an insect or plant, is common to nearly all primitive peoples, and is undoubtedly of great antiquity. The other thought, of a recompense in another world for the deeds done in this, is neither so widespread nor so old ; and where it is accepted it has usually been as an alternative to the earlier view of the soul's future destiny, superseding or displacing it, but not amalgamating with it. The combination was effected in India by transferring the retribution from a future and unknown world to the known present, and making the amount of the recompense precisely equivalent to that which the deeds of the individual may deserve and have determined. Hence to a greater degree, and more forcefully than can perhaps be found elsewhere, the Indian doctrine of *Karma* and transmigration fixes personal responsibility."³ As regards the practical influence of this doctrine, it would appear that it does not sustain the sense of liberty, but rather imposes a feeling of bondage to the past. "To most thinkers," says Dr. S. Cave, "this doctrine appears to solve life's mysteries, but it has not eased life's pain. Life has seemed not good, but evil, and the supreme quest of Indian philosophy has been, not abstract truth, but freedom from the bondage of the *Karma* of past deeds."⁴ Dissatisfied with the deliverance which Indian philosophy offered (a

¹ *The Three Religions of China*, pp. 46–48.

² *Idem*, p. 48.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 297.

⁴ *Living Religions of the East*, p. 34.

deliverance to which we must again refer in dealing with pantheism), Gautama the Buddha sought, found, and offered men another way of salvation. He too started from the doctrine of *Karma*, but set aside the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. "There is no 'soul' which in its individual and personal identity endures through many births," for each individual is made up of five groups of qualities, or *skandhas*. "The dissolution of the *skandhas* which takes place at death is immediately followed by a reconstitution. Thus a new individual arises in this or some other world through the combining together afresh of the groups whose union had been momentarily broken up. The link between successive existences, between the new and the old, is *Karma*, action, or rather – since the word is without an English equivalent – action with all its inevitable consequences, good and evil."¹ It is the recognition of this principle, constant and universal, which leads some scholars to maintain that Buddhism, despite its ignoring of all gods, can be called religion. For a similar reason the claim that it is a religion has been advanced for the metaphysics of McTaggart in his book, *The Nature of Existence*, which presents an interesting parallel to the Hindu in its main feature, but not in detail. "In his view the universe consists of a society of uncreated and eternal selves, which exist *sub specie temporis* through a succession of lives, in each of which the lot of the individual self is largely determined by the fact that, *sub specie æternitatis*, it is united to one or more other selves in a relation of love."²

(c) Theoretically the conception of *Karma* is distinguished from the conception of *fate* as what man brings on himself, and is not put on him; but practically it often leads to the same helpless, hopeless attitude. "The idea of fate," says A. Dorner, "is found only in conditions when some attempt has been made to trace all phenomena, and more particularly the phenomena of human life, to an ultimate unity. Fate, indeed, is precisely this unity apprehended as an inevitable necessity controlling all things; it is the absolutely inscrutable power to which all men are subject, and may be either personified or represented as impersonal."³ It is personified in the three Fates of Greek mythology, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who determined the birth, life, and death of man. While the conception prevails

¹ Geden, *op. cit.*, pp. 524-525.

² *Philosophy*, 1931, p. 325.

³ *E. R. E.*, Vol. V., p. 771.

wherever the belief in a rational order, or a purposive will, has not been reached, or as a relapse from such a higher mode of thought, we may now confine ourselves to Greek thought. Even Zeus himself is subject to fate, *Μοῖρα*, necessity, "who, acting independently of Zeus, assigns the term of human life. In the tragic poets the idea of fate was superseded by that of a just and beneficent world-order controlled by Zeus: *Μοῖρα* gives place to *Δίκη*. . . . Fate acquires an ethical significance, the *Μοῖρα* combines with the Erinyes, who punish *ὑβρις*, the temper which transgresses the limits of human power."¹ The Fate (*Εἰμαρμένη*) of the Stoics was a determinism, guided by intelligence to the best and wisest ends, of which even the gods themselves were organs, and this could be described as Providence, but even that was not altogether free from natural necessity. "Greek thought did not succeed in fully harmonising moral reason and natural necessity; it either identified the two, or admitted a residuum of dualism, and, while the conception of cosmic unity became more and more clearly formulated, all the more persistently did some remnant of fatalism maintain its ground, asserting itself alike in ritual and in moral life."²

(d) Without entering into any details regarding the Pre-Socratic attempts to find a unifying principle for the world, we may call attention to the principle formulated by Anaxagoras, the *νοῦς*, which he describes as "spontaneously operative, unmixed with anything, the ground of all motion, but itself unmoved, everywhere actively present, and of all things the finest and purest." He does not, however, escape dualism, for "side by side with the *νοῦς*, and equally original with it, there stands the mass of the primitive constituents of things: 'all things were together, infinitely numerous, infinitely little; then came the *νοῦς* and set them in order.'"³ This doctrine had been in so far anticipated by Heraclitus, inasmuch as he applies the kindred term *λόγος* to the process of the world, which he conceived as a process of becoming, as an ever-living Fire: the physical, ethical, and logical are here not differentiated as by Anaxagoras, owing to the undeveloped stage Greek thought had reached. This conception of the *λόγος* is taken up by the Stoics, but receives a pantheistic setting. "As actively productive and formative power the deity is the

¹ E.R.E., Vol. V., pp. 773-774.

² *Idem*, p. 774.

³ Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, pp. 28-29.

λόγος σπερματικός, the *vital principle*, which unfolds itself, in the multitude of phenomena, as their peculiar, particular λόγοι σπερματικοί, or *formative forces*. In this organic function God is, however, also the purposefully creating and guiding Reason, and thus, with regard to all particular processes, the all-ruling Providence (πρόνοια)."¹ To the use of this conception of λόγος in Hellenistic and Christian thought we must subsequently return. Stoicism did seek in its pantheism to transcend dualism; and it even offered a theodicy to solve the problem of good and evil in the world. That moral and religious dualism is, however, the characteristic of Iranian thought in Zoroastrianism, to which we must now turn.

(3) Although the Aryo-Indians and the Iranians belong to the same racial stock, yet their migrations from their common home brought them under so different conditions that the common religious ideas were greatly modified, until there came to be a very wide religious and moral divergence. Difference there would probably have been in any case, as religion is inevitably affected by the total conditions of life; but to the Iranians there was given a great religious personality, Zoroaster (Zara-thustra), about the date of whose activity there is still much dispute among scholars. The religion had taken root in Persia in the sixth century before Christ; and we must allow probably more than a century of previous development. The founder believed himself to have been called and fitted to proclaim to others the word which the Wise Lord, Ahura-Mazda (Ormuzd), had revealed to him after he had overcome the temptation of the evil power, Angra-Mainyu (Ahriman). He summoned his people to a conflict for Ormuzd against Ahriman. The doctrine he taught is recorded in the *Gathas*. The cleavage of good and evil is found in nature and man, and even among the spirits, for the gods of the popular religion (the *Devas*) have allied themselves with the evil power against the good. It is not, therefore, only an ethical, but also a metaphysical, dualism, and the conflict is cosmic as well as human. An attempt was made by later Zoroastrian speculation to resolve the metaphysical problem by the assumption of one first principle, Space or Time, from which there emerged a good god and an evil demon; but this metaphysical essay had no religious value whatever. The ethical dualism is resolved in the belief in the ultimate

¹ Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 180-181.

triumph of Ormuzd over Ahriman. The much later writing, the *Bundahish*, although it represents Ahriman as "the creator, not only of the demons, but of all that is bad in the natural world, from the wandering planets to the noisome insects," nevertheless teaches an ultimate universal perfection and restoration of all things. "The triumph of God is in this respect more complete than in Christianity, which leaves hell, with the devil and his angels and the wicked in torment for ever, an unconquered realm of evil."¹ Whether Christianity is really committed to such a position must be discussed in dealing later with the Christian doctrine of God. That Zoroastrianism through Judaism did in this doctrine affect Christian theology seems certain. In gnosticism and Manichæism the Christian Church was exposed to serious peril; and its theology did not altogether escape their influence. But dualism cannot remain a goal for man's thoughts.

(4) Polytheism cannot be accepted as a permanent form of religious belief and worship. In the measure in which human personality realises its own unity, and recognises unity in the world around, must multiplicity in the object of religion yield to unity. The mind demands one principle for the explanation of the world, in which the discovery is ever being made that "all things work together" (Rom. viii. 28). The heart craves one object of devotion, as *kathenotheism*, however imperfectly, shows. Conscience demands one supreme moral authority and one constant moral order; else morality is involved in perilous confusion. The attempt to revive polytheism in a philosophical form in *pluralism* seems to me a bad joke, a mere freak of intelligence; for William James does sometimes give one the impression that he is trying, to use the slang phrase, to pull the leg of his readers; it is a philosophy so much an anachronism, in view of man's intellectual no less than his moral and religious development, that it scarcely deserves the serious treatment which it receives in Ward's *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism*. It must be frankly conceded that the exposition and the demonstration of the divine unity amid the multiplicity of the world is beset with difficulty; to relate the many to the One is by no means an easy task. For the conception of the divine itself combines contrasts. To recall the description given of religion in an earlier chapter, the divine is *above* and *beyond* man and world, and yet *akin to* and *within*

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 404-405.

man. How to formulate the relation of the divine transcendence of the world to the divine immanence in the world, how to describe the difference and yet the affinity of God and man, is no easy problem. If personal perfection and absolute power are both assigned to God, as the religious consciousness in its fullest developments seems to demand, the very formidable problem of the relation of God as Almighty Goodness to the evil, physical and moral, arises. As regards the first of the problems, the relation of God to the world, the theistic solutions may be distinguished as regards their respective emphasis on immanence or transcendence into pantheism on the one hand, and deism on the other, and the monotheism which seeks the intermediate position. As regards the second problem – the difference between, and the affinity of, God and man – the *crux* is whether at all, or in how far, personality can be ascribed to God. As has already been stated, in religion man *anthropomorphises*, and the progress of religion is marked by an increasing *anthropomorphism*. Man as personal must think of God as at the very least as far personal as to be able to enter into personal relations with him. But as the difficulty of ascribing personality to God is not felt by religion, although thought by philosophy, the treatment of this question belongs to the second, or philosophical, part of the present volume. So does *theodicy*, although religion must find some working hypothesis in relief of doubt or support of faith. We shall in the remainder of this chapter be concerned with pantheism, deism, and monotheism.¹

II

(1) Although in religion there is present the contrast in the conception of the divine between the Above and Beyond, and the Akin and Within – the transcendence and the immanence – one of the tendencies to unification is the setting aside of the contrast. The relation of God with world and man is annulled in the affirmation of identity. When religion became reflective, pantheism emerged.² (a) The term

¹ Chapters viii. and ix. in Part II. discuss these problems.

² I have written the article on "Pantheism" (Introductory) in *E. R. E.*, Vol. IX., pp. 609–613, but shall deal with the subject more briefly here, and only as a development of religion.

is used so loosely that it is necessary to define it as exactly as possible, and to distinguish its types accurately. The derivation from the two Greek words $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\varsigma$ allows an ambiguity. It may mean that God is all, or that all is God ; and it makes a great difference which of the terms is subject and which predicate, as the predicate may be narrower, but cannot be wider, than the subject in its connotation. If God is the subject, then all is raised to the level of the conception of God, whatever that may be. If all is the subject, and the all be conceived within the limits of the universe as known to man, then the conception of God is brought down from the supernatural heights, to which religious consciousness has raised its thought of God. If we say that God is all, then the world is not only subordinated to, but absorbed in, God, and we have a pantheism which is an *acosmism*. It is with this type, as we shall see, that religion is concerned. If we say that *all is God*, then we have what is known as *pancosmism* ; and God is lost in the world. Haeckel claimed to be a pantheist in agreement with Spinoza ; but the two systems are poles apart. By what cannot be otherwise described than intellectual *sleight of hand*, he transferred energy from the material to the spiritual attribute of the one substance ; and so was able to identify soul or spirit with it, and give what, with all its pretensions to impartiality, is really a materialistic explanation of the universe. His monism is atheistic, and not pantheistic.

(b) The motive of pantheism, in any tolerable sense of the word, may be either religious or speculative. It may start from the religious consciousness of God, conceived not only as One, but as infinite and absolute in such a sense as to be the only reality, and consequently exclusive of any other, even if the existence of the world is in some sense or another allowed. The Brahmanic is a consistent pantheism, as for it *Brahma* is alone real, and all else is *maya*, illusion. Although Spinoza developed a speculative system, based on the Cartesian philosophy, and professing the rigorous method of mathematical demonstration ; yet it can be truly said that the motive of the "God-intoxicated man" was religious ; hence the inconsistency of his practical conclusion that man's highest wisdom and virtue is the knowledge and the love of God, so different from the Brahmanic goal of all endeavour as the realisation that *âtman* and *Brahma* are not different, and that self-consciousness is an illusion. One cannot read Spinoza's *Ethics* without a

feeling that it was religion which led him to his speculation, and that the results of his speculation fall far short of the actuality of his religion. If he does not, with Brahmanism, describe the world as we know it as *maya* in comparison with God, all objects and persons are for him but finite modes of two infinite attributes – extension and thought – existing parallel, *realiter* and *idealiter*, in the one substance God, which attributes alone out of an infinite number are subjectively apprehended by the human mind. Since in his view *omnis determinatio est negatio*, the world as we know it really tells us nothing about God. This pantheism is not an identification of God and world, as God really is other than all the appearances which to us are actualities of experience. Recognising the religious motive of Spinoza's philosophy, we are not for our present purpose immediately concerned with it, as here we are dealing with pantheism in the history of religions; but two supplementary considerations may be offered. *First of all*, this pantheism in its negations approaches very closely to *agnosticism*, for God is not in the world or through the world known as He really is: He is not brought into a fully intelligible relation to it. *Secondly*, this pantheism in its emphasis on the contrast between the finite modes and the infinite substance does so separate the one from the other as to tend to *deism*. Although not so explicitly, Spinozism is acosmic, as is Brahmanism.

(c) Intermediate between the religions and the speculative pantheism lies a system such as the Hegelian. The motive was undoubtedly speculative; Hegel aims at a philosophy which can claim to be the absolute philosophy as the consummation of the previous philosophical development, for the place which the Idea or Spirit (or God, if we may make this identification) holds in the evolution of the real, which is also the rational, Hegelianism claims for itself among the philosophies. He claimed also, and we are not justified in challenging the honesty of his claim, that his philosophy in the superior mental mode of the conception (*Begriff*) confirmed what the Christian religion in the inferior mode of the representation (*Vorstellung*) offered as its doctrine of God in the doctrine of the Trinity. But when we examine the Hegelian notion of God, it is so dominantly intellectualist that Pfleiderer has quite properly described it as *panlogism* rather than *pantheism*. The Lutheran orthodoxy of Hegel can be saved only if the Evolution of the Universe as he

describes it is not the Evolution of God Himself, but only of His manifestation of Himself as Creator in the Universe He is creating ; but this does seem a forced interpretation. The Neo-Hegelians, T. H. Green, John and Edward Caird, stand much nearer the Christian position than Hegel himself, but the monism of Bradley and Bosanquet does subordinate religion to speculation.

(d) To the speculative types we must return in the Second Part of this volume ; but we must now consider two modes of thought, which are often described as pantheistic, but which do not correspond with a strict definition of it. Neo-Platonism, while formulating a philosophy, had a religious motive. It offered itself to the ancient world as on the one hand a rival to Christianity, giving a similar satisfaction to the soul, and on the other as a reinterpretation of the paganism which Christianity was superseding. It did affirm, with Brahmanism on the one hand and Spinozism on the other, that God as absolute unity is above all determinations and relations. Nevertheless, though inconsistently, it affirmed a relation of God to the world of sense as the lowest of a series of emanations, each possessing a lower degree of perfection. So far from the world being identical with God, it is in its evolution, or rather devolution, increasingly different from Him. As there is this descent from God to the world, so the ascent of the soul to God must leave the world behind, and even the consciousness of self as related to that world. It is only in the subjective condition of ecstasy that the soul is united to God. But should such a relation of God to the world be regarded as consistent pantheism? A modern exponent of what claims to be a rigorously consistent pantheism, J. Allanson Pictson, would unhesitatingly deny this. "I only wish to premise plainly," he says, "that I am not concerned with any view of the world such as implies or admits that, whether by process of creation, or emanation, or self-division, or evolution, the oneness of the Eternal has ever been marred, or anything other than the being of God has been, or can be, produced." For the same reason he refuses to regard the Christian mystics as pantheists, because their comparison of the relation of man to God as of a ray to the source of light represents man also as an emanation, and pantheism can only regard him "as a finite mode of infinite Being."¹

(e) A similar doubt arises in regard to Stoicism. While

¹ *Pantheism ; its Story and Significance*, pp. 13, 15.

there are statements in which God and world are identified, e.g. οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μὲν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον,¹ and "*Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse*,"² yet on the other hand a distinction is made between the world as the σῶμα and God as the πνεῦμα; and this distinction Plutarch explains as follows: "It is one and the same being which presents itself now as individual unity (God), now as divided multiplicity (world)."³ "This type of pantheism would lie between the religious pantheism which so emphasises the transcendence of God as to regard the world as illusion, and the philosophical pantheism which so emphasises immanence as absolutely to identify God and world. There is a divine mystery behind all, and yet a divine manifestation in all. . . . It is so far religious as to make some distinction between God and world; it is so far philosophical as to think of God as identical with the world."⁴

(f) Mysticism often displays a pantheistic tendency; or we might even say that mysticism is the pantheistic type of piety. What the mystic desires is an immediate contact and intimate communion with God; so long as the sense of personal distinction between God and man is preserved, this is not pantheism. There is pantheism only when such union with God is sought as amounts to identity, the loss of self in the sole reality of God. This union may be thought of in two ways. If an initial distinction between man and God is recognised, then there is an ascent of the soul to God as in Neo-Platonism. But if an absolute identity of the world with God, or the sole reality of God, is the starting-point, then the goal of aspiration is not an ascent to God, but a return from the consciousness of separate finite existence to the infinite existence of God, as in Brahmanism. Christian mysticism, even in the intensity of the desire for union, did sometimes use the contemplation of, and affection for, Christ as a means towards an even closer relation to God than that so historically mediated.⁵ What has been called Paul's *faith-mysticism* has been appealed to in justification

¹ *Diogenes Laertius* VII. 148: "Zeno said that the whole was the substance of God."

² Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I. 14: "Cleanthes said that the world itself is God."

³ *De Stoic. Rep.* 41. For this and the two preceding quotations I am indebted to Eisler's *Wörterbuch*, pp. 556-557.

⁴ *E. R. E.*, Vol. IX., p. 611.

⁵ See Harnack's *History of Dogma*, Vol. VI., Eng. trs., p. 105. Chapter vii. in Part II. will be devoted to Mysticism.

of such developments : but the word *faith* makes all the difference. Paul's Jewish monotheism was too deeply rooted, his sense of Christ as personal reality was too vivid, his conception of union with Christ as crucifixion (death unto sin) and resurrection (life unto God) with Him was too ethical, to run any risk of pantheistic diversion. Intense as was his devotion to Christ, he never uses terms of endearment, such as the mystics allowed themselves, for Christ is always trusted and obeyed as Saviour and Lord.¹ This aspiration for union with God is an essential element in the complete religious consciousness ; but, qualified by the moral conscience, it does not become a sense of unity.

(g) There is a phase of thought and feeling akin to pantheism and its accompanying mysticism which should, however, be carefully distinguished from it. To recognise and realise the presence of God in nature and man should not be called pantheism. A name which has been suggested for this type of apprehension and appreciation of God in all is *panentheism* (all in God). The most adequate expression of this panentheism is found in Wordsworth's "Lines, Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey." Familiar as the lines are, they are too relevant to the subject under discussion not to be quoted :

*And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.*

Tennyson's poem "The Higher Pantheism" as a call to personal communion with a present God is properly panentheism.

*Speak to Him, thou, for He hears, and Spirit with spirit can
meet ;
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.*

¹ See Deissmann, *Paul : a Study in Social and Religious History*, pp. 147-157.

Surely Kant had some of that feeling, deistic as his thinking generally is, when he recognised the two sublimities of the starry heavens above and the moral law within (cf. Ps. xix.). And Paul gives such a doctrine confirmation in his words: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts xvii. 28). It is only when immanence is narrowed down to identity that there is pantheism.

(2) Having discussed the subject in this general way, we must now look at some illustrations of pantheism as a development of religion. (a) In China, Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200) modified the dualistic system of Chou-Tun-i, who recognised two cosmic principles, the active Yang and the passive Yin, in the direction of monism: "Eternal matter is informed and directed by an immanent intelligence,"¹ as in Stoicism. He explicitly rejects the notion of Shang-Ti. The attempt by the Zervanites in Persia to derive both Ormuzd and Ahriman from an ultimate unity, time or space, has already been mentioned. The liturgical hyperbole, in which all the gods of Babylon are represented as only names of Marduk, has no religious significance. Not only is there in Egypt a similar tendency to represent one god or another as the One of whom all the others are but manifestations (so Ra, Isis, and Osiris); but "according to Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.* IX.), a temple of Isis bears the inscription, 'I am all that hath been, is, or shall be, and no mortal hath lifted my veil.'"² An apparent contradiction in the teaching of the Egyptian priesthood, viz. a combination of monotheism and polytheism, finds a solution, according to Renouf, in the conception of *nutar*, which, similar to the Indian *Brahma* originally, however "never became a proper name. It was indeed restricted in its use, as far back as our knowledge of the language enables us to trace it, but it never ceased to be a common noun, and was applied indifferently to each of the powers which the Egyptian imagination conceived as active in the universe, and to the Power from which all powers proceed. Horus and Ra and Osiris and Set are names of individual finite powers, but a Power without a name or any mythological characteristic is constantly referred to in the singular number, and can only be regarded as the object of that *sensus numinis*, or immediate perception of the Infinite, which, like my learned predecessor Professor Max Müller, I consider 'not the result of reasoning or generalising, but an intuition as irresistible as the impressions

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47.

² E. R. E., Vol. IX., p. 611 note.

of our senses' (*Science of Language*, second series, p. 479, 7th ed.)."¹

(b) Most imposing of all the religious pantheisms is that of India. In the religion of that land are found the extremes of rarefied speculation and of gross superstition and corruption; a sublime philosophy on the one hand, a debasing idolatry on the other. With these contrasts, striking and interesting as they are, we are not meanwhile concerned, but solely with the philosophy. To this subject P. Deussen has devoted a book² to which I am much indebted. Corresponding to the Greek doctrine of the *ἕλη* and the *νοῦς* there is what Deussen calls *realism*. God as *δημιουργός* shapes the world out of matter, which is eternal and does not owe its existence to Him. What he calls *theism* is really *deism*: "God creates the universe out of nothing, and the latter then has a real existence independently of God." He further distinguishes *pantheism* from *idealism*, although the second mode of thought is generally regarded as the distinctive Indian pantheism. His description of both modes, as justifying the distinction, must be given. In pantheism "God creates the universe by transforming Himself into the universe. The latter confessedly has become God. Since it is real and also infinite, there is no room for God independently of the universe, but only within it. The terms God and Universe become synonymous, and the idea of God is only retained in order not to break with tradition." This is *pancosmism*. Why Deussen should have retained the term *pantheism* it is difficult to understand. Surely what he calls *idealism* has a better claim to the name. "God alone and nothing besides Him is real. The universe is in truth not real: it is mere illusion, as used to be said; mere appearance, as we say to-day. This appearance is not God, as in pantheism, but the reflection of God, and is an aberration from the divine essence. Not as though God were to be sought on the other side of the universe, for He is not at all in space; nor as though He were before or after, for He is not at all in time; nor as though He were the cause of the universe, for the law of causality has no application here. Rather, to the extent to which the universe is regarded as real, God is without reality. That He is real, the sole reality, we perceive only so far as we succeed in shaking ourselves

¹ *Hibbert Lecture on the Religion of Ancient Egypt*, 1879, pp. 99-100.

² *The Religion and Philosophy of India: the Upanishads*, Eng. trs., 1906, pp. 160-161. Cf. pp. 237-239.

free theoretically and practically from this entire world of appearance." This is acosmic pantheism, and is akin to the philosophy of Spinoza. If Deussen's statement that "this appearance is not God as in pantheism, but the reflection of God, and is an aberration from the divine essence," is to be taken literally, then the doctrine would have some affinity with the emanationism of Neo-Platonism; but this seems an unlikely interpretation. To this philosophy there corresponds a mystic piety. There are four states of the soul through which the *âtman* passes, "in which its real metaphysical nature becomes gradually more and more plainly visible. These states are : (1) waking ; (2) dream sleep ; (3) deep sleep (*sushupti*), i.e. deep, dreamless sleep, in which the soul becomes temporarily one with Brahman and enjoys a corresponding unsurpassable bliss ; and (4) the 'fourth' state (*c'aturtha*, *turya* *turiya*), usually called *turiya*, in which that disappearance of the manifold universe and the union with Brahman on which the bliss of deep sleep depends takes place, not, as before, unconsciously, but with continued and perfect consciousness."¹ In the older Upanishads only three states were recognised : "It was first later on, with the rise of the yoga system, that in the yoga a state of the soul gained recognition which was exalted above deep sleep." The difference between the two states is described in the following poem :

*As eternal changeless knowledge,
Not distinct from that which is known,
Brahman is ever known—
By the eternal is the eternal known.*

*This process consists in this,
The irresistible suppression
Of all movements of the spirit,—
It is otherwise in deep sleep.*

*The spirit gives light in deep sleep,
But when suppressed it gives no light,
It becomes Brahman, the fearless,
The sole and entire light of Knowledge.²*

The identity of *Brahman* and *âtman* is expressed in the phrase *tam tvam asi*, "thou art that." To recognise that

¹ *Idem*, pp. 296-297.

² *Idem*, pp. 309-310.

identity is the highest type of piety, the *gnana marga*. But such a rarefied atmosphere is evidently one that only a few can breathe ; and thus there are two other types of piety : the *Bhakti* piety, associated with the incarnations of Vishnu (*avatars*), Krishna, and Rama, and with Siva himself, and the *Karma* piety, the offering of sacrifices, etc., in the popular polytheism. Indian pantheism is not a condemnation of, nor is it in conflict with, the popular polytheism. After the spread of Buddhism, Brahmanism made a compromise with the two most widely spread sectarian movements, the Vaishnavite and the Saivite. "Brahman (neuter), the Absolute, manifests himself in three persons of equal rank – Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the preserver, and Çiva the destroyer. Kalidasa sings :

*In those Three Persons the one God was shown –
Each first in place, each last – not one alone ;
Of Çiva, Vishnu, Brahma, each may be
First, second, third, among the Blessed Three.*¹

This is known as the Hindu *Trimurti*, or Trinity ; and, although the above verses may recall to us the Athanasian Creed, it is evident that the Hindu doctrine is in origin and significance entirely different from the Christian. So also is the Hindu doctrine of Incarnation. It is obvious that to pantheism the doctrine of Incarnation offers no difficulties. As the gods are but different manifestations of the one reality, so may these gods assume human or animal forms. The Hindu differs from the Christian doctrine of Incarnation in the following ways : (1) It is, as is the *Trimurti*, a compromise of pantheism with popular polytheism. (2) There are manifold incarnations, not one, and by its nature necessarily one. (3) The incarnation is not in human nature or form alone. Vishnu is incarnated as fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, dwarf, Rama with the axe, Rama, Krishna, Buddha, Kalki, or Kalkin. (4) The most popular of these incarnations, Krishna, presents a moral character so defective that Holtzmann has properly remarked : "What fatality impelled the Indians to elevate such a man into an incarnation of the Supreme Deity is an, as yet, unsolved enigma."²

(c) The subject of pantheism as a philosophy will be

¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 344.

² Quoted by Slater, *The Higher Hinduism*, p. 129.

discussed more fully in the Second Part. Here only a few comments on its value as religion need be added. It does not unloose the Gordian knot of the relation of God to self and world, which consciousness of their distinction demands, but simply cuts it by a bare denial. While it does gratify the intense desire for union with God which fervent piety demands, it is not religiously satisfying, as the reality reached is too abstract and vague for the concrete needs of the human soul in actual living. That these other types of piety exist in India is an indication of its insufficiency. Moral distinctions and social relations belong to the world of *maya*, illusion ; and thus the motive for moral and social progress is annulled. Moral distinctions lose their enduring significance if God as the totality of reality is alone real ; and moral endeavour is not a condition of, but rather a hindrance to, the attainment of the goal of this mystic piety. In the next chapter we shall have more to say about the moral and social defects of Hinduism in its popular forms : but against this pantheism the charge can be brought that it is not only tolerant of, but can even make a compromise with, the superstition and corruption of the popular religion. If, as we must subsequently try to show, personality is the most adequate category for our thought, and the realisation of personality is the highest ideal for our life ; and if the personal relation of man as progressively personal and God as perfectly personal is the truest conception we can form of religion, then the relapse of the personal *âtman* into the impersonal *Brahman* cannot be accepted as the goal of religious aspiration and endeavour.

(3) A much briefer notice of deism will suffice, as it is not, as is pantheism, a mode of theistic thought which can to-day offer itself as a rival to monotheism. All we need notice is tendencies towards deism in several religious developments. The term itself, however, needs closer definition. Its derivation from the Latin *deus* offers no clue as to its distinctive meaning. In contrast to pantheism, it emphasises God's transcendence, and minimises God's immanence : it does not identify God and world, but so far separates them as the recognition of any relation of God to the world allows. The deists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not all agree in the measure in which this tendency dominated them. It was the intention of Lord Herbert of Cherbury to vindicate the divine providence. Shaftesbury protested against any view which represented God as wholly

transcendent. Morgan recognises the divine immanence. For a great part of his career Toland was a pantheist ; and it was he who first used the term pantheism. What has led to the popular ascription of this tendency to the whole school is that they were agreed in denying a supernatural revelation of God, and offering as a substitute the "natural religion" of the human reason. This controversy lies altogether beyond our present interest. What alone is now necessary is to indicate how, in the development of religious thought, this tendency emerges, and one may even say necessarily emerges. Applying the Hegelian formula, we may say that the thesis is in polytheism ; the gods are too much within the world, and too much akin to man, even although in the background there remains the sense of the divine as *above* and *beyond* ; the antithesis is in the deism which distinguishes God from man, and elevates God above the world ; the synthesis in monotheism, once this difference and this elevation have been recognised, can take up again the belief in the nearness of God in the world, and His likeness to man.

(a) To the world of sense Plato opposes the world of ideas, which alone is truly real. What gives unity to the system of ideas is the Idea of the Good, which is both the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi*, and as such it is "beyond existence" and "above knowing." This is God. In making the world as its δημιουργός He shapes it out of what in comparison with the ideas is not-being, i.e. space. *Mechanical necessity* (ἀνάγκη), however, hinders the complete translation of the ideas into actuality. "Divine activity," says Windelband, "according to ends and natural necessity, are set over against each other as explaining principles, on the one hand for the perfect, and on the other hand for the imperfect, in the world of phenomena."¹ Aristotle starts from the contrast of matter (ὑλη) and form (εἶδος). The Pure Form is the First Mover ; but as itself not moved "operates, not by means of its own activity, but only by means of the fact that its absolute actuality exerts in matter the impulse to form itself according to it (the prime mover), not as a mechanical, but as a *pure, final cause*." This is "quite the same thing as the Idea of the Good in the Platonic" system. "It is eternal, unchangeable, immovable, wholly independent, separated (χωριστόν) from all else, incorporeal, and yet at the same time the cause of all generation and change. It is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

the perfect Being (ἐνέργεια) in which all possibility is at the same time actuality : of all that exists it is the highest and best – the *deity*.”¹ Both of these conceptions are deistic.

(b) In Israel there was a development from Semitic heathenism to *monolatry* or *henotheism*, a relapse on the settlement in Canaan to *syncretism* – the worship of Yahveh and Baal combined, or even a confusion of the two objects of worship, a recovery from this popular religion in the succession of prophets, till a confident and consistent monotheism emerges. If we can recall the beginnings of this movement in the opening chapters of Amos, in which the function of Judge among the peoples is assigned to Yahveh, we can study its close in the scathing mockery of polytheism and idolatry in the opening oracle of Deutero-Isaiah (chapter xl.). The national covenant-God Yahveh has become God over all, God alone. From this exalted doctrine it is often assumed that there was a lapse in post-exilic Judaism, which has been charged with a deistic tendency. This charge Montefiore seeks to refute. He admits that “the God of the post-exilic period and of Judaism generally was very ‘personal’ and ‘transcendent.’” But he adds : “God was transcendent, however, not as being distant and unapproachable, but because the conception of Him was so very simple and childlike ; partly also He remained transcendent because of the mere weight and mass of scriptural authority.” He sets himself to prove that “the ‘transcendence’ of deity was not a result, neither a cause, of any distance or separation between God and the world,” as is maintained in “the current estimates of Judaism.” He then discusses “the relation of God to nature, to Israel, and to the individual Israelite, as well as the divine character as it was generally conceived in post-exilic Judaism.”² He does concede, however, that “the real means . . . by which later Judaism triumphed over the religious dangers of a one-sided exaggeration of the divine transcendence, while they were thoroughly effective, were yet national and particularist,” whereas “Jesus and Paul triumphed over them by a more general method, by bringing into more habitual and emphatic prominence the other and complementary aspects of deity, the immanence of the divine spirit in the souls of men and the universal Fatherhood of God.” In short, the ethical monotheism of

¹ *Idem*, p. 145.

² *Hibbert Lecture on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews*, 1892, pp. 423–424.

the prophets, as preserved in Judaism, found its correction and completion, so far as was necessary, in the Christian revelation. He further denies the allegation "that the greater prominence of angels in the post-exilic literature is due to an anxious and deistic tendency to keep God as much as possible away from any direct intervention in human affairs." Admitting that "angels, both good and bad, play a greater part after the return from Babylon than they had played hitherto," he shows that "yet upon the whole the doctrine of angels had for a long while but little influence upon actual religious life."¹

(c) Be his argument conclusive or not, we cannot escape recognising that there were developed several conceptions, such as the Angel, the Word, and the Wisdom of God, which served to mediate the presence and the action of God in the world. Most important of all of these was the conception of Wisdom, regarding the representation of the function of which in the Proverbs Montefiore denies the need of admitting any influence of Hellenism; but he recognises that in the passage in the eighth chapter in which Wisdom is personified "it is fair to argue that we can hardly refuse to admit the intrusion of distinctively Greek ideas."² Regarding Philo's exaggeration of the divine transcendence there can be no doubt: for, says Windelband, he "emphasised so sharply the contrast between God and everything finite that he designated God expressly as devoid of qualities (*ἀποιος*); for since God is exalted above all, it can be said of Him only that He has none of the finite predicates known to human intelligence; no names name Him."³ But, as his object was to reconcile Hebrew piety and Greek philosophy, he must needs bring God into relation with the world; and this he did by the conception of the *λόγος*, a conception which played so great a part in Christian theology that it will be necessary to return to it. The same conception of God meets us in the Hermetic writings and in Neo-Platonism. There was thus a sharp antagonism between the Christian revelation of God and the intellectual environment into which, soon after its beginnings, it entered; for "Hellenism found itself working under presuppositions that were completely different from those of the doctrine of the new religion."⁴

(d) As Islam is of later date than Christianity, and is in

¹ *Hibbert Lecture on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews*, 1892, pp. 429-430.

² *Idem*, p. 380.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 237.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 235.

its doctrine of God derivative from the Old Testament and Judaism, it does not enter at all as a factor into the religious development which culminates in Christian monotheism. It must suffice to note that the two doctrines of Christianity which are most repugnant to the Moslem mind are those in which the divine attribute of immanence is most fully involved – the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the Trinity. And it can be said that, while God's sovereignty on earth is fully recognised, yet God is so exalted as Absolute Will above the world and men that it is no injustice to ascribe to it a deistic tendency.

(4) It is not intended in this last section of an already long chapter to give an exposition of Christian monotheism, as that must form the subject of the concluding chapter of this volume, and as I have already published a book on *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* : but there are some general observations which are directly relevant to the argument of this chapter.

(a) Monotheism is the doctrine not only that there is *one* God (*henotheism* expresses that), but that by His very nature He is God *alone*. This religious conviction was developed by the Hebrew prophets from Amos to the Deutero-Isaiah. Its origin is not to be traced to a Semitic tendency to monotheism, for the religion of Israel's kinsmen did not go beyond monolatry, nor to a genius of the people for religion, for the prophetic teaching was in contrast and conflict with the popular religion. There was a constant tendency to relapse to syncretism or polytheism. It has already been insisted that genuine religion implies real revelation, and that we must recognise the presence and activity of God as Spirit wherever and whenever men have sought Him ; for man seeks God only as God has found him. This universal revelation does not exclude, however, the possibility that there may have been given a fuller self-disclosure of God to, and by, one people. It is a fact that the history of this people discloses more clearly than any other a continuous divine guidance and dealing, and that to no other people was given such a succession of religious teachers, who in interpreting the divine providence in that history gave a progressive revelation of the nature, character, and purpose of God. If it be said that this difference is explicable by the subjective human conditions, the greater receptivity of these agents of revelation, the divine activity is not thereby excluded : for man is not self-sufficient, least of all in his religion : it is

God's Spirit within that makes the seer or the saint. In dealing with nations, may there not be a divine selection of one for one function, and another for another? God was in Greek culture and in Roman law as well as Hebrew piety; but in the last, by its very nature, there must be consciousness of that divine presence as is not necessary for any other human function. In such selection there is no favouritism: for it is to vicarious service, and for Israel that vicarious service involved vicarious suffering. (Isa. liii. does not apply only to Israel's greatest Son.) I myself believe that the ethical monotheism of the prophets was due to a progressive divine revelation. Whether the history was marked by miracles, or what the nature of the inspiration of the prophets was, is quite a subordinate consideration; for the truth and the worth of the revelation do not depend on how we regard these. The basis of this revelation is no less in the moral conscience than the religious consciousness; it is not in the speculative intellect. It is as righteous judge and ruler among all peoples that Amos conceives God; it is the character of Yahveh's rule that gives it its universality. Hosea conceives so intimate a relation of God to His people that he can assert its absoluteness and exclusiveness. Through the individualism of a Jeremiah, the particularism of the religion as national reaches out to universalism. God is God alone, not only because He is all-mighty, all-wise, but still more because He is all-righteous, all-holy, all-good, and even merciful and gracious. Apart from this history and this succession of prophets, monotheism would not have arisen by natural evolution: it is God's self-revelation.¹

(b) Jesus inherited this ethical monotheism; it has been said that He added nothing to its content; that for all He said about God a parallel can be found in the Old Testament; even the Fatherhood of God is anticipated.² Even if this be so, what He added was Himself, His moral character, His religious consciousness, His redeeming and reconciling ministry; and that transformed all that He had inherited. The Fatherhood of God became central to the conception of God, because He lived as the Son, knowing God and making Him known as Father, among men (Matt. xi. 27). The love of God became a present active reality in His grace towards

¹ The argument here so briefly summarised has been fully developed in my article on "Revelation" in Hastings's *Bible Dictionary*, extra volume, pp. 321-336.

² See A. C. McGiffert, *The God of the Early Christians*, pp. 3-21.

sinner. By drawing men unto Himself He brought them unto God in an intimate filial relation, in which they became conscious of God's presence and activity in them as Spirit. The New Testament is either testimony to, or interpretation based on experience of, the fact of Christ. The fact cannot be less adequately described than as Incarnation, God's presence with, and activity for, men as man ; the Incarnation cannot be interpreted without such a transformation of the ethical monotheism of the prophets as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity gives. I do not, and cannot, therefore, regard these two Christian doctrines – the Incarnation and the Trinity – as superfluous refinements or hurtful accretions to the faith of the prophets ; but as fulfilments, not only of the Old Testament revelation, but of the Godward movements of the religions of the world. The doctrine of the Incarnation affirms the divine immanence in the world and man, as is crudely recognised in such a doctrine as *mana* : and it justifies the *anthropomorphism*, which has been indicated as a progressive factor in the development of religion. The divine transcendence is asserted in the conception of God as the "Father who is in heaven," and yet it is harmonised with immanence, not only in the consciousness of Jesus as Son to God as Father, but also in the experience of God's presence and power in the Holy Spirit. The manifoldness of the divine activity, which polytheism recognises, is harmonised with the unity, for which Hebrew monotheism contends, in the conception of God as Father, Son, and Spirit, diversity-in-unity. The conceptions of sacrifice and sacrament associated with totemism find their correction and completion in Christ's death for, and life in, man. The Christian revelation and redemption is not to be measured by these imperfect anticipations ; but they find their clue of meaning in it. The second half of the hymn,¹ of which the first has already been quoted, suggests how in the Christian faith other faiths find their fulfilment, because, as the first part showed, all the faiths are seeking one Good, in however diverse ways.

*Thine is the mystic life great India craves,
Thine is the Parsee's sin-destroying beam,
Thine is the Buddhist's rest from tossing waves,
Thine is the empire of vast China's dream ;
Gather us in.*

¹ *Congregational Hymnary*, No. 326.

*Thine is the Roman's strength without his pride,
 Thine is the Greek's glad world without its graves,
 Thine is Judæa's law with love beside,
 The truth that censures and the grace that saves ;
 Gather us in.*

*Some seek a Father in the heavens above,
 Some ask a human image to adore,
 Some crave a spirit vast as life and love ;
 Within Thy mansions we have all and more ;
 Gather us in.*

(George Matheson, 1842-1906.)

(c) Such a claim could not be made, however, for the orthodox Christian theology ; for, on the one hand, it has often obscured and perverted the Gospel of Jesus Christ by including much that is merely local and temporary in the Hebrew and Jewish medium in which that Gospel is historically conveyed, and, on the other hand, Greek philosophy and Roman law, the dominant influences in its early environment, were allowed unduly to influence its formulation. To give a few instances, Jewish eschatology has been a limitation of the Christian hope for the individual and the race which the conception of God's Fatherhood would warrant ; the dogma of the Incarnation has been formulated in terms of the Greek philosophy, which make unintelligible the unity of God and man in the one person of Christ ; and, in the doctrine of the Atonement, Roman legalism has distorted the personal relations of God and man. If Christian theology is to meet the universal human need, it must be stated in more universal human terms. Without depreciating Jewish piety, Greek philosophy, or Roman law as the husk, protecting and preserving the kernel of the Hebrew monotheism as transformed in Christ, we must now detach the kernel from the husk. We do not want to imprison it again in a Japanese, Chinese, or Indian husk ; we do not want to racialise or nationalise its universality again. Is it wrong to suggest that there was a *præparatio evangelica* in the historical environment of early Christianity, since God "sent His Son in the fullness of the times" (Gal. iv. 4) ; and that consequently it would be a less excusable mistake to try and impose any such racial or national limitations in a time when the solidarity of the race is becoming, not a vague abstraction for the idealist, but a

concrete fact for the realist? That historical associations, local conditions, moral or national characteristics, will affect the presentation of the Gospel to and by any people must be conceded, as we have nowhere yet discovered or developed *the universal man*. But, allowing for this influence, the purpose of the Christian theologian must be, as the hymn indicates, to gather in, not the relative historical, but the absolute eternal values, recognised and realised, however imperfectly, in the different religions of the world, into one Christian monotheistic faith as the fulfilment of the promise of each, so that the common brotherhood of man, the goal towards which human evolution points, may be sustained and sublimated by the one Fatherhood of God, as revealed in history by Christ, and realised in experience by His Spirit.

CHAPTER VII

THE VALUES OF RELIGION

I

(1) RELIGION as a relation to God has a value of its own, subordinate to no other value. Man's highest privilege and greatest good is that he is capable, not only of apprehending the truth and appreciating the beauty of the world around him, of entering into personal relations to his fellow-men, in which moral character is developed and social institutions are evolved, and thus individual and communal progress is achieved ; but that he can reach away, and soar from, the world and his fellow-men to that which is above and beyond both, and yet gives fullest meaning and highest value to both – even God as essential reality, ultimate cause, and final purpose of the universe. In the preceding chapters we have been dealing with what is the supreme value of the life of man – this relationship with God. To treat religion as a means towards any other end, as Kant does in regard to morality, or Hegel in relation to philosophy, is, as has been shown in an earlier chapter, to misinterpret it : mistaken as Schleiermacher was in limiting religion to emotion, he understood as neither of these great thinkers did its intrinsic value. Man is to be godly, not that he may become wise or good, although wisdom and goodness follow on godliness, but because God has so made him that he can find his supreme good in God. “Man's chief end,” as the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly answers the first question set, “is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever.” Or, as the psalmist puts it in the only passage which, as some modern scholars admit, bases the hope of personal immortality on the personal communion of the believer with God (Ps. lxxiii. 23-26) :

*Nevertheless I am continually with Thee :
Thou hast holden my right hand.
Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel,
And afterward receive me to glory.
Whom have I in heaven but Thee ?
And there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee.
My flesh and my heart faileth :
But God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever.*

No intellectual significance, no ethical influence, no social construction, no æsthetic inspiration which may accompany religion, is the reason for it : but man's need of God, and God's grace to man.

(2) Any depreciation of the intrinsic value of religion having been excluded, we must avoid the error which piety has often fallen into, namely, the separation of religion from the rest of life, and the attempt to cultivate religion apart from, or even in antagonism to, the manifold interests and functions which go to constitute a complete human life. The attempt to separate the "religious" life of monk or nun from the secular life of the men or the women fulfilling manifold functions in society was a fatal error, which has had disastrous consequences. Religion preserves its savour as salt only in savouring (Matt. v. 13), and functions as leaven only in the meal (xiii. 33). It realises the distinctive relation to God only in manifold relations to nature and man. It is an exotic on earth if it cannot grow in the common soil of human society, and bear its flowers and fruits in the common air of life. It is not a separate department of human interest and activity, but the motive, the purpose, and the quality which should belong to life as a whole. The Hindu ascetic or the Buddhist monk are abnormalities. The supreme value of religion is indissolubly related to all the other values of human life, and the value of any religion is to be tested by its influence on these other values. "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. vii. 16) ; and these fruits are to be sought in the whole of human life. Accordingly, although it might seem as if we had reached our goal in this part of this volume in tracing the evolution of the conception of God to its consummation in Christian monotheism, yet it is no irrelevance for us before we turn to the endeavour to relate the theistic conception to the reason of man generally in its varied functions, theoretic, æsthetic, practical to enquire : What have been the fruits of religion in history, and by what tests shall we determine their values for the life of mankind ?

(3) In the previous discussion we have already seen what some of the fruits have been, e.g. the tribal deity is the guardian of tribal custom, the earliest form of morality and law ; the domestication of plants and animals is probably closely associated with totemism, or a phase of religious development akin to totemism ; the association of religion with the fertility of the soil and the herds has resulted in the

survival in mythology and ritual of ideas and practices condemned by a progressive morality ; the conception of spirits or gods as hostile to man, and needing to be propitiated, has led to human sacrifice and other acts of cruelty. There is much to the debit as well as to the credit of the account of religion. But in casting the balance we must remind ourselves that religion in its belief and ritual must be relative to the stage of development in culture or civilisation which has been reached ; and that we must not condemn as unmitigated folly or wrong from our advanced Christian standpoint what, if we fully recognise this relativity, may claim more tolerant judgment. We must recognise the fact, as having even for to-day practical significance, that religion tends to be more conservative than science or morality. Because it is concerned with God, it is prone to give absolute value to doctrines and practices of which the value is only relative, and to retain what should have been superseded in view of changed conditions of thought and life. Christian men, on the supposed authority of the Bible, ascribe actions to God which a good man would repudiate if charged against himself. On the other hand, it must be remembered that human progress has been largely due to the influence of great religious personalities, who even in their moral and social reforms fall back on divine authority. It is within religion itself that effective, because constructive, criticism has arisen ; the outsider who only finds fault does not amend. The history of religion itself accordingly refutes the objection to missions, often advanced, that every people has the religion which is best adapted to it, and should not be disturbed in the exercise and the enjoyment of it. This adaptation has always been relative ; and change of circumstances has resulted in maladjustment. Confucius sought to remedy the evils of his times by a revival of what he believed the better ways of the fathers, but in so doing he believed himself to be interpreting the ways of heaven (T'ien). Buddha sought the secret of salvation from the succession of lives which *Karma* involved, because the current religion had not disclosed it to him ; while he in no way recognised the agency of the gods in this process of salvation, a permanent and universal need of the human soul was met only when he, with others, was exalted to the dignity of Saviour. It was in the name of Ormuzd that Zoroaster summoned his countrymen to war against Ahriman. So Allah commissioned Mohammed to amend

the beliefs and customs of Arab heathenism. We must not blame religion, as such, for defects which inhere in the stage of human development reached. We may recognise that its pace has often been slower than that of knowledge and morality. We must not forget, however, that it has in its history shown itself to have springs of revival, sources of reform, which have made it on the whole a factor in human progress.

(4) We must, however, recognise to-day that the influences affecting human life, and consequently religion, are not local – national or racial – but universal, world-wide. By commerce, conquest, and colonisation, by the diffusion of culture and civilisation, the nations are being forced out of their isolation. And it is impossible to believe that, as this solidarity of mankind is increasingly accomplished, the religions can maintain their independence or support the morality that has been peculiar to them. A common reason, a common conscience, a common spirit (if we may use this term to express the religious function), is becoming a necessity. As the purpose of this volume is to vindicate the Christian belief in God, the Hebrew monotheism as transformed by the fact of Christ, what must here be undertaken is the endeavour to show that Christian standards must be applied to the whole range of life, and that none of the religions which still claim the suffrages of nations, and challenge the supremacy of Christianity as the religion for mankind, have brought forth fruit, or are still bringing forth fruit, which justifies their claim and their challenge. It does not seem necessary to bring all the religions of the world into the comparison, as the past history of religions is already their present judgment. We may then try to classify them in respect of values in order to narrow the range of our enquiry.

(a) It has been stated in a previous chapter that religion has a practical purpose, and that the good which the religions of the world have sought might be described as natural, moral, and spiritual. Many of the lower types of religion are concerned with natural goods – food, clothing, shelter, safety, health, deliverance from death. It will be generally agreed that, while even in the higher phases of religion concern about these goods cannot be altogether excluded, for Christ Himself bids His disciples trust God, who knows that they have need of these things (Matt. vi. 32, 33), yet, where these goods are the main concern, there

is a stage of religion which the progress of mankind is leaving behind. The moral and the spiritual good must remain as permanent and dominant concerns of religion. As the conception of God becomes moralised, as God is conceived as the morally perfect, the two goods become inseparable, and cannot even be thought apart, and the value of a religion will be determined not only by the satisfaction it offers to man's religious needs, but also by how much it does for morality. Does it help or does it hinder by giving less help than morality has a right to expect from it?

(b) This question leads us to another distinction between religions. Some are predominantly legal: God gives a law, rewards obedience, and punishes disobedience; but man must by his own efforts keep the law, secure the reward, and escape the penalty. It is no injustice to describe Pharisaic Judaism as mainly, if not solely, legalistic; at least Paul found it so. And, despite the appeals to Allah as merciful, Islam can also be so characterised. There are other religions which are redemptive. God, recognising man's weakness and failure does not primarily impose a law, but offers a salvation: the forgiveness of past transgressions, the renewal of the moral personality, the realisation of the purpose of man by His Grace to man. Christianity is the fully redemptive religion; it offers salvation, not by the works of the law, but by faith in the grace of God in Christ. Buddhism offers redemption, but it is, in the *Hinayana* of earlier form, self-redemption, as Gautama gave the law and the community, but not himself as Saviour. It is only when the insufficiency of such a method of salvation was recognised that in the *Mahayana* Buddha himself becomes a Saviour. In Islam this human need seeks relief in the intercession of Mohammed and the saints, the *Zikr*, or mystic practices of the invocation of God; and among the Shiahs "faith in the saving virtue of sufferings, especially the sufferings of the Imams." "The point which specially appeals to the hearts of Shiahs," says the Rev. W. A. Rice, a missionary in Persia, "is the sufferings of the house of Ali, especially Husain and his family. The latter particularly is an affecting story, and the yearly recital of it, the miracle plays in which the tragic scenes are re-enacted, keep alive the devotion to Husain and the keen memory of his sufferings and supposed wrongs. If the missionary speaks of the Christian religion as presenting a Saviour, the Shiah will not unlikely reply, 'We too have a Saviour, namely Husain,

who suffered for his people.'"¹ Here too we have an addition to the original religion, showing a defect that needed to be remedied.

(c) All the religions mentioned in the preceding paragraph look back to a personal founder ; and this fact calls our attention to a significant difference among religions. Of some religions we have, as it were, no record of birth ; like Topsy, they simply "grewed" ; their roots are in prehistoric times, and they have developed along with the general life of the people. But all the more advanced religions look back to a personal founder ; and their value is largely determined by the character and the purpose of their founder. Confucius, in seeking to restore the religion of ancient days, did leave the impress of his personality upon it ; but his system of morals more than of religion was so bound up with the order of the Chinese Empire that the revolutionary change which has taken place has loosened, if not destroyed, his authority ; Sun-yat-sen now means more for progressive China than he does. Zoroaster had a mission for his own times ; but his religion survives only in a relatively insignificant remnant in India, having been swept away in its home by the overwhelming tide of Islam. The significance of Gautama the Buddha abides, although, as has been just indicated, the extension of his religion beyond India has involved a change in its character. So has Islam undergone profound modification in its orthodox as well as in its heretical form. Admirable as was the character of Gautama, and excellent his purpose, his personality cannot in its historical actuality make the same appeal as can the personality of Jesus Christ, for His religious consciousness as Son of God, and His saving activity among men, supremely in His Cross, offer a completeness of character and purpose such as Gautama lacks. Sincere as was Mohammed in the early days of his prophethood, yet in the later days of his power how his character deteriorated ! The Rev. S. M. Zwemer, then a missionary in Arabia, states that "many Moslems are dissatisfied with Mohammed as an ideal of character. They are perplexed with the inconsistencies of his life and teaching."² And this is not the prejudice of a propagandist, as impartial students of the Koran cannot defend his conduct, even as tested by his own standard. His relations to women are his worst reproach.

¹ Quoted, *Report of World Missionary Conference*, 1910, Vol. IV., p. 128.

² *Idem*, p. 130.

Even if the defects some critics have found in Christ were real, His superiority to any of the leaders of religion stands unchallenged. It may also be added that in no religion has the founder so essential a function as Christ in Christianity. Mohammed was the prophet of Allah : Christ as Son revealed the Father. Gautama never offered himself as Saviour ; but Christ did, and in His Gospel still does, and proves Himself to be all He offers.

(d) Gautama, Mohammed, Christ, founded religions claiming to be universal. Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, are names associated with national religions, not claiming to be, or attempting to become, more. But those three in intention look beyond any national frontiers ; and by missionary activity have passed from land to land. But the claim to universality may be tested. Mohammed, in his endeavour to regulate the life of his community in so minute details, has in the Koran bound it up closely with the Arab society, which he was seeking to reform, and which, however, he was not able in any large measure to rise above, or reach beyond. Polygamy, slavery, the *jihad*, have the authority of Mohammed : and a reformed Islam which abandons these has challenged the claims he made for himself. The history of the peoples which have adopted Islam confirms what the Koran itself makes evident – that Islam as Mohammed made it has not the qualities which fit it to be a universal religion. Buddhism was originally a monastic order ; and even although it has been modified to extend its adherents, is by its inherent attitude to the present life, and all its interests and activities, quite clearly unfitted to afford religious guidance to a progressive culture and civilisation for the world. For many of the forms Christianity has assumed in its history, no claim for universality could be made. What can claim universality is Christ Himself as Saviour and Lord in the revelation of God as Father which He gives in His person, in the redemption for man from sin, which He offers in His grace (including His sacrifice), and in the cleansing and renewing activity of His Spirit in the world.

(5) We need not take into account the animistic religions of the uncivilised races. Even although the general considerations which have been just advanced have so far narrowed the range of comparison that Christ appears to stand incomparable among the founders of religion, and in the universality of His appeal, yet, as we do want to acquaint

ourselves more fully with such values as the important and influential religions of mankind do offer, we shall not maintain rigidly the limitations so suggested. It might seem reasonable to limit our regard to the three universal religions; but China, Japan, and India as ancient civilisations and cultures are too important in the history of mankind to be entirely ignored. Interesting as is the sudden swift progress of Japan to be one of the Great Powers, yet religiously, with its rigidly national faith of Shintoism and its borrowed religions of Confucianism and Buddhism, it seems to me not to be significant enough for further notice, beyond the admission that its characteristic moral ideal of *Bushido* does contain a valuable contribution to ethics. "The personal element in the idea of duty as understood among the Japanese is closely connected with the spirit of loyalty which is so characteristic of their national genius. The spirit which animates their splendid patriotism, which inspires all their sentiments in relation to the Emperor, and which shows itself in the code of knightly honour (the *Bushido*) which distinguished the old Samurai, reveals a quality of character capable of great things when enlisted in the service of Christ."¹ That China has survived, as it has, all the political vicissitudes through which it has been passing, is testimony to some enduring element in its social system. "Ancestor-worship is the most sacred and revered rite in China, and is common to all classes. . . . It is the first and great commandment, the corner-stone of society, and the foundation of the family and the State. The agnostic and the indifferent may sneer at the gods and neglect them as far as practicable, but all join in ancestor-worship *con amore*. Personal gratitude and affection, as well as family and clan feeling, unite all in this time-honoured national rite. The man who neglects it seems an inhuman monster, a wretch who has renounced father and mother and ancestors."² This statement was made about twenty years ago, and would probably need some qualification to-day, but it is quoted to show the influence which for centuries has held sway. While it has been a hindrance to conversion to Christianity, an experienced missionary in Japan, Dr. Gulick, expresses the conviction that "it can easily be Christianised, and should be maintained in this

¹ Quoted, *Report of World Missionary Conference*, 1910, Vol. IV., pp. 101-102.

² *Idem*, pp. 46-47.

form as a valuable national asset."¹ Probably no great religious system is responsible for so many moral and social evils as is Hinduism ; yet nationalist feeling in India has prompted educated men to defend what to-day is inexcusable in a country like India, with its ancient civilisation and what it has received from modern civilisation. It will be necessary to call attention to these evils as indicating how lamentable may be the results of false conceptions of the divine and consequently wrong modes of worship.

(6) The test of the values of religion is this : Does it produce by its testimony and influence the *best* personality in the *best* society ? We have to consider, then, the ideal for personality and society, and the best is reciprocal ; the best men will produce the best social relations with their fellows, and the best community will produce the best men. There are ideals of *truth*, *beauty*, *goodness*, which have found general recognition. It seems to me that we have to include more than these to give completeness to our ideal. Croce has included *utility* along with morality (economics with ethics) as expressions of the practical reason, as beauty and truth (æsthetics and logic) are of the theoretical. For this inclusion two reasons may be mentioned. Man is not disembodied angel, and has bodily needs to be met, and on his physical condition his personal efficiency largely depends. We may modify the familiar Latin saying, and say, *Persona sana in corpore sano* ; for health and holiness are not only etymologically connected with wholeness. Even so rigid a moralist as Kant recognised this wider range of the Good. The teaching of Christ makes care of the bodily needs of man both a divine concern (Matt. vi. 32-33) and a human duty (xxv. 35-36). Again, although right social relations may be included in the ideal of goodness, it is well to throw into prominence that no man can realise his personality in isolation, and so emphasise *love* as goodness in its social exercise. Lastly, as has been argued at length, religion is essential to complete manhood, and we may, therefore, add *godliness* to our list of ideals, even although it might be included, as also might love in goodness. But to lay stress on both is necessary, as individualism would ignore love, and moralism godliness. As the ideals are realised, as the human personality develops towards completeness, there

¹ Quoted, *Report of World Missionary Conference*, 1910, Vol. IV., p. 102. I have quoted this testimony of missionaries as we are concerned, not with the religions in their literature, but in the life as known to sympathetic observers.

emerges, not as an additional ideal, but as a hope – or a postulate, as Kant would call it, not of the practical reason only, but of the whole ideal personality – for continuance, for a destiny hereafter, conforming to the actual and still potential value of personality. What does a religion offer in confirmation of this hope? In forming a judgment of the claim of any religion to become the universal religion, the tests we should apply, then, are economic, intellectual, ethical, æsthetic, social, religious, and eschatological.

(7) In applying such tests, there are three considerations to be kept in mind : (a) We must carefully distinguish how the religion works out in life and what it sets forth in literature. The practice of most religions falls short of its profession, although, owing to the religious conservatism already noted, a religion may retain in theory what it has outgrown in practice. If conduct is usually not as good as creed, creed may sometimes be less good than conduct. Many a fundamentalist would be ashamed to do himself what he does not hesitate in defending as done of old times at the command of God.

(b) Hence we must discriminate between what is *accidental* to, and what is *inherent* in, a religion. Drunkenness is accidental in a Moslem, for his religion forbids the use of intoxicating liquors, but slavery and polygamy are inherent in its social system. The sexual licence which is met with in Christian lands is no reproach to its teaching on the relation of the sexes, as it is intolerant of such licence. The evils of child-marriage in India are a reproach to Hinduism, for it offers no rebuke of the practice. A religion can be held responsible not only for what it forbids or enjoins, but also for its lack of moral insight in what it fails either to enjoin or to forbid, and also for the inadequacy of its motives to obedience or its restraints on disobedience.

(c) In view of these two considerations, a third emerges : How far, if it is showing itself defective, has it within itself the capacity for the necessary reform, without changing its essentials, and how far has it the resources within itself for such reforms? Christianity has again and again showed itself capable of reform ; can the religions which are its rivals ?

II

The subject can now be discussed in greater detail.

(1) It is a significant fact that the progress of modern science, and the consequent development of modern industry and commerce, have been among the nations which are in name Christian, and where thought and life, even if there are many individuals who make no Christian profession, have been influenced by Christianity. It may be argued, of course, that this culture and civilisation have inflicted more evils on mankind than the benefits which have been conferred. But it must be maintained that as regards security, comfort, satisfaction of needs, protection against dangers, the standard of living for the great multitudes has been raised. It may be admitted that the machine has to a large extent mastered the man ; and that moral and religious development have not advanced fast enough to give man that control over the machine which will prevent its injurious, and promote its beneficent, operations. It is being gradually recognised that the acquisitive and competitive economic system has been proving itself ethically defective ; and has now, as it seems, even come to an economic *impasse* ; plenty and poverty, economic over-production and under-consumption, confront one another, because the distribution of wealth has not been properly adjusted to the rapid increase of production. If only too tardily, the Christian Church is beginning to realise the moral resources it has in the Christian ideal, and is beginning to apply them to the moral transformation of the economic system, the only remedy for its present sickness. This industrialism has been exported from Europe and America to the other continents, and, in the absence of Christian influences, has produced even greater evils. The other religions have not proved that they have the moral resources in themselves to combat these evils. And the missionary societies are recognising that it is their urgent, imperative task to study this world-wide industrialism in order to apply, if possible, in other lands the Christian principles, which the Churches are trying, quite inadequately, to apply at home. Through the Labour Department of the League of Nations the evils of this modern industrialism are being attacked over the whole world. Can it be denied that the principles which are being thus applied are essentially Christian ? Here the distinction mentioned on a previous page must be recalled.

Sorrowfully it must be confessed that during the last century the Christian life fell far short of the Christian literature. In the spheres of economics, as well as politics, the Christian ideal of human brotherhood based on divine Fatherhood, the law of equal love to self and neighbour, motivated by absolute love to God, was "more honoured in the breach than the observance." I dare not maintain that Christendom has solved the economic problem ; for it has failed to do so, and the world-wide harvest of that failure is being now reaped ; but what I venture to affirm is that Christianity has the resources, if the Churches will but use them, to promote the solution. The patriotism of Japan, the ancestor-worship of China, the caste-system of India, the tribalism of Africa, cannot offer a solution. The caste-system of India and the tribalism of Africa will go down before this advance of modern industrialism ; the patriotism of Japan and the ancestor-worship of China will certainly undergo modification. None of these social bonds, however, holds out the promise of the necessary reconstruction of society which this industrialism, as it spreads, will involve. In view of the world-wide crisis, it is not necessary to show how the spirit of Japan shut it off from intercourse with other peoples, how oppressive has been the caste-system of India, how unfit to guide any modern development of culture and civilisation both Buddhism by its monasticism and Islam by its association with polygamy and slavery have proved. Within Christendom itself we might make a comparison between the influence of Catholicism, Roman or Greek, and of Protestantism on the economic conditions of the peoples, over which they respectively exercise an influence ; and evidence might be offered to justify a conclusion more favourable to the one or the other, but I refrain, as I am not here concerned with any one historical form which Christianity may have assumed, but with the principles and motives affecting the economic activities, inherent in it, and not accidental to it.

(2) From the economic influence we can pass to consider the intellectual adequacy of any religion. We can start from an interesting and important fact—the contrast between the Edinburgh Missionary Conference of 1910 and the Jerusalem Missionary Council of 1928. Three features especially can be noted. The problems of world-wide industrialism bulked largely in 1928, but not in 1910. The growing strength and desire for independence of the "new"

Churches, scarcely noted in 1910, were generously and gratefully recognised in 1928 by the "old." Less attention was given to the other religions of the world as rivals to the Christian Gospel than to the secularism which is the common foe of all religion. This secularism, a world-wide phenomenon, is the result of the spread of Western industrialism, but no less of modern science ; not of science as such, but of the philosophies which have claimed the support of science ; for the agnosticism and materialism which many men of science in Europe are discrediting and discarding are still holding the mind of Asia. No more serious task confronts religion to-day than an understanding with science. If fundamentalism were inherent in Christianity, a true interpretation of it and not a false aberration, it would be just as helpless before the assaults of science as any other religion. To talk of "vain philosophy" and of "science falsely so called" is to betray the vital interests of Christian faith. The attempt to reconcile geology and Genesis is foolish and futile ; it is not necessary, and cannot be done. To oppose the story of Eden to the theory of evolution is stupid ignorance of the meaning of the one and the aim of the other. The only issue between Christianity and science is this : Has science disproved, can science disprove, the belief in "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth" ? When science confines itself to its own province, and puts forward only the conclusions which it is competent to advance, it is evident that this it has not done, nor can do. Only if religion, forsaking its stronghold, and offering battle on the field of phenomenal explanation, where science is entrenched, challenges the legitimate results of science, will it suffer a deserved defeat. In the second part of this volume this matter must be fully discussed. Here it had to be made clear that it is not for a Hebrew cosmology, but only for monotheism, that Christianity needs to take account of science. A candid, informed scrutiny from both sides shows no necessary contradiction. Can any polytheism, however, be maintained in view of the demonstration by science of the unity of the universe, the working of all things together ? Can the doctrine of the Yang and the Yin, which "has entered so intimately into the philosophy, the religion, and the practices of the people, that in discussing the religions of China we cannot afford to ignore it,"¹ retain its hold ? Can the enquiry of the geomancer

¹ Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 183.

regarding the *fêng-shui*, the propitiousness or otherwise of any spot, live alongside of the investigations of science regarding cause and effect? In so far as Hindu or Buddhist cosmology is bound up with the religious doctrine and practice, modern science must be fatal to them. And already the contradiction is being made manifest in the spread among the educated classes of non-Christian lands of a culture which denies God. In India it might be maintained that pantheism, which is the Higher Hinduism, as not incompatible with science, could replace polytheism, the Lower, which so manifestly cannot survive alongside of modern science. Undoubtedly pantheism can exist as a philosophy beside science; but in the previous chapter it has been shown how far Indian pantheism has compromised with polytheism, and to be reconciled with science it would need to repudiate that compromise; and also the objections to pantheism have there been stated.

(3) As important as, if not more important than, the intellectual adequacy of a religion is its moral efficacy.

(a) Probably there is no other religion, commanding so great a number of adherents, that lays itself open to more severe condemnation than does Hinduism. Not only in India, but in other lands also, the close association of religion with the fertility of the soil or the fecundity of animals has had a most disastrous influence on morals, since the sexual act has become a part of the ritual of religion. To have intercourse with a temple maiden, devoted from birth to thus serving her god, or to yield to a priest's embrace, has come to be regarded as a religious act. The British Government has, despite violent opposition, abolished the cruelties of the car of Jagannātha (Juggernaut), of widow-burning, and of human sacrifice. "In our own day the English police," says Barth, "have put an end to these rites, which, however, in the civilised districts of India, have always been more or less exceptional occurrences. This is not the case with those coarsely sensual and obscene observances which form the other side of these secret cults, and the indecent regulations in regard to which the Tantras expound with minuteness."¹ Even if the *yoni* and *linga* are not images, but only symbols, in no way indecent in form, their presence in temples shows an unwholesome

¹ *The Religions of India*, pp. 204-205. I refrain from quoting the description of the shameful orgies by which it is supposed union with the divine can be effected.

preoccupation of the religion with an aspect of life which should not be thrust into prominence. The rites above mentioned are not general, but peculiar to certain sects ; but the gods to the worship of which they belong are universally recognised in the popular religion. And this emphasis on sex-relations is not an accident, but inherent in the conceptions of the divine in the cults of the people. There is prostitution in Christian lands ; but the Church from the very beginning has condemned the indulgence of the flesh, and has constantly combated licence. To give such rites an exalted mystical significance as symbols does not rob them of their offensiveness, just as the use of the Song of Solomon by some Christian mystics also deserves condemnation. This is, of course, the darker side of Hinduism ; and there is a brighter side in the *bhakti* worship, although even here the grace sought is not deliverance from sin, but from the bond of " three strands : (1) *Anavam*, an inherent defilement, which darkens the soul's light or intelligence, so that it cannot understand its true nature, its oneness with Siva ; (2) *Karma*, the effect of past deeds impelling to new births which must be neutralised ; (3) *Maya*, which in this system is not so much illusion as an elemental matter in which inhere the impurities of the soul." With some modification of the metaphysics this description would indicate what is the object of other forms of *bhakti* also. Dr. Cave adds : " Where God is not regarded as essentially holy, and where man is not sufficiently responsible for his deeds really to be guilty, we cannot give to grace its Christian meaning."¹ The speculative pantheism on the one hand, and the debasement of much of the popular polytheism on the other, reduce immeasurably the influence of Hinduism for moral aspiration and endeavour. Virtues the Indian people do possess, but do not derive directly from their religion ; for much that is morally bad their religion is responsible. Need it be added that we are not pronouncing a harsh judgment on the personal character of the people who, as missionaries testify, possess many attractions ; but we are applying the objective standard of the morality which we ought to expect from a religion which could become universal.

(b) The moral code prescribed for the Buddhist monk is, in contrast to Hinduism, a very exacting one, and has many admirable features, as had also the character of Gautama. But it is not fitted to become an ideal wide enough for a

¹ Cave, *Redemption, Hindu and Christian*, pp. 136-137.

progressive society ; nor does its influence, even in its later form, more adapted to human need, seem potent enough to deal with moral efficiency with the new situation which is emerging. A Japanese Christian bears this testimony : " Generally speaking, dissatisfaction against Buddhism is increasing more rapidly than against any other system, for it is insisted that Buddhism does not fit the Japanese because it is pessimistic, while the people are optimistic." ¹ Life is thus confirming what the literature shows. A religion which regards life as evil, and the good to be sought as escape from life, is not suited to enable men who believe in living to make the best and the most of life. In Buddhism, morality is not an end in itself, but a means towards a state, in which morality has no meaning or worth, for effort has ceased.

(c) About Islam nearly as much has been already said as need be said. The history of Moslem lands is the judgment of its moral inferiority. If Christians have persecuted and oppressed and gone to war, it has been contrary to the morals of the religion which they profess. But Mohammed himself commanded the *jihad*, commonly interpreted as the " holy war." " The ' Way of God ' was, above all, war against unbelievers in defence of the true religion, or to extend its dominion and achieve its supremacy in the world." ² The regulations of polygamy and slavery in the Koran do show a reforming spirit, but also show how little Mohammed was in advance of his people and time, and " unfortunately he gave the finality of revelation to their limitations." ³

(4) The æsthetic values of religion are of much less importance for the progress of mankind than the intellectual and moral, and yet they should not be entirely ignored. The contrast of Greek and Hindu representations of the gods has already been mentioned. The very perfection of the human representations of the gods in Greek art was a religious defect. Anthropomorphism was carried to an excess, so that the difference of the human and the divine failed even to be suggested. Hindu idols would give the impression that the Indian people lacked artistic gifts, but apart from religion, there is abundant evidence to refute any such charge. One does wonder, however, whether, even to symbolise divinity in its superiority to man, it was necessary

¹ Quoted in *Report, World Missionary Conference, 1910*, Vol. IV., p. 90.

² Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., pp. 487-488.

³ *Idem*, p. 400.

to make the idols so hideous as many are. With the cessation of polytheism and its accompanying idolatry, such representations would cease. For the Jewish aversion, shared by the Moslem, to any representation of God seems to be an entirely sound emotion. Even symbols of God, such as Japanese Shintoism uses, seem to be incongruous in a monotheism that has adequately enlarged its conception of God to correspond with the vastness, marvel, and splendour of the universe. Beauty of form and colour, and sublimity, if that can be suggested, in the architecture of places of worship, are an appropriate tribute of art to religion. Representations of Jesus in picture and in sculpture cannot be judged unfitting, for in Him God was manifest as man, and a reverent imagination may dare to body forth, imperfectly at best, what the appearance of the man in whom God was pleased to reveal Himself may have been. In idolatrous worship there is, and must be, much to condemn. Whether Jewish and Moslem worship have given art an adequate recognition may indeed be raised as a question deserving further consideration. Christian worship has in some of its forms assumed a sensuous splendour that has endangered its proper spirituality, or in others has, as a reaction, cultivated an ugliness repellent to men of æsthetic sensibility. Wrong translation though it is, a splendid ideal is expressed in the phrase "the beauty of holiness."

(5) If the solidarity of mankind, the human society of the future, is to be realised, it must be by the recognition of a universal brotherhood, the essential unity of men, transcending all those differences of colour, nation, rank, wealth, culture, and even sex which now divide men, and oppose them to one another. The Hindu caste-system is a flagrant challenge of any such ideal; and yet it claims religious sanction. Within Islam there is a brotherhood which recognises none of these distinctions, but it is based on the acceptance of the five "pillars," the obligations imposed by the prophet; and its obverse is hostility to all unbelievers. Buddhism as primarily a monastic order with lay adherents offers no principle for the constitution of a human society. It may be said that these might be so reformed, as to rise to the demand of human brotherhood. But what can be urged is this, that these religions as they now are have not inherent in their principles and practice, the promise of any such transformation, or resources in themselves to bring it about. Christ stands alone in His teaching and example,

the motive He inspires, and the power His spirit confers, to make such a Kingdom of God among men actual.

(6) Man, however, is not a citizen of the world only; he has a "citizenship in heaven" (Phi. iii. 20); he belongs not only to the earthly society, but also to the commonwealth of heaven, God and the redeemed. As the Christian looks into Jesus, the author and finisher of faith, he is compassed by a great cloud of witnesses (Heb. xii. 1, 2), he endures as seeing Him who is invisible (xi. 27); and because he is a partaker of the Holy Ghost, and has tasted the good word of God, he knows the powers of the age to come (vi. 4, 5); for faith makes the future which is hoped for as certain as the present, and the unseen God who is trusted as real as the seen (xi. 1).

Religion for the completeness of human personality must satisfy man's need of God, the ultimate reality, and confirm man's hope of immortality, his final destiny. (a) How adequate Christian monotheism is will be argued in the second part. Here it need only be said that the historical revelation of God in the personal experience of the believer in Christ yields the conception of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; God transcendent as infinite and eternal reality, yet related to man as the love, the Fatherhood, which enters into communion with man that man may be conformed to the divine perfection; God immanent in human history, manifest in His truth and grace in Jesus Christ, Saviour and Lord; God still more intimately related to man as immanent in religious experience and moral character as the Holy Spirit, making Christ present to faith as Saviour and Lord, and so inwardly renewing man as to make him increasingly a partaker of the divine nature (2 Pet. i. 4) perfect as the Heavenly Father is perfect (Matt. v. 48). God has *anthropomorphised* in Christ that He might *theomorphise* man by His Spirit. Although for our human thinking we thus distinguish God in His eternal reality, His historical manifestation, His operation in personal experience and character; yet it is the one God, Who is over all, through all, and in all.

(b) From such a conception of God, and of man's relation to God, the assurance of immortality, progress towards perfection in still clearer vision, closer communion, and greater conformity (1 John iii. 1, 2) inevitably follows. It was on the intimate relation of God to the patriarchs that Jesus based His assurance that "God is not the God of the

dead, but of the living" (Mark xii. 26, 27) : it was on his close fellowship with Christ that Paul, in an hour of despondency, rose again to confidence regarding the hereafter, so as to be "willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be at home with the Lord (2 Cor. v. 6) ; and the author of the Fourth Gospel conceives of believers as by a birth from above (John iii. 3-6), or by a spiritual resurrection having already eternal life (vi. 40), and puts on the lips of Jesus Himself this assurance (xi. 25-26). This hope has its pledge and pattern in Christ Himself, risen from the dead, and present as living, mighty Lord with His Church all the days unto the consummation of the age (Matt. xxviii. 20). I have found myself constrained to deal with the Christian faith in God, and hope for the hereafter together, as they are indeed inseparable.¹

(c) To such a conception of God and expectation for the future what can Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam offer as a better alternative? Brahma in Hinduism is a goal of speculative thought more than an object of devotion. Krishna, Rama, Siva do inspire an intense devotion in the *bhakti* cults ; but their characters as represented in the sacred literature forbid our regarding them as morally worthy of such devotion ; and worship of such objects cannot but have undesirable moral reactions. Neither pantheism nor polytheism can offer a reality as object of godliness which will elevate human personality. To be absorbed into Brahma as ultimate reality or to be condemned to a succession of rebirths until such a consummation can be reached after much toil and travail is not an inspiring prospect. Buddhism was in its original *Hinayana* form atheistic in practice if not in theory, the gods were ignored, if not denied. Gautama did inspire devotion and admiration. Not only, however, must we regard him as personally inferior to Jesus, but it does make an incalculable difference whether the human person so inspiring can, or cannot be regarded as revealing the character and purpose of God. Whatever gifts Buddha bestowed on his disciples of teaching, example, or companionship, he did not bring God to them ; but the grace of Christ reveals the love of God. The deification of Gautama in the later *Mahayana* Buddhism was an after-thought,

¹ I have used the language of Scripture as that which least inadequately expresses my own religious thought and life, not offering a historical exegesis in any detail, but conveying in this to me most familiar and attractive language this constructive theology, the result of many years' study and meditation.

unrelated to the historical facts, and contrary to the founder's intentions. It was in the first generation of believers, immediately after the Resurrection, that faith ascended to the exaltation of Jesus the Christ as Lord ; and it is in the literature of the first two generations that the relation of the Lord and of the Spirit is so apprehended as to yield the full conception of God expounded in a preceding page. As regards Confucius it may be noted *passim* that, while he formulated a system of ethics, admirable in many ways, yet limited by the existing social system, and emphasising propriety unduly as a rule of life, as regards the spirits and the hereafter, his attitude was agnostic, or, rather, non-committal ; why divert attention from what matters to that of which one cannot be sure ? The Chinese need to supplement Confucianism by Buddhism and Taoism ; and give the impression that they take all three with strict moderation, we may say, prosaically. It cannot be claimed that Mohammed has made an original contribution to the belief in God, or the hope of immortality ; he borrowed from Judaism and Christianity, but what he borrowed he did not improve. His Allah is more absolute power and arbitrary will than mercy and grace. His utterances are " crude and inconsistent " and even if " here Mohammed was walking more closely than he knew in the traces of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures," yet what must be remembered is that he did not recognise the progressiveness of the Old Testament revelation, nor the transformation of much in the Old Testament by the revelation of God in Christ ; and for so imperfect a reproduction of the Scriptures he claimed a final, absolute authority. " His own revelations were transcripts of a celestial original, brought to him in parts from time to time as need was by Gabriel." ¹ What Mohammed claims for himself binds Islam to the Koran, as Christianity is not bound to the Bible. Mohammed's representations of Heaven and Hell take Jewish eschatology with prosaic literalness, and give to these representations a sensuousness and even sensuality from which the Christian Scriptures are free. From this Jewish eschatology Christian thought even in the New Testament is beginning to detach itself ; and progressive Christian thought has laid these views aside altogether.

(7) These ancient faiths are not submitting to the advance of Christianity in the world through its missionary enterprise without a struggle. There is the conservative opposition,

¹ Moore, *op. cit.* II, p. 397.

which sees no reason for a change, and holds to the old ways. But there is also an opposition from those who recognise that in the world, as modern knowledge and industry are shaping it, there must be adaptation of the religious inheritance to the new moral and intellectual environment ; and yet who desire to preserve their continuity with their past as far as is possible. Such endeavours as the Neo-Hinduism, Neo-Buddhism, or Neo-Islam can command only our sympathy, as attachment to a religious inheritance is a worthy motive ; but we may well ask : Is this sublimated essence of the old religion, as adapted to modern needs, really sufficiently in continuity with it to be justified in its name, or is it not rather a new religion, and a new religion which owes as much at least to Christianity as to Hinduism, Buddhism, or Islam ; for has it not discarded much that was inherent in, and not accidental to this inheritance from the past ? So far these restatements, if such they are, have proved too artificial to gain a wide influence. They do not seem to be necessary developments of the religion, the name of which each has appropriated. How can Buddhism with its essentially negative attitude to the world and life become a religion to meet the complex demands of to-day ? Can Hinduism shed its polytheism and pantheism to become consistently monotheistic ? How can Islam free itself from some of its lower theological, ethical, and social aspects, when the Koran stamps on its doctrine and practice the absolute authority of God through his prophet ? If these religions change adequately, as the times demand, they cannot preserve the continuity which will command the allegiance of those to whom the old faith in its essential features still makes its appeal. The motives of those revivals, especially in India, is racial or national more than moral or religious ; for it has been the misfortune of Christianity to be associated in Asia, as in Africa, with the dominating, exploiting European peoples. Of the revival of Hinduism a missionary who laboured for many years among the higher castes, the classes whom this movement most affects, the Rev. T. E. Slater, wrote : " The present Hindu reaction against a foreign will – the resurrection of the national spirit which is now challenging the West – cannot but gain respect for the patriotism that inspires it ; but much of the clamour for ' a revival of ancient Hinduism ' is mere idle talk, and very few who advocate it really understand what they mean by it : it is an appeal to a false sentiment

rather than a response to a sincere conviction. . . . With reference to the Hindu Revivalism a remarkable communication appeared not long since in an Indian paper (the *Madras Mail*) from a Brahman correspondent, from which we quote the following : ' It is a well-known biological truth that the continued existence of any type depends on its capacity to adapt itself to altered environments ; and the principle holds good of all human institutions. You can no more make feudalism flourish in England to-day than you can make the religion of the Puranas or the Vedas serve the Hindus of to-day. The very fact that the ancient institutions died out is a proof they had ceased to suit the community. . . . Whatever of the older forces still at work can be profitably utilised should still be used, but the important thing is to recognise clearly that there can be no going back to the Vedic times, and that the present state of things cannot long continue unchanged. It is a sheer waste of time and energy to infuse life into the dry bones of an ancient system. It is *reformation*, and not *revival* that is wanted.' ¹ This, though written a number of years ago, applies generally to all these efforts to galvanise the dead.

(8) It is a great gain to Christianity that its literature makes no claim to verbal inspiration, and that its records bear so clear indications of progress, not only to Christ, but even in the interpretation of Christ in the New Testament. Unlike Mohammed or Buddha Jesus did not organise a society prescribing rigid rules for it. He gave to His disciples ideas of God and ideals for man, which impose no bondage of the letter, but leave freedom to the spirit of man. To this community there was also given the Spirit of truth to guide into all the truth (John xvi. 13). Although He lived and taught in one age and among one people, He did not fetter His permanent mission in the world by temporary conditions, or impose on His universal message local limitations. Absolute as is His sufficiency as Saviour, and His consequent authority as Lord, He was no taskmaster or law-giver ; but He called men to a service in which because love is its constraint they can realise freedom. Paul's *Epistle to the Galatians*, and Luther's *The Liberty of a Christian Man*, strike the key-note of the religion of the Spirit, which through the mediation of history lives in the eternal God. The doctrines of the verbal inspiration of the Bible, the dogmatic authority of the creeds, and the infallibility of

¹ *The Higher Hinduism*, pp. 289-290.

general councils or popes, are a fundamentalism that has the folly to build on sand, and not on rock (Matt. vii. 24-27). An unencumbered faith in Christ fears not literary or historical criticism, welcomes the assured results of science, tests the speculation of philosophy, uses the language, recognising its inadequacy at the best, which each age can most fully understand to present in His truth and grace the "Jesus Christ, who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever" (Heb. xiii. 8) as revealing the eternal God, and as redeeming from the sin which is ever besetting men to the holiness which meets the moral demands of any age. The Christian monotheism which this volume seeks to command is no dogmatic or sectarian system, creed, code, ritual or polity. If the mission enterprise is to make the best and the most of its present opportunity it must be emancipated from many of its historical accretions, dogmatic and ecclesiastical limitations ; it must not present to the world a Christ divided (1 Cor. i. 13) by the differences of the denominations. If Christianity is to establish its claim that by its nature it can be the universal religion of mankind, as neither Buddhism nor Islam, because of their limits, can be, it must transcend its present schisms, and make manifest to the world the unity of the one body of Christ, the one community of the Spirit, the one temple of God, in which all the peoples can worship and serve.

PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL: THE CONFIRMATION

CHAPTER I

THE RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN AND THE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

IN the first part of this volume we have been relating the Christian belief in God to religion generally. In this second part our task will be to relate this belief in God to the whole life of man, the varied functions of human personality. It might appear as if we had already anticipated this task in the last chapter in dealing with the values of religion ; but a distinction must here be recalled between the *philosophy of religion* and the *philosophy of theism* which it is useful in my judgment to make. In the first discipline we seek to relate religion to the other personal functions of man, to determine its *value* for human life generally. In the second we are relating religion exclusively to one of these functions, man's pursuit of *truth*, his need of the conviction that his belief in God does correspond to reality. Has it not only *value* for man, but has it *validity* as interpreting the reality of the universe ? But, though the approach to reality will be intellectual by thought, the avenue of approach will not be only knowledge (science and philosophy), for man's æsthetic sense and social conscience are, no less than his theoretical intellect, such avenues. We shall ask ourselves the question, Can a more intelligible and credible interpretation of the universe in man's varied relations to it be made without or with the belief in God as a datum or clue ? In other words, our task will be to show that the *affirmation* of religion that *God is*, finds *confirmation* in the philosophy of the world and life, to which man's varied personal interests and activities lead. The conclusion of the first part is the datum from which this second part starts ; it may be summed up in three propositions : (1) Man is everywhere religious, and needs religion for the completion of his personality, thus is proved the universality of religion in mankind and the necessity of religion for manhood ; (2) religion is a relation to an object, other than the world and man, which may be variously described as the *numinous*, the superhuman, the supernatural, the divine – that is, a reality *above* and *beyond* man, and yet *akin to* and *within* man ; (3) religion has, as affected by the total conditions of man's life, evolved

towards the conception of divine unity, of which pantheism, deism, and monotheism are variant conceptions.

I

(1) This conclusion from the history of man's religious evolution has been included among the proofs for the existence of God, and has been known as the argument *e consensu gentium*. (a) The assumption that what is generally believed may be accepted as true need not be confined to the belief in God, but can be regarded as evidence for other truths. Socrates held that, out of the variety of opinions regarding just acts, by his *majeutic* method he could elicit a general conception of justice. Plato's doctrine of ideas involves that, while the images were individual, the idea was universal. Aristotle, in his *Topics* i. 1, states this position : "These things are to be regarded as just truths, the credit of which is not derived from other truths, but is inherent in themselves. As for probable truths they are such as are admitted by all men, or by the generality of men, or by wise men ; and among these last, either by all the wise, or by the generality of the wise, or by such of the wise as are of the highest authority."¹ The *consensus gentium* was used by the Stoics as proof of the originality and validity of certain conceptions, especially the idea of God. Cicero, in his *Tusc. Disp.* i. 16, 36, speaks of the *consensus nationum*. He appeals to this in regard to the belief in God in *De Nat. Deorum* i. 13 : "That is truly necessary regarding which there is general agreement ; therefore it must be confessed that there are gods." Seneca, in *Ep.* 117. 6, states : "We are wont to assign much importance to what is assumed by all men, and for us it is a proof of truth that anything appears true to all." The Christian Apologists also use this argument. Minucius Felix, in his *Octavius* viii. 1, recognises the variety of the conceptions, and the unity of the belief : "While the reason and the origin of the immortal gods of all nations may be uncertain, yet there remains a secure agreement."² Tertullian is quoted by Schaff³ as asserting : "God will never be hidden, God will never fail mankind ; He will always be recognised, always perceived, and seen, when man wishes. God has made all that we are, and all

¹ I have not been able to trace this translation to its source.

² The original quotations are in Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

³ *History of the Church : Ante-Nicene Christianity*, II., p. 539.

in which we are, a witness of Himself. Thus he proves Himself God, and the one God, by His being known to all : since another must first be proved. The sense of God is the original dowry of the soul ; the same and no other in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus ; for the God of the Jews all souls call their God." The Scholastics continue this line of reasoning.

(b) Even although Descartes constructs two proofs for the existence of God – one from the content of the idea of God as necessarily existing, and the other from the idea of God in man as an effect, of which God alone can be the cause – he shares the assumption of the sense of God as an original dowry of the soul. Locke strenuously opposed the theory of innate ideas, denying their possession by savages and children. Descartes modified his theory in substituting a *disposition* for the possession of them by all. To the scepticism of Hume, Reid opposed, as a basis of knowledge in the mind of man, "the principle of common sense – the consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned." But he did not himself regard the belief in God as belonging to the *common sense*, as had Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the Deists. Mill regarded it as an appeal to authority, and as assuming "an intuitive perception, or an instinctive sense of deity." "To a thinker," he says, "the argument from other people's opinions has little weight, it is but second-hand evidence."¹ In this criticism he shows no appreciation of the history of the argument, nor yet of the broad basis in almost, if not altogether, universal experience on which it rests.

(2) But the principle of authority which Mill expressly rejects has been advanced in Balfour's *The Foundations of Belief* as a reason for believing. (a) "A community," Balfour says, "of which each member should deliberately set himself . . . to examine the grounds whereon rest every positive enactment and every moral precept which he has been accustomed to obey ; to dissect all the great loyalties which make social life possible, and all the minor conventions which help to make it easy, would stand but a poor chance in the struggle for existence. . . . It could never even begin to be ; for, if by a miracle it was created, it would without doubt immediately resolve itself into its constituent elements." Having indicated the danger of the exercise of private judgment, he affirms that man's distinctive dignity

¹ *Essay on Theism*, pp. 154–160.

lies in his being influenced by authority. "It is Authority rather than Reason to which in the main we owe, not religion only, but ethics and politics. . . . It is yet no exaggeration to say that, if we would find the quality in which we most notably excel the brute creation, we should look for it, not so much in our faculty of convincing and being convinced by the exercise of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority." What, then, is this authority? It is "that group of non-rational causes, moral, social, and educational, which produces its results by psychic processes rather than reasoning."¹ The above quotation shows that Balfour uses the word reason as equivalent to *reasoning* – the older English use, and not in the sense which Coleridge, naturalising Kant's use of *Vernunft* in contrast to *Verstand*, gave to it. A defender of Lord Balfour's book argued that what he called authority was reason in that wider sense, the Idea or Spirit as realised in standards, beliefs, customs, institutions. But that interpretation is, it seems to me, impossible in view of the manifest intention of the book.

(b) Similarly Benjamin Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, regards religion as a non-rational sanction of morality, the subordination of egoism to altruism. Matthew Arnold appeals to culture as "the best thought of the best minds" as against individual taste or even merely intellectual reasoning – this is a similar attitude (*Literature and Dogma, God and the Bible*). It may be admitted that for the majority of men, and even for all men at some stage of their development or in some phases of their thought and life, reliance on authority is a necessity. That acceptance, however, must be provisional, and cannot be absolute. In religion especially, conviction must be first-hand, and not second-hand. Descartes, for instance, confesses such a conditional acceptance: "The first maxim was to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering firmly to the Faith in which, by the grace of God, I had been educated from my childhood, and regulating my conduct in every other matter according to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest removed from extremes, which should happen to be adopted in practice with general consent of the most judicious among whom I might be living."² Even as regards Hume, deemed to be the arch-sceptic, Dr. Calderwood maintains that he was not

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 196, 229, 219.

² *On Method*, Part III., trans. by John Veitch, p. 23.

irreligious. "To Hume it was a matter of satisfaction that 'our most holy religion is founded on Faith and not on Reason.' Most Christians will hold that faith and reason are united in the religious life ; and religious faith at least is honoured by Hume. His scepticism belonged to the region of philosophy, not to the sphere of religion."¹ Be this contention tenable or not in this case, there can be no doubt that many thinkers have found refuge from their difficulties and perplexities in a reliance on some authority of Bible or of Church. It is no injustice to Cardinal Newman to suggest that it was his naturally sceptical mind which led him to find in Roman Catholicism an authority which even his Anglicanism failed to provide.

(c) Maintaining, as we ought, that external authority cannot in religion or morals be a substitute for internal conviction without stultifying human personality, and in this agreeing with Dr. James Martineau,² we must recognise that the religious community is of value for mediating individual faith. So independent a theologian as Albrecht Ritschl, as we have already seen, recognises this mediation for the Christian thinker. Dr. V. N. Stanton, in his book *The Place of Authority in Religious Belief*, 1891, advances a moderate and temperate plea : "If religious knowledge is to exist objectively at all, and not relatively to the individual consciousness alone, the principle of authority must enter, as it does in every other kind of knowledge." The faith of the individual can be strengthened and widened by the influence of the society. "Our weak faith may at times be permitted to look through the eye of some strong soul" ; and "it may thereby gain a sense of the certainty of spiritual things which before we had not, and which we lose when we return within ourselves." Further, "the volume of the spiritual experience of mankind is a fact vastly greater than the experience of a single individual." The degree of dependence will differ ; but only the exceptional man can stand quite alone. The reaction of such an individual on society must also be recognised. "What is the testimony of the Church but the conspiring testimony (of individuals) strengthened and corrected by combination and comparison." The right and duty of the individual to think is not denied, but the necessary qualification of individualism is insisted on. "The individual must think and judge, but he should do so with

¹ *David Hume*, by Henry Calderwood, p. 91.

² *A Study of Religion*, 2nd ed., Vol. II., pp. 6-9.

the consciousness that he is but one member in a vast organism. He must live in a larger life ; he must think as one whose own work and narrow thoughts should be guided and controlled by the worthier, truer thoughts of a vaster mind."¹ Concerned as we here are, not with the creed of any religious community, but with the evolution in mankind of the belief in God, we may regard that fact as important enough, not to be dismissed as an illusion, nor to be insisted on as by itself conclusive, but as a datum deserving of fuller consideration in relation to human thought and life generally.

II

(1) In thus endeavouring to relate religion to the other functions of human personality, we are at once confronted with the proofs which have been offered for the existence of God. Since Kant's damaging criticism of the three rationalist proofs, these have been generally regarded as altogether discredited. It may be fully admitted that they cannot claim logical validity ; the conclusion contains very much more than the premisses. The current philosophical conception, or theological doctrine, of God was brought into that conclusion ; and could not be found in the premisses, the idea of the world or man ; and in the ontological proof, where the conception or doctrine is the premiss, the truth is already assumed, which the pretence is made to prove. As proofs in the sense of logical demonstration or sensible evidence these must be abandoned, and no mere change of form can re-establish their claim. But this admission does not involve the dismissal of these proofs as not deserving further consideration ; because, (a) just as in the previous part it has been well worth while tracing the development of the conception of God in the evolution of religion, so it is of interest and importance that we should enquire how thinkers in the past have tried to relate their belief in God to the thought of their own time, for here, as in other questions, adequate knowledge of the past is a condition of effective judgment in the present ; and (b) the proofs, if not conclusive arguments, are suggestive indications as to the way in which we can to-day relate the idea of God to the rest of our thought on the world and life. Let it be conceded on the one hand that

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5, 32, 189, quoted by Caldecott ; *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 240.

the traditional form of the proofs is not valid logically, and indeed that no sensible evidence or logical demonstration of the existence of God is possible. "No man hath seen God at any time" (John i. 18). "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?" (Job xi. 7). But let it be maintained on the other hand that faith has accomplished what neither sense nor reasoning has done, and has found God, or rather been found by God as reality; that, as man cannot be divided against himself or opposed to his world, the belief in God must seek to justify itself in relation to thought generally; and that the world can be interpreted most intelligibly for the mind of man in a theistic setting.

(2) In the next chapter it will be necessary to deal in more detail with the conditions of human knowledge as giving man access to reality; here we may assume that neither the rationalism which ignores experience nor the empiricism which excludes reason as a factor in knowledge is an adequate solution of the problem. (a) We are now concerned with reason, which is not used here in the sense of reasoning but in the wider sense, corresponding to Kant's *Vernunft*, although for our present purpose we need not distinguish it from *Verstand*, understanding. The categories as well as the ideas may be assigned to the reason of man, the mental constitution which makes possible for him his own intelligence and the intelligibility of the world. To Kant's pure or theoretical reason, and his practical, we now add the æsthetic, corresponding to the three ideals which man strives to realise — truth, goodness, beauty. If these are not subjective, projections of the mind of man above and beyond himself, but objective, as corresponding to what is in the world around him, each of these, and not the first only, may be avenues of approach to reality. The tendency of philosophers and theologians has been to lay undue stress on the one, and to let the others fall into the background. Hence the prominence given to the three traditional proofs. The practical and the æsthetic reason have their own contribution to make to the belief in God.

(b) A distinction is made between the ontological proof, on the one hand, and the cosmological and the teleological, on the other hand, which deserves brief notice. In the ontological proof, the inference to the existence of God is drawn from the idea of God; and the proof is accordingly described as deductive, or *a priori*. In the other two, from a datum of

experience, the existence of the world or the evidence of design in the world, an inference is drawn to God as Cause or as Intelligence ; and the proofs are, therefore, described as inductive, or a *posteriori*. For our present treatment this distinction has no significance. These three proofs are *inferential* ; there is *reasoning* from premisses to a conclusion.

(c) To this inferential mode of proof there is opposed the *intuitionalist* claim that God is known by *reason without any reasoning*. As advanced by Lord Herbert of Cherbury the emphasis is on the *innateness* of the knowledge : man is endowed by nature with certain common notions, of which the existence of God is one. This claim has already been discussed in the Introduction. Modern psychology or epistemology lend no countenance to such a claim. But this is a more modern form of *intuitionism* which lays stress, not on *innateness*, but on the *immediacy* or self-evidence of the knowledge of God. Dr. Simon insists that man has a perception of God as certain as that of the world, but, as has already been shown, even perception of the world around is mediated physically, organically, and psychically, although there is no consciousness of the mediation. The certainty of the consciousness of God has behind it an age-long history of mediation. To this subject we must return in dealing with mysticism in a subsequent chapter.

(d) Although Kant has, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, declared the idea of God as only *regulative*, and not *constitutive* of knowledge, yet, if we set aside his scepticism in this matter, we may claim that there is a *transcendental deduction* of the idea of God, which affords at least a presumption of the divine existence. This conclusion must be more fully dealt with in the next chapter in connection with the ontological argument. The postulate of the Practical Reason for the existence of God is preceded by an argument, and might be so far regarded as an inferential proof, although not of strict logical validity. This Kantian postulate leads us to consider the moral argument. This can assume two forms as we start from *law* or *good* as the moral standard. What is the source of the categorical imperative ? What is the relation of morality to total reality ? Is a purpose being fulfilled in the world indifferent, adverse, or favourable to moral effort ? From abstract ethics we can turn to concrete history. The æsthetic reason has been less appealed to than the practical, and that less than the theoretical, but all the ideals must be taken into account in theistic thinking.

(3) Is reason the only avenue of approach to reality, or can emotion or volition be in any way brought into the confirmation we are seeking of the religious belief in God? We cannot construct an emotional or volitional argument, but we may ask whether the probability of the judgment of the mind can be turned into certainty by the emotion which it evokes or the volition, of which that emotion can become the motive. We have already insisted that in religious belief there is feeling and willing as well as thinking, and we must recognise that the appeal has been made in the history of theism to the one or the other aspect of personality. We must accept the challenge of mysticism that it is not the human personality in its ordinary functioning, or in its normal conditions, which finds the open way to God; but that there is a special faculty for communion with God in man, or that an exceptional state must be reached, if the reality of God is to be apprehended.

III

Some preliminary indications may be now given as to the treatment of these "proofs" in the remaining chapters of this volume. (1) The ontological argument must come first, for it raises the fundamental issue whether man's mind is capable of reaching ultimate reality, whether this is so much of the same nature as is man's intelligence as to be intelligible. Is man's reason a chance product of a mindless evolution, or is it the necessary disclosure of the secret of the nature and the purpose of the universe? Although we may distinguish epistemology (the theory of knowledge) from ontology (the theory of reality), yet the two are inseparable, for as we estimate knowledge so must we conceive reality. Assuming that our first question—Can reason interpret reality?—is answered affirmatively, we can then, as it were, put our questions to the world. Knowing the *what* the world is as intelligible, we can go on to consider the *how* and the *why*. It was the doubt Hume cast on the principle of causality, which, however much modern science may transform it into a mathematical formula, has been the basis of science, that aroused Kant out of his dogmatic slumber and led him to his critique of human knowledge. Man in conceiving causality must needs *anthropomorphise*, as indeed he must in all his thinking, as he has no other mind

to think with than his own, and so conceived it on the analogy of his own volition. He wills, and it is done. It is the principle of causality, which is applied in the *cosmological* argument, the name of which is wider than its content. When it is confined to seeking a cause of the world merely, it should rather be called the *etiological*, from the Greek word *aitia*. The word *cosmos* not only suggests an effect, but also the character of the effect; and consequently of the cause corresponding to it. It is not merely the existence of the world we want to explain, but surely also how it is the kind of world it is. The separation of the *cosmological* from the *teleological* argument is a mistake. It is for the world as an intelligible system that we want to find a cause. In the traditional form the proof must be abandoned. It is not a cause external to the world, but a principle of unity amid diversity, "all things working together," that we are after—how is there a *cosmos*, and not a *chaos*? The analogy of the will may serve us here, as the will is not merely power, but intelligent power. Much which would have fallen within the teleological proof must be included in the cosmological. The distinction which may be suggested between the two is this. In the cosmological argument we are concerned with the world order. In the teleological treatment we ask ourselves: What purpose does that order subserve? We are led from the *how* to the *why*, from the ultimate cause to the final purpose. The old argument from *design*, with its illustrations, can no longer command assent. But the question of purpose still forces itself upon our attention.

(2) Does the world include any indications of what its purpose is? Do starting-point and course show the goal? Here we pass from causes and ends to *values*, intellectual, moral, æsthetic—the three ideals already noted. In the measure in which man can know the nature, the cause, and the end of the universe, he is realising the ideal of truth. But the purpose of the world must include these other values, unless they are to be rejected as vain imaginations; the teleological consideration leads us on to the significance, for belief in God, of the moral and æsthetic values. But these are not, for the majority of mankind, the supreme value, and owe much of their value to that value. We are here assuming the religious belief in God as our datum, and have not used the prevalence of that belief, and the authority over the individual mind that so almost universal a belief might claim, as a part of our confirmations of theism:

but we can now, without the charge of argument in a circle, deal with man's communion with God which man has sought and found in religion as, not only one of the values, but, for those who possess that communion, as the supreme value.

*I have said unto the Lord, Thou art my Lord :
I have no good beyond Thee.*

(Ps. xvi. 2.)

"Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee" (Augustine). The experience of the seers and saints, whether of the mystical or non-mystical type, deserves consideration as, in its value for them, confirming the more general belief in God. Is man's personal relation to God the final purpose of the universe?

Since, however, in the world around us and our own life there are facts – evil, pain, and sin – which contradict these ideals, and which consequently challenge the belief in God, we must ask ourselves whether we can justify the ways of God to man.

(3) When we have reached the end of this enquiry into the confirmation of the religious belief in God in human thought generally, we must face our last question. What is the conception of God, pantheistic, deistic, or monotheistic, which is most adequate and satisfying as the fulfilment of human personality in its varied functions? Have we a historical or experimental verification that there is reality corresponding to that conception? Thus from apologetics we pass to dogmatics, from the religious belief in God to the Christian faith in the Father in heaven.

CHAPTER II

ONTOLOGY

I

(1) IT has been said that ancient philosophy was objective, and modern is subjective; and this generalisation has such measure of truth as to afford at least a starting-point for the discussion of this chapter. (a) Ancient philosophy asked, *What* do I know? Modern asks, *How* do I know? Whether we regard the realists or the idealists of Greek thought, this contrast holds. Air, fire, water, number, being, becoming, on the one hand, or idea and image, matter and form, on the other – the mind is turned to the object of knowledge; the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, realism, nominalism, conceptualism, had the same direction. When Descartes entered on his adventure of universal doubt, and ended in what he regarded as the safe haven of his *cogito ergo sum*, the mind was turned in on itself as the subject of knowing. But Descartes, with his criterion of truth, the distinctness and clearness of ideas – his innate ideas – the divine veracity as the guarantee of the ideas which stood this test, very quickly bent back upon his track, and got again to scholasticism. But the debate between rationalist and empiricist – Descartes and Locke – did follow the new tendency. Leibnitz's mediating effort to recognise both factors – sense and reason – and Hume's *reductio ad absurdum* of the associational theory of knowledge, prepared for the far more searching examination of Kant into the subject of knowledge: *How do I know?* But it is to be observed that Kant's *Critique* was not a psychological enquiry into the process of knowing; it was an epistemological examination of the object of knowledge – the content of experience, to determine the respective contributions of sense, understanding, reason. The ontological problem passes over into the epistemological. (b) While it is convenient to distinguish these two philosophical disciplines, yet we cannot separate them from one another. If our knowledge is not subjective illusion, but has an objective reference, it must enable us to reach reality; the mind must be so constituted that it can know reality, and the reality must be so constituted that it can be known. There must be such a correspondence between the mind and

the world that, as the mind in its development becomes more intelligent, so the world in man's interpretation of it becomes more intelligible. In subsequent chapters of this book we shall be concerned with the interpretation of the world in which it becomes more intelligible for the intelligence of man as a confirmation of the affirmation of religion regarding the existence of God. Here, as the basis of all that follows, we must try to reach such a conception of reality (ontology) as makes man's intelligence, not an alien in a world he cannot understand, but at home in a world which can be, and is, ever more fully known (epistemology).

(2) An appropriate illustration for the present purpose of the correspondence of the intelligent mind and the intelligible world may, in my judgment, be found in the *ontological argument*. In inferring the divine existence from the idea of God in the mind of man, this argument assumes that there is such a correspondence between what man *thinks* and what *is*. Kant's criticism of it challenges that correspondence; and, nevertheless, his recognition of the idea of God as one of the three ideas of the reason *regulative* of thinking, but not *constitutive* of knowledge, can lead only to scepticism, if such a correspondence is not accepted. As Kant's criticism attaches itself to Descartes as well as to Anselm, the statement of the argument by both must precede the scrutiny of Kant's criticism.

(a) Corresponding to Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* is Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*. He starts from Christian faith, and his aim is to show that faith is reasonable. His argument is presented in the spirit of devotion. "Lord, I strive not," he says,¹ "to penetrate Thy lofty nature, for in no way do I compare my understanding with it; but I desire in some degree to understand Thy truth, believed and loved already in my heart. For, indeed, I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand. For this also I believe, namely, that unless I believe I shall not understand." The argument may be briefly summarised as follows. The fool who denies the existence of God thereby only proves that he is a fool, for he shows that he has the idea of God "in his understanding, even though he does not go on to understand that such a being exists." This idea, further, is the idea of "something than which no greater can be conceived." Such an idea,

¹ From the *Proslogium*, quoted by Caldecott in *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, 3rd ed., p. 2.

however, cannot exist only in the understanding, for something that also existed would be greater. And thus the idea of God would not be that of something than which no greater can be conceived. God must be conceived as "both in the understanding and in reality."

(b) Accepting for the present the initial assumption, although we shall later discuss the question whether the idea of God is one necessary for human thought, we may confine ourselves to the crucial question: Are we entitled to pass, as Anselm does, from a necessity of thought to a reality of existence? This right was challenged even in Anselm's time. Gaunilo, in his *Liber pro Insipiente adversus Anselmi in Proslogio ratiocinationem*, argued that existence could not be inferred from thought, but must be independently proved. He uses the illustration of a perfect island. That such can be conceived does not prove that it exists. Anselm's reply is that the idea of God is different from all other ideas as that than which nothing greater can be conceived; he offers to present Gaunilo with the island than which no more excellent may be conceived. That Anselm has stated his argument in a form to which exception can be taken may be fully conceded; but he has raised a wider issue of which Gaunilo's objection does not dispose. Is the idea of God of such a kind, is it so necessary to the intelligible unity of man's thinking, that the denial of the divine existence leads to scepticism?

(3) But before discussing this we must glance at Descartes' statement. Among the ideas which he finds in his mind, which stand the test of clearness and distinctness, is the idea of God, which is "very clear and distinct, and contains in itself more objective reality than any other; there can be no one of itself more true, or less open to the suspicion of falsity."¹ This idea of God is that of "a substance infinite (eternal, immutable), independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which" all things that exist "were created."² As a finite substance man cannot of himself conceive infinite substance, and therefore man could have no idea of God, unless God Himself gave it. This is one of the forms in which Descartes presents to himself the theistic proof. It is not, however, the ontological form which derives the existence of God from the content of the idea itself, and not from the possession of the idea by the mind of man. As here stated, the argument is more akin to the cosmological

¹ *Meditation III.*, p. 126.

² *Idem*, p. 125.

argument from the existence of the world as an effect to God as its cause. The reason why Descartes does not follow the example of Aquinas in applying the principle of causality to the world is that he is confining himself to the ideas which are clear and distinct, as the data of experience are not. The argument in its ontological form is found in *Meditation V*.¹ "Although it may not be necessary that I shall at any time entertain the notion of Deity, yet each time I happen to think of a first and sovereign being, and to draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the store-house of the mind, I am necessitated to attribute to him all kinds of perfection, though I may not then enumerate them all, nor think of each of them in particular. And this necessity is sufficient, as soon as I discover that existence is a perfection, to cause me to infer the existence of this first and sovereign being : just as it is not necessary that I should ever imagine any triangle, but whenever I am desirous of considering a rectilineal figure composed of only three angles, it is absolutely necessary to attribute those properties to it from which it is correctly inferred that its three angles are not greater than two right angles, although perhaps I may not then advert to this relation in particular." To put the argument in a few words : because the idea of God includes necessary existence, therefore God necessarily exists.

(4) Quite rightly, Kant denies that existence is a predicate which can be added to a subject by thinking apart from experience. (a) "*Being* is evidently not a real predicate – that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of a certain determination of it logically, it is merely the copula of judgment." . . . "The real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. The real object – the dollars – is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception."² In criticism of Descartes' illustration Kant says, "To suppose the existence of a triangle, and not that of its three angles, is self-contradictory ; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so it is with the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates ; how, then, can

¹ *Idem*, p. 147.

² Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's trs., p. 368.

there be any room for contradiction? . . . When you say *God does not exist*, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this judgment there cannot exist the least self-contradiction."¹ It must be fully admitted that, as a logical demonstration of the existence of God, the ontological argument as stated by Anselm and Descartes is invalid. Anselm raises the wider issue of the necessity of the idea of God to human thought. Man's thought finds its upward limit in this idea. Is it necessary that thought should so advance? Descartes, when he has proved that God alone can have given man the idea, and that God necessarily exists because the idea contains necessary existence, bases on the veracity of God his confidence in the truth of clear and distinct ideas. He too leads us to this wider issue.

(b) Kant himself finds, not only room for, but even need of the idea of God in his criticism of experience. "I understand," he says, "by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are *transcendental ideas*. They are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding. And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea."² . . . "Although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise."³ . . . "All transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the *first* of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject*, the *second* the absolute *unity of the series of the conditions* of a phenomenon, the *third* the absolute *unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general*."⁴ In simpler words, we may say that, as we unify our inner and outer experience, we are thinking, and necessarily thinking, of the self as a unity, the world as a totality,

¹ Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's trs., pp. 365-366. See also *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 190-192.

² *Idem*, pp. 228-229.

³ *Idem*, p. 230.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 233.

and God as the ground of the existence and correspondence of both self and world. Tennyson, in his familiar poem about "the flower in the crannied wall," illustrates this progress of reason from the particular to the universal, from diversity to unity. Kant recognises the *regulative* value of these ideas, but denies their *constitutive* validity. We may, nay must, think *as if* the self were a unity, the world a totality, and God the ground for both. But we do not know that self, world, or God is ; for, as no object of sense corresponds to them, they lie outside our experience, which Kant virtually limits to our sense experience. The conception he offers of God is stated in abstract terms, in which religion would find it difficult to recognise its God. "The conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a *thing in itself*, regarded as completely determined ; and the conception of an *ens realissimum* is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate, of all possible contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to *being*. It is therefore a transcendental *ideal* which forms the basis of the complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest material condition of its possibility – or condition on which must rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay, more, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable ; because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined by and through itself, and cognised as the representation of an individuum."¹ Although Kant sets aside all the rational proofs as incapable of proving the existence of God, yet "he emphasises that the denial of God's existence is a claim which steps beyond the bounds of our experiential knowledge, and is as incapable of proof as the opposite, and that rather the belief in a living Real unity of all reality constitutes the only powerful motive for empirical investigation of individual groups of phenomena."² "It is by setting before itself such an ideal object, and by treating all the phenomena of the world of experience 'as if they drew their origin from such an archetype,' that reason is enabled to give the greatest unity, extent, and system to our empirical knowledge."³

(5) So important is Kant in the history of modern philosophy that his treatment of the subject deserves fuller examination. (a) The intuitions of sense and the categories of

¹ *Idem*, p. 355.

² Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 550.

³ Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, II., p. 136.

the understanding, applied to the data of sense, yield us experience of *reality* ; but not so the ideas of reason, as no objects of sense correspond to them ; thus, while they are regulative of our thought, they do not constitute knowledge of reality. Before going further, an explanation of his use of the word "sense" as given by Dr. H. R. Mackintosh may be quoted. "Let it be noted," he says, "that when Kant uses the word 'sense' he means by it something more than the special sensations which come through the bodily organs ; he means the whole mental susceptibility or sensibility on its outward side as well. Passivity is the signature of sense, as spontaneity is of understanding. It is obvious how the term 'sense' naturally, and almost inevitably, suggests 'bodily sensation' alone ; and thus for Kant the problem of knowledge tends to be, How do we know the external world ? rather than the deeper and more universal question, How do we know *reality* (which may be described in terms *either* of Spirit or Nature) ? This is but one aspect of the truth that Kant's philosophy, after all, belongs to the eighteenth century, though it was his to set the problems on which nineteenth-century thought, from first to last, was engaged."¹ Tennyson is a Kantian, when he voices the nineteenth-century agnosticism, which derives from Kant :

*We have but faith ; we cannot know,
For knowledge is of things we see.*

Such a limitation of the range of knowledge we must deny. Man has a receptivity and responsiveness to a reality which sense, even in an extended meaning, cannot reach. Man has intuitions, æsthetic, moral, and religious ; he has judgments of value : as the history of religion shows (and not mystical experiences alone), man has in religion a consciousness of reality, which Otto describes as the *numinous*, but which may be also indicated in other terms. Kant himself, in his *Critique of the Practical Reason*, breaks through the barriers which he sets himself in the *Critique of the Pure Reason*. The *categorical imperative* is not an object of sense, yet man knows it. In the moral consciousness, man rises above and reaches beyond the world of sense. Even if only as postulates, God, freedom, and immortality come within the region of the reality with which man is concerned. Had Kant had

¹ *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 183.

the same receptivity for, and responsiveness to, religion as morality, God would not have remained for him only a regulative idea of the pure, and a postulate of the practical reason. The discussion of the first part of this volume justifies us in holding that God, though no object of sense, is on that account no less real, since sense does not set the bounds of knowledge.

(b) May we not in like manner claim that the world as a totality and self as a unity are more than *regulative ideas*? Although a man does not know himself completely, and his whole self is never an object of his consciousness, yet, as his personality develops, he grows in "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control." His personal identity (unity and continuity) becomes more clear and distinct. So also, while science has not yet discovered all the secrets of the world, and may never, owing to the limitations of human capacity, explain all the mystery, yet surely the ideal of science to unify all phenomena in one system has been so far realised that knowledge may advance with a confidence going beyond "as if the world were a totality." The distinction of matter and force as ultimate has disappeared. The differences of the chemical elements have been explained, in the current theory of atoms, as systems, more or less complex, of electrons and protons, electric charges. If we must still speak of emergent evolution, since vital phenomena cannot be resolved into physical and chemical, nor psychic into vital, yet are there not some indications that *panpsychism* may be the final unification of the world? We may venture beyond Kant's "voluntary humility" as regards the ideas of reason, and include them, as well as the intuitions of sense and the categories of understanding, as *constitutive* of knowledge.

(c) As has already been remarked, it was Hume's scepticism which awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. I think we may say that it was in the interests of physical science that he was most concerned to prove that the category of causality is not an irrational custom, but a necessary principle of relation, if experience is to be an intelligible unity. But there is scepticism at the base as there is at the summit of his system. The thing-in-itself, the *noumenon*, is unknown, and what we, with the data of sense, make an intelligible experience remains appearance, *phenomenon*. But, when we consider to what physical science has reduced the universe apart from what it becomes in man's

perceptions, ideas, and ideals, we shall surely be bold enough to affirm that the reality of the universe is disclosed, not in the physical conditions of our sensations, *the thing-in-itself*, but in what the world is for consciousness, *the thing-as-known*. Mind is not an alien factor in the universe, adding what is not essential to it, but its secret at last disclosed, its essence hitherto concealed at last revealed. Had Kant been confident that mind can know, he would not have left the *thing-in-itself* unknown. Further, there is scepticism in his refusal to regard the ideas of reason as clues to reality. He recognises, as we have seen, the necessity of those ideas to thought ; and yet, admitting a correspondence with reality in the process of interpretation by the intuitions of sense and the categories of the understanding, what completes the process, and brings the final unification of all the data in an intelligible experience, he projects beyond reality into the void. The same inconsistency appears in the contrast he makes between the practical and the pure reason ; the postulates of the one he honours, the ideas of the other he discredits. This separation of understanding and reason, reason pure and practical, is a false abstraction. There is only one mind in man ; perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, reason, are all activities of that one mind. Human personality is one, whether functioning as thought, feeling, or will, whether exercised in science, morality, art, or religion. In contrast to his scepticism, we can put confidence in all that makes our experience coherent, in ideas and ideals which for us complete the meaning and the worth of our world and our life. We can boldly claim that the necessities of our thought are not only regulative, but constitutive, of our knowledge.

(6) Accepting, then, the idea of God as a clue to reality, we may take Kant's very abstract definition of the *ens realissimum* and translate it into language less remote from the religious consciousness. As has been already often reiterated, and the discussion requires that it should be, man's religious consciousness is directed to an object above and beyond himself and his world, and this contrast between God and the world and self may be developed in a series of affirmations about the nature of God, which are correlates of man's conceptions of the world and the self. Man is conscious of his dependence ; he has, as Otto insists, the "creature feeling," and that consciousness extends to the world around him. In contrast to that dependence he

conceives the Absolute. Again, man is aware of his limitations, and the limitations of all objects around him ; it is not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative, limitation ; not only can we make affirmations of an object, but, also, these affirmations carry with them negations (here, indeed, every *determinatio est negatio*), and the objects in the world impose limitations upon one another. Self and world alike are finite. In contrast to this is the Infinite, not a merely negative conception, for man's sense of finitude implies a sense of the Infinite as well. We must beware, however, of giving to the terms Absolute and Infinite a false connotation, as do Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer. Absolute does not mean out of all relations, nor infinite without any limitations ; but, in God's relation to the world, may mean self-relating and self-limiting ; the relations and limitations are not imposed from without, but determined from within the nature of the Absolute and the Infinite. Man finds himself, in his thought and life, conditioned by time and space. He must needs think the world, and also his body, as in space ; not so his mind, as he does not measure his thoughts or feelings by inches nor offer yards of affection or devotion. In his inner life he is conscious of duration, a succession of experiences, and yet even here he can fuse past, present, and future to some extent, as, for instance, in his appreciation of a poem or a symphony ; into his present he brings memories of the past, anticipations of the future, and these do affect the total character of his experience. And yet with these qualifications we may say man is conscious of the limitations of time and space. Not only can he partially transcend these limitations himself, but as contrasts he can and does conceive immensity and eternity, spaceless and timeless reality. Here, again, a caution which will be afterwards more fully discussed must be given. Affirming as the religious consciousness does and must, that God is above the limitations of time and space, yet the negative inference must not be drawn that time and space have no meaning or worth for God in His relation to man and world ; we may rather affirm that both have as much reality for God as the reality of that relation demands.¹ Further, man judges himself and his world qualitatively as imperfect, because there comes to him the vision of perfection, of a reality of his ideals, not partial, but complete. Lastly, even if man thinks of himself as unity, and the world as a totality, what his

¹ See the last chapter for a fuller discussion, p. 443.

experience presents to him is multiplicity, a multitude of persons, an abundance of things, diverse, separate, if not always conflicting. Over against the many he envisages the One, in whom and by whom multiplicity is harmonised and diversity reconciled in unity. Such is the *ens realissimum* for the religious consciousness.¹

(7) Kant presents us in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, with an epistemology, not a psychology or description of psychical processes of knowing, but, as it were, the skeleton of our experience. His two sceptical elements at the basis and at the summit of his analysis (the thing-in-itself and the regulative character of the ideas of reason) rob it of full objectivity, and stamp it to some extent with subjectivity. But if, as in the previous discussion has been shown, we rid ourselves of his scepticism, and affirm that the thing-as-known is the thing-in-itself, and what he calls the thing-in-itself only the physical and other conditions of our sensations, and that the ideas of reason, as unifying our knowledge of world and self in a common source – God – are not leading us astray, but are bringing us to a fuller understanding of reality in its wholeness, then his epistemology may become an ontology; reality as known and understood by the mind of man is reality in itself. Not that our awareness, apprehension, comprehension, or explanation is, or can ever be, complete, for here we know in part; but what we are aware of is reality, and what our thought does is not to separate us further from reality, but to disclose progressively its significance and value; and, in that reality, God is the supreme reality as the goal of rational thought. If the ideas of reason reveal reality no less than our sensations, intuitions, and categories, and if, among these, especially the idea of God gives the final unification, so that our thought has the coherence of truth, what we are aware of, although not always with the same clear and distinct consciousness, is the supernatural as well as the natural, and the supernatural in and through the natural, the *numinous* in nature. As does the poet, so does the seer or the saint apprehend in sea, or sky, or sun “the presence that disturbs” him with dread, awe, joy. The mediation, physical, psychical, or historical, which the man of science or the scholar may describe for us, does not annul, but only explains, the immediacy of our contact with reality. Light, sound, heat, as the man of

¹ In the chapters following this we shall see how man is led to think of an *ultimate cause* and a *final purpose*.

science describes and explains them by physical processes, are not more the reality, the thing-in-itself, than the colour, shape, and smell of the rose ; the difference between primary and secondary qualities which was so much emphasised does not lie in the one set being more objective, and the other more subjective, but in the process of sensation on which our perception depends. Although for most men the facts of sense appear much more real than the values of spirit, truth, holiness, beauty, love, yet in the course of human history the things that are not seen, tasted, or handled have proved themselves, by their working in the life of man, as no less real. Still more has the supersensible, superhuman, supernatural God made His reality known in human experience, character, destiny, although it may be to a narrower circle even than the human values. Only as we " see life steadily and see it whole " can reality be known to us.

(8) I have been glad to find a confirmation of this line of argument in *Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge*, by Dr. Norman Kemp Smith, which I read after the preceding paragraphs had been written. As this volume is not primarily concerned with the details of epistemology, I shall not attempt to reproduce his discussion, but only indicate the matters that are immediately relevant.

(a) Dr. Smith is a realist ; but his realism is not opposed to, but issues in, idealism. He describes the doctrine of representative perception, develops the argument in support of it, and sets over against this the argument in criticism of it (chapters ii., iii., iv.). With this we need not now be concerned.

(b) His philosophy is " realist in intention," but he does not limit himself to " sense-experience " as an organon of knowledge, but includes also " the purposive activities of our discursive thinking."¹ Nature, as self-revealing, so evokes the activity of the mind of man that he becomes more intelligent as it becomes to him more intelligible. Man's knowledge is acquired for the preservation and protection of life ; thus it is not true that " the function of sense-experience is to enable us to gain *knowledge* of the world around us " ; but " the function of sense-perception, as of instinct, is not knowledge, but power ; not insight, but adaptation ; and accordingly the qualities and merits of our perceptions are only to be understood in the light of practical criteria which

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

determine whether the perceptions are or are not suited to practical needs.”¹ While utility is the primary end, our sense-experience shows a “fitness to subserve values of a higher order than the strictly practical”² – the pursuit of truth and the appreciation of beauty. From this point of view the distinction of primary and secondary qualities lapses, as the secondary “exist in their own right, and they vindicate their reality, as do the primary qualities, by the indispensable part which they play in nature’s ordered and complex economy.”³ Sight, smell, taste, touch, enable the organism to adapt itself to its environment.

(c) The writer distinguishes between *sensing*, the subjective process of apprehending, and *sensa*, the objective qualities of the reality so apprehended. “The *sensa* are events, conditioned by physical, physiological, and possibly also psychical factors.” They are not merely *subjective*, as the doctrine of representative perception assumes, because they result from these three factors ; but they are not *public*, as naïve realism asserts ; but *private*, as “open to the observation of only one percipient.”⁴ Placing, as he does, the *sensa* on the objective and not the subjective side, he agrees with Whitehead, in his *Concept of Nature*, that “the fundamental bifurcation is not between the psychical, taken as including the *sensa*, and the physical, taken as excluding them, but between awareness and a physical system of which the *sensa* are integral factors.”⁵ The *sensa* do not come in individual isolation, but within “a presentational continuum.” The *sensa* are not only *sensed*, but also *intuited*, in space and time, which “possess a constitution different in character from any sensuous quality, and such as allows of their being the fundamental features of a public world that is independently real.”⁶

(d) Passing from the Kantian intuitions of time and space, the writer next deals with the Kantian categories of substance and causality ; he sets aside the subjective explanation from the analogy of “the self as an abiding and active agent,” and, insisting on the constant interplay of self and world, he states his own position in the question : “If the factors directly enjoyed are feelings and conations, and if they are experienced when *any* activity is observed,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.

² *Idem*, p. 36.

³ *Idem*, p. 37.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 71.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 75.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 114. *Public* is used, in contrast to *private*, as apprehended by all percipients.

whether in objects or in the self, what grounds are there for the view that the concept of substance, as representing the factor of permanence, and the concept of causality, as representing the factor of activity and agency, are first apprehended only in reference to the self, and are then, by analogy, imparted to other existences?"¹ He himself finds none.

(e) Further, the writer brings the categories into closer relations to the intuitions, and does not, like Kant, simply place them side by side. "Though the categories would at first sight appear to be of two distinct types – those which so directly connect with what is intuited that they may be said to be themselves intuitable, such as the category of whole and part; and those which are apprehensible only in thought, such as the categories of substance and causality – this distinction, on further analysis, turns out to be untenable. All the categories alike involve the thought of a something – a whole, a substance or an agency – which, while it can be *located* at this and that moment, here and there, cannot itself be intuitively apprehended. . . . They are formal and problematical in character; that to which they refer can, by their means, be entertained in thought, but cannot be rendered specific save in proportion as empirical data are forthcoming."² The two indispensable categories are those of "totality (whole and part) and necessitation (determining ground and conditioned consequence)," or substance and causality. The first conception "cannot be empirically, i.e. sensuously, acquired," as all empirical awareness is conditioned by "the apprehensions of time and space, which presuppose it,"³ since both have common to them the conception of continuity. "Any particular time or any particular space, however large or however small, is conditioned and made possible by the earlier time and by the wider space which leads into or contains it." The wholeness in time and space "*determines* the elements constituent of it."⁴ Thus we pass from the category of substance to that of causality: and both are involved already in the intuition

¹ *Idem*, pp. 128–129. We may compare a similar contention by Dr. Clement C. J. Webb regarding knowledge of other persons. "In the case of our relations with our fellows it will be readily apparent, on consideration, that our recognition of them as persons cannot be explained as merely an 'inference' from our perception of their bodily shape and movements by analogy with our own. Such inference may indeed play a part in the recognition, but the direct *rapport* transcending anything that such an inference by itself could give us is absolutely necessary" (*God and Man*, p. 564).

² *Idem*, p. 133.

³ *Idem*, p. 134.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 137.

of time and space. "Categorical thinking is a condition of, and is not derived from, intuition."¹ Through this connection, categorical thinking connects with sensing also. "Complete consciousness, i.e. any actual consciousness, involves all three on the objective side, the *sensa*, the categorical relations, time, and space; on the subjective side, sensing, categorical thinking, and intuiting."² As the *sensa* are intuited in time and space, so the categories of substance and causality are thought in the intuition, and there is a correspondence of the objective reality and the subjective process of apprehension.

(f) The development of thought here sketched appeals to my judgment very strongly. It affirms the immediate contact of the mind with reality, but recognises the mediation of the awareness of that reality by the physical, physiological, and probably also psychical (if sub-conscious) factors in perception. It recognises also that the secondary qualities are as real as the primary, since the human organism affected by them is part of reality; and the awareness of them by the mind not only subserves the vital function of the adaptation of that organism to its environment, but becomes the basis of the higher life in man. "Discerning truth, beauty, and goodness, *man* adopts the attitude of contemplation, and, in view of these absolute values, organises even his practical life on a different plane."³ Such a result cannot be accidental,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

² *Idem*, p. 158.

³ *Idem*, p. 231. A similar, if not in all respects identical, epistemology and ontology is found in *A Study of Realism*, by John Laird. He seems to me, however, unduly to minimise the active function of mind in perception in his opposition to the view that percepts are merely mental. His tendency is less idealist than is Dr. Kemp Smith's; and he is strongly opposed to monism. "Realists," he says, "are committed to a doctrine of logical pluralism. They maintain that there is nothing in the nature of knowledge to prevent any given judgment from being wholly and finally true, irrespective of the conditions of existence and of the truth of other judgments, however closely the judgments may be connected with these in fact. And realists accept a kindred theory of perception, for they hold that physical things may be revealed to the perceiving mind as they really and truly are in their own proper character" (p. 149). "The pluralism . . . is a logical pluralism, not necessarily a pluralism of existence. On the other hand, any monism which seeks to discredit the empirical unity of empirical things, or to cast doubt on the possibility of any knowledge unless the knower is also the whole of existence, should be disputed to the hilt. We may be parts of a stupendous whole, but at any rate we are ourselves; and the reality of self-reliance, responsibility, personal freedom and individual judgment are worth fighting for. Realists need not deny that the self is *also* a part of the cosmos and knit with it. But it is *at least* a self" (p. 179). This writer opposes the mystic's doctrine of absorption in deity, as he rejects the identification of knowing and being; but on the doctrine of God he exercises a reverent reserve (pp. 212-217).

but is an instance of the teleology discernible in the world and man. Although not in this writing, yet elsewhere Dr. Kemp Smith claims that there is possible an immediate knowledge of God.

II

(1) If we bring ideas and ideals – the values – within the range of reality as well as the data of sense, and if in so doing we make our whole experience more intelligible, it seems to follow that our knowledge in this wide range and deep reach can disclose reality to us. The idealist successors to Kant set aside his scepticism and believed that human reason could interpret universal reality. Attaching himself more closely to the practical than to the theoretical reason, Fichte regarded reality as essentially an ethical process : God is for him the *Moral World-Order*. Schelling, in one of his many phases of thought, ascribed an equal claim to the objective and the subjective reason, and, while unable to harmonise them, “identified them in their ultimate essence.” The common principle which is necessary for nature and self is called the “*Absolute Reason*, or the *Indifference* of Nature and Spirit, of object and subject ; for the highest principle can be determined neither as real nor as ideal ; in it all antitheses must be obliterated.”¹ For Hegel, nature was the Otherness of spirit, by which spirit realised itself. Reference will need to be made to his English followers and their monism in the last chapter, dealing with the Conception of God ; and reference has already been made to his subordination of religion to philosophy as an inferior kind of knowledge of reality ; here a brief allusion alone is necessary. For him “the real is the rational,” and the evolution of reality is the self-unfolding of reason in the triple movement of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The logical, the cosmical, and the theistic evolution are co-ordinated, if not fused together. Hegel sought to represent his philosophy as the rational interpretation of the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation ; and the Hegelian school of theology has followed in his steps. But his system is more generally understood as a *pantheism*, which differs from Spinoza’s in substituting *subject* for *substance*, but no less identifies God and universe. More appreciative of religion than Kant, he nevertheless so emphasised the intellect,

¹ Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 608.

abstract thinking, that Pfleiderer has, with justice, described his philosophy as a *panlogism*, rather than a *pantheism*. In Hegel, idealism proved a "vaulting ambition which o'erleaped itself" and was followed by a reaction to materialism.

(2) Materialism as an interpretation of reality is now so generally abandoned, even among men of science, that it will suffice for the present purpose (a) to summarise a succinct and lucid condemnation of it by Külpe¹ on three grounds, physical, psychological, and epistemological. (i.) It comes into conflict with the law of the conservation of energy, inasmuch as "the production of any conscious processes by material processes would involve a loss of energy without the compensation of it by an equivalent quantum of another of the known forms of energy." I may here add consideration that thought would join heat as a spendthrift of the universe.² (ii.) From psychology another objection arises. "For this science, materialism would be at least a useful hypothesis if it were possible, with its help, to make intelligible even only the simplest and most elementary psychical processes. But it has been repeatedly observed that the sensation of a red (colour) or of a tone of a certain pitch is in no wise made more intelligible, because it is traced back to one or another activity of the brain." (iii.) From epistemology we learn the origin of such conceptions as matter and energy; they serve to explain the succession or co-existence, in accordance with laws, of occurrences of which we become aware in our sensations, but which are independent of us. They are hypotheses to explain data of our consciousness. "From this it becomes at once intelligible that the conceptions of natural science, of which materialism makes use, antecedently have not at all, nor can have, the purpose to explain mental processes in their distinctiveness and uniqueness." If I may so put this consideration, the creature of the mind of man cannot be its creator.

(b) Against the monism of Haeckel – which is really a disguised materialism, as, for the duality of mind and matter, he furtively substitutes spirit (or energy) and matter and, professing to regard the world substance as Spinoza regarded it, he derives psychic from physical phenomena – Külpe not only directs these objections to materialism

¹ *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland*, pp. 55–57.

² Modifications of the physical theory of subsequent date do not invalidate this objection from the science contemporary with materialism.

generally, but mentions two additional difficulties which this monism presents.¹ (i.) The first is due to the identification, just mentioned, of spirit with energy : on the one hand the soul-life seems to be associated with every kind of matter, on the other hand it is treated as the function of a particular kind of matter, the psycho-plasm. Similarly, while matter and energy are co-ordinated as the aspects of the one substance, Haeckel demands a natural causal relation of the psychical with the physical processes – an evident inconsistency. (ii.) The second objection is the indistinct character of the relation of the conscious to the unconscious ; although no marked frontier between the two is asserted, the emergence of consciousness is attached to a definite organ, the central nervous system.

(3) In Great Britain more respect has been paid to religion, and the interpretation of reality from the standpoint of religion. (a) Huxley disclaimed being a materialist, but claimed that the interpretation from the standpoint of physical science was more fruitful and useful ; so also Herbert Spencer believed that, in his *agnosticism*, he was effecting a reconciliation between science and religion by claiming for science the region of the known, and leaving to religion the realm of the Unknowable. As I have dealt with the subject of agnosticism in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, I refrain from discussing it here again ; but I may be excused if I quote the concluding summary of the article. "The materialistic explanation for which it seeks to find room is inadequate to account for life, mind, morality, religion. The idealistic explanation which it seeks to shut out, not only does justice to the highest interests of life, but makes more intelligible the whole process of the universe as an evolution of spirit. The theory of knowledge on which it rests is sceptical in its result ; and this scepticism must extend to science as well as to philosophy and theology. The trust in the reason of man, on which the proof of God's existence rests, is as necessary to give validity to the conclusions of science. The arguments from the relativity of knowledge, the conditionateness of thought, the negative character of the conceptions of the Infinite and Absolute have the futility of scholastic abstractions and verbal subtleties, and show no direct contact with any intelligible reality. The religious consciousness is altogether misrepresented when it is claimed as confirming the conclusion of the

¹ *Idem*, pp. 42-43.

inscrutable nature of the ultimate reality. More recent philosophical developments encourage the expectation that agnosticism will soon be a superseded mode of thought."¹ The anticipation in the last sentence, written about 1908, has been fulfilled, and the attitude of many men of science has changed.

(b) Disclaiming materialism, this explanation from the standpoint of natural science has been called naturalism,² and the conclusive refutation of it, as well as the agnosticism which is its basis, has been given by Dr. James Ward in his Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. His conclusion deserves full quotation: "This reality, richer than thought, is experience. Science cannot originate experience, for experience is the source of science, yet always more than its product, so surely as the workman is more than his tools. Science is but the skeleton, while experience is the life; science but a means, and experience the end itself. And when we examine that necessity which is the boast of science, the ground of its utility and the criterion of its perfection, how singular is the result we find! For the sake of this ideal, the historical is ignored, the metaphysical eliminated, substance and cause become fetishes, God a superfluous hypothesis, and mind an enigma, a troublesome by-product, a veritable ghost that cannot be laid. Nevertheless, this necessity itself remains inexplicable, and in turn is scouted as but a shadow of the ghost or anathematised as an intruder. Naturalism can do nothing without it, and agnosticism can do nothing with it. For the one can only attain reality by treating necessary truths as truths of fact, and the other can find no necessity in fact at all. But these necessary truths, we have seen, are, as Leibnitz rightly called them, truths of *reason*. They originate in the subject of experience, not in the object. If the objects conform to them, then all experience is rational; our reason is confronted and determined by universal reason. Such is the world of spiritualistic monism, and to this world, as I have tried to show, naturalism and agnosticism eventually lead us in spite

¹ *E. R. E.*, I., p. 220. *Alternate* in the penultimate sentence is a misprint for *ultimate*, and I have made the correction above.

² The mechanical theory which is the basis of this *naturalism* has been left behind in the modern conception of the atom. The view of evolution – life and mind as not other than more complex forms of matter-in-motion – has been abandoned in the view of evolution as *emergent* and *creative*. The treatment of mind as an *epiphenomenon* of brain process, as the quotation from Külpe shows, finds no support in physics, psychology, or epistemology.

of themselves. Thus their demurer to theistic enquiries is not sustained.”¹ To get rid of all that stands in the way of the essentially materialistic interpretation of the world, naturalism has to invoke agnosticism ; but the scepticism of this, its ally, challenges and rebukes its own dogmatism.

(c) I may here add an argument against materialism and its basis in agnosticism, which I remember was used by Dr. John Caird, but which I cannot now trace in his writings ; which, therefore, I must state in my own way, although trying to reproduce his thought. If object is relative to subject, if the thing-in-itself is the thing-as-known, if the significance and value of reality is found in the sphere of consciousness, in the apprehension of truth, the appreciation of beauty, the realisation of goodness, and if these reach beyond themselves, in the relation to God, how poor and empty a world materialism or agnosticism leaves to us in comparison ! The world as object does not depend for its existence on any one man, or on all men as subject ; but how much more significant and valuable reality becomes for our thought if the religious belief in God enables us to conceive Him as the permanent and universal Subject, who apprehends its truth, appreciates its beauty, realises its goodness perfectly as we can only partially ! Withdraw the conscious subject from the world as object, or make that subject only an accident, does reality remain ?

(4) So many and varied are the philosophical tendencies of to-day – the theories of knowledge and the conceptions of reality – that only a few of the more prominent may be mentioned.² *Pragmatism* has some affinity with agnosticism, as in its fully developed form it does not concern itself with ultimate truth, but only the truth relative to human thought and life. After mentioning *scepticism* and *fictionism*, Dr. Wolf³ thus characterises pragmatism : It “ likewise is not essentially different from scepticism. What it says in effect is that the proper distinction is between fruitful beliefs and misleading beliefs, rather than between true and false beliefs, but fruitful beliefs may be called true, and misleading beliefs may be described as false. Fictionism, as compared with pragmatism, admits rather more candidly that even

¹ *Op. cit.*, II., pp. 282–283.

² A comprehensive, if summary, survey of these tendencies is given by Dr. Wolf in his contribution on “ Recent and Contemporary Philosophy ” to the volume *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 545–546.

avowedly false views may have practical importance, and that it is just this practical importance that really matters." A pragmatist like F. C. S. Schiller would deny such indifference to truth.

(a) We may distinguish accordingly a pragmatism which is relatively true and a pragmatism which is entirely false, and the above sentence indicates the difference. That truth *works*, that beliefs are to be tested by their consequences (not necessarily immediate, but ultimate when due time has been allowed) for thought, no less than for life, affords a criterion which is generally recognised. But that whatever works, and as long as it works, is to be regarded as true is to base truth on shifting sand. A false belief has only to be found out to lose its efficacy. It is true that in science the method is pragmatic; hypotheses are adopted because they offer the best available explanation for a class of phenomena, but they are discarded as soon as other hypotheses are discovered which more adequately explain these phenomena, or even can cover a wider class. This is, however, relative, and not absolute truth; and the enquiring mind does not rest content with it, but is always pressing on beyond it. The Newtonian physics worked, and for many phenomena still works, but, in relation to other phenomena, Einstein has supplemented, if not superseded, Newton. An illustration of such pragmatic truth may be found in the development of mathematics. "As is always the case," says Professor Rice, "every new branch of mathematical investigation takes its rise in some practical need of man, then develops on its own account, as it were, by reason of his purely intellectual interests, and, in so doing, becomes a still more powerful aid to him in his control over the forces of the world, and in his investigation into their nature and origin."¹ In science, progress is made by this method.

(b) This is what C. S. Pierce, who suggested the term pragmatism twenty years before William James used it in his pamphlet *Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results* (1898), intended. For him, "every 'truth' became a question of empirical observation and scientific experiment."² This critical method was assumed to refer mainly to practical action and its consequences to the discrediting of theory. "Pragmatism was regarded as a sort of 'practicalism' and as a disparagement of 'theoretic' truth which was a direct insult to all who cultivated the latter." This "is not

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

² *E. R. E.*, X., p. 148.

correct etymologically, for the word is derived from *πράγματα* ('things'), not from *πράξις* ('action')."¹ Fully recognising the crucial importance of the practical, and also admitting that, in man, cognition is largely affected by conation – i.e. the pursuit of the knowledge of an object is stimulated by a "selective" interest in that object – nevertheless, many pragmatists would admit that truth must be theoretically, no less than practically, tested; usefulness cannot supplant reasonableness. The test must be appropriate to the purpose; economic utility does not prove ethical validity; religious beliefs may comfort and help, and yet be in contradiction to such knowledge as is generally current. Coherence in thought as well as consistency in conduct must be taken into account. Thus the pragmatic test may be admitted to be a test of truth of relative, and not absolute, validity – as it is not the only test. But pragmatists would make it the final and supreme test.

(c) The expectation and endeavour to reach absolute truth having been abandoned, it is proposed to speak of *postulates* rather than of principles and *axioms*. "Dewey emphasises the *biological function of thinking* as an instrument of vital adaptation, and his name for pragmatism, 'instrumentalism,' conceives it as a radical application of Darwinism to psychology."² James holds that the belief in God stands the pragmatic test, and on that account he defends "the will to believe." To act on the hypothesis of God does work; and experience proves its validity. Belief in the right sort of God moves a man to the best moral action, satisfies his religious needs, and even gives the world most meaning and worth for man. Such a volition, while individual, yet links a man to the race, as God has been the normal object of human belief. But even here the human standpoint is obtruded. Hence pragmatism may also be described as *humanism*. Truth is a useful *instrument* for human good. This test of truth the pragmatists oppose to the *correspondence* and the *coherence* tests. To the first they object that the reality with which it is claimed that human thought corresponds in truth lies beyond human consciousness. To the second they object that no finite mind can attain an absolute coherence of thought; and one is not justified, on the basis of the relative coherence possible to man, in assuming as a possible ideal such an absolute coherence. Man cannot know the thing-in-itself outside of his knowledge

¹ *Idem*, p. 148.

² *Idem*, pp. 148, 149.

to test its worth, nor can he think God's thoughts after Him.

(d) The relative truth of pragmatism has already been acknowledged ; but a few comments of a critical kind must be added. (i.) It does not seem to me to be so absolutely opposed to the correspondence or the coherence test of truth, when moderately defined and applied as it claims. If a belief is true which *works*, that surely means this : a verification in experience ; the results are what we expect them to be. A hypothesis is found to explain a number of phenomena, and deductions drawn on the basis of that explanation are found to explain a wider range of phenomena. It is true the thing-in-itself does not enter into consciousness for comparison ; but it is found to behave in what falls within consciousness as had been anticipated. To give an illustration : there were gaps in the series of the atomic weights of the chemical elements, but further discovery is filling up some of these gaps. Does not this actual experience show that there is a correspondence between reality and thought close enough to allow thought to forecast what, under given conditions, the course of reality will be. No man can transcend his own consciousness, but within what falls in his consciousness he can find such grounds for believing in a correspondence of thought and reality. Again, if the test of truth is to be theoretical as well as practical, nothing can be accepted as relatively true which is a contradiction of other relative truths. If chemistry offered a physical explanation of the differences of the chemical elements which was inconsistent with the conception of energy accepted by physics, that might be a challenge for a reconsideration of the conception, but science would not acquiesce in such an inconsistency. Must there not be *coherence* in human thinking ? Recognising the limitation of man's capacity to know, and the incompleteness of the knowledge man has attained, it would be arrogant fully to claim complete *correspondence* and absolute *coherence*. And yet, while such coherence and correspondence cannot be claimed as the actuality, should they not remain the ideal, or, to use Kant's terms, while they may not now be *constitutive* of men's thinking, should they not be *regulative* ? Must we not continue thinking *as if* there were correspondence with reality and coherence in thought. To deny the possibility of approximation to truth, not relative to our time and place, but absolute as God is truth, is surely to lower the inspiration of the pursuit of truth. Can we not

believe, may we not believe, that we are nearer the journey's end than those who went before us? Is there no goal to which the course tends, or are there only halting-places on an endless path?

(ii.) Admitting that we do not live to think, but think to live, yet an adequate view of life will include knowledge as one of its necessary elements. Hence I object to the term *instrumentalism*. Just as morality is not merely a means to the Good as the end, but belongs inherently to the end,¹ even so knowledge is an element in the Good, and not only an instrument for its attainment. Truth, beauty, and goodness are ideals of absolute value. Saul found a kingdom in searching for his father's asses; and so science was developed to meet practical human needs; but as the kingdom had a value in itself, though Saul failed in realising it, so knowledge has its own worth and claim. And many of the inventions which have benefited human life have been the application of discoveries, the motive of the search for which was an interest in science itself. In pursuing this kingdom of truth, how many droves of asses of convenience have been found! How much we should lose if science were valued only for its practical applications!

(iii.) The alternative term *humanism* also provokes a criticism. It exalts man too high in relation to God, and abases him too low in relation to the world. If "man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy Him for ever" in the pursuit of truth, he is not concerned about a merely human good, he is fulfilling a divine purpose: he cannot accordingly acquiesce in the estimate of truth that it is only an instrument of human ends: it is an inherent element in his relation to God. To vindicate this view of man belongs to another place in this volume; but it may here, by anticipation, be mentioned. Again, only if man is the thinking product of the thoughtless process of the evolution of the universe can his pursuit of truth be regarded as only the organism's adaptation of itself, as best it can, to its environment. If, however, man be the summit of a purposeful development, in which the universe becomes, as it were, self-conscious, capable of knowing and understanding itself, if thought be not an accident in the world, but its essence, if reality has its significance and value within

¹ Buddhist morality is inferior to the Christian, close as is the agreement in many of its precepts, because morality offers guidance for the way to Nirvana, in which morality has no place.

consciousness, then the pursuit of truth is not merely a human device meeting human needs, but it is integral, organic, vital, crucial for the fulfilment of the universe. Pragmatism as humanism or as instrumentalism does not think fitly or worthily of man, the world, or God. It has a measure of truth in relation to the actuality of man's knowledge, but not in regard to the ideal which, however partially and imperfectly, that actuality discloses.

(5) Realism is a term which in the history of philosophy has had varying meanings. (a) Ancient and mediæval realism is concerned with the reality of concepts, ideas, universals. Plato affirmed that ideas were real, and that individual objects, though in some sense participating or copying the ideas, were less real. Aristotle insisted on the reality of individual objects; as, in these objects, matter and form were combined. He did not intend, although he might in his emphasis appear, to deny the reality of the ideas. Thomas Aquinas also insisted on the reality of individual objects, but maintained, too, the objectivity of the universals. The Platonic realism may be expressed in the formula *universalia ante rem*; the modified Aristotelian as *universalia in re*. Against both of these forms of realism, *nominalism* was a revolt, and asserted the reality of individual things; it may be only a charge against the nominalists by their opponents that universals for them were only *flatus vocis*. Occam sought to show that the universals did not exist *in re*. How they existed *in mente* is left undefined. But the formula *universalia post rem* indicates a dependence of universals on particulars. A concept is a generalisation of percepts. The concept man is derived from a comparison of Tom, Dick, and Harry. This interesting development we need not follow further here, although it misses the fundamental issue of the relation of thought to things. Is it arbitrary, accidental, or necessary, organic?

(b) In *naïve realism*, the view of the man, innocent of psychology and philosophy, things *are* as they *seem*; the grass is green and the sky blue, quite independently of the fact and the mode of knowing. Sensation and perception, as psychology describes them for him, make no difference to the immediate knowledge which he claims to have. The "natural realism" of the Scottish school desires to assert this same immediacy; but, unable to ignore previous philosophical thinking, it does not altogether escape the view that somehow our perception is not of the object itself, but of

a representation of the object. Hamilton moves further in this direction, and denies, as does Spencer also, that the thing-in-itself can be known.

(c) Modern realism, or *neo-realism*, bends back upon the position of naïve realism, and seeks to justify it philosophically. Shadworth H. Hodgson, in his book *The Metaphysic of Experience*, "sought in his 'subjective analysis of what is actually experienced' to reach the reality of objects in 'face to face perceptions.'" In an article in *Mind* he asserts that "a thing is what it is known as – a reality independent of the existence of a perceiving consciousness."¹ The thing-as-known is the thing-in-itself apart from any knower. How the knower can both affirm the object as known, and eliminate himself as subject knowing, passes altogether my comprehension. It is a movement which has invaded philosophy from science, which quite legitimately for its own purposes ignores the subject of knowing and fixes attention on the object known. A further step to guard against subjectivism such as Berkeley's, and yet to preserve his monism of *esse est percipi*, was taken by G. E. Moore in *The Refutation of Idealism*. "Moore contends that a sensation is in reality a case of knowing or being aware of something." To this I entirely agree, as I hold that in our perceptions there is an objective reference: they are knowledge of something. Moore explains his statement as follows, "When we know that the sensation of blue exists, the fact which we know is that there is awareness of blue. On analysis the 'sensation of blue' is thus seen to include, besides 'blue,' both a unique element, awareness, and a unique relation of this element to blue. From this it follows that, when we know that the sensation of blue exists, we know blue – i.e. we are already outside the subjectivist's circle of his own ideas and sensations. This distinction between sensation and sense-data thus forms a step towards the generalised argument against subjectivism, basing itself on the externality of relations – a doctrine supported by the success of modern logic, since it merely expresses the justification of logical analysis."²

(d) Without challenging the above analysis as a

¹ *E. R. E.*, X., pp. 584–585. I must confess that this recent movement has made so little appeal to my interest that I have not been induced to make an independent study, and must rely, in my brief reference, on the valuable article referred to in the notes. Dr. Kemp Smith and Professor Laird must not be identified with this movement, but are independent thinkers, and have already been discussed.

² *E. R. E.*, X., p. 585.

psychologist's reflection, it seems to me that the ordinary man is aware of blue as objective without thinking at all of his awareness, or of the relation of that awareness to the blue of which he is aware. If by subjectivism is meant the reduction of reality to ideas and sensations, then such an argument against it is valid ; but, if by subjectivism were meant the recognition, in all our knowing, of a subject as well as an object, then no such analysis would justify a transference of all reality to the sense-data, and the awareness as objectivity to the elimination of the subject. That physical science and psychology as a science, and logic as an organon of science for their purposes, are justified in thus abstracting the object from the subject, concentrating their attention on the object and ignoring the subject, may be conceded ; but a philosophy which seeks to see reality as a whole has no right to do this. The author of the above exposition is compelled repeatedly to use the pronoun "we," to relate to such a subject even the analysis which would substitute awareness for a subject aware. We cannot think, we cannot speak, without self-contradictions if we do not recognise that subject. In the perception of an object there are physical conditions, physiological conditions, and psychical conditions of perception. The first two might conceivably exist without "a perceiving consciousness," but how to give any meaning to the third quite baffles my understanding.

(e) The American neo-realists go further, under the leadership of Wm. James, who, in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912), "approved the view that things are what they are known as (p. 27), but insisted that they need not be known in order to be (p. 26). The divergence comes when he urges that there is no specific character of mental things, the difference between mental and physical being one of content and arrangement (*ib.*, p. 25)." This position, to which I can attach no intelligible meaning, is described as "neutral epistemological monism plus independence."¹ I need not pursue this exposition further, as I must confess the standpoint seems to me so irrational that the school does not deserve fuller or closer study. Like *behaviourism* as regards human activity, and *pragmatism* as regards human knowledge, it depreciates human personality as physical science, and mental as assimilated to the physical, may regard it ; but not as man's mental, moral, æsthetic, and religious values would demand.

¹ *E. R. E.*, X., p. 585.

(f) Bosanquet has subjected neo-realism to a searching scrutiny and severe criticism ; and his judgment may be quoted. He recognises that neo-realism is right, as against the neo-idealism of Croce and Gentile, "in regarding the external world of things, in the current and popular sense, as a factor of the universe having its own reality, and not a product and creation of the mere thinking activity. Nature in its concreteness and beauty is real, and is real as we know and value it, and is not created by our thinking." He contends, however, that, when neo-realism represents individual things as existing independent of connection with one another and with percipients, then it comes into conflict, not only with neo-idealism, but with the type of idealism which he himself represents, and names absolutism. "Absolutism," he urges, "will never be brought to believe that things exist as they appear, apart from the context of the system in which we find them, whether in its causal or its apprehensive aspect. It does not hold that their *esse* is *percipi*, if that implies immediate presentation. It holds that reality is what thought, operating on and in the whole complex of experience, compels us to affirm. Reality, therefore, as the object of thought, is always mediate and transcendent of the immediate."¹

(g) Bosanquet also recognises that, in *Essays in Critical Realism*, some of the exponents are making an advance in correcting some of the crudities of the beginning ; and this movement he describes as follows : *critical realism*, he says, "is a realism in holding that there are external existents, the physical objects of science, which are in themselves what they are, unaffected by the thought or perception of other beings, and form the real world with which we are aware of being in contact, and to which our efforts and cognitions are directed." . . . "Its criticism" of neo-realism, however, "follows the familiar idealist line, to the effect that the things of normal apprehension cannot be regarded as self-contained existents composed within themselves of the qualities which we find belonging to them. Separation from the context of percipients, and of other things, destroys these qualities, or, if we insist on them as inherent, makes the apparent group of them a mass of contradictions. . . . Thus critical realism

¹ *Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 127-128. Laird's rejection of this view has been quoted. I hold an intermediate position. We may for partial knowledge for a particular purpose set limits to our enquiry regarding any object ; but the ideal of truth demands "thinking things together" in an ever-widening range of understanding.

goes so far with absolutism as to treat the members of the normal outer world, other than physical objects, as something determined by intercourse with each other and with intelligent organisms, and as shorn of all or a great part of their appearance in so far as such intercourse is ended or suspended."¹ Its distinguishing feature is that it contrasts, and even separates, the *what*, or essence, and the *that*, or existence, of things. "The 'what' is in the form of 'essences' or quality groups; the 'that' in the form of existents, identified with physical objects. Knowledge consists in qualifying the existent 'that' by the ideal 'what.'"² Critical realism, Bosanquet holds, "has done the work it claims to have done so far as destroying neo-realism is concerned," but "the absolute severance of truth and reality as opposed to their relative identity is the point of divergence between critical realism and absolutism."³ What, to correct its defect, it needs to reach is the conclusion of Husserl, that "in the physical method the *perceived thing itself*, always and in principle, is *precisely the thing which the physicist investigates and determines scientifically*."⁴

(h) To sum up what seems the truth of this matter in one sentence: While physics and chemistry on the one hand investigate the conditions of the object known, and physiology and psychology the process in the subject of knowing, reality is in the object as not only perceived, but as conceived in its manifold relations to the world by the mind; for mind is so essential and organic to the universe that its complete reality is disclosed only as it is in and for mind. The standpoint of this volume, as has already been indicated, is a *realism* which affirms that man is aware of reality and apprehends it as he attends to the objects of which he is aware; but, in his comprehension and explanation of the reality, reason completes intuition, or whatever we may call this awareness or apprehension, and thus its realism is also idealism, as Dr. Kemp Smith's theory is, as recognising the function of reason in reality and the ultimately rational nature of reality.

(6) In this chapter an epistemology, and consequent

¹ *Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 128, 129. ² *Idem*, p. 134. ³ *Idem*, p. 137.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 139. Science is concerned with the *what*, the object as known, and not the *that*, the physical object, apart from those groups of qualities, by which it is known. Even critical realism, in its opposition to idealism, seeks in this separation of *what* and *that* to sever subject knowing and object known, truth and reality.

ontology, has been constructed in criticising various philosophical schools and tendencies. It is this : that the correspondence of man as intelligent and the world as intelligible indicates that reality is essentially, ultimately, finally spiritual, mind akin to man's mind, and that the coherence of human thought about man and world is completed only as reality is theistically interpreted. This is not a logical demonstration of the existence of God – a proof in the sense in which rationalism claimed that it could prove God's existence. It is a rational confirmation of the affirmation of religion that God is, and that man can and has knowledge of, and dealings with, Him. The view of knowledge in relation to reality as natural and supernatural, here taken, has a fundamental agreement with that so ably and attractively expounded by Dr. John Oman in his book *The Natural and the Supernatural*, although it has been independently reached. "Four types of knowing are to be distinguished," he says ; "these we may call awareness, apprehension, comprehension, explanation." "We may have a vivid sense of all that is about us, without attending to anything in particular." When attention is arrested by any object, we seek "to *apprehend* it as one object by what appears to be its more relevant and important details."¹ What we fix on will depend, as Ward has shown, on a *selective interest*, of which one of his illustrations may be quoted : "Take the passengers on a coach going through some glen ; . . . in one sense the glen is the same for them all, their common environment for the time being. But one, an artist, will single out subjects to sketch ; another, an angler, will see likely pools for fish ; the third, a geologist, will detect raised beaches, glacial striation, or perched blocks."² For the geologist, apprehension has already passed into the stages of comprehension and explanation. Rightly Dr. Oman indicates the need of keeping the awareness vivid and the apprehension keen, and the danger of getting away from reality in our comprehending and explaining. "We do not always," he says, "return from our comprehending and explaining better equipped by awareness and apprehension for perceiving. Instead, we can make our perception both partial and perverse by seeing only with the eyes of our theory. Besides, there is a sense in which no return is possible even with the utmost openness of mind, because there is a simple penetration in awareness which is lost when mixed

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

² *Naturalism and Agnosticism* I., p. 295.

with apprehension, and something is always lost in apprehension when mixed with our understanding and explanations."¹ The chapter in which Dr. Oman develops this subject of awareness and apprehension deserves study. Theory may make reality less real to us. For the poet and the artist, the awareness of nature may be more vivid than for the man of science. For the seer, God may be more present than for the theologian. For the saint, duty may be more evident than for the moralist. It is the philosopher who questions the reality of what the ordinary man perceives as real. Is not the explanation that the whole man is aware, and that, as the process of knowing advances, the intellect becomes ever more dominant, and thus the man is laying hold on reality less adequately? The religious consciousness is awareness of the supernatural, more intense than the apprehension even can be distinct. The vision of God is not given to the pure reason or to the practical reason in detachment, but to faith, the whole personality sensitive to, receptive of, responsive to the invisible reality.

(7) A similar tendency is seen in Bergson's emphasis on intuition as affording more adequate knowledge than intellect can offer. I do not share in that depreciation of intellect in which the advocates of intuition indulge. I cannot even entirely endorse Oman's words: "The true gain of comprehending and explaining is not for perceiving our environment, but for using it"²; for surely understanding the world is an end in itself, and not merely a means to the end of use, if truth be an ideal of an intrinsic value. But, while believing that science and philosophy have a right of their own apart from utility, I must admit that too exclusive a pursuit of comprehension and explanation may blunt the sensibilities, and may make a man less intensely aware of the world which he more comprehensively understands. Such philosophies as have been criticised in the preceding pages, which leave out so much that gives significance and value to the life of man, can be traced to this lack of full awareness of the whole reality. That capacity to know is conditioned by such adequate contact with the reality to be known is the burden, as I understand it, of Eucken's philosophy. A man must have risen to the spiritual life before he can even apprehend the objective spiritual reality - God. While all the mental, æsthetic, and moral activities of man are incomplete until the spiritual is apprehended in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

² *Idem*, p. 121.

them, it is in religion that the spiritual reality is possessed in a personal relation. Similarly, the theory of value-judgments put forward by Lotze, brought into greater prominence by Ritschl and his school,¹ and given a wider appeal by Dr. Streeter in his book *Reality*, stresses the relation of knowledge to life, of intellect to personality ; and subsequent chapters will show that this is here fully recognised.

¹ See my book *The Ritschlian Theology*, 2nd ed., pp. 161-193, 407-414.

CHAPTER III

COSMOLOGY

I

(1) IN the previous chapter the endeavour was made to explain the relation of ontology to epistemology, of the object known to the subject knowing. The general conclusion of this enquiry was that the fact of knowledge itself (all that man had achieved in discovering the nature of the world, in interpreting the significance and appreciating the value of reality) and the datum of religion – the belief in God – confirmed, on Kant's own showing, by the necessity for the completion and the coherence of the process of thought of the idea of the *ens realissimum*, or God – combine in justifying the initial assumption, to be turned by subsequent further considerations into the final assurance that, since reality is of such a kind that it can be known, and since the mind of man finds itself not an alien, but at home in the universe, reality must be akin to the mind of man, and that to the subjective *psychism* in man there corresponds the objective *psychism* of the world.

(a) In this chapter we are concerned with the question : Does the nature of reality as known sustain the religious belief in God as Maker of the world ? As in the previous chapter, we make our start here from one of the theistic proofs, the *cosmological*, in which the principle of causality is applied to the relation of God to the world. Before giving some illustrations from history of this argument, some closer definition of it may be necessary. In its greatest generality as simply asserting that the world is the effect, God is the cause, the term cosmological does not get its full significance, as nothing is said about the nature of the world ; only its existence is assumed. In this form, the argument might be called the *aitiological* (Greek *aitia*) : but it is doubtful whether in this form it would have any justification, for we must assume, before we can go any further, that the nature of the world is such that it is necessary to think of it as not self-caused, but needing a cause other than itself. Accordingly, the form the argument generally assumes is expressed in the alternative name for it, *e contingentia mundi*. The existence of

the world presents itself to our thought as contingent, and not necessary ; that is, as an effect, of which we must seek to discover the cause. It is in this form that the argument has been usually presented. The name for the argument, *cosmological*, leads to something more. The word *kosmos* suggests something of the nature of the world. The original meaning of the noun is *order* ; and the world is so called because of its arrangement (verb *kosmeo*, to arrange ; cf. Latin *mundus*, from the adjective *mundus*, akin to the Sanskrit root *mand*, *ornare*, meaning adorned or ornamented). The cosmos is in contrast to chaos. Thus the words *kosmos* and *mundus* alike bear witness to the objective psychism, of which we have just spoken. The very name of the cosmological argument points beyond the idea of cause simply to a particular kind of cause, a cause that arranges, orders, adorns, or ornaments.

(b) The separation of the cosmological argument from the teleological is not only arbitrary, but offers ground for the objection to the second argument – that it yields only a World Fashioner and not a World Maker ; and in some presentations of the argument it must be admitted that God is represented as making the best He can in His wisdom, power, and goodness of a material that He does not completely control. This is, of course, a survival of the ancient dualism. The separation of *aitia* and *telos* is itself arbitrary, and a *kosmos* cannot be conceived without a *telos* ; the ordering must be for some end, not necessarily beyond itself, as order is itself an end, and yet does suggest something more as end. It is not only a *contingent*, but also an *ordered*, world that is the datum of the argument. Since, however, the two arguments have been distinguished, it will be convenient in this chapter to confine ourselves to the consideration of the world as an ordered whole, or *the nature of the physical world* (to borrow the title of Eddington's book), and to reserve for the next chapter the consideration of the world as progressive, with special reference to life and mind in evolution. It will then be found that the teleological argument, when it reaches the human values, goodness and beauty, passes over into the ethical and æsthetic bases of theism. If we give to the cosmological argument the legitimate extension indicated above, we shall be saved from the absurdity in our theistic inference of trying to conceive a will that is not intelligent, or a mind that is inactive, as the separation of the two arguments from one another entirely

would involve. It may be added that, although to avoid confusion in the discussion of so complex a subject as the relation of God and world we must apply the principle *divide and rule*, yet in all we are concerned with the world as a whole and God as one.

(2) Even in the lowest forms of religion the mysterious powers, which man invokes to aid him, are assumed to have control over the world around him, and in many religions a Creator God emerges, even when other gods are regarded as of more immediate importance in the practical ordering of men's lives. It is true that this Creator God is not creator absolutely, but has to bring the cosmos out of the primæval chaos, in a conflict with a hostile power, some monster of the deep. Of the illustrations which could be mentioned, two will suffice. The gods will confer the supreme power on Marduk, if he will overcome Tiamat; and his sovereignty among the gods is based on his victory. To this Babylonian myth corresponds the Greek story of the conflict between the Titans and the gods of Olympus. This dualism survives in the view of Anaxagoras of the ordering of the primitive *hyle* by the supervening *nous*, and no less in Plato's doctrine of ideas, and in Aristotle's contrast of matter and form. While the Holy Scriptures of the Jewish and the Christian faiths assert unequivocally a Creator, a Maker, and not only a Fashioner of all, yet traces of the older mythology survive, as appears even in the record of the creation in Genesis; and this is brought out more clearly in Moffatt's translation: "When God began to form the universe the world was void and vacant, darkness lay over the abyss; but the spirit of God was hovering over the waters" (i. 1, 2). In the poetic figures of the Psalms and the symbols of the Apocalyptic literature this ancient view reappears. The Christian creeds describe God as "the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth," and Christian theology has generally taught the creation of the world out of nothing. This religious belief has assumed a philosophical form, and to this we now turn.

(3) Plato has "the idea of a *world-forming God* (*δημιουργός*), demiurge, who formed or shaped out that which is not Being, i.e. space, 'with regard to the ideas,' " a perfect embodiment of which in the world was hindered by *mechanical necessity* (*ἀνάγκη*).¹ In Aristotle, too, there is the contrast of matter and form. "Matter as the merely possible

¹ Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

or potential has in itself no principle of motion or of generation." We must accordingly assume a *pure form*, which as actual, and not merely possible or potential, is "the first mover (πρῶτον κινῶν), and is itself unmoved." As unmoved, how can or does it move? "It operates," says Windelband, "not by means of its own activity, but only by means of the fact that its absolute actuality excites in matter the impulse to form itself according to it (the prime mover), not as a mechanical, but as a *pure final cause* (κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον, οὐ κινούμενον)." This first mover Aristotle identifies with "the perfect Being (ἐνέργεια) in which all possibility is at the same time actuality; of all that exists it is the highest (τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον) and best = the deity."¹

(4) The statement by Aquinas may be regarded as the fullest and clearest which is offered to us. (a) In answering the question *An Deus sit?* (*Summa Theologica*, Part I., Quæst. II., Art. 3) he asserts: "That God exists can be proved in five ways." Although the fourth and fifth might be regarded as belonging more closely to the teleological proof; yet they may be here included so that his argument may be seen as a whole. (i.) "The first and most evident Way is the argument from motion." As we cannot proceed to infinity, "we must then arrive at some first source of motion which is moved by nothing else; and such a source all men understand to be God." (ii.) "The second Way is from consideration of efficient causes. In things of sense we find an order of efficient causes; but it is not found, nor is it possible, that anything is the cause of itself, for this would mean that it is prior to itself, which is impossible." As we cannot proceed with the series of efficient causes to infinity "we must therefore posit some first efficient cause; and all men call this God." (iii.) "The third Way is taken from consideration of the possible and the necessary, and proceeds as follows." There would be nothing in existence if only the things capable of non-existing existed. "There must be among things something which is necessary." As here again we cannot proceed to infinity "in things necessary which have a cause of their necessity" . . . "we must, therefore, posit something which has its necessity, not from some other quarter, but *per se*; and which is itself a cause of necessity to other things. And this all men call God." (iv.) "The fourth Way is the consideration of the grades or stages which are found in things." What is the Best must also be

¹ *Idem*, pp. 144-145.

the cause of all else. (v.) "The fifth Way is the consideration of the government (*gubernatio*) of things." As things that do not know an end must be directed thereto, there must be an intelligent Being so directing, and "this we call God."¹

(b) The first way seems to be only a specific illustration of the second, but the third advances beyond both in indicating that the cause of contingent effects must ultimately be necessary. The fourth way also adds something – that the cause cannot be less than the effect; and in the fifth way the consideration is advanced which has already been mentioned – that we are concerned with a *cosmos*, an ordered world, demanding some intelligent control. The fourth way may be further illustrated from Descartes' argument, already mentioned, that God Himself must be the cause of the idea in the mind of man, as the finite mind of man could not be the source of the conception of infinite Being. While it is true that the idea of God, as Descartes possessed it, was not immediately given to his mind, but had a long history of mediation behind it in man's religious and intellectual development, and his argument cannot be taken at its face value; yet, as has been shown in the first part of this volume, man in religion reaches *above* and *beyond* himself and his world, and this universal impulse of the mind of man, if his thought is not deceptive, must be the response to some reality in the environment which evokes it; and, further, as was argued in discussing the *ens realissimum* in the previous chapter, such conceptions as infinite, absolute, are not merely the negations of, but correlative to, the conceptions which man applies to himself and his world. So stated, Descartes' contention may be regarded as valid. His argument introduces to our notice a general principle of much wider application. The effect cannot have a greater content than the cause. The current phrases *emergent* or *creative evolution* describe a fact that in the world around the new appears, and is not explicable by what went before. The qualities of oxygen and hydrogen do not explain the qualities of water; chemical and physical processes do not account for vital; biology cannot solve the problems of psychology. A descriptive phrase, however, is not a conclusive explanation. Just as I do not believe that, and cannot conceive how, $2 + 2$ might = 5, so the words *emergent* and *creative* mean nothing to me, unless

¹ *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 23–28.

what emerges was already *latent*, if not *patent*, in that from which it emerges ; or, what is more intelligible to me, what is created owes its existence to the Creator, who can be conceived as having in Himself the resources to bring into being all that appears in the evolution of the universe. Accordingly, although in this chapter we shall be concerned mainly with the physical universe, we must always conceive the cause of that primary stage of the evolution as adequate for the effects in the subsequent stages – life and mind.

(5) The monadology of Leibnitz, which might appear to endow each monad with independent existence, requires as an explanation of the unity-in-difference which the world as one whole presents not only the *pre-established harmony*, but also a source of that harmonising principle in the central monad, God, who also created each monad, and gave to each its own distinctive character and place in the harmony of all. His system sustains the conception of God as ultimate cause. (a) For our present purpose we need not discuss Hume's endeavour to get rid of the principle of causality as an irrational custom of treating the *post hoc* as the *propter hoc* ; but pass at once to Kant, who admits the principle as a category of the understanding necessary for the unification of our experience, and yet objects to the application of the principle to the relation of the world to God. Kant naïvely admits that the basis of the cosmological argument is a natural inference, which his philosophy, however, compels him to reject as "not on that account reliable." "It is," he says, "something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily." This involves him in a dilemma. "I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me – be a thing or being what it may – from cogitating its non-existence." He therefore concludes : "I can never complete the regress through the conditions of existence without admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a *commencement* from this being." From this dilemma he seeks to escape by the assumption "that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves . . . but merely subjective principles of reason . . ." and "both principles in their heuristic and regulative character . . . are quite consistent with each other." Accordingly he concludes that "the ideal of the Supreme Being, far from being an enunciation

of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a *regulative principle* of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena."¹

(b) Attention has in the previous chapter been called to the scepticism of Kant's position in treating the ideas of reason as regulative and not constitutive principles; and an attempt has been made to show that the necessities of thought must have some correspondence with the nature of reality. Against a merely rationalistic argument, moving wholly in the realm of abstractions, his inability to excogitate a necessary thing may be valid – that is a matter of no interest for those who prefer to move in the realm of reality. God as a datum of religious experience is not beyond the range of experience unless we illegitimately confine experience, as Kant tends to do, to sense-data. In relating God to the world as its cause we are not, to use Kant's terms, making a *transcendent*, that is illegitimate, but an *immanent*, that is legitimate, use of his *transcendental* principle of causality. When restating the argument, we do not deistically go outside of the world for God as a transcendent cause, but theistically recognise God as within the world, its immanent principle of unity amid diversity. In such a restatement we meet the second of his objections, which has been very well stated by Pfeiderer: "It is an unwarranted assumption that the world was an accidental thing, which must have its necessary cause outside itself in a most perfect being or an extramundane God; for though every detail in the world is accidental and determined by something else, it by no means follows that this is the case as regards the world as a whole, as if it also must have its cause outside itself; indeed, the world can be regarded very well as a thing essentially necessary, and having its cause in itself." As regards Kant's limitation of the principle of causality to experience, Pfeiderer rightly denies the assumed impossibility, that our thought cannot go beyond the phenomena of the world, which are the raw material of our experience, to their supersensuous ground. As regards the second objection, Pfeiderer concedes that "the assumption is not only incapable of proof, it is distinctly incorrect, that the world is a mere fortuitous aggregate of fortuitous particulars,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 378–380.

for which it is necessary to look for an external cause. On the contrary, the world presents itself to us as a well-ordered law-impressed whole, all the parts of which stand in an inviolable nexus, each of them having the cause of its definite being and activity in connection with the rest, in the collective order of the whole. But while the phenomena of the world by no means point to an extramundane cause, the law and connection in which they stand to each other as members of one great whole must certainly compel us to infer one *intramundane* cause as the real productive ground of the law and order of the whole."¹ Pfleiderer goes on to argue that the law of causality leads us to such a conception, but that that law "appears to contradict" the assumption of a beginning in time.

(6) Relevant at this point is Lotze's discussion of causation. (a) "The conception of efficient causation," he says, "is inevitable for our apprehension of the world, and all attempts to deny the reality of efficient causation, and then still comprehend the course of the world, make shipwreck of themselves. But just as certain is it that the nature of efficient causation is inexplicable; that is to say, it can never be shown in what way causation in general is produced or comes to pass. On the contrary, all that can ever be shown is what preparatory conditions, what relations between the real beings, must in every case be given, in order that this uniformly incomprehensible act of causation may take place."² What makes efficient causation inexplicable is the assumption of the independence of things, and of the "passing over" of an influence from one being *a* to the other being *b*, and this assumption must be abandoned, for "a state *a* which takes place in the element *a* must, for the very reason that it is in *a*, likewise be an 'affection' in *b*; but it does not necessarily have to *become* such an 'affection' of *b* by means of an influence issuing from *a*. The foregoing requirement can be met only by the assumption that all individual things are substantially one; that is to say, they do not merely become combined subsequently by all manner of relations, each individual having previously been present as an independent existence; but from the very beginning onward they are only different modifications of one individual Being, which we propose to designate provisionally by the title of the Infinite or the

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trs., Vol. III., pp. 256-258.

² *Outlines of Metaphysics*, Eng. trs., pp. 68-69.

Absolute = M . The formal consequence of this assumption is as follows : The element a is only = $M_{(x)}$, the element b = $M_{(y)}$, etc. Every state a which takes place in a is therefore likewise a state of this M ; and, by means of this state, M is necessitated according to its own nature to produce a succeeding state β , which makes its appearance as a state of b , but which is in truth a state of this M , by means of which its preceding modification $M_{(y)}$ is changed. Efficient causation, therefore, actually takes place, but it takes place only apparently between the two finite beings as such. In truth the Absolute produces the effect upon itself, since by virtue of the unity and consistency of its own Being it cannot be affected with the state with which it is affected as the being a without likewise being affected with the succeeding state in the being b — a state which appears to our observation as an effect of a on b .¹

(b) This statement would at first sight appear to be pantheistic, an identification of God and the world, and a representation of all phenomena as modes of divine activity ; but Lotze's emphasis on values, and his insistence on the personality of God, are sufficient to meet that charge against his philosophy generally. This statement, however, does claim closer scrutiny to remove even " the appearance of evil." It is to be observed that Lotze calls M provisionally the Infinite or Absolute, and does not use the word God in this connection. He closes this chapter with the reservation, " Finally, it is to be remarked that the conception of the Infinite, or of the One Real Being, which we have here made use of, merely designates a postulate in a provisional way. But the enquiry how we are to conceive of this Infinite itself, and of these modifications of the same Infinite which we explain the individual things to be, is reserved for subsequent investigation." At this stage of our discussion it must be noted that Lotze's statement does not involve us in a universal rigid determinism. The change of state in a which is followed by a change of state in b need not be externally determined. In a living organism the change may be due to the spontaneous adaptation to environment which is characteristic of life, and in a conscious personality the change may be due to free activity to meet any situation which demands it. In a physical object only is the change determined from without, unless in so far as we must take

¹ *Outlines of Metaphysics*, Eng. trs., pp. 71-73.

into account the latest physical theory of the atom, which seems even here to introduce a measure of indeterminacy, a modification of physical determinism which we must further discuss in the second part of this chapter. If *a* and *b* may be living organisms or conscious persons as well as physical objects, then *M* in its immanent activity in all phenomena cannot be conceived as only physical force. Although this theory of causation was advanced by a man who was not only a philosophical thinker, but also had a competent knowledge of the science of his day, we need not commit ourselves altogether to the details of his statement. It suffices to indicate that in dealing with the cosmological argument we must not conceive a series of causes, which, if we are to escape the infinite regress, we must conclude as ending in a cause, which is not an effect, but a *causa sui*, but must think of the universe as one system, all the parts of which are inter-related, in which there is one universal immanent causality. "How it is in general that 'causal' action is produced is as impossible to tell as how 'Being' is made."¹ Along the line of physical investigation the way may be barred. But, if we accept the datum of religion that there is a personal God, then we may surely conceive causal activity on the analogy of our human volition. This is anthropomorphism undoubtedly, but we have no other mind to think with than our own, however limited that may be.

(7) Before examining this analogy, one may confidently assert that the common judgment of men will not accept Hume's resolution of causality into succession, or Comte's into an equation of antecedents and consequents. The physicist may for his own purposes reduce the physical universe to a mathematical formula, but common sense will insist that there is some action involved, some force exerted, some "influence," to use Lotze's non-committal term, exercised, and metaphysics justifies common sense. This is a matter of sufficient importance to justify a quotation from George Croom Robertson's *Elements of General Philosophy*, which states the issue clearly: "As this aspect of phenomenal relation, of co-existence and succession, developed, the popular notion of cause and effect, with its

¹ *Idem*, p. 73. C. Lloyd Morgan, in his book *Emergent Evolution*, distinguishes *causation* immanent in the universe from *causality* as God's activity. "No instance of causation, subject to limitations of time and space, save as the expression of causality *sub specie aeternitatis*" (p. 300).

implied assumption of power, became attenuated to indicate merely a special kind of phenomenal succession, and theorists began to dispute the propriety of using the word 'cause' in this connection as misleading. Hume's philosophy centres entirely round this part of the subject, namely, the great question. Can this relation among phenomena that science takes account of be properly called *causal*? Mill answered this affirmatively, and tried to show that the notion of *power* (in cause to produce effect) ought to be excluded from the notion of causation. This is equivalent to asserting that a causal relation, as it is made out in science, is purely phenomenal. Both Kant and Hume agree with him here. Berkeley regarded cause not as a phenomenal antecedent, but as a spiritual reality, as the connection between the real being (mind) and what appears. He spoke of the scientific cause as a 'phenomenal sign' of the true cause, science dealing with ideas (phenomena) that are significant of other ideas. Comte was the most thorough phenomenalist of them all. . . . According to Mill, scientific relations, though all phenomenal, may yet be called causal. According to Comte, because they are phenomenal they must not be called causal. Comte agrees in expression, though not in thought, with Berkeley and also with Dr. Martineau. These two concur in saying that science is concerned only with the signification of phenomena by phenomena, in order to show that, beyond all consideration of phenomenal relation, there is a deeper consideration of cause, viz. as to how any phenomenon is related as effect to a cause in the sphere of metaphysical reality or ultimate being. They add that when we have got science we are only at the beginning of our investigation and not, as Comte believed, at the end of all possible enquiry."¹ We are justified in going beyond the attenuated conception of cause in science to the full-bodied conception of common sense and metaphysics, as Lotze's statement on causation does.

(8) Although Kant limited the application of the principle of causality to the data of experience, and consequently forbade its application to the relation of God to the world, yet inconsistently he regarded the thing-in-itself as the cause for our sensations, so carrying it in this respect at least beyond the limits of the phenomenal, and in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he recognised freedom in the noumenal.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

He regarded it as a category of the understanding, as a synthetic *a priori* judgment. Modern psychology does not leave this category nor the intuition of space unexplained¹ as an ultimate datum. We have a "direct consciousness of muscular movement." "That has a bearing upon the development of our physical experience not less than upon that of our apprehension of space and form. We cannot move without having passive sensations along with our consciousness of the movement ; we cannot receive passively the sensations that enter into our apprehension of objects without executing actual movements."² We must get rid of the conception of space as a subjective condition of our apprehension of objects, and recognise that it is an objective condition of the existence of the objects which we apprehend and of the body which the mind uses in relating itself to those objects. Further, it is the resistance to our movements which is probably the rudimentary source of our apprehension of an external reality ; and this external reality we at first conceive as animated on the analogy of our own bodies ; and only gradually do we discriminate objects which show the qualities which we are conscious of in ourselves in the bodily actions through which alone we can apprehend them, from objects which do not in the same way display these qualities. In the chapter of the First Part dealing with *Animism* this process has been more fully described. This general transfer from our consciousness to external reality takes place as regards causality, and the previous instances show that such transfer is legitimate, nay, inevitable. "The notion of power in the conception of cause is got from our consciousness of *being able to put forth activity*, from our consciousness of *volition*." . . . "We know ourselves as beings that may or may not exert a definite energy, and this quite takes our actions out of the category of phenomenal successions. Now just as, in regard to movements of my body, I come to consider them as depending on my will, so I come to conceive there is a similar causal power determining other movements in nature."³ There is no difficulty about transferring volition in this full sense to the persons

¹ See Kemp Smith's discussion of the intuitions and categories in the previous chapter.

² G. C. Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338.

³ *Idem*, p. 144. In contrast to the view given above is Kemp Smith's claim for a direct apprehension of substance and causality. For my purpose it is not necessary to discuss the difference, although it illustrates the movement to realism, the compresence of the mind with its objects.

around us, and even to animals in diminishing degree as their actions display decreasing intelligence. In plants we recognise not only external determination, but internal, the response of life to environment. In physical objects we speak of force or energy. We may depersonalise the objects ; can we as completely depersonalise the force ?

(9) Before attempting an answer to this question, it will serve our purpose to analyse more closely the process of volition. The word itself must not start us on a wrong track – an impersonal process. Volition is the person willing, and the volition cannot be separated from intellection and conation. The psychic process is impression, affect, and expression. The volition is the antecedent of the expression in speech, look, or action. How that motion which is conveyed to the brain by the afferent nerves from the sense organs emerges in consciousness as an impression, how consequent affect follows, is a secret neither physiology nor psychology has yet discovered. So how volition by means of the brain and efferent nerves to the muscles of the body is transformed into movement and action is a fact equally inexplicable. But briefly this is the process in consciousness : an object is perceived, an emotion is experienced, a desire is stimulated, a volition which through action will satisfy the desire in relation to the object is taken ; if not frustrated by outward conditions, the object is possessed for use or enjoyment. This is the simplest process. But there may be perceived competing objects, stimulating conflicting desires ; there is deliberation and decision ; the self identifies itself in respect of the good, which it seeks with one of those desires as the motive of its volition, as the reason for, and not the cause of itself willing. This analysis shows that volition is personal, conscious, free, and is inconceivable apart from intelligence. I can assign no meaning to blind *will*, will as emerging out of the Unconscious, as it is assumed by the pessimists Schopenhauer and von Hartmann.¹ If this be so, we must conceive the universal immanent causality in the world as intelligent, and this conclusion from our psychological analysis is confirmed by the considerations already presented – that we are concerned here with a *cosmos*, not a chaos, an ordered world ; and an ordered world is inexplicable unless by an intelligent cause. Hence the arbitrariness, already noted, of the separation of the teleological argument from the cosmological,

¹ This subject is further discussed in Part II., chapter viii., pp. 415–419.

as the character of the content of the effect must determine what is its adequate, efficient cause. We have reserved for the next chapter the evidence that the cause of the world is an intelligent will, fulfilling a purpose. In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider what the latest science has to tell us as to the nature of the physical universe ; and we shall find that before we examine the testimony of life and mind in the evolution of the universe, even its physical basis (of material basis it would be out-of-date to speak) discloses such an order, as confirms, and does not contradict, the belief that the Cause of the World is in the language of religion – God.

II

It has already been clearly stated that these rationalist proofs do not offer a logical demonstration of the existence, the nature, or the purpose of God, and the rationalism which believed that they could is no longer the standpoint of the Christian theist. Even Anselm stated : “ *Credo ut intel- ligam.*” It is faith which is “the proving (R.V. marg.) of things not seen” (Heb. xi. 1). Religion offers the affirmation, of which human thought generally may offer confirmation. To believe in God is reasonable, because that belief enables us to offer a reasonable interpretation of reality. In seeking such confirmation, each age must relate its belief in God to the current thought. Accordingly, as in the first section of this chapter the cosmological argument has been re-examined, we must now ask whether the science of to-day allows such a conception of the cosmos as has been briefly indicated

(1) Until the beginning of this century there were three fundamental principles of science : the uniformity of nature, the indestructibility of matter, and the transformation of force or energy. (a) An ambitious (or even, we may say, pretentious) system like that of Herbert Spencer had as its basis the dualism of matter and force, and undertook to explain the universe as matter-in-motion, the dissipation of force and the integration of matter. Even if matter was recognised as existing in three states of the cohesion of the atoms, solid, liquid, and gaseous, yet any mass of matter was held to fill the space which it appeared to occupy, and offered more or less resistance. The atomic theory had

come down from the ancient world, from Leucippus, Democritus, and Lucretius. The characteristic of matter was *inertia*, a continuance in the same state of rest or motion, unless that state were changed by an applied force.

(b) Psychology distinguished in the object perceived primary and secondary qualities; as the latter were obviously connected with an organ of sense – colour with the eyes, sound with the ears, smell with the nose, taste with the tongue – they were regarded as subjective, although having necessarily their physical conditions in the object itself; but the former, which in the time of Locke had not been so obviously connected with human sensibility, were regarded as inherent in the object itself, such as shape, size, etc. “Locke’s doctrine of matter as known was that of our ideas of external things; some correspond to qualities really existing in external bodies, while some are of qualities wrongly imputed by us to those bodies, and which have no objective existence. The former are ‘extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number’; the latter are ‘all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth’ (Locke, *Essay*, Book II., chapter viii.). Those he calls primary, these secondary qualities. The latter are not in things, but are sensations of ours interpreted as absolute qualities of things. Primary qualities exist absolutely, but of them too we have sensible apprehension.”¹ Berkeley resolved “all qualities of things, primary as well as secondary,” into phenomena, the *esse* of which is their *percipi*. Minds and God, however, remained objective for him. Hume went a step further, and represented mind as being as phenomenal as matter. His philosophy was the *reductio ad absurdum* of this mode of thinking; and Kant made a fresh start on another way, which we need not now pursue. We need only add how psychology later explained this distinction. “It is the consciousness that we have in connection with muscular activity, or, rather, active sense, which gives the real psychological explanation of the difference between so-called primary and secondary qualities of matter. The latter are the result of our passive sense; all the former, except the dubious case of ‘number,’ being the result of complex active sense.”²

(c) Although this distinction was thus made relative to the mode of sensation, yet the source of the sensations was found in an external object, the nature of which fell to be

¹ G. C. Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–156.

² *Idem*, pp. 171–172.

investigated by physics and chemistry. The science of the material world thus had, as it were, two termini, the chemical elements and the energy or force which could pass from one form to another, and it was on this then unresolved and seemingly unresolvable difference that two of the fundamental principles of science rested – the indestructibility of matter and the transmutation of energy. It would seem that now the only principle that remains certain is the uniformity of nature, and the modern theory to some minds suggests even a doubt of that principle in the recognition of a principle of *indeterminacy*, namely that science is “describing the laws of an incompletely causal world.”¹ The up-to-date conception of the atom abolishes that distinction between matter and force in the absolute form in which these two principles state it, as the atom is resolved into a system of protons and electrons, positive and negative charges of electricity, while the differences of the chemical elements are explained by the number of protons and electrons in the atoms composing them. Even the accepted conceptions of time and space are being modified in the theory of relativity.

(2) The greatness of the change which contemporary science is bringing about may be indicated by the opening paragraph of the first chapter of Eddington's work *The Nature of the Physical World*, in which he describes the *Downfall of Classical Physics*. “Between 1905 and 1908 Einstein and Minkowski introduced fundamental changes in our ideas of time and space. In 1911 Rutherford introduced the greatest change in our idea of matter since the time of Democritus. The reception of these two changes was curiously different. The new ideas of space and time were regarded on all sides as revolutionary; they were received with the greatest enthusiasm by some and the keenest opposition by others. The new idea of matter underwent the ordinary experience of scientific discovery; it gradually proved its worth, and when the evidence became overwhelmingly convincing it quietly supplanted previous theories. No great shock was felt. And yet when I hear to-day protests against the Bolshevism of modern science, and regrets for the old-established order, I am inclined to think that Rutherford, not Einstein, is the real villain of the piece. When we compare the universe as it is now supposed to be with the universe as we had ordinarily preconceived it,

¹ Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 306. I simply quote this opinion without making haste to base any conclusion upon it.

the most arresting change is not the rearrangement of space and time by Einstein, but the dissolution of all that we regard as most solid into tiny specks floating in void. That gives an abrupt jar to those who think that things are more or less what they seem. The revelation by modern science of the void within the atom is more disturbing than the revelation by astronomy of the immense void of interstellar space."¹ In his Introduction the same author very strikingly describes the contrast between the table of ordinary perception, extended, comparatively permanent, coloured, *substantial*, a *thing*, and the table as it is for science. "My scientific table," he says, "is mostly emptiness ; sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed ; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself. Notwithstanding its strange construction, it turns out to be an entirely efficient table. It supports my writing-paper as satisfactorily as table No. 1 ; for when I lay the paper on it the little electric particles, with their headlong speed, keep on hitting the underside, so that the paper is maintained in shuttlecock fashion at a nearly steady level. If I lean upon this table, I shall not go through ; or, to be strictly accurate, the chance of my scientific elbow going through my scientific table is so excessively small that it can be neglected in practical life."²

(3) The conception of the structure of the atom has been entirely changed. (a) The first step to the present theory was taken when atoms of the different chemical elements were weighed ; and it was discovered not only that there was a difference of weight, but also that the differences corresponded to differences of properties. A periodic Table of the Elements was constructed ; and it was found that the physical and chemical properties that characterised any given atom occurred periodically at intervals throughout the table. "This similarity of properties suggested a similarity of structure. It began to be suspected that atoms were not merely simple particles, but entities possessed of a more or less complicated structure."³ The second step was taken twenty-five years later. In 1897 J. J. Thomson experimentally discovered that electric rays consisted of "electrically charged particles" "two thousand times smaller than the lightest known atom – namely, the hydrogen atom," and

¹ Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 1.

² *Idem*, p. xii.

³ *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 91.

exactly alike. To "these little electrified particles the name 'electrons' was given." Here, then, it was conjectured, were the real foundation-stones of the material universe. "The theory came into being that all material atoms are composed of electrons." The third step was taken when it was discovered that (1) "when a body is charged with electricity, that body behaves as if its mass were increased; and that (2) when the mass and the electric charge of an electron were measured separately it turned out that the *whole* of the mass of an electron was due to its electric charge." The conclusion could then be drawn that "the electron was nothing but electricity. There was no 'ordinary matter' there at all."¹ The fourth step was taken in explaining how atoms which are electrically neutral could be composed of electrons "which are charged with negative electricity," for "electrons, all being negatively electrified, repel one another, and an assemblage of them could not be stable. We must assume, therefore, that the electrons in an atom are somehow associated with a charge of positive electricity. Such a combination could be stable, and would also account for the fact that an atom is electrically neutral." The last step was taken by Sir Ernest Rutherford, who suggested that the atom was "a miniature solar system." "The positive charge was supposed to be located at the centre of the atom, while the negative electrons, like so many planets, circulated round it. In every case the central positive charge is just sufficient to counterbalance, electrically, the sum of the electrons circulating round it. The differences between the different kinds of atoms are explained by differences in structure."² Into the details it is not necessary to enter, except to mention that the nucleus may consist of several protons combined with electrons in such a way as to neutralise electrically the circulating electrons.

(b) But at this stage the mathematicians intervened with a difficulty. In accordance with the well-established laws of electro-dynamics, "such an atom could not be stable. The revolving electrons, it could be shown by mathematical calculations based on the accepted laws, would necessarily radiate energy and approach ever more closely to the nucleus. Finally, they would fall into the nucleus, and the whole atom would vanish in a flash of radiation. On the basis of the accepted laws of nature, therefore, such an

¹ *Idem*, p. 92.

² *Idem*, pp. 92-93.

atom was impossible." But Max Planck came to the rescue. "He had come to the conclusion that the heat radiated from a hot body was not radiated in a continuous manner, but in little jerks, or *quanta*. Similarly, the heat falling on a body was not absorbed continuously." Planck's own explanation of this phenomenon has given place to another, namely, that "radiant energy is, in its very nature, atomic. This conclusion applies to all forms of radiant energy—heat, light, electricity, X-rays, and so on."¹ This theory, with some modifications, was applied by Niels Bohr to the atom: "It not only accounted for the stability of the atom, but it also accounted for certain well-known experimental results which had never previously been explained." While the acceptance of this theory involves the abandonment of the old laws of radiation, yet they cannot be abandoned completely, as certain phenomena connected with the propagation of light cannot be otherwise explained. "The two theories cannot be reconciled with one another, and yet there is strong experimental evidence for both." The quantum theory, however, best explains "the liberation of electrons from metals under the impact of X-rays," and also "the processes that go on inside an atom." Since 1925 a mathematical theory has been developed which represents the electron as a wave system. Although this theory is "a mere mathematical device and not a description of a physical reality," yet "it leads to calculated results which are confirmed by experiment," but which "cannot be deduced from the older theory."² "In the meantime it is safest to assume that all we know about the electron is its mathematical specification, and that we are not yet in a position to say what is the physical reality that obeys that specification."³

(4) Some of the other developments of modern physics can only be mentioned. (a) "There is something radically wrong with the present fundamental conceptions of physics and we do not see how to set it right." This is Eddington's confession; and he continues: "The cause of all the trouble is a little thing called *h*, which crops up continually in a wide range of experiments." *h* has been measured as an unimaginably small fraction, which it is not necessary here to reproduce, of *erg-seconds*. "The erg is the unit of energy and the second is the unit of time." Strange as such

¹ *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, p. 93.

² *Idem*, p. 94.

³ *Idem*, p. 95.

a multiplication of energy by time may seem to us, it is not so strange in the four-dimensional world in which the speculation of physics moves. These erg-seconds are called *action*. "The name does not seem to have any special appropriateness, but we have to accept it."¹ We can next pass to the description of the quantum as given by Jeans in his book *The Universe Around Us*. "The quantum is supposed to be proportional to the 'frequency,' or number of vibrations, of the radiation per second, and so is *inversely* proportional to the wave-length of the radiation – the shorter the wave-length, the greater the energy of the quantum, and conversely. Red light has feeble quanta, violet light has energetic quanta, and so on." He adds a note: "To be precise, if ν is the frequency of the radiation, its quantum of energy is $h\nu$, where h is a universal constant of nature, known as Planck's constant." The interest of these hypotheses lies in their application to changes in matter. "Einstein now supposes that radiation of a given type can effect an atomic or molecular change only if the energy needed for the change is precisely equal to that of a single quantum of the radiation. This is commonly known as Einstein's law; it determines the precise type of radiation needed to work any atomic or molecular penny-in-the-slot mechanism." This homely metaphor may be illustrated by Einstein's own photochemical law: "In any chemical reaction which is produced by the incidence of light, the number of molecules which are affected is equal to the quanta of light which are absorbed."² Thus radiation may be destructive of atomic structure. A quantum of radiation may not only eject an electron from an atom, but its excess energy may endow that electron with motion. Just as in the solar system the planets have their orbits, so also the electrons within the atom, yet the number of permitted orbits is limited. An electron may, however, move from "one permitted orbit to another under the stimulus of radiation," but there is room for only one electron in any orbit. The mind, having gone so far, seems unable to go farther; and thought finds itself arrested.

(b) The difficulties with which enquiry in these "regions beyond" the sensible experience are beset may be illustrated by what Eddington calls the *principle of indeterminacy*. "The gist of it can be stated as follows: *a particle may have position or it may have velocity, but it cannot in any exact sense have both.*"

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 79–80.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 123–124.

This saying, hard to be understood, he qualifies thus : " If we are content with a certain margin of inaccuracy, and if we are content with statements that claim no certainty but only high probability, then it is possible to ascribe both position and velocity to a particle." From this *impasse* Eddington passes to a conclusion of a surprising kind. " When we encounter unexpected obstacles in finding out something which we wish to know, there are two possible courses to take. It may be that the right course is to treat the obstacle as a spur to further efforts ; but there is a second possibility – that we have been trying to find something which does not exist." Here he chooses the second alternative. " From this point of view we assert that the description of the position and the velocity of an electron beyond a limited number of places of decimals is an attempt to describe something that does not exist ; although, curiously enough, the description of position or velocity if it had stood alone might have been allowable."¹ Eddington draws a further conclusion from this principle of indeterminacy elsewhere : " Thus far we have shown that modern physics is drifting away from the postulate that the future is pre-determined, ignoring it rather than deliberately rejecting it. With the discovery of the Principle of Indeterminacy its attitude has become more definitely hostile." This hostility is very boldly stated. " Classical physics foists a deterministic scheme on us by a trick : it smuggles the unknown future into the present, trusting that we shall not press an enquiry as to whether it has become any more knowable that way. The same principle extends to every kind of phenomenon that we attempt to predict, so long as the need for accuracy is not buried under a mass of averages."² The bearing of this on the problem of free will must be reserved for much fuller consideration, although Eddington himself relates his conclusion thereto. Jeans also in his small book³ recognises this principle of indeterminacy, but with more caution. " Thus, although we are still far from any positive knowledge, it seems probable that there may be some factor, for which we have so far found no better name than fate, operating in nature to neutralise the cast-iron inevitability of the old law of causation. The future may not be as unalterably determined by the past as we used to think ; in part at least it may rest on the knees of whatever gods

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 220–222.

² *Idem*, pp. 306–308.

³ *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 25.

there may be." According to Jeans, "Dirac finds it necessary to extend this indeterminacy and uncertainty of knowledge over the whole of atomic physics." He mentions "a still more drastic possibility," namely, that "the four-dimensional continuum of the theory of relativity is adequate only for some of the phenomena of nature"; and that just as consciousness is "something outside of the continuum," so may be "the meeting of electrons." "It is conceivable," he says, "that happenings entirely outside of the continuum determine what we describe as the 'course of events' inside the continuum, and that the apparent indeterminacy of nature may arise merely from our trying to force happenings which occur in many dimensions into a smaller number of dimensions."¹ In view of such an admission of such an *impasse* in scientific knowledge, Jeans's words in his larger work, *The Universe Around Us*, are worth recalling: "there is no need even to worry overmuch about apparent contradictions. The higher unity of ultimate reality must no doubt reconcile them all, although it remains to be seen whether this higher unity is within our comprehension or not. In the meantime, a contradiction worries us about as much as an unexplained fact, but hardly more; it may or may not disappear in the progress of science."² Meanwhile, it would be well for moralists and theologians to adopt the maxim *festina lente* in citing this principle of indeterminacy in support of the doctrine of free will. Eminent men of science, such as Sir Oliver Lodge, do not commit themselves to it, and, as is indicated above, science may find an exit from this "blind alley." Moral and religious truths rest on their own solid foundations; and neither ethics nor theology needs to be the dog waiting to pick up the crumbs which fall from the table of science.

(c) By a number of experiments "first performed in 1887 and more accurately in 1905," it has been shown that "a rod is shorter when it is along the line of motion than when it is across the line of motion." This would be quite inconceivable from the standpoint of the older physics, but not from that of the new, as already described, where particles in rapid motion within a given space take the place of a solid body. "By setting in motion the rod," says Eddington, "with all the little electric charges contained in it, we introduce new magnetic forces between the particles. Clearly the original balance is upset, and the average spacing

¹ *Idem*, pp. 123-125.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 330.

between the particles must alter until a new balance is found. And so the extension of the swarm of particles – the length of the rod – alters.”¹ The result of these experiments is to make us uneasy about the classical physics, even if it does not lead at once to the theory of relativity. It challenges the constancy of any measuring scale. It varies with the position of the observer ; by this his frame of space is determined. “The frame of space used by an observer depends only on his motion. Observers on different planets with the same velocity (i.e. having zero relative velocity) will agree as to the location of the objects of the universe ; but observers on planets with different velocities have different frames of location.”² While there is nothing necessarily wrong with our frame of space, it is not the only possible one. We can now pass to Einstein’s theory of relativity. He maintains that “the question of a unique right frame of space does not arise. There is a frame of space *relative* to a terrestrial observer, another *relative* to the nebular observers, others relative to other stars. Frames of space are relative. Distances, lengths, volumes – all quantities of space reckoning which belong to the frames – are likewise relative.” But “the other quantities of physics go along with the frame of space, so that they also are relative.”³ “They are all related to the reckoning of length, time, and mass.” There are, however, invariants, such as momentum, horse-power, number ; and “relativity physics is especially interested in invariants, and it has discovered and named a few more. It is a common mistake to suppose that Einstein’s theory of relativity asserts that everything is relative. Actually it says, ‘There are absolute things in the world, but you must look deeply for them. The things that first present themselves to your notice are for the most part relative.’”⁴ This theory is thus a challenge for the reconsideration of many hitherto accepted conclusions, such even as Newton’s law of gravitation.

(d) We may glance at this change as illustrating how far-reaching this challenge is. “There are both relative and absolute features about gravitation. The feature that impresses us most ” (e.g. the fall of the apple) “is relative – relative to a frame that has no special importance apart from the fact that it is the one commonly used by us. . . . We ought to disregard it in any attempt to form an absolute

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6.

² *Idem*, p. 14.

³ *Idem*, p. 21.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 23.

picture of gravitation. . . . But there always remains something absolute, of which we must try to devise an appropriate picture. For reasons which I shall presently explain, we find that it can be pictured as a curvature of space and time."¹ His argument we cannot attempt to summarise. Difficult as this picture seems, he holds it to be "more graspable than an elusive tug which flits from one object to another according to the point of view chosen."² The law of gravitation which Einstein has formulated – too difficult to state here – has proved "the better approximation" than Newton's. One test, however, can be mentioned. "Light waves in passing a massive body such as the sun are deflected through a small angle. This is additional evidence that the Newtonian picture of gravitation as a tug is inadequate. You cannot deflect *waves* by tugging at them, and clearly another representation of the agency which deflects them must be found."³ As this new view of gravitation substitutes "a geometrical quantity *curvature* for a mechanical quantity force," we are led to a new geometry. "Hitherto geometry has not included time in its scope. But now space and time are so interlocked that there must be one science – a somewhat extended geometry – embracing them both."⁴

(e) In this connection only one other conclusion of the new physics need be mentioned in closing this section. Hitherto thought has been in a strait betwixt two: infinite and finite space are alike inconceivable. Einstein's theory of relativity seems to offer an escape from the *impasse*. According to his theory, "space is finite, but it has no end; 'finite but unbounded' is the usual phrase. Infinite space cannot be conceived by anybody; finite but unbounded space is difficult to conceive but not impossible." We can advance from the circle, "a finite but endless line," to the sphere, "a region which is finite but unbounded," and at last conceive a hypersphere, "a skin without the inside. That is finite but unbounded space."⁵

These illustrations of recent scientific thought, which have been mentioned as briefly as possible, not only indicate how completely the physics, on which materialism and naturalism relied, has undergone a revolution, but also how the mind of man, undaunted by the inadequacy of its former explanations, presses on to penetrate more deeply into the nature of reality. Can a universe which thought can so

¹ *Idem*, pp. 114–115.

² *Idem*, p. 119.

³ *Idem*, pp. 122–123.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 133.

⁵ *Idem*, pp. 80–81.

handle be mindless, without any affinity to the mind of man ?

III

(1) It is evident how great a change has been brought about by recent science in our cosmology. It is uncertain, modest, diffident, as the science of last century was not. The solid materialism and the rigid determinism have disappeared. The dualism of matter and force, along with what were regarded as the fundamental laws – the indestructibility of matter and the transmutation of force – have become relative to phenomena, and the universe becomes a system of energy.

(a) Radiation can destroy the atom, and before man's advent on earth "most of the universe had melted into radiation," says Jeans. "But as inhabitants of earth we are living at the very beginning of time. We are still too much engulfed in the greyness of the morning mists to be able to imagine, however vaguely, how this world of ours will appear to those who will come after us and see it in the full light of day. But by what light we have, we seem to discern that the main message of astronomy is one of hope to the race and of responsibility to the individual – of responsibility because we are drawing plans and laying foundations for a longer future than we can well imagine."¹ Promising as is man's place in time, so significant is his position in space.

(b) Eddington, in answering his own question : "Does this prodigality of matter, of space, of time, find its culmination in man ?" argues that, although "a rather strong case for the existence of vegetation on Mars seems to have been made out," yet as regards the existence of animal life he expresses a doubt. "Mars has every appearance of being a planet long past its prime ; and it is in any case improbable that two planets differing so much as Mars and the Earth would be in the zenith of biological development contemporaneously."² The claim of Mars as a rival to the Earth as the home of animal life, culminating in self-conscious personality, is thus discounted. How did the earth as part of the solar system come so to differ from the other parts ? For it is only within a narrow range of physical conditions that life, plant or animal, is possible.

¹ *The Universe Around Us*, p. 343.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 169, 174, 175.

(c) How did the solar system itself come to be? "Almost all observed astronomical formations can be placed in the evolutionary sequence we have just discussed," says Jeans, "either with fair certainty or with reasonable plausibility, except for one outstanding and conspicuous exception – the solar system."¹ The explanation which Jeans gives of the origin of the solar system is that it was due to the approach of two stars to one another close enough to influence one another – an exceedingly rare event. "Actual collisions must be so exceedingly rare that we can leave them out of account. When two stars pass close to one another, the primary effect must be that each raises tides in the other. The closer the approach, the higher the tides in general, although something must depend also on the speed with which the bodies pass one another, because this determines the length of time during which they influence one another."² Although "that 'gravitational instability' appears to be the agency primarily responsible for the main architecture of the universe," yet "the tidal theory provides a simple explanation of the origin of the solar system."³ "What would have happened," asks Jeans, "if the passing star had not passed, but had come to stay? So long as it remained within a certain distance of the sun, its tidal forces were pulling the sun to pieces. We can imagine how a longer visit from it would have resulted in a greater upheaval in the sun, and the birth of a larger family of planets. Finally, a visit of unlimited duration would have shattered the sun into fragments."⁴

(d) The origin of the solar system thus is represented as an exceptionally rare occurrence, or even solitary as far as our knowledge goes. The formation of the earth within that solar system is represented also as a solitary occurrence. That the earth is so adjusted in its physical condition that life has appeared on it as nowhere else, as far as our knowledge goes, and that life has evolved until man has emerged, capable of offering an explanation of the universe, the solar system, the earth, the evolution of life, until he himself can, looking backward, spell out the wondrous story – can this be accident, a fortuitous combination of atoms, "signifying nothing"? Or does it mean purpose, and, therefore, mind as present, directing, controlling the whole process, and the power in the process itself, mind, intelligent will? While

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 227.

² *Idem*, p. 232.

³ *Idem*, pp. 240–241.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 242.

the next chapter will deal with *teleology*, yet the *cosmology* cannot be examined without passing into teleology.

(2) In the first section of this chapter, the conclusion was reached, starting from the cosmological argument, that the cause of the universe might be conceived as active intelligence, or intelligent will. It is not claimed that the statement in this second section of some of the leading hypotheses of modern physics *proves* that conclusion. All that is claimed is that it does not forbid, and even leaves room for the theistic interpretation. Faith in God has its own inner witness, independent of science ; and has trusted that witness, even when science was offering it a challenge. Now science is offering a confirmation.

(a) *Negatively*, science confesses that it has not solved its problems so as to be justified in any dogmatic denials of this witness of faith. Some physical phenomena are explicable by the quantum theory, the particle, others by the theory of wave radiation. "Light," says Eddington, "is an entity with the wave property of spreading out to fill the largest object glass and with all the well-known properties of diffraction and interference ; simultaneously, it is an entity with the corpuscular, or bullet, property of expending its whole energy on one very small target. We can scarcely describe such an entity as a wave or as a particle ; perhaps, as a compromise, we had better call it a 'wavicle.'"¹ There are two theories of the atom. The electron theory held the field till 1925 ; since then it has a rival – the mathematical theory, which is not picturable as is the other, but appears only as a mathematical specification and not a physical reality, and yet leads to calculated results, confirmed by experiment, which cannot be deduced from the older theory. The physical reality – matter – seems to disappear ; at least we do not know what it is ; and we are left with a mathematical specification. The relativity theory is not a sceptical theory, like that of sophists – "each man a measure of reality" – and yet it recognises that the universe presents different aspects to different observers according to the frame of space.

(b) *Positively*, while science cannot be dogmatic, it need not be sceptical. Unsolved problems are a challenge to fresh attempts. For the science of last century there were the two termini, the indestructibility of matter and the transmutation of energy, with no common junction beyond ;

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

now the dualism has been resolved. The different lines of investigation which converged on the new theory of the atom are surely a convincing evidence that the world does respond to man's demand for a disclosure of its secrets. One theory may displace another, but each successive theory covers a wider range of phenomena ; and, when we look back on the path of science, its movement is not retreat, but advance ; even when sometimes the order of the day may be *reculer pour mieux sauter*. It is no interest of religion to cast up to science its unsolved problems. It has solved so many that it can go on confidently. Its triumphs are an evidence, which religion may rejoice in, that reality is intelligible, and, if so intelligible, must not intelligence belong to its ultimate nature ?

(3) It may be that whatever progress science may make, it may always find that its path leads to a mystery. This does not prove that the ultimate reality must remain for ever unknown, only that the approach by physical science alone is a *cul de sac*, a blind alley, because the methods of science can observe and experiment with the physical universe, and find theory after theory offering more adequate explanations, but can never give the final interpretation, since that is in the mind which science uses as an instrument, but does not recognise as holding the final secret of reality. Science does show us a correspondence, ever closer and wider, between the object known and the subject knowing, and thus does justify the claim of the subject knowing to say the last word – the word religion in all ages has been repeating – God as Creator. The relation between volition of the mind and movement of the body is still an undisclosed secret ; and psychology contents itself with the theory of a *psychophysical parallelism* ; yet we know that when we will to move we do move. Similarly the relation between the physical reality – the energy of the universe – which the latest science describes in a mathematical specification and the intelligent will, which religion calls God, remains a mystery ; but we may dare to affirm the connection of the one with the other in some such words as these : Physical forces are a finite exercise of infinite will, and natural laws are a finite expression of infinite thought. The all-prevailing energy of the universe, which the mind of man can in some measure describe in terms he can understand, may be regarded, without any dogmatic denial, or even confident challenge, by modern science as a disclosure in time and

space of the omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent God, whom religion believes in, and worships as Above and Beyond nature and man, and yet Akin to and Within man.

*Where could I go from Thy Spirit,
Where could I flee from Thy face ?
I climb to heaven ? – but Thou art there ;
I nestle in the nether world ? – and there Thou art !
If I darted swift to the dawn, to the verge of the ocean afar,
Thy hand even there would fall on me,
Thy right hand would reach me.*

Ps. cxxxix. 7-10 (Moffatt's translation).

CHAPTER IV

TELEOLOGY

I

KANT, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, while regarding the teleological argument as *regulative*, and not *constitutive* of thought, describes it as "the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity."¹ Philosophy here joins hands with religion. Most philosophical systems aim at exhibiting an immanent reason and efficient purpose of the universe; and in the religions we have the conceptions of the Chinese *Tao*, the Indian *Karma*, the Greek *Logos*, and the Hebrew *Wisdom*. In Job the Wisdom which is undiscoverable by man is God's secret. "God knows where she is, God only is aware of her abode; for he saw to the very ends of the earth, he scanned the whole world under heaven, when he fixed the forces of the wind, and measured out the waters, when he made rules for the rain, and paths for the lightning flash; he saw wisdom then, and studied her, worked with her, proved her" (Job. xxviii. 23-27, Moffatt; cf. Prov. viii. 22-31, Eccles. xxiv.).

(1) It is in Greek philosophy that this conception is most fully developed, and from it passed into modern thinking, philosophical and theological. (a) Anaxagoras ascribed the movement and order of the world by analogy to νοῦς; but his own explanation of the world was mechanical; and Plato and Aristotle blame him for not making a thorough use of his principle. Socrates not only develops the proof for the purposiveness of the world, but even gives it a definite theistic reference. His argument has been so admirably stated by Dr. James Adam² that I must give the reader the pleasure of reading it as a whole. "To Socrates the whole of nature appeared to bear the impress of design. Anticipating in scope and purpose, though not, of course, in detail, the 'Anatomist's Hymn' of Oliver Wendell Holmes, he enlarges on the adaptation of means to ends discernible in the structure of the human body, arguing that it cannot be the work of chance, but only of a wise artificer, who

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 383.

² *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, pp. 347-348.

loves the creature he has made (σοφοῦ τινὸς δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου). The same lesson, he maintains, is even more clearly taught by a study of man's psychical nature. Those involuntary instincts which ensure the safety of the individual and the species, the reproductive impulse, the love of parents for their children, our natural love of life and hatred of death ; the faculty of speech, by which alone society, civilisation, and law are rendered possible ; how are they all to be accounted for except on the hypothesis of a Being who deliberately planned the existence and happiness of man ? Consider again the religious endowment of the human race. Man is the only animal who can apprehend the existence of gods, the only creature who is privileged to do them service. Or consider the faculty of reason, by which we draw conclusions from what we perceive and devise contrivances for enjoying the good and repelling the evil. Surely in all this we have the strongest proof of a creative intelligence deliberating for the interests of mankind. And if we turn from man to outward nature, the spectacle is just the same. Socrates expatiates on the movement of the heavenly bodies, on the blessed gift of sunlight, on the silence of the nocturnal hours designed as if to invite repose ; he points to the earth yielding her fruit in due season, to the beneficent operation of the other elements, and insists so powerfully on the adaptation of universal nature to human needs that Euthydemus is disposed to doubt whether the gods have any other occupation except to minister to man, till he remembers that the other animals also partake in many of these benefits. True, replies Socrates ; but the lower animals are themselves created for the sake of man, to supply him with food, and labour, and so on. And finally, in matters appertaining to the future, where human reason is of no avail, the gods are ready and willing to help through the medium of oracles and divination. The inference which Socrates draws from all these apparent instances of design is that in nature, as in man, there is an indwelling intelligence or mind, ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησις, invisible, omnipresent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent, itself in need of nothing, but always working on behalf of human creatures, both individually and collectively. This is the Socratic conception of God as described by Xenophon ; and Socrates further suggests that the human mind is itself only an efflux or fragment of the universal or cosmic mind (*Memorabilia*, I. 4. 8)." This is a confident, comprehensive, optimistic

teleology, which gives in outline the whole field to be covered by later thinking.

(b) Plato does not follow Socrates in dwelling on special instances of design, nor in subordinating the whole world to the interests of man. While, in the words of J. Hutchison Stirling, he regards the world as "a single teleological system with the Good alone as its heart" (*Philosophy and Theology*, p. 113), yet the Demiurge of the *Timæus*, in bringing order out of chaos, or non-being ($\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$), is hampered by natural necessity ($\eta\ \alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$), and "the self-moved mover who fashions the world is not identified with the Good, nor is he to be equated with the God of modern theism."¹ Aristotle seeks to overcome the dualism of Plato in the development of reality, and to harmonise mechanical process and progress to an end ($\tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma$). The Good is the highest form of all, to which no matter attaches. It is not only the final purpose of the world, but also the ultimate cause, as the unmoved mover who attracts all things towards its perfection. This Good may be identified with God. While Aristotle applied to the explanation of nature mechanism as well as teleology, yet he always subordinates the first to the second; and consequently he hindered progress as well as failed to carry out his own principle by too great readiness to fall back on final causes.

(c) As might be expected from the ethical intention and the metaphysical basis of Epicureanism, it offered no teleology. While the Stoic affirmed that all particular phenomena were determined by natural necessity, yet the monism they professed – God as soul and world as body – allowed for a vital activity which could be teleologically interpreted. Sometimes this teleology sank to triviality, and became too anthropocentric, even as that of Socrates as represented in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Marcus Aurelius, while professing this monism, was in his outlook on the world and life a dualist at heart. His inconsistency is thus described by Dr. F. W. Bussell: "We see that Marcus, in common with the greater number of speculators in the second century, is at heart a gnostic. He is only saved by his otiose and theoretical monism from the conclusion of St. John (1 John v. 19: $\delta\ \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omega\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\ \kappa\acute{\epsilon}\iota\tau\alpha\iota$), and his reverence for the divine spark, and his depreciation of human life and nature, are distinctly Basilidian or Valentinian – fundamentally dualistic. As with man's soul, alien

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. XII., p. 217.

sojourner in a contemptible framework of corruption, so with the Supreme Power. It is hard to reconcile the praise of God with the scorn of the visible universe which embodies Him. In what part of the world, in what corner of nature, can He reside, where all is pitiable and disgusting? Has He a foothold more secure in the realm of history or time? Marcus's contempt of *Time* is perhaps even more striking than his dislike of *Matter*; and yet, by the very terms of his hypothesis, God reigns supreme in both departments, and is so far from merely guiding or superintending a somewhat stubborn and indocile complex – is substantially identical with it.”¹ The contrast with Socrates is very striking, and shows, in any argument for God from the rational character of the world, that not only the inference must be regarded, but that the data on which that inference is based must be considered. It is a judgment of value, depending largely on “the personal equation” which decides whether a man will find God in the world or not, be optimist or pessimist.²

(2) When we turn from ancient philosophy to Christianity, we find the belief in the revelation of God in nature and history. (a) Jesus Himself saw the care and the bounty of the Heavenly Father in the clothing of the flowers of the field and the feeding of the birds of the air (Matt. vi. 26–30) no less than in the provision for man's needs. He read the history of His people's past, as did the prophets, as divine providence and governance. Paul recalls Socrates in his description of the body in 1 Cor. xii. 12–27; for he finds God's ordering in it: “God tempered the body, together, giving more abundant honour to that part which lacked” (verse 24). There is a philosophy of history in Rom. viii.: “We know that to them that love God all things work together for good” (verse 28).

(b) In the development of Christian theology the conception of the *Logos* played a dominant part. There is the *logos endiathetos*, immanent in God, the *logos prophorikos*, transeunt from God to the world, the *logos spermatikos*, immanent in men and nature. The Fathers use various images

¹ *Marcus Aurelius*, pp. 225–226.

² A sentence from Cicero, who was influenced by Stoicism, may be here added: “What Being that is destitute of intellect and reason could have produced these things which not only had need of reason to cause them to be, but which are such as can be understood only by the highest exertions of reason” (*De Natura Deorum* II. iv.). I cannot now trace where I get this quotation.

to describe God's presence, activity, and guidance in nature. Theophilus compares the universe to a ship in full sail, of which God is the pilot ; Minucius Felix to a well-ordered house, and Gregory Nazianzen to a melodious lyre. Augustine delights in dwelling on the beautiful (*pulchrum*) and the fit (*aptum*) in nature, and thinks of the world as a work of art, in which gradations and contrasts are blended harmoniously. In his great work *The City of God* he, like Paul, offers a philosophy of history which is Christocentric ; but as in his interpretation of history pagan vices were destroying Rome, the city of this world, and Christian virtues alone offered salvation to mankind, any further consideration of this great work must be reserved for chapter viii.

(c) In dealing with the cosmological argument the five ways of proving God's existence stated by Aquinas have been mentioned ; the fifth way, from the government of things, may be here more fully quoted : " We see that some things which have no power of knowing, such as natural bodies, work for ends (*propter finem*), as is manifest from their constantly, or at least frequently, working in the same way for the attainment of that which is best ; which shows that they arrive at their end, not by chance, but from intention. Now such things as have no power of knowing do not tend towards an end unless they are directed by some being which has knowledge and intelligence, as an arrow is directed by an archer. There is therefore some intelligent Being by which all natural things are directed towards ends. And this we call God."¹ In the fourth way Aquinas argues that there is in the world a progress towards the " good and true and noble," and that what is " most true and most good and most noble " is necessarily " being in the highest degree (*maxime ens*)," and the cause of other beings, and their possession of these qualities in more or less degree. There was, however, in the Middle Ages, a tendency to irrationalism, to an exaltation of the arbitrary will of God, and consistently therewith of the authority of the Church as the custodian of the divine revelation. For instance, Duns Scotus held that there was no necessary value or virtue in the satisfaction rendered by Christ, that God's *acceptatio* alone made it what it was ; and he admitted that a mere man might have saved us. Later schoolmen went further, and were bold enough to say that God might have assumed the *natura asina* and so saved us. Against the prevalent finalism,

¹ *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 26-28.

the invention of ends instead of the investigation of causes as the method of explaining nature, Roger Bacon was in revolt. Although not exempt from the prejudices and superstitions of his age, he did in his enquiries and inventions anticipate the coming age of science.

(3) With the Renaissance and the Reformation we pass from the dominance of thought and life by the Church to an era of intellectual emancipation. The divisions of the Christian Church so weakened its authority that there was given the opportunity for independent thought.

(a) Giordano Bruno represents the transition from ancient and mediæval to modern thought. He accepted the mechanical explanation of individual phenomena, and yet affirmed a world soul, purposive in its action, and securing progress.

(b) Francis Bacon was a resolute opponent of the explanation of phenomena by final causes; not because he was opposed to the belief in God, but, because such an explanation had hindered the progress of science, was sterile in discovery as the vestal virgins, and delayed the ship of investigation by the proper methods from sailing. The *anthropo-centric* (*ex analogia hominis*) tendency of such interpretations was condemned by him as opposed to the universal outlook (*ex analogia universi*). He even suggests that the divine wisdom may bring about results other than nature intended. In *Essays*, xvi., "Of Atheism," he argues that while superficial thinking may end in atheism, more profound will lead to belief in God.

(c) Descartes, too, was a theist, and formulated, as we have seen, two arguments for the existence of God; but he was as much opposed as was Bacon to the intrusion of final causes into physical investigations. He maintained that "a true science of nature extends just as far as mechanics will carry it and no farther."¹ He was even "content to regard all the lower animals as simply automatic machines, comparable, though superior, to marionette dancers and flute-players such as those made afterwards by Vaucanson, which led Lamettrie to call even man a machine."² For Descartes man himself was a conscious automaton. But the consciousness did not direct and control the mechanism of the body, as he admitted no interaction, but ascribed the concurrence of the psychic and the physical process to God. "It seems manifest to me," he says, "that it is none other than God

¹ Ward, *op. cit.*, I., p. 166.

² *Idem*, p. 291.

Himself, who, in the beginning, created matter along with motion and rest, and now by His ordinary concourse alone preserves in the whole the same amount of motion and rest that He then placed in it.”¹ His objection to the assumption of final causes had, however, a deeper ground in his belief that if such there are they are hidden “in the inscrutable abyss of His wisdom.”

(d) Although admitting the existence of God on authority Hobbes was a consistent materialist. The parallelism of the modes in extension and the modes in thought in the system of Spinoza forbade any interaction. Whatever is necessarily is, because God alone is, and to ascribe ends to God is to liken Him to man. Yet the *amor intellectualis Dei*, which he regards as the highest wisdom and goodness, and the fullest blessedness, is not consistent with such a system.

(e) Even as Leibnitz tried to reconcile sensationalism and rationalism by adding to the watchword of the one – *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu* the words *nisi ipse intellectus* – he attempted to combine mechanism and teleology, as alternative, but not inconsistent, or conflicting modes of interpreting reality. As matter was for him force (*un être capable d'action*), and mind embraced subconscious states (*petites perceptions*), the Cartesian dualism was left behind, and the world came to be for him “an infinite host of independent monads or individuals, at countless different stages of development, whose activity is fundamentally spiritual or perceptual.” Each in itself mirrors the whole more or less according to its capacity of perception, and each is striving to realise all its own possibilities. God as the Supreme Monad has all perfection in Himself, is the Creator of the monads, which, though independent, because of the pre-established harmony of which God is also the source, concur in the progress of the whole. This is a teleological system through and through.² Leibnitz was well aware of the challenge to teleology offered by the existence, prevalence, and persistence of sin and evil in the world. And he takes up the challenge in his *Théodicée*, the title of which has added to the philosophical vocabulary the word *theodicy* as the term for any endeavour to justify the ways of God to men. Here he tried to show that this is *the best of all possible worlds*.³

(f) In the eighteenth century Leibnitz's theology was

¹ Quoted by Veitch, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

² *E. R. E.*, Vol. XII., p. 219.

³ His argument will be fully discussed in the chapter on “Theodicy,” p. 413.

popularised, and one may add even vulgarised, in the rationalistic theism of Wolff. The fundamental conception of God's relation to the world was deistic; the world is mechanically conceived, and its order is externally imposed by God, not for His glory, as Calvinism had taught, but for the good of man and beast; an individualist utilitarianism marked the statements of the design-argument; and this was often illustrated by many trivial instances. The cork-tree produced its bark to provide stoppers for bottles. The vermin which sometimes infest the human body were intended to compel men, who are lazy animals, to keep themselves clean.¹ This trivial and often ludicrous utilitarianism even invaded the pulpit. "There were sermons on the dressing of the hair, tobacco smoking, and so forth. Scarcely one of the subjects chosen by our sensational advertising preachers had not its prototype more than two hundred years ago in Germany."² And even such subjects as cattle-feeding, lamb-raising, ploughing, harrowing, and reaping were discussed. God was little more to many than a universal provider for human need. In Great Britain a similar tendency appeared, though in less extreme form. Paley's *Natural Theology* may be regarded as one of the best examples of this mode of thinking. As a watch shows design, and design involves a designer—man—so arguing by analogy the abundant evidence of design in the world proves that it must have a designer, and that designer must be, and can be, no other than God. It is common, but also cheap, to ridicule Paley; for he uses the material which the knowledge of his day afforded skilfully, and his method was that of his own times. Had he lived in the later half of the nineteenth century, he would probably have adapted his reasoning to the theory of evolution.

(g) Before passing by way of Hume and Kant to more recent modes of thinking, some defects of this rationalistic theism which have been already mentioned may be further emphasised. As the cosmology was mechanical and the theology deistic, the teleology was not immanent, but imposed. Some of the ancient dualism was assumed, and God's wisdom was displayed as overcoming the difficulties which an intractable material offered. Even Newton speaks of the world as disclosing "a cause well skilled in mechanical

¹ I cannot now recall where I came across these instances, but they are authentic, and not invented.

² Ker's *History of Preaching*, 1888, p. 178.

ingenuity.”¹ The analogical form of the argument would undoubtedly influence the representation. Man does not create the material which he manipulates, and in adapting which to his own ends he has to overcome obstacles which the nature of his material offers. God shapes not the already made, but as He makes ; His creation is throughout purposive. Even in some of the hymns there is what sounds to us the strange phrase “ the designing God.” Again how anthropocentric the outlook is. Even the poet Gray in the familiar lines falls into the fallacy of assuming that all nature exists for man’s use or delight :

*Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear.
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.*

Mineralogy would have something interesting to tell us about the gem ; and botany tells us that the colour and the smell of the flower discharge a vital function, and offer no problem of disutility, when a poet’s eye and nose are absent. We shall have a good deal to say at a later stage of this discussion on man’s place in nature, and on the bearing of his ideals or values on the immanent purpose of the universe ; but this superficial, anthropocentric, individualistic utilitarianism must be abandoned as a superseded mode of thinking.

(4) Hume not only provoked Kant to his critical activity, but even was a necessary preparation for him, as he reduced associationalism to its inevitable consequence in scepticism. (a) His own position on belief in God, and especially the argument from design, is difficult to determine.² On the one hand, he admits that the world on the whole makes the incontestable impression of purposiveness and rational order, and on that account recognises that *natural religion* is a reasonable mode of view for the practical man ; but, on the other hand, he maintains that the belief in design cannot be established from the standpoint of science ; for he conceives it explicable that even on the hypothesis of a purely mechanical theory, amid the countless combinations of

¹ Letter in Bentley’s *Works*, Vol. III.

² Two of his fellow-countrymen in their books on him take opposite views of his personal attitude to religion : Orr regards him as in his own convictions sceptical, but Calderwood inclines to a more charitable judgment.

atoms, one which was durable, purposive, and well-ordered should at last come about. In line with Empedocles and Lucretius he may have had some inklings of an immanent teleology, the principle of the survival of the fit, or a tendency inherent in matter itself to equilibrium or equilibration, an anticipation of later thought. While he rejects the kind of teleology current in his own day, as described above, yet his own position, despite his sensationalism and scepticism in his epistemology, may be expressed in his admission "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence."¹

(b) As was indicated in the opening of this chapter, Kant treats the teleological proof with more respect than he does the other aspects of current rational theism. "It animates the study of nature," he says, "as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature by directing our attention to a unity the principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this idea – its cause; and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction." Consequently he admits that "for these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed." Nevertheless he contends that "we cannot approve of the claim which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits, apart from favour or support by other arguments," and he maintains that "the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it

¹ *The Dialogues*, quoted in *E. R. E.*, Vol. XII., pp. 220–221. Since the above was written I have come across two less ambiguous statements. The third sentence of "The Natural History of Religions" runs as follows: "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion" (*Hume's Essays*, published by Ward, Locke & Co., p. 514). Still more emphatic are the opening sentences of Section xv., "General Corollary": "Though the stupidity of men, barbarous and uninstructed, be so great that they may not see a Sovereign Author in the more obvious works of nature to which they are so much familiarised; yet it scarcely seems possible that anyone of good understanding should reject the idea, when once it is suggested to him. A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in everything; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author" (*idem*, pp. 551–552).

must entrust this to the ontological argument – to which it serves merely as an introduction, and that, consequently, this argument contains *the only possible ground of proof* (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this being.”¹ Taken by itself, apart from the cosmological argument which seeks to prove God to be the necessary ultimate cause of the world, Kant further argues that “this proof can at most demonstrate the existence of an *architect of the world*, whose effects are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a *creator of the world*, to whom all things are subject.”² While this criticism is valid against the current rational theism, it does not in the least affect the validity of the discussion here. In the first chapter it was clearly indicated that these proofs do not yield, and cannot in themselves yield, the theistic conception of God; if there be a teleological principle discoverable in the world, it can be cited as giving a confirmation to, not a demonstration of, the belief in God. We may, however, pursue the subject a little further to show the inconsistency of Kant’s thinking. While he recognises a *regulative* value of the teleological principle, yet at the same time he fears that the teleological interpretation may conflict with the mechanical explanation, and thus offer an easy escape from it. “In regard to this point,” says Pfeiderer, “Kant clearly lands himself in self-contradiction. In the *Prolegomena* (Section 44) he calls attention to ‘the remarkable circumstance that the ideas of the reason are not, like the categories, of advantage to us by enabling the understanding to cope with experience, but in this respect are *perfectly unnecessary*, may even be said to be *positive difficulties and hindrances* to the principles of the knowledge of nature formulated by the understanding.’ . . . As to the idea of God, ‘we must abstain from all interpretations of the system of nature which are derived from the will of a Supreme Being, because here we cease to be engaged with the philosophy of nature and confess by the very fact that this for us has reached its limit.’ What value, then, can be ascribed to regulative principles, which are not only perfectly unnecessary for the explanation of phenomena, but even obstruct it?”³ Kant seems in this unqualified criticism to have forgotten the saying that *abusus non tollit usum*. Elsewhere he recognises that the two principles are not mutually exclusive. “He places,” says

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 383. ² *Idem*, p. 385.

³ *Op. cit.*, I., p. 160.

Pfleiderer, "the maxims of the mechanical and the teleological interpretations of nature side by side, and declares them to be equally legitimate, equally indispensable. 'To exclude the teleological principle,' he says, 'in favour of the mechanical, and where utility undeniably presents itself as a reference to another kind of causality to pay heed to mechanism alone, this is to condemn reason to flit about fantastically among shadowy semblances of powers of nature which thought refuses to entertain; just as a merely teleological explanation which pays no regard to the mechanism of nature, reduces reason to a visionary.' For a union of the two principles Kant takes first the subjective road, declaring them both to be merely regulative; yet he cannot conceal from himself that even such a subjective capacity for combination points to a common objective principle, in which the unity of the ends and of the efficient causes must be based; and he finds this principle in a 'supersensuous real ground for nature' under which perhaps there may lie an 'intellectual view' (*Anschauung*) for which the parts and the whole do not fall asunder as they do to our discursive reason, but coincide (*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Ed. Hart. V., p. 422 seq.)."¹ The *Critique of Judgment* is not only complementary to, but even corrective of, the *Critique of Pure Reason*. While even in this book he does not altogether escape "the radical dualism characteristic of his system, which seems eternally fated to forbid intelligence and reality to come to terms with one another, still, in this work we meet two cognate and, in a sense, equivalent conceptions, which are of the highest moment for a constructive theism. One is the idea of an *intuitive understanding*, for which the whole and the parts mutually and organically involve each other; and this may be said to be Kant's conception of God in its profoundest

¹ *Op. cit.*, III., p. 260. An instance of the value of the conception of design in investigating causes may be added here in illustration of Kant's statement. The Hon. Robert Boyle reported this conversation with William Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood. "I remember that, when I asked our famous Harvey what were the things which induced him to think of the circulation of the blood, he answered me that, when he took notice of the valves in many parts of the body, so placed that they gave free passage to the blood towards the heart, but opposed to the passage of the venous blood the contrary way, he was invited to think that so provident a cause as nature had not placed so many valves without a design, and no design seemed more probable than that, since the blood could not well, because of the intervening valves, be sent by the veins to the limits, it should be sent through the arteries, and returned through the veins, where valves do not oppose its course that way." (I regret that I cannot now trace the source of this quotation.)

form. The other is the idea of *immanent adaptation*, in which mechanism and teleology are fused together ; and this is plainly the same conception, looked at from the side of the world. These speculative suggestions have yielded much richer results to later thought than Kant himself succeeded in educing from them. They must be pronounced inalienable elements in the edifice of modern theism."¹ The successors of Kant – Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel – need not be dealt with in detail, as their systems have in a previous chapter been mentioned. Hegel carries teleology beyond the bounds the limitations of human intelligence must set to an interpretation of the world in affirming that "the real is the rational." One instance of the extreme to which he carries his rationalisation will suffice. Innocence is the thesis ; sin the antithesis ; and holiness the synthesis. Other systems of monism which undertake to rationalise all reality, "to think all things together," are marked by this same excess of confidence in the reason of man. It is well, in view of such over-confidence, to remember that "we walk by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. v. 7), and that "we are saved by hope" (Rom. viii. 24). There is mystery enough in experience to forbid such rational certainty.

(5) Pfleiderer gives some useful quotations² from German philosophers which deserve to be reproduced, as they show that the teleological principle remains valid. "The peculiarity of nature," says Schelling in his *Transcendental Idealism*, "rests on the fact that with all the mechanism it is still full of purpose. The difference between the products of art and those of nature is, that in the former the notion is only impressed on the surface of the object, while in the latter it has entered into the object itself, and is absolutely indivisible from it." The world for Hegel is "an organic life, a living system ; all that is makes up no more than the organs of the one subject ; the planets which revolve round the sun are only the giant members of this one system." Then follows a sentence which shows his tendency to pantheism. "This, however, is to affirm no more than that it is alive, not that the world soul as spirit is different from this its life" (*Religionsphilosophie*, XII. 458, 462). One would not expect an admission of purpose from pessimism ; but, nevertheless, Schopenhauer recognises the teleological principle without drawing the theistic inference, and von Hartmann

¹ Mackintosh in *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 182.

² *Op. cit.*, III., pp. 260–262.

admits that the principles of teleology and causality can be reconciled. "In fact," says Schopenhauer, "every good and sound head must be brought by the contemplation of organic nature to a teleological position ; though it is by no means necessary, unless preconceived opinions so direct him, that he should land either in physico-theology or in the anthro-po-teleology condemned by Spinoza" (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, II., p. 389). "At the root of the matter," says von Hartmann, "both these principles are mere moments of a logical process set up by themselves, and endowed, as it were, with independence : logical necessity is the one principle which appears, when looked on from one side, as (seemingly dead) causality of the mechanical law of nature, while, when regarded from the other side, it appears as teleology" (*Wahrheit und Irrthum des Darwinismus*, p. 160). Modern science has often been regarded as fatal to teleology, especially so Darwinism : but not so judges Teichmüller in his *Darwinism and Philosophy*. "The interaction of all the elements presupposes laws which go beyond the existence of each separate element, and embrace all particular things in a unity. Whoever, therefore, assumes any laws of nature whatever, must also assume a system of laws, and must consequently refer the different laws to one ultimate unity or to an ultimate end. Every student of natural science, therefore, if he seeks for laws of nature at all, is inevitably, from that time forward, a teleologist, i.e. he assumes a unity of an ultimate end, from which all laws can be explained, as from the simplest principle."

(6) One of the most interesting personalities of last century as a man of science, who lost, and then recovered, his Christian faith, was Professor Romanes, and this is what he wrote in the *Contemporary Review*, July 1886. (a) "I need scarcely wait to show why it appears to me that the world-object furnishes overwhelming proof of psychism, for this truth has been ably presented by many other writers. There is first the antecedent improbability that the human mind should be the highest manifestation of this subjectivity in this universe of infinite objectivity. There is next the fact that throughout this universe of infinite objectivity – so far at least as human observation can extend – there is unquestionable evidence of some one integrating principle, whereby all its many complex parts are correlated with one another in such wise that the result is universal order. And if we take any part of the whole system – such as that of

organic nature on this planet – to examine in more detail, we find that it appears instinct with contrivance. So to speak, wherever we tap organic nature, it seems to flow with purpose. Assuredly no human mind could either have devised or maintained the working of even a fragment of nature, and, therefore, it seems but reasonable to conclude that the integrating principle of the whole – the Spirit, as it were, of the universe – must be something which, while, as I have said, holding kinship with our highest conception of disposing power, must yet be immeasurably superior to the psychism of man.”

(b) Whewell, in his *History of Scientific Ideas*, in a brief and striking way illustrates the necessary change in the mode of stating the argument from design. “The assertion appears to be quite unfounded that, as science advances from point to point, final causes recede before it, and disappear one after the other. The principle of design changes its mode of application, indeed, but it loses none of its force. We no longer consider particular facts as produced by special interventions, but we consider design as exhibited in the establishment and adjustment of the laws by which particular facts are produced. We do not look upon each particular cloud as brought near to us that it may drop fatness on our fields; but the general adaptation of the laws of heat and air and moisture to the promotion of vegetation does not become doubtful. We do not consider the sun as less intended to warm and vivify the tribes of plants and animals because we find that, instead of revolving around the earth as an attendant, the earth, along with other planets, revolves around *him*. We are rather, by the discovery of the general laws of nature, led into a scene of wider design, of deeper contrivance, of more comprehensive adjustments. Final causes, if they appear driven farther from us by such extension of our views, embrace us only with a vaster and more majestic circuit. Instead of a few threads connecting some detached objects, they become a stupendous network, which is wound round and round the universal frame of things.”¹

(7) Lotze recognises that the teleological argument is not a logical demonstration of the existence of God, but, when conjoined with religious belief, lends a support to it. Dealing with the conception of the “world-aim,” he says :

¹ I cannot now trace the source from which, many years ago, I obtained these two quotations.

"Speculatively it is by no means to be demonstrated ; it continues to be perfectly possible to think of the course of the world as an entirely purposeless, although more or less living, development of the Absolute. But religious feeling has an evidence that the case is not so, and that all the phenomena of inspiration, of adoration, and of the feeling of an obligation to an ideal, are not explicable as casual effects in the development of a purposeless Principle. But if the conception of a supreme aim for the world is once acknowledged, then the other ideas, which form its necessary points of relation, comport with it ; and especially the idea of a personal God, in whose consciousness and will alone this aim, previous to its full accomplishment, can have any actuality by which it becomes effective as guiding principle for the course of the world itself."¹

Eucken insists that man must achieve spirituality subjectively in himself before he can perceive it objectively in the world around : all the human interests are incomplete without, and find their fulfilment in, what he calls universal religion, or *Geistlichkeit*, but this universal religion itself gains its firm footing in the characteristic religion, the personal relation to the personal God. This argument is developed in his book *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*.²

(8) Although Bergson in his *Matter and Memory* seeks to show the difference of mind and matter, and the independence of the one on the other, and in his *Time and Free Will* vindicates human freedom, yet in his *Creative Evolution* he so insists on the spontaneity of the *élan vital* as to reject design. Carr sums up his exposition of Bergson's philosophy in a sentence. "Our arguments have led us to the conclusion that the reality which thinks is not matter but spirit, that in the intuition of life we experience an activity which is free, and that in evolution we have the present fact of a continuous creation." In these works Bergson had refrained from any theistic inference, but Carr goes on to refer to a "Letter of M. Bergson to Father Tonquédec in *Les Études*, February 20, 1912, p. 516," the purport of which he summarises as follows : "There emerges quite clearly and distinctly the idea of a God who creates and who is free, source and generator at once of matter and of life, and whose creative effort is continued from the side of life in the evolution of species and in the constitution of human

¹ *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 114-115.

² See also *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy*, by W. Tudor Jones.

personalities."¹ But the conception of God which results from this philosophy differs from the current theological "God has nothing of the already made ; He is not perfect in the sense that He is eternally complete, that He endures without changing. He is unceasing life, action, freedom."² Bergson would not deny intelligence in the creative evolution ; but only the execution of a programme fixed beforehand. Carr describes this conception as "the final refutation of Calvinism."³ One passage may be quoted in illustration of his position : "If the evolution of life is something other than a series of adaptations to accidental circumstances, so also it is not the realisation of a plan. A plan is given in advance. It is represented, or at least representable, before its realisation. The complete execution of it may be put off to a distant future, or even indefinitely ; but the idea is none the less formulable at the present time in terms actually given. If, on the contrary, evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, it creates, as it goes on, not only the forms of life, but the ideas which will enable the intellect to understand it, the terms which will serve to express it. That is to say that its future overflows its present, and cannot be sketched out therein in an idea. This is the first error of finalism. It involves another, yet more serious. If life realises a plan, it ought to manifest a greater harmony the further it advances, just as the house shows better and better the idea of the architect as stone is set upon stone. If, on the contrary, the unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus that pushes it along the road of time, the harmony is not in front, but behind. The unity is derived from a *vis a tergo* : it is given at the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction. In communicating itself, the impetus splits up more and more." There is not uniform advance, as might be expected if a fixed plan were being carried out. There are deviation, conflict, stagnation, retrogression. "Thence results an increasing disorder. No doubt there is progress, if progress means a continual advance in the general direction determined by a first impulsion ; but this progress is accomplished only on the two or three great lines of evolution on which forms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear ; between these lines run a crowd of minor paths in which, on the contrary, deviations, arrests, and set-backs are

¹ *The Philosophy of Change*, p. 186.

² *Idem*, pp. 187-188.

³ *Idem*, p. 196.

multiplied. . . . We must recognise that all is not coherent in nature. Before the evolution of life, on the contrary, the portals of the future remain wide open. It is a creation that goes on for ever in virtue of an initial movement. This movement constitutes the unity of the organised world – a prolific unity, of an infinite richness, superior to any that the intellect could dream of, for the intellect is only one of its aspects or products.”¹ We can apply to this view the formula *solvitur ambulando*. The spontaneity of life and the liberty of mind are opposed to a predestination by God. The intellect may desire it, but intellect is for Bergson inferior to intuition. “Philosophy,” says Bergson in the last sentence of his book, “is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort; it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and consequently the true continuation of science – provided that we understand by this word a set of truths either experienced or demonstrated, and not a certain new scholasticism which has grown up during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old scholasticism grew up around Aristotle.”² We shall afterwards see that there can be no philosophy, still less theology, which concerns itself only with Becoming, with Time only and not Eternity. Be this as it may, Bergson cannot be cited as an opponent of teleology in a wider sense than that of a rigid divine purpose exactly fulfilled. In his latest work: *Les deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, Bergson becomes more explicit than in his previous writings. He distinguishes the *Closed* Morality of Nature from the *Open* Morality of the *élan vital*, and similarly the *Static* from the *Dynamic* Religion, which is the religion of the mystics, who from love for God become organs of the progressive divine activity. While the attitude to teleology remains the same, yet in one passage he seems to go beyond this when he states that “to the philosopher who applies himself to mystic experience Creation will appear an undertaking of God to create creators, and to enlist the assistance of beings worthy of His love.”³

(9) From the distinctive standpoint of Monism, to which further reference will be made in chapter ix., Bosanquet accepts the principle of teleology, but criticises and modifies

¹ *Creative Evolution*, Eng. trs. pp. 108–110.

² *Idem*, p. 391.

³ See article by Dr. Muirhead in *Hibbert Journal*, October 1932.

the current presentation of it. "It would become apparent that there is a teleology (if the word is to be retained) deeply rooted in the universe, wholly above and beyond any plan or contrivance of a consciousness guiding or directing the universe, but expressing itself, for example, in conjunctions and results of the co-operation of human minds, quite beyond the knowledge and intentions of any of them; and, again, in the character and formations of inorganic nature, altogether below the region of intelligent action, but plainly the foundation of the development to which that action belongs, e.g. as geological to biological evolution. It should be noted that of the lower forms of consciousness at least it is impossible to suggest that they guide organic evolution. It is plain that the guidance comes from the environment, and even if subjective selection assists adaptation, it stands or falls finally by the verdict of natural selection. The conclusion would be that the value of the universe, or its capacity to constitute an experience without defect, lies much deeper than in what is commonly called teleology; which is understood to imply direction by a supreme mind outside or above the universe, and by finite minds within it. The suggestion would be that the universe is, as a whole, self-directing and self-experiencing; that minds (such as ours) are members of it, which play their part, taught and moulded through nature, in the work of direction, and a very essential part in the work of appreciation. But the supreme principle of value and reality would be wholeness, completeness, individuality, and not teleology."¹

(10) Two of the latest statements on this subject may, in closing this historical survey, be cited. (a) Brightman, in his book on *The Problem of God*, finds in the evil and the sin of the world an adequate reason for asserting the finitude of God, such limitation in God as hinders His making His world all He would in His goodness wish it to be – to this question we must return in a later chapter. Nevertheless, he advances a number of reasons for belief in God, and he has himself conveniently summarised them. "The chief evidence for God, as I see it," he says, "may well be summarised under six heads: the evidence of the rationality of the universe, the evidence of the emergence of novelties, the evidence of the nature of personality, the evidence of

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. xxiv.–xxv.

values, the evidence of religious experience, and the evidence of systematic coherence.”¹

(b) The argument of Dr. Tennant’s *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. II., has also been conveniently summarised by a reviewer, Professor W. G. de Burgh. “Dr. Tennant discusses successively six ‘main fields of fact in which adaptation is conspicuous,’² viz. the adaptation of nature to knowledge, of things to thought; the internal adaptedness of organic beings, the problem of their *Zweekmässigkeit ohne Zweck*; the adaptation of the inorganic to the production and maintenance of life; the æsthetic value of nature; the instrumentality of nature to the development of man’s moral life; and finally the inter-adaptiveness of the aforementioned fields of fact as exhibited in the course of emergent evolution, culminating in man as a rational and moral being.” Some of the facts mentioned will be treated in subsequent chapters; now we turn to consider the purpose which can be traced in evolution.

II

(1) More than half a century ago, when I was still a schoolboy, there were, on the one hand, futile attempts to reconcile Genesis and geology, and, on the other hand, violent denunciations of Darwin and his theory of evolution as an assault on the Christian faith. Even Gladstone was drawn into the fray. It was assumed on both sides – the scientific and the theological – that the ideas of evolution and of God were incompatible; that faith must here vanquish science or be itself destroyed. My honoured teacher, Dr. Fairbairn, the value of whom as a pioneer in theology has not been adequately recognised, or at least too soon forgotten, found no such contradiction, as for his thought cosmic evolution was the method of divine creation, and not a substitute for it. For him these were not exclusive alternatives.

*A fine mist and a planet,
A crystal and a cell,
A jelly-fish and a saurian,
And caves where the cavemen dwell.*

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 148.

² *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1930, pp. 616–617.

*Then a sense of law and beauty,
And a face turned from the clod ;
Some call it evolution,
And others call it God.*

(William Herbert Carruth.)

The account Dr. Fairbairn gave in 1877 of the conflict is worth quoting¹: "The scientific and religious conceptions of the world seem to stand at this moment in the sharpest possible antagonism. Their conflict has, indeed, of late been too much a mere platform and pulpit controversy to be a brave and fair facing of the questions and issues. Certain leaders in science with a turn for metaphysics, certain leaders in theology with a turn for science, have become almost intellectual knights-errant, always prancing about the country bellicose and armed, great in challenge and counter-challenge, retort, invective, and innuendo. These passages of arms may easily be overrated. The world's decisive battles have not been fought by careering and trumpeting errant knights. Thinking done in public and embodied in speech now scornful, now pitiful, now minatory, may, while very pat to the times, be deficient in every quality that can command conviction and win respect. But there is one fact we cannot well overrate – the state of conflict or mental schism in which every devout man, who is also a man of culture, feels himself compelled more or less consciously to live. His mind is an arena in which two conceptions struggle for the mastery, and the struggle seems so deadly as to demand the death of the one for the life of the other – faith sacrificed to knowledge or knowledge sacrificed to faith."

(2) There has been a very great change on both sides. Modern biblical scholarship has so altered the view which nearly all cultured men hold as to the purpose and character of the Bible that it is no longer felt necessary to defend its authority in matters which fall properly into the sphere of science. Fundamentalism still survives even among some educated theologians ; and the members of the Churches who have not read or thought in these matters, probably in a vague way still hold the old convictions. Dr. Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham, when he deals with these matters in dispute, is regarded as good copy by the papers, so that one may assume that the theory of evolution is still to be

¹ *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 61–62.

regarded as news, good or bad according to one's preference or prejudice. Nearly forty years ago, soon after I began my ministry, I wrote a series of articles for the *Scottish Congregationalist*, in which I tried to show that the Gospel of the grace of God remained unaffected by modern scientific thought ; and as far as I know I did not suffer in reputation or influence by so doing. It may be taken for granted that Christian theology accepts the theory of evolution as the method of creation.

(3) To a view which would exclude an immanent divine control and guidance of the continuous process, or would drop the activity of God altogether, it must necessarily remain unalterably opposed. Bergson, in describing evolution as *creative*, does not, as we have just seen, exclude divine agency, although greatly modifying the Christian conception of God. Neither does C. Lloyd Morgan, when he speaks of it as *emergent*. The deity of Professor S. Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity* has no resemblance to any object of human belief and worship, and Julian Huxley deifies man. Mr. Middleton Murry has parted from God on better terms than he once expected. To this subject we must return at a later stage of the discussion.¹ At the proper place we must also discuss the question whether Darwin's theory of natural selection substitutes chance for design. On the side of science there has also been a change. The abandonment of the classic physics has left materialism behind as a superseded theory, and also agnosticism as its apologist. It can, with such measure of truth as a generalisation on such a matter can claim, be stated that the physicists, who are studying matters at close quarters, are least inclined to materialism, but biologists and psychologists of eminence are also affirming that neither life nor mind can be explained by matter-in-motion. Some of the most eminent of the former generation seem to have cast a wistful glance over the hedge that they had themselves allowed to grow around their thinking. I may quote two interesting references in an article by Professor Wright² : " In the *Life of Darwin* by his son, we are told of some words spoken by him in the last years of his life to the then Duke of Argyll. The latter had said, with reference to some of Darwin's remarkable scientific work on the fertilisation of orchids and cognate

¹ Alexander and Lloyd Morgan are discussed at the end of this chapter, and Julian Huxley and Middleton Murry in the next.

² *Expository Times*, Vol. XLIII., p. 331.

observations on nature, that it was impossible to look at these without seeing that they were the effect or expression of mind. Darwin looked at the Duke of Argyll very hard and said, 'Well that often comes over me with overwhelming force ; but at other times it seems to go away,' and he shook his head vaguely" (Vol. I., p. 316). The other instance is Herbert Spencer. Herbert Spencer, at the age of seventy-three, in his "Reflections," with which he concluded his *Autobiography*, said : "Among men of science there are those who, curiously examining the spectra of nebulae, or calculating the masses and motions of double-stars, never pause to contemplate under other than physical aspects the immeasurably vast facts they record. But in both cultured and uncultured there occur lucid intervals. . . . By those who know much, more than by those who know little, is there felt the need for explanation" (Vol. III., p. 469). So important is the idea of evolution, not only for science, but also for philosophy and theology, that a general statement about it may be presented.

(4) Since men began to think they have recognised Becoming as well as Being, and have tried to describe the process so far as observation allowed, and even beyond that, as far as speculation would carry them. Lucretius' great poem, *De Natura Rerum*, offers a materialistic theory of evolution. The theory was used in the realm of astronomy before it came to be applied to the sphere of biology. Hegel's system was an exposition of a logical, a cosmical, and a theistic evolution. Sir James Jeans passes from his survey of the starry heavens to his explaining the atom, because in atom as in star there is the same process of change. "Stars are something more than huge inert masses," he says. "They are machines in action, generating and emitting the radiation by which we see them. We shall best understand their mechanism by studying the ways in which radiation is generated and emitted on earth, and this takes us right into the heart of modern physics."¹ In a previous chapter Eddington as well as Jeans were cited to show that the formation of a solar system must be a rare occurrence ; that our solar system may indeed be the solitary instance ; that the conditions which allow for life must be rarer still ; and that Mars as a rival claimant to be a scene of life has been discounted. Can this be accident or is it design ? As regards the beginning and the

¹ *The Universe Around Us*, p. 89.

ending of the cosmic evolution, the evidence available makes "clear that the present matter of the universe cannot have existed for ever; indeed we can probably assign an upper limit to its age of, say, some such round number as 200 million million years. . . . In some way matter which had not previously existed came or was brought into being." Jeans's conclusion is that, if we treat matter, space, and time as a single system, we are brought "very near to these philosophical systems which regard the universe as a thought in the mind of its Creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material creation to futility."¹ As regards the ending of this "show of things," while the first law of thermodynamics might suggest that life could go on for ever, the second law modifies this prospect. "What keeps the varied life of the universe going . . . is the transformation of energy from a more available to a less available form; it is the running downhill of energy."² The end of this progress lies, however, in a remote future. "On the whole, while it has to be admitted that accidents may happen, there seems to be no reason for modifying our round number estimate of a million million years as the probable expectation, in the light of what astronomical knowledge we at present possess, of the future life of the human race on earth."³ Such a forecast leaves an ample prospect for human progress in the fulfilment of divine purpose.

(5) The world is the stage, but life is the drama, and when we speak of evolution we think primarily of life. (a) "The theory of organic evolution," says Dr. D. Starr Jordan, "is, in brief, that in our world no living thing and no succession of living things remain exactly the same for any period of time, long or short; and, furthermore, that all change is *orderly*, never the result of accident or caprice or favouritism. In Huxley's words: 'Nothing endures save the flow of energy and the rational order that pervades it.'"⁴ The characteristics of a living organism are individuality, irritability (that is, reaction on environment), reproduction, metabolism, growth, and evolution. Of the last, "the evolution of living beings or the transmutation of species," the "moulding factors are *heredity, variation, selection, segregation*." The first two are inherent; the one conserves, the other creates divergences. The second two are external influences. "Selection destroys unadapted individuals, and

¹ *The Universe Around Us*, pp. 327, 328.

² *Idem*, p. 319.

³ *Idem*, p. 341.

⁴ *Creation by Evolution*, p. 2.

often, through them, the types or species they represent. Isolation, with its consequent segregation, or prevention of mass-breeding, leads to the separation of minor groups from the original stock by barriers, mainly but not wholly geographical. Selection fits all types to their environment ; it enforces adaptation on all living beings but does not divide them into species. Segregation is the final moulder of species. No sound discussion of species as they exist in nature can ignore geography.”¹ The crux of the teleological problem here is this : are the variations accidental, or in the variation itself is the organism responding to the demands of the environment upon it. The response may be a miss as well as a hit.

(b) The proof of the theory is indirect rather than direct. “Although we do not know of any competent biologists,” says Sir J. Arthur Thomson, “to-day, however sceptical or enquiring he may be who has any doubt as to the fact of organic evolution, yet no one would assert that it can be demonstrated as one might demonstrate the law of gravitation, or the conservation of matter and energy, or the development of a chick out of a drop of living matter on the top of the yolk of the egg. But how can a conclusion be accepted without hesitation if it is not rigorously demonstrable? The answer is that the evolution-idea is a master key which opens all locks into which we can fit it, and that we do not know of a single fact that can be said to be in any way contradictory. Like Wisdom, the evolution-idea is justified of its children.”² There is first of all “the rock record,” which shows “a gradual emergence of finer and nobler forms of life.” The geographical distribution of fauna and flora – the restriction of certain species to different areas – can only be accounted for by such a natural process. The similarities of structure which anatomy discloses, as of “our own arm, a bat’s wing, a whale’s flapper, a horse’s foreleg, a bird’s wing, a turtle’s paddle, a frog’s small arm, and a giant giraffe’s at the other extreme,” are best explained by the evolution-idea. “Another anatomical argument is to be found in the frequent occurrence of vestigial structures in animals and in ourselves” – these are structures which once had a function in the organism at a lower stage of development, but which they have now lost, although they survive as a “dwindled relic.” Old structures, however, do not merely survive ; they may be transformed, e.g. all the parts of a

¹ *Idem*, pp. 6–7.

² *Idem*, pp. 13–14.

flower are "transfigured leaves," or an "elephant's trunk is just a very long nose with an additional piece due to the pulling out of the upper lip." In natural classification we can make "genealogical trees" for varied species, and can trace the transitions from one to another. Even great classes in the animal kingdom show linking types. There is a fossil bird which shows "reptilian features," and "this fossil is unexplainable unless we recognise the fact that this bird had reptilian ancestors." One of the most striking evidences is that of embryology. "The development of the individual is like a condensed recapitulation of the probable evolution of the race." Among plants and animals, even now "the fact of variability is widespread." Man as a breeder or cultivator "is able to produce great changes, for instance, by altering surroundings and food; but he usually has to wait for what the natural fountain of change supplies." "All the facts," says Thomson, "conspire toward the conclusion that animate nature has come to be as it is by a continuous natural process, comparable to that which we can study in the history of domesticated animals and cultivated plants."¹ Of this process there are conflicting explanations, such as the Darwinian and the Lamarckian. Thomson adds three reasons of a wider kind in favour of evolutionism: "(1) The evolution-idea gives the world of animate nature a new unity. (2) It is indeed a sublime picture the evolutionist discloses – a picture of an advancement of life by continuous natural stages, without haste, yet without rest. (3) One of the greatest facts of organic evolution – a fact so great that it is often not realised at all – is that there has not only been increase in complexity, but a growing dominance of mind in life. Animals have grown in intelligence, in mastery of their environment, in fine feeling, in kin-sympathy, in freedom, and in what we may call the higher satisfactions."²

(c) Two considerations may here be added. While life depends on chemical processes and physical conditions, yet it cannot be explained by these. "All life, so far as we know, starts from life, and every living being had some sort of living ancestry moulded by the shifting and sifting of environment."³ And it would seem that in all life there is the mental factor. The response to the environment "rises by degrees to tropism – the tendency to react in a definite manner – and to reflex action, with its specialised derivatives

¹ *Creation by Evolution*, pp. 14–20.

² *Idem*, pp. 20–21.

³ *Idem*, p. 4.

-instinct and intelligence."¹ As regards the first point Ward says emphatically, "There is no physical theory of the origin of life," and "of the origin of life, *if it ever did originate*, we have absolutely no knowledge." We may speculate "in the *terra incognita* between physics and physiology" on the possibility of a transition from mechanical to vital processes. "Meanwhile - and again contrary to expectation - the progress of knowledge, and especially of that systematic reflection concerning knowledge itself as the object of science, the science we call epistemology, instead of making this conjectural transition easier, renders it increasingly hazardous and difficult."² As regards the second point, Ward, after a careful examination of the naturalistic view of life in the lower organisms, which is from there carried forward to the higher - the levelling-down - method, - asserts as more intelligible the levelling-up process. "However we resolve the problem as to the connection of mind and matter, it is then, we may conclude, unquestionably a simplification to infer that wherever a material system is organised for self-maintenance, growth, and reproduction, as an individual in touch with an environment, that system has a psychical as well as a material aspect."³ At this psychic aspect we may now look more closely.

(d) In respect of the organ of mind - the brain - Dr. G. Elliot Smith maintains that "the brain affords evidence in corroboration of man's origin from an ancestor common to man and ape that is too exact and impressive to admit of any doubt as to its significance. By demonstrating that the structures concerned in the highest expressions of human intelligence are already present in the ape's brain, even if they are very diminutive, the study of the brain adds strength to the conviction that the mind as well as the brain has been evolved." He concludes from the evidence

¹ *Idem*, p. 5. ² *Op. cit.*, I., p. 8, pp. 261-262.

³ *Idem*, p. 285. Dr. Bosanquet, in *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, criticises this view, not to deny teleology in the world as a whole, in environment as well as in organism, but to dispute the emphasis on an intrinsic direction of the organism. He rejects pan-psychism, and doubts the presence of mind in the lower organisms where there is no consciousness. The reason for this seems to me to lie in his general philosophical principle that only the Absolute as conforming to the principle of non-contradiction can be regarded as having individuality and value. Hence his depreciation of human personality; it is not an embodied *soul*, but a logical system, distinct from, yet associated with, a neural system, which it uses as its organ. Where there is not in some sense this logical system, we need not assume a "psychical factor" in an organism.

(a) "that these other creatures have the undeveloped germs of a mind similar in kind to man's (one, however, that has definitely lost the power of significant development or further progress of the kind distinctive of man's immediate ancestors), and (b) that both the brain and the mind of man are the results of a long process of development from ancestors common to those of other living creatures having brains of the same essential type."¹ This writer as an anatomist, while admitting divergences, lays stress on resemblances between man and ape; but he does not treat mind as a function of brain, but discusses the brain as "the instrument through which the mind expresses itself and manifests its wonderful versatility."²

(e) Dr. C. Lloyd Morgan, in dealing with mind in evolution, lays stress on its counterpart, dissolution: "Wherever we look we find not only progress, but regress; we find not only building up, but breaking down."³ He describes the threefold aspect of mind as *enjoyment* (negative as well as positive), *objective reference*, and *guidance of action* (feeling, mind, and will), and insists that though we may distinguish them, all three go together. Wherever there is life there is "mind, though it may be a very simple form of mind. It is, then, for the physiologist to tell *his* story in terms of action and reaction under physical influence, and the psychologist to tell *his* story in terms of enjoyment and reference."⁴ There is divergence of opinion on the question whether we may ascribe guidance of behaviour to amoeba and the lowest forms of life. If not, at what stage of evolution does this aspect of mind emerge? We can distinguish a lower unreflective and a higher reflective guidance; but even from the lower we cannot altogether exclude some prospective objective reference. "Does not all guidance," asks he, "imply some measure of reference to future events rendered present in expectancy, however shortsighted?"⁵ Behind mind in evolution this author recognises the presence and certainty of God. "Many thinkers to-day are convinced that only in the light shed by the concept of evolution does the full richness of Divine Purpose, as thus manifested, appeal to some at least of those in whom a spiritual attitude toward God has itself been evolved."⁶ For him emergence means something new appearing in the process; but this is no explanation. "The whole story of nature's inherent

¹ *Creation by Evolution*, pp. 324-325.

² *Idem*, p. 314.

³ *Idem*, p. 344.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 349.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 350.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 352.

constructiveness is the story of emergent 'just-comery,' each item of which we accept just as it comes, without further question, *so long as we keep within the domain of scientific interpretation.*" But this does not exclude the other interpretation — that the emergent is also the creative.¹ He confesses for himself that belief in God implies "*reference to God as object of spiritual contemplation ; guidance of conduct in the light of this reference ; joy in attaining such ends as are deemed to be consonant with Divine Purpose.*"²

(f) In view of the disbelief in progress which is sometimes voiced even by Christian thinkers, it is noteworthy that Professor Julian S. Huxley contributes to this volume a chapter entitled "Progress shown in Evolution." In the evolution of animals there has been not only increase in size, but also increase in efficiency. There has been specialisation, improvement in one direction at the cost of the possibility of improvement in another. "We usually say that parasites are degenerate, because we note their striking loss of organs and faculties, but they are only particular examples of specialisation, with, as usual, elaboration and improvement in one direction and loss in others." This loss, however, is not inevitable. "There are examples of evolutionary improvement which are all round, or balanced, and do not deprive their possessors of their previous plasticity. For instance, the change from cold-bloodedness to warm-bloodedness in vertebrates was such a change."³ There has been an animal ascent in such balanced advance. Should this be called progress? Huxley maintains that we can speak of biological progress. "There are very few," he says, "who will not admit that these biological improvements, which have made for survival and success in evolution, are not also improvements when judged by our human standards of value. We, too, strive for control over nature and for greater independence of outer conditions ; we value harmony ; we prize knowledge and all the products (when balanced) of increased intensity of emotion and will."⁴ His answer to the objection that this human valuation is "a mere reasoning in a circle" is this : "The only reason why we find that the direction of biological progress coincides so closely with much of our own ideas of progress and value is that man happens to be in the main stream of biological progress, not in an eddy or backwater."⁵

¹ See *Mind at the Crossways*, pp. 18, 209.

² *Creation by Evolution*, p. 353.

³ *Idem*, p. 331.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 335.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 337.

(g) The tendency in the new psychology to minimise the difference between man and the lower animals does not receive support in this volume. Dr. G. Elliot Smith, while asserting the similarity amid divergence of the human brain and that of the ape, admits that "we would seem to have some excuse for regarding men, endowed with such unique powers of intellect and sentiment, as being fundamentally different from all other living creatures. Hence it is not surprising that the suggestion has found expression, even among such believers in evolution as, for example, Darwin's famous collaborator Wallace, that the mind is a distinctively human attribute, something that is lacking in other animals, the possession of which by man puts him in a class by himself." Using the dog as an illustration of intelligence, he insists that "the dog is endowed with intelligence, which differs from man's intelligence not so much in its essential qualities as in its degrees – in the range of the understanding which it confers."¹ This claim to continuity need not be challenged, so long as it is not used to degrade man, or to deny his uniqueness. The degree of difference is so great that it amounts really to an essential change, an emergence of something strangely and wonderfully new.

(6) None of the accounts of evolution in this volume excludes purpose, or even divine direction. And one of the greatest naturalists, the charm of whose writings has given him a deserved popularity – Sir J. Arthur Thomson – has recently published a book on *Purpose in Evolution* (*Riddell Memorial Lectures*). The first of the three lectures deals with purpose in evolution.² Recognising that "science does not enquire into ultimate purpose," he maintains that "the general idea of purpose is legitimate in scientific enquiry, and cannot be dispensed with." In human activities and those of the higher animals purpose is evident. Instinctive action is so foreign to man's experience, that it is more difficult here to discern purpose. Behind the apparent automatisations, may there not be a long history of endeavour? If there is no purposefulness, may we not speak of instinctive purposiveness? Even in simpler organisms, the concept of purpose seems to be necessary to explain their behaviour. "Thus we reach the idea, obvious but often ignored, that insurgent organisms share in their own evolution, not in the sense of making towards a racial ideal, for man alone is fit

¹ *Creation by Evolution*, p. 314.

² This also appears in *Philosophy*, Vol. VI., pp. 153-165.

for that, but in the sense of endeavouring to make the most of things and to express themselves in obedience to the universal urge of life – *the urge for more* ; more food, more room, more light, more love, more life. Life in evolution is interpenetrated with Purpose ! ”¹ No less necessary is the teleological idea in physiology and embryology. “ The physiologist, even if mechanist, must start with recognising the organism as teleological. Those who are fond of the risky machine analogy in physiology must admit that it does not become easier in embryology. For the embryo-machine makes itself as it goes on, often takes itself in part or whole to bits, and begins again, and often lays down before it finishes with itself a stock of little machines for the next season’s sales.”² So do the adaptations in organisms indicate purpose. “ All complex organisms are bundles of fitnesses, and it is worth re-reading Darwin’s account of the numerous mutual adaptations of bee and orchis, partly to realise afresh what a eloquent fact adaptation is, and partly to notice that Darwin found it a little difficult not to talk like Paley.” Although when the Darwinian theory was first formulated, the impression given was that chance took the place of design in the variations, which by natural selection secured the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence ; “ yet,” says Thomson, “ to use the word ‘ chance ’ nowadays in its popular sense in this connection is a verbal fallacy. There is very little fortuity in variation, and almost none in Natural Selection, which sifts those saying Shibboleth from those saying Sibboleth.”³ These evidences of purpose in evolution are held to justify a positive answer to the philosophical question, “ Does Organic Evolution express a Purpose ? ” There is orderliness and beauty in nature. The earth, so far as our knowledge goes, is unique in providing the conditions which make life possible ; the inorganic world seems to be a preparation for the organic, and the lower stages of organic evolution appear as a preparation for the higher. “ Broad foundations were laid which made a lofty superstructure possible.”⁴ The objection has been made that the evolution has been so circuitous that the course to the goal has not been straight ; yet the long-drawn struggle has been throughout marked by “ the progressive victory of spirit over matter.” There has been “ a series of progressive syntheses, which allow of novel expressions of the richness inherent in

¹ *Idem*, p. 155.

² *Idem*, pp. 157–158.

³ *Idem*, pp. 156–157.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 161.

reality.”¹ “We think,” says this man of science, “of Evolution too unimaginatively. We do not, for instance, sufficiently realise the teleological interest of great trends that are, as it were, anticipatory of man’s higher values – the true, the beautiful, and the good. For there are prolonged pre-human trends in favour of nimble wits, clear-headedness, and facing the facts; also trends in favour of beauty and its appreciation; also trends in favour of the primary virtues like courage and affection. T. H. Huxley notwithstanding, we discern a momentum in animal evolution which is in a line with man’s most progressive movements.”² If man is, as he appears to be, the Climax of Creation, on him rests the responsibility to carry on the purpose. “We must study the tactics so that we may share more fully in the realisation of the strategy.”³

(7) Two books dealing with Evolution as Emerged may at this stage be discussed, Professor S. Alexander’s *Space, Time, and Deity*, and Professor C. Lloyd Morgan’s *Emergent Evolution*. They have many resemblances, but differ as regards their conclusion.

(a) The first book in expounding an epistemology constructs an ontology; it presents an “emergent evolution,” of which God is not the ultimate cause or even the final purpose, as He emerges in the stream of time, and may seemingly be there also submerged. Although the creative principle of the world is Space-Time, yet Time seems to be the predominant partner. While for experience Time and Space are distinguished, yet in this metaphysic they are mutually necessary to constitute this creative principle. As in man mind is related to body, so is Time to Space, although the analogy is not complete. The one is the *dynamic*, the other the *static* aspect. Space corresponds with the category of substance, and time with the category of causality. Time as temporal only would be a mere instant. Space as spatial only would be a blank. The first book of Vol. I. (pp. 35–180) is devoted to the exposition of this dual conception, Space-Time, as not only the beginning, but as the essence of all existents. Able as is the exposition of this section, I must confess it is to me entirely unconvincing as a basis for the evolution of the universe. Professor C. Lloyd

¹ *Philosophy*, Vol. VI., p. 162.

² *Idem*, p. 163. Cf. with the above statement Henry Drummond’s *The Ascent of Man*.

³ *Idem*, p. 165.

Morgan, who is in substantial agreement as regards the later stages of the evolution, here expresses his dissent, in my judgment too modestly. In comparing his own exposition of *Emergent Evolution* he says: "Much more modest is the constructive scheme which the more limited range and penetration of my speculative insight permits me to entertain. I seek in vain for evidence that spatio-temporal relatedness does exist apart from physical events. I can pierce no deeper than events which, in their primordial form, are not only spatio-temporal, but physical also. Furthermore, while I acknowledge the flow of physical events, subject always to spatio-temporal relatedness, I doubt whether the concept of the fluency of time, on which so much turns, will stand the test of philosophical criticism."¹ When such an abstract conception as Space-Time is presented, what at once suggests itself as a concrete instance of the combination of the conditions of time and space is motion. I find some ambiguity in the exposition. Motion sometimes appears in Dr. Alexander's exposition as the first product of Space-Time, and sometimes as identical with it. "Space-Time or Motion."² To have begun with Motion would seem to me a more plausible course. It is conjectured that there may have been a mode of motion, from which the atom, at which physics stops, emerged.³ Book II. in Vol. I. (pp. 183-347) deals with the Categories, "the fundamental features, which belong to every existent generated within the universe of Space-Time."⁴ These categories are pervasive of all reality, not, as Kant thought, "because they are due to mind, but because they are fundamental properties of Space-Time."⁵ Into this subtle but not always convincing exposition we need not now enter.

(b) The second volume deals with emergent evolution. Book III. (pp. 1-338) discusses *the Order and Problems of Empirical Existence*. As a condescension to traditional philosophical habit, chapter i. (pp. 1-37) discusses the subject of knowledge, although "mind" is regarded as a comparatively late arrival in a hitherto mindless universe. The two current hypotheses of consciousness as an epiphenomenon and of psycho-physical parallelism are both on good grounds rejected; so also is *Animism*, the belief in a soul distinct from, however intimately related to, body. Although

¹ *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 23-24.

² *Op. cit.*, II., p. 428.

³ *Idem*, p. 53.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 428.

⁵ *Idem*, pp. 186-189.

mind is recognised as "something new in life," in other words, as an emergent *quality*, yet an identity of mental and neural processes is insisted on. To my mind there is an inconsistency here. If mind is different enough from life to be described as "new," is there only identity? We are permitted to speak of an interaction of mind and brain "*under a certain proviso*. . . . The proviso under which such language is permissible is that no brain process should be understood to cause its corresponding mental process and no mental process its corresponding brain process."¹ On the ground of this identity the author rejects the theory of the unconscious mental processes, and affirms that these are "purely physiological." How we know physical objects is discussed at a later stage; but in this chapter also he maintains that our "apprehension of other minds" is not "acquired by analogy but direct experience," in virtue of man's instinctive sociality. Elsewhere he admits that this experience is supplemented by analogy.

(c) The qualities which experience apprehends – primary, secondary, or tertiary ("values") – are all emergent, something new, inexplicable by what went before, and yet identical, as mind is with life and life with matter. Mind even is a form of Time, and not Time a form of mind, for Time is the generator of all qualities. That matter, as the physicist knows it, is to be distinguished as an emergent from mere motion as "a distinctive constellation of motion" is assumed. Its primary qualities are size, shape, number, motion. From them may be distinguished, mass, inertia, and energy as the distinctive features of materiality. As regards the apprehension of primary qualities, touch is held to be superior to the other senses: and materiality is "apprehended in the sensation of resistance offered to our bodies."² As are the categories so are the primary qualities apprehended by intuition; the secondary qualities are contemplated, and the mind cannot become an object to itself; it can only be enjoyed. The secondary qualities are objective, not subjective, they are not mental, produced by the mind, for the mind only contemplates; they result from the compresence of the object and the organism. All mind does or can do is to select among the objects compresent with it, and in this selection it is manifestly determined by the neural processes, which, as the later account of freedom shows, are also determined. The relation of knowing is not

¹ *Op. cit.*, II., p. 12.

² *Idem*, p. 158.

as unique as philosophy has often represented it as being, for minds are finite existents among others, and have relations with them as the others have with one another. As a response to objects mind is made up of conations, "cognition is an arrested conation"; feeling, the third element, is dismissed, as it is parasitical, pain accompanying frustrated, pleasure successful conation.

(d) If the mind of Professor Alexander is only what he represents "minds" as being, it is surprising that he should advance so confident an interpretation of reality, for mind on his showing would seem to be incompetent for such an adventure. Other parts of this volume indicate sufficiently how completely I must reject his estimate of "mind"; and the section of this book dealing with an idealist realism may be taken as a rejection of the realism which regards mind as passive even in perception, for the perception of an object is there shown to be an event, with psychical as well as physical and organic factors. With such a view of the insignificance of mind it is surprising that the author should devote a long chapter (pp. 236-314) to the Values of Truth, Goodness, Beauty. While the Secondary Qualities are not at all mental, although mind is conscious of them, these Tertiary Qualities "arise from the amalgamation of mind with objects," and these "appreciations arise from the community of minds"; the standards are a social product. While there is much that is admirable in the discussion of these values, yet the chapter closes with what to many must appear an anti-climax. The values must not be taken as clues to reality. They are but "incidents (though of the highest interest for us, outside the religious interest) in the empirical growth of things within what is really the primary reality of Space-Time."¹ In accordance with this estimate of values is the account given of freedom. "Freedom is nothing but the form which causal action assumes when both cause and effect are enjoyed; so that freedom is determination as enjoyed or in enjoyment, and human freedom is a case of something universal which is found wherever the distinction of enjoyment and contemplation, in the widest sense of those terms, is found."²

(e) Book IV. in Vol. II. (pp. 341-429) deals with Deity in three aspects or relation, that is, with God, the Religious Sentiment, and Value. In accordance with the scheme of Emergent Evolution "deity is the next higher empirical

¹ *Idem*, p. 314.

² *Idem*, p. 315.

quality than mind," and God is the universe as possessing deity ; but God is not actual. "The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual. The individual so sketched is not asserted to exist ; the sketch merely gives body and shape, by a sort of anticipation for the actual infinite God whom, on the basis of experience, speculation declares to exist. As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity but is the universe as tending to that quality, this *nisus* in the universe, though not present to sense, is yet present to reflection upon experience. Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God."¹ Professor C. Lloyd Morgan quotes a statement by Professor Alexander from *Mind*, xxx., p. 428. "God as actually possessing deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming ; but God as the whole universe tending towards deity does exist."² On this he comments : "According to the second part of this statement, with its ring of Spinoza, God, as Being, is the *nisus* of the universe, pressing onwards to levels as yet unattained ; or, as I should prefer to say, is the *nisus* directive of the course of events. With regard to the first part, the crucial question arises whether, and if so in what sense, such an ideal is veritably real." Regarding this reference to Spinoza, it should be pointed out that for him God was eternal Being ; for Professor Alexander, God is constant Becoming. I have no hesitation in answering the crucial question that such an ideal is in no sense real as religion needs and affirms God's reality. Quite vain, therefore, is the attempt of the next chapter to represent this deity as adequate to satisfy the religious sentiment. A God who did not make man, but is being made by man, in so far as he actualises in his progress this *nisus*, is not an object of worship. Spencer's Unknowable would be a preferable substitute. I agree with Dr. Clement C. J. Webb when he says that "the religious consciousness demands, not merely a prospective, but an actual God, already possessing all to which we can aspire."³ Professor Alexander admits that he has had little experience of the religious sentiment, and does not claim to be a competent theologian. The confession is quite unnecessary. In the last chapter, on the relation of Deity and Value, religion is said to be no outgrowth from morality, and deity is pronounced to be a quality and not a value, and yet is held to be on the side of goodness. But then follows a curious statement : "Value is in the above

¹ *Op. cit.*, II., p. 361.² *Op. cit.*, p. 34.³ *God and Personality*, p. 203.

sense conserved in deity. But withal we have to recognise that, not in deity, but in God, unvalues also are contained ; not merely badness and ugliness and error, but in the end all impermanent forms of finite occurrence."¹ The universe may be called God, because it has this ideal nisus-deity, but God as identical with the universe includes all existents, values, and unvalues. It is not surprising that in view of the insignificance of mind, the dependence of mind on body, the unreality of God in any sense religion can recognise, individual immortality is denied, and what has been called a posthumous immortality is preferred. "That wish of continued existence may be replaced, and perhaps with greater humanity, by resigning our work to others, as we are accustomed to do here, when occasion demands."² "In the hierarchy of qualities," he concludes, "the next higher quality to the highest attained is deity. God is the whole universe engaged in process towards the emergence of this new quality, and religion is the sentiment in us that we are drawn towards Him, and caught in the movement of the world to a higher level of existence."³ This *sounds* more theistic than, in view of what has gone before, it *means*. All it can mean is that there is a progressive tendency in an evolution of which, if these be any creative principle, not God, but Space-Time is the ultimate cause, essential reality, final purpose – all that religion calls God. In my judgment, this empirical metaphysics is the *reductio ad absurdum*, when it attempts to deal with God, of the realism which does not give to mind as the subject of knowledge and action the place which morality and religion accord to it, and idealist philosophy has allowed. It is a courageous, confident, and exceptionally able attempt to achieve the impossible.

(f) Much more attractive and congenial to me is the volume already referred to, *Emergent Evolution*, by Professor C. Lloyd Morgan. His standpoint is clearly indicated in the following sentences : "The question arises whether such scientific or naturalistic interpretation suffices, or whether some further supra-naturalistic explanation is admissible at the bar of philosophy, not as superseding, but as supplementing the outcome of scientific enquiry. I shall claim that it is admissible, and that there is nothing in emergent evolution which purports to be strictly naturalistic that precludes an acknowledgment of God. This implies (1) that a constructive philosophy is more than science, and (2)

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 419.

² *Idem*, p. 423.

³ *Idem*, p. 429.

that such acknowledgment is here to be founded on philosophical considerations only."¹ Even from the standpoint of science evolution must be regarded as emergent; the new is more and something higher than the old; while the old is *involved* in the new, matter in the living organism, the living organism in mind, the old for the distinctive character it acquires is *dependent* on the new. His comprehensive scheme runs thus:

"C. Mind (with physical correlates).

B. Life (with psychical correlates).

A. Matter (with psychical correlates)." ²

At no stage is the process mindless; at the highest stage comes consciousness. Mind has thus a much larger place, and plays a much more important part in this philosophy than in Alexander's. Lloyd Morgan distinguishes the subject and the object of knowing as *minding* and *minded*, and the minded no less than the minding is within the person — "within that entity which is both body and mind." . . . "There are physical things existent in their own right outside us in a non-mental world," and "the properties which render them objective in mind are projiciently referred to these things."³ We need not here reproduce the discussion of the method by which there is this projection of the qualities to things in space. This projicience he adopts instead of the assumption of a direct apprehension of things by the mind. "On my view the mind is captain in the conning-tower of the bodily ship. It knows only such messages as come in from the world of battle around the ship. And the mind never gets outside its conning-tower of vision save through projicience."⁴ This too is a realism, but it accepts more fully the psychic as well as the physical and organic factor in perception. The author recognises that the scheme of naturalistic interpretation is incomplete, and as regards the *Activity*, without which the process cannot be completely conceived, must be supplemented. While such an activity cannot be proved by naturalistic science, the "acknowledgment" which Lloyd Morgan feels himself compelled to make does not contradict any positive evidence. "I acknowledge God," he says, "as the *nisus* through whose activity emergents emerge, and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed."⁵ More fully is his position stated in the words, "This Ideal within the human person but

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 2. ² *Idem*, p. 27. ³ *Idem*, p. 50.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 50-51. ⁵ *Idem*, p. 36.

Transcendent of his human level of deity is God – completing the scheme of relatedness from above. But in and through Activity, universal from base to apex of the whole emergent pyramid, God is no less Immanent. Substantial to all the substantial togetherness which suffices for naturalistic treatment is the planful Activity in and through which its stuff has being and is held together. It is on this relating Activity in Substance that the schoolmen insisted ; it is this that T. H. Green emphasised as the unifying Principle.”¹ He admits that he can form no adequate conception of God “in isolation from the world,”² and yet he acknowledges God “as also above and beyond.” Most remarkable of all is his admission of the possibility of Incarnation. “If an impartial historical survey should lead to the conclusion that the nisus towards deity has culminated in one unique individual, there is, so far as I can see, nothing in the naturalistic interpretation of emergent evolution which precludes the acceptance of this conclusion.”³ The realism of emergent evolution need not be opposed to theism, and even Christian theism.

(8) This section may be closed with the words of a great astronomer. Having contrasted the *mechanical* view of the world favoured by science thirty years ago with the tendency of to-day, which begins to see the universe more like a great thought than like a great machine, Jeans states : “We discover that the universe shows evidence of a designing or controlling power that has something in common with our own individual minds – not, so far as we have discovered, emotion, morality, or æsthetic appreciation, but the tendency to think in the way which, for want of a better word, we describe as mathematical.”⁴ This is the view of God which the approach through physics and astronomy yields ; but there are other approaches, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. This chapter, we may confidently claim, has proved sufficiently a directive and controlling mind in the universe – a conclusion which the doctrine of evolution in no way disproves, although it has imposed a new mode of statement. We may claim that the universe is sufficiently intelligible to allow us to offer such an interpretation, even if, as science confesses, our knowledge leads us to an *impasse* at times. But so often has the mind of man

¹ *Idem*, p. 209. ² *Idem*, p. 299. ³ *Idem*, p. 31.

⁴ *The Mysterious Universe*, pp. 148–149.

triumphed over such difficulties that the quest can be hopefully pursued. Again we admit the existence of the ugly, the noxious, the seemingly useless and wasteful in the world – evil in manifold forms of pain and sin – but the facts which challenge do not destroy the conviction of divine purpose. As moral considerations and religious must enter into any attempt to find a solution of this problem, the treatment must be reserved for the subsequent chapter on “Theodicy.” Then shall we be in a more favourable position to consider the question – which it would be premature to discuss here – What is the relation of the divine mind to the orderliness of inanimate nature, to the adaptations in the organic sphere, to instinct in the lower animals, and to intelligence in the higher animals, and most of all to man? The uniformity of nature, the spontaneity of life, the liberty of mind – all these manifestations of mind in the world raise many questions regarding God’s immanent activity in His world. The manifestation of God is supremely in the human reason, theoretical, practical, æsthetic, and we may add spiritual, man’s relation to God Himself. We have been concerned in the previous chapters with reason theoretical : in the next we pass to reason practical.

CHAPTER V

ETHICS

(1) As has already been indicated, one of the important recent contributions to epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and, through it, to ontology (the theory of reality) is the doctrine of values. In the world around us there are *facts*, and they are related to one another by the principle of *causality* (cosmology), but these facts on closer study disclose that they have *values*, so that facts are related to one another as *means* to *ends* (teleology). In other words, besides the causal interpretation of reality, there is the final; the first looks backward to the beginning, the second forward to the end. Because the science of a previous generation insisted on looking backwards only, like Lot's wife, it became petrified in an altogether inadequate view of nature and man, and of the higher interests of life – a pillar of salt, to complete the analogy. Lotze related his theory of value to man's life, his sense of good or evil; Ritschl applied it to the content of faith; but it has, in more recent philosophy, been more widely applied to the human ideals generally. The objection urged against the theory, especially as presented by the Ritschlian school, was that it substituted subjective estimation for objective reality. But this was to misunderstand and misrepresent this school, as I have elsewhere, I hope, conclusively shown.¹ It seems to me, however, that the conception of value is of universal application and should not be restricted to human values, although here these values present themselves as ideals to be realised, duties to be done. We may say that, wherever ends are fulfilled, values appear (negative if the ends do not properly belong to the order of the world, the purpose of life). Whenever a fact subserves a fact of a higher order, is a mean towards it as end, there is value. Thus life is dependent on water, and the chemical formula for the molecule of water is H_2O , two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen; in this combination lies the value of oxygen and hydrogen. So physical, psychological, and probably psychical factors are

¹ *The Ritschlian Theology*, 2nd ed., pp. 161–193, 407–414, and *The Christian Certainty amid the Modern Perplexity*, pp. 230–278.

the necessary conditions of the *sensa* – colour, sound, taste, smell – which have, as we have seen, an indispensable function in the preservation and protection of life, guiding the organism, as it were, in receiving or rejecting what its environment offers. Here is the value of these complex conditions. Instinct in the lower animals, intelligence in the higher, as securing the self-preservation, self-development, and self-propagation of life are values also. As human personality is more complex than any animal existence, the human reason presents ideals for realisation, and, in the measure that they are realised, these become values *in* human personality, and, as it is self-conscious, *for* it, and, as it is free, *by* it. There is value in the fulfilment of function by any part within the whole of reality.

(2) The human values are generally restricted to the three, *truth, beauty, goodness*; but I am in agreement with Croce that we should add another, *utility*. He places economic along with ethical activity as exercises of the practical reason, even as æsthetic and logical are of the theoretical reason. Only a living man can apprehend truth, appreciate beauty, actualise goodness; hence the protection, preservation, or promotion of life is a duty, and so has a value. This is usually recognised as a moral obligation; while self-sacrifice for an adequate reason is commended, suicide is condemned, including the self-neglect which imperils life; still more is the duty of caring for the life of others insisted on. In view of this recognition, it would seem to me desirable expressly to recognise the distinction of utility, as relating to man as a vital organism, from goodness, as concerned with the *quality* of human personality in the individual, and in all his social relations. If we restrict morality in our thinking to the realisation of the ideal of goodness, we must include in goodness, as excellence of personal quality, the pursuit of truth, and the quest of beauty, as well as the conquest of that personal quality. The good man in the fullest sense of the word will seek truth, enjoy, or as artist achieve, beauty; but we must recognise that these ideals have not the absolute authority of goodness.¹ The realisation of human personality in all its values will

¹ Leonard Nelson, in his posthumous work, *Ethik und Pädagogik*, recognises this difference: "In so far as the realisation of an ideal has an objective and, indeed, positive value, we can say that every ideal sets an aim for an action, to attain which is our task, without its being our duty to reach that aim. We call such a task, in contrast with the categorical imperative of duty, a categorical optative" (pp. 199, 200).

include all four ends mentioned. That there is a subordination of values is generally recognised. A man may be called to surrender material wealth for personal worth ; happiness may be a sacrifice on the altar of holiness. So, while to think and to speak truly is a moral obligation, a man may find that other claims upon him must have the preference to the pursuit of truth generally ; most bread-winners cannot afford to be scientists, historians, philosophers, or theologians. It is desirable that æsthetic appreciation, and even creativeness, should be as widespread as possible, yet the exigencies of life make the connoisseur or artist a *rara avis*. The quality of personal character and social institutions is the primary obligation in morality, even although in the wide sense it does embrace the realisation of all the ideals, and not only that of goodness. If values are recognised and realised by man in relation to nature (including all living beings), his fellow-men, and himself, is there not a value to be recognised and realised in the widest and highest of all relations, that to God ? Religion, too, should be included in the ideals and values, as indeed the supreme, for it is concerned with the essential reality, the ultimate cause, the final purpose. To receive the gifts and to respond to the claims of God must also be reckoned a moral obligation, giving to the word morality its most extended sense. In the preceding chapters we have been concerned with man's pursuit of truth. In the next chapter we shall turn to his quest of beauty, and, in the chapter following, his relation to God. In this chapter we shall confine ourselves to morality in the narrower sense – the conquest of goodness – and its bearing on the belief in God.

I

(1) The distinctive feature of morality may be expressed in these words, *duty*, *liberty*, and *responsibility*. It does not state what is ; it judges what ought to be. It is the *quality* of the action, and of the character which the conduct expresses, with which it is concerned. It pronounces conduct *right* or *wrong*, character *good* or *bad*. There are thus two standards of judgment, which can ultimately be resolved into one ; but to this contrast and its reconciliation we must return after examining the other terms. There could not be any such judgment were the action inevitable, a necessary

consequent of fixed antecedents. Puppets or machines are morally neither right nor wrong in their movements, good or bad in their constitution. Only persons can be morally judged ; in other words, duty implies liberty. Kant insists on this ; and accordingly one of the postulates of the practical reason is freedom ; in the phenomenal world the principle of causality applies to all occurrences, events, or actions ; in the noumenal world man chooses, wills, and acts freely. It is not necessary for the purpose of this volume to discuss the question of freedom. Only two observations may be offered. The solution of the problem does not lie either in *determinism* (the determination of the will by the strongest motive) or *indeterminism* (volition without motive), but in *self-determination* (the motive of the choice being the desire with which the self identifies itself as its good). It would be unwise in the advocacy of human liberty to snatch as a support the principle of indeterminacy even in the atom, which has, as we have already seen, been recognised in recent physics, as it has not found universal acceptance, and many men of science still hope to find an explanation of this apparent breach in the order of causality. The moral consciousness need not wait anxiously for the permission of physics to bear its own witness to freedom. Where there is liberty, there also is *responsibility*. Man as the author of his own conduct and character is held accountable to himself, to society, and to God for the use or the abuse of his freedom to make or mar himself. He has merit for right conduct, good character ; demerit for wrong conduct, bad character ; he deserves reward or punishment ; he can approve or condemn his own action, be praised or blamed by others. As only the self-deceived Pharisee can suppose that he is, or does, all he ought, moral self-satisfaction is excluded, even if some parts of life are approved. Self-condemnation, when it leads to amendment, is repentance ; when there is no such hope, to remorse.

(2) This brief analysis of the moral consciousness must suffice as a starting-point for the discussion in this chapter. But the two standards of judgment must be further examined, as the ethical proof of the existence of God can be based on the one or the other.

(a) The contrast *right* and *wrong* indicates a conception of morality as in accordance with or contrary to a rule, law, or principle. This is the more prevalent and obvious conception ; here the stress lies on conscience commanding or

prohibiting. Teachers and preachers have used eloquent (not to say grandiloquent) language about conscience as the voice of God within. But the fact cannot be stated quite so simply, if we have any regard for the history of human morals. That every man has a capacity for moral judgment must be asserted, but the content is not so directly inspired from heaven as is often assumed. To begin with, morality is acceptance of tribal custom, conceived as having the sanction of the tribal god ; and the individual moral capacity does not go beyond recognition of the authority of the tribe thus to regulate the individual life. The sense of blood-kinship is the moral cement of early society. But moral progress depends on individual tribesmen with keener moral insight looking beyond the moral routine, and by their influence securing an advance on the customary morality. If successful in "getting over" and "putting through" this fresh view, the individual proves a reformer ; if not, he may become a martyr, as was Socrates. He did not claim the authority of revelation, but only of reason, for the advance he advocated. But more usually it is as a prophet that the reformer appears – that is, he claims divine authority for the moral demands which he makes. Moses spoke in the name of Yahveh, and so did the prophetic succession. Jesus spoke as Son knowing the Father. Paul believed himself to have the mind of Christ. Thus there are three stages : tribal custom, individual conscience, divine revelation.¹ In the development of morals itself is found this transition from man to God ; the moral proof is implicit in all morality which is closely allied with religion. Before developing this proof explicitly, we must look at the other basis, that which is indicated by the contrast good or bad.

(b) These terms are evidently of wider application than the terms right or wrong ; they are not confined to morality ; we may speak of a good or bad cake, a good or bad picture, or good or bad argument ; the standards of utility, beauty, and truth, as well as of goodness, can be thus applied. But here we are concerned with the terms only in their moral application. What these terms point to is not a rule, law, or principle, but an end or purpose, and this is the Good, or

¹ Kant excluded the theistic reference in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, and insisted on the autonomy of the moral consciousness. To regard moral obligations as divine commands, as religion does, is, in his view, a condescension to human imperfection. We may add, to regard moral obligations merely as divine commands, with no personal assent to them as in themselves right or good, is Pharisaic legalism and not Christian morality.

the Highest Good (the *Summum Bonum*), however we may conceive it. This Highest Good includes all the values, utility, beauty, truth, as well as goodness, but goodness is not only a means to it as end, but a part, an essential part, of it ; the law, rule, principle, is an essential constituent of the end or purpose. From the standpoint of religion, God is the supreme value, the Highest Good, inclusive of all others. Rigorist as Kant was in his ethical theory, even he had to recognise the Good as an end. This he does in dealing with the existence of God as a postulate of pure practical reason. "In the foregoing analysis the moral law led to a practical problem which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and principal element of the *summum bonum*, viz. morality ; and, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of *immortality*. The same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the *summum bonum*, viz. happiness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial reason ; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect ; in other words, it must postulate the *existence of God*, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum* (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason)." ¹ Reason demands that holiness shall have adequate opportunity for complete development, and also that happiness shall be brought into an enduring accord with holiness. This theistic argument is built on far too narrow a basis, as man has many more and better reasons for believing in God. Recalling Carlyle, we may ask whether *happiness*, in the narrow, low sense in which the term is often used, need be regarded as the necessary element of the Highest Good, and whether we should not rather speak of *blessedness*. Kant himself, in his note, supplies the correction. "In this progress which, though it is directed to a goal infinitely remote, yet is in God's sight regarded as equivalent to possession, he may have a prospect of a *blessed* future ; for this is the word that reason employs to designate perfect *well-being* independent of all contingent causes of the world, and which, like *holiness*, is an idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is

¹ *Critique of Practical Reason*, Book II., chapter ii., section 5, as translated in Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, pp. 220-221.

never fully attained by a creature." The problem which Kant here raises may be stated in the form of a question. Is there not only a moral witness within a man, but is there also a moral order in the world around, in nature and history? Do the stars in their courses fight against Sisera? (Judges v. 20.) Is there no peace for the wicked? (Isa. xlvi. 22.) Does the righteous by his fidelity live? (Hab. ii. 4.) Do all things work together for good to those who love God? (Rom. viii. 28.) Are moral values conserved in the natural order? An affirmative answer to the question does confirm the belief in God, for it shows that the final purpose, as disclosed in the Highest Good, is also the ultimate cause of reality.

(3) The whole history of a religious morality is a witness to the existence of God; but we may now consider a few instances of an explicit argument. "Raymond of Sebond," says Dr. Flint,¹ "was perhaps the first to present it in a more artificial form. He argues thus: man is a responsible being who can neither reward nor punish himself, and who must consequently be under a superior being who will reward and punish him, unless his life is to be regarded as vain and purposeless – unless even the whole of external nature, which is subject to man, and exists for his sake, is to be pronounced aimless and useless. External nature, however, is seen to be throughout orderly and harmonious; how can we suppose the moral world to be disorderly, and chaotic? As the eye corresponds to things visible, the ear to things audible, the reason to things intelligible, so conscience must correspond to a judgment which implies someone to pronounce it, and a retribution which implies someone to inflict it. But this someone must be absolutely just; he must be omniscient, as possessing a perfect knowledge of all human actions and a thorough insight into their moral character; omnipotent to execute his judgments; and, in a word, must be the most perfect of all beings – i.e. God." Without formulating the theistic proof, Butler's whole treatment of the subject of morality in the *Analogy* implies it. He concludes the first part in these words: "The proper motives of religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our natural apprehensions of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge; a nature and conscience and apprehension given us by him."² A more attractive,

¹ *Theism*, p. 407.

² *Op. cit.*, Angus ed., p. 146.

because less legalistic, presentation of the proof is found in Erskine of Linlathen.¹ "When I attentively consider what is going on in my conscience, the chief thing forced on my notice is, that I find myself face to face with a purpose – not my own, for I am often conscious of resisting it, but which dominates me, and makes itself felt as ever present, as the very root and reason of my being. . . . This consciousness of a purpose concerning me that I should be a good man – right, true, and unselfish – is the first firm footing I have in the region of religious thought ; for I cannot dissociate the idea of a purpose from that of a purposer : and I cannot but identify this purpose with the Author of my being and the being of all beings, and further I cannot but regard His purpose towards me as the unmistakable indication of His character." Robertson of Brighton might be quoted to the same effect. For Newman, conscience "is the essential principle and sanction of religion in the mind." He says : "I find it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I am quite sure) without believing also in Him who lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience."²

(4) In these instances it is the individual conscience on which the belief in God is based. What strengthens the evidence is that there has been in human history a succession of reformers, martyrs, prophets. The most conspicuous instance is that of the Hebrew prophets. They interpreted human history as divine judgment, not on ritual offences, but on moral evils and social wrongs. To ritual they opposed righteousness, and often so vehemently that many scholars suppose them to have been opposed to all ritual. The monotheism of an Amos was based on his conviction of God as the one supreme moral ruler among the nations ; and in him also are found the beginnings of the later universalism, the extension of moral obligations beyond national barriers. The development of Jewish legalism after the *ethical monotheism* of the prophets may seem a reaction ; and theoretically it was, but practically it served as a moral discipline for the nation ; it was a protective husk for the kernel of the teaching of the prophets. As has already been mentioned, in Socrates there is the advance of the individual conscience beyond the customary morality. Here, too, there was a succession in

¹ *The Spiritual Order, and other Papers*, pp. 47-48.

² Quoted by Caldecott in *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 263.

ethical reflection ; the Cynic school cannot be regarded as a moral advance, but it afforded a transition to the Stoic teaching, which on the one hand showed many affinities with the Christian, and on the other afforded a solid theoretical basis for Roman jurisprudence, a valuable contribution to man's moral progress. In Confucius, Zoroaster, and Gautama we have also instances of the influence of the individual conscience through the formation of a new religious community on human moral progress, although neither Confucius nor Gautama appealed to divine authority as did Zoroaster and the Hebrew prophets. The moral code which Mohammed gave Islam was an advance on Arab tribal custom, but must be regarded as a relapse from Jewish and Christian morals, although it must be recognised that he came in contact only with debased types of both religions. Within Christianity there has been progress, not beyond the fundamental principles of the teaching of Jesus, but beyond what survived of current Jewish or pagan moral practice in the early Church, beyond even some of the applications by Paul, as affected by his Jewish prejudices, of his own principles. Within Christendom there has often been stagnation and even retrogression ; and the progress in the application of Christian principles has been disappointingly slow. But some advance there has been. Even within this generation, as a result of the Great War, there is a changed attitude to war, in which probably large sections of the peoples are in advance of the Governments. And the present world-distress and threat of disaster are stimulating ethical reflection on economics and politics.

(5) This very brief sketch of the progress of what we might call the corporate moral consciousness, always depending on the finer discernment of individual consciences, may serve as a transition to the second basis for theism.

(a) In the preceding chapter it was shown that there has been progress in the organic evolution to man, not only greater complexity of structure and diversity of function, but also greater efficiency. Mind has been increasingly disclosed as a directive and controlling factor in the development of life. Unconscious or barely conscious adaptation of organisms to environment has been followed by the emergence of instinct, and all the marvels in the furtherance of life which it achieves ; and, even in the higher animals, intelligence emerges along with instinct, allowing a wider range of adaptation than instinct could. This vital evolution

has culminated in man, with few instincts, but with an intelligence capable of development as in no other animal ; besides the impulses to self-preservation, sex relations, social solidarity, which he shares with his animal kindred, he has values of which they seem to be unaware, although their conduct gives some indication of a rudimentary possession, as in the sense of beauty (to which further reference will be made in the next chapter) and the sentiments which attach to sex and parenthood. We have now to ask whether there is any disclosure of purpose in human as in organic evolution ; has there been, not only a preservation, but even an enhancement of human values ? This brings us to the philosophy of history.

(b) The Hebrew prophets were conscious of divine purpose in their national history, its failures and defeats no less than in its successes and victories ; and Paul has, in Rom. viii. and Eph. i., outlined a divine purpose in the Church as the body of Christ, the complement of Him who completeth all in all. So did Augustine, in his great work *The City of God*, see in history a conflict between the Kingdom of God, as embodied in the Church, and the kingdom of this world, as represented by the Roman Empire ; and, even if he painted the contrast in too vivid hues, yet that there was such a conflict of that old pagan world on which disgust and loathing had fallen, with the new Christian world being born amid the travail of the peoples, who can doubt ? His personal experience was the *microcosm* of which that world-ruin and world-recovery was the *macrocosm*. R. Flint has, in his book on *The Philosophy of History in Europe*, accorded to Vico the place and merit of pioneer, and has also written a monograph on him. A brief summary of his position is given by Windelband.¹ "Influenced by the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of the Renaissance, especially by Campanella, and educated by Bodin and Grotius, he had grasped the idea of a general natural law of the development of life, which manifests itself in the history of peoples as well as in that of individuals, and with great learning had sought to prove this principle of the identity of all natural development. But if, in such a conception of the naturally necessary correspondence between the different historical systems and the fundamental biological scheme, the thought of a purposeful inter-relation of the destinies of nations had remained foreign to him, this had previously found all the more

¹ *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 526-527.

forcible support in *Bossuet*. This French prelate continues the patristic philosophy of history, which had pushed the Redemption into the centre of the world's events. He would have the christianising of modern nations through the empire of Charles the Great, regarded as the concluding and decisive epoch of universal history, the whole course of which is the work of divine providence, and the goal of which is the dominance of the one Catholic Church." Restricted as was Bossuet's conception of the world-purpose, yet he supplied what was lacking in Vico, who assimilated historical to biological evolution. Lessing was a man of devout disposition; and, recognising that religion is a mutual personal relation with God, he maintained that where there is religion there too is revelation. To the history of religion he gave a unity by conceiving it as a progressive series of revelation, by means of which God is educating mankind. Beyond the New Testament itself there may be the *eternal Gospel*. The optimism of Herder did not allow him to accept Rousseau's view of the degeneracy of mankind from its primitive condition according to nature; but he regarded man's history as corresponding with his natural development in a living relationship of God and man. Fichte offers us a sketch of universal history. The earliest stage of *rational instinct* or *instinctive reason*, in which the individual is dominated by the universal consciousness, is followed by the necessary intermediate state, in which the individual ego asserts itself, and society tends to anarchy, the state of *complete sinfulness*; but this must give place to the *rule of reason*, in which the autonomous self recognises and submits to the universally valid reason. The moral government of the world is, for him, God. In Hegel the principle that the real is the rational, that the evolution of reality is the manifestation of reason, is carried out consistently in the interpretation of history. He leans more to the theoretical than the practical reason. Matthew Arnold, opposed as he was to dogma, reliant as he was on culture, the best thought of the best minds, does discover in history "a power not ourselves which makes for righteousness." Over against all these witnesses of a theistic interpretation of history we may place Hume's *Natural History of Religion*, in which the development is explained by psychological principles, and yet the monotheism which results from it is in accord with the belief in God, which, he admits, if not rationally demonstrable, an intelligent man

might hold. For *Comte*, however, the theological state had been superseded by the metaphysical, and that was giving place to the positive.

(6) The record, thus briefly outlined, has a cumulative influence in our thought. It may be said confidently that the majority of thinkers have inclined to give history some theistic setting. What for our present purpose is of even more immediate interest and crucial importance is the effect of the doctrine of evolution on the interpretation of history.

(a) It has already been mentioned that Wallace did not regard it as possible to explain man's endowments by the principle of natural selection. Huxley, in his *Romanes Lecture*, argued that the same principle did not apply to man's moral progress as to the cosmic process, but the very reverse; it is not to the struggle for existence that man must look as the condition of progress. In this contention Darwin would have agreed with him. Nevertheless, the Darwinian principle has been appealed to as the justification of war as a biological necessity. Nietzsche, although he disclaimed dependence on Darwin, in his view of the superman was carrying out this conception of the survival of the fittest in the struggle. Sir J. Arthur Thomson, in the book already referred to, *Purpose in Evolution*, calls us to reconsider the view of nature for which Darwinism is held to afford a justification. A convenient summary of his argument may be quoted.¹ He "comments somewhat severely on the arraignment of Nature made by John Stuart Mill and William James, philosophers 'with only a nodding acquaintance with Nature.' He treats with more respect the criticisms of Huxley, though he takes care to remind us that Huxley, 'while he was a biologist of the highest rank, was not, as he admits, much of a field naturalist.' Professor Thomson, in short, is an ardent lover of Nature, and is exceedingly jealous of her good name. He grows manifestly impatient with the view of Nature as 'red in tooth and claw.' 'A nightmare view,' he calls it, and quotes Darwin and Wallace to the contrary. 'When we reflect,' says Darwin, 'on this struggle, we may console ourselves with the full belief that the war of Nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply.' Wallace writes to the same effect. 'On the whole, then, we may conclude that the popular idea of the struggle for existence

¹ *The Expository Times*, Vol. XLIII., p. 293.

entailing misery and pain on the animal world is the very reverse of the truth. What it really brings about is the maximum of life, and of the enjoyment of life, with the minimum of suffering and pain.'” The problem of why there is any pain at all will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter ; but it is well at this point to have a false impression corrected.

(b) The mind of man does not readily acquiesce in a dualism ; and accordingly the endeavour has been made to find, not contrary principles, but one common principle for both evolutions. Henry Drummond, who, in his most popular book *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, had made the attempt to raise the law of the lower to the higher realm, in another book, *The Ascent of Man*, reversed the process, and sought to discover moral principles in animal behaviour. His thesis is that there is a struggle for the life of others, and not of self only, in the care for offspring, etc., among animals. Somewhat rhetorically he sums up his argument : “ What is evolution ? A method of creation. What is its object ? To make men perfect living beings. What is Christianity ? A method of Creation. What is its object ? To make men perfect living beings. Through what does evolution work ? Through love. Through what does Christianity work ? Through love. Evolution and Christianity have the same Author, the same end, the same spirit.”¹ It is doubtful whether all his illustrations of his theses will convince. One sometimes feels that ardent poetry is replacing sober prose, as when he finds an illustration of altruism in the division of a mass of protoplasm to form two organisms instead of one. There can be no doubt whatever that the animal world is a scene of co-operation more than of conflict. Prince Kropotkin has shown how much mutual aid and defence there is. Widespread is the principle of *symbiosis*, living together for common advantage. What might appear parasitism proves partnership.

(c) Benjamin Kidd in his writings has developed another line of argument. Accepting the principle of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, he applies it, not to individuals, but to societies ; and here the subordination of egoism to altruism is the condition of fitness to survive. “ The phenomena of the development of the altruistic feelings presents well-marked features ; it has been persistent and continuous throughout a prolonged period ; it has

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 438.

progressed farthest amongst the most advanced peoples ; and it has all the appearance of being closely associated in some way with the progress we are making in other directions." The essential conclusions to which he is led in dealing with Western civilisation are stated by himself as follows. "First, that the process of social development which has been taking place, and which is still in progress, in our Western civilisation is not the product of the intellect, but that the motive force behind it has had its origin in, and is still sustained by, that fund of altruistic feeling with which our civilisation has been equipped. Second, that the altruistic development and the deepening and softening of character which has accompanied it are the direct and peculiar product of the religious system on which our civilisation is founded. Third, that to science the significance of the resulting process of social evolution, in which all the people are being slowly brought into the rivalry of existence on equal conditions, consists in the single fact that this rivalry has tended to be thereby raised to the highest degree of efficiency, as a cause of progress, it has ever attained. The peoples affected by the process have been thereby worked up to a state of social efficiency which has given them preponderating advantages in the struggle for existence with other sections of the race."¹ How far the course of history, since the publication of this book in 1895, has modified this optimistic estimate we need not now discuss, but may admit that it was true relatively to the time. Nor need we restrict the meaning of the term reason in such a way as to make it necessary to regard religion as not rational. His main contention, however, may be accepted. There has been progress ; and morals and religion have been linked together as its conditions. In his second book, on *The Principles of Western Civilisation*, he develops a similar thesis ; his formula here is that the condition of progress is the subordination of the individual and present to the universal and future. In his third book, *The Science of Power*, he finds in the emancipation of woman the promise and potency of such progress. The general conclusion which we seem to be justified in drawing is that even the Darwinian formula for evolution need not deprive us of the belief in the realisation of the Good in human history.

(7) Some considerations suggested by recent history may

¹ *Social Evolution*, pp. 175, 198-199.

be added. It has often been contended that the spheres of economics and politics are autonomous, and beyond the sway of moral principles which are authoritative for individual conduct. In industry (using the term in the widest sense to include all human labour to produce and distribute material wealth to meet the physical needs of men) we have had an acquisitive and competitive system which, in making greed the motive and rivalry the method, challenged the Christian ideal of service and fellowship. So long as it was successful, the practical men, as they called themselves, derided the moral idealism as inapplicable and ineffective. The distress of the world to-day, where there is poverty amid plenty, under-consumption amid over-production, is the judgment of the moral order of the world, of God on both the motive and the method. Even economists and politicians are at their wits' ends, and may perhaps give more heed now to the teaching and warning of the moralist. It needed the calamity of the Great War, with all its still-continuing disastrous consequences, to bring to judgment these same non-moral motives and methods in the relations of nations. An exclusive, assertive nationalism, which regarded war as a legitimate method of advancing national interests, or vindicating national honour, is now being, if reluctantly, recognised in the world's present vital unity a fatal anachronism, a racial suicide. Unrestricted, unregulated rivalry now appears no condition of progress, but a provocation of retrogression. Moral idealism is being justified by the course of history.

II

This close relation of morality with religion does not find universal recognition. (1) In the ethical schools which make pleasure or happiness the moral end there need be no reference to God. The Cyrenaic and the Epicurean schools had no need and made no use of religion. Indeed, that man might be the master of himself, Epicurus, without denying the existence of the gods, banished them from all control of human affairs. The utilitarianism which makes *the greatest happiness of the greatest number* the moral end is not anti-theistic, but does not rest on a theistic basis. To the other sanctions of morality with which this school concerned itself – natural, political, social, moral (the pleasure

of a good conscience and the pain of remorse), Paley added the religious. He defines virtue as "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting life" – a definition which has been censured as "the maximum of error in the minimum of space." Unlike Paley, Kant makes the practical reason autonomous, the sole legitimate motive of morality being reverence for the moral law: it must be absolutely disinterested to the exclusion even of human affection – a rigorism which Schiller ridiculed in his short poem, in which the philosopher advises the man distressed, since he does good because he loves his friends, to try and hate them, so that his conduct may become really virtuous. On the other hand, his position approaches that of Paley when he represents belief in God as a postulate of the practical reason, because God alone can make the good man happy. Of this argument Fichte said: "The system in which happiness is looked for at the hands of a being of superior power is a system of idolatry"; and Schiller described it as "a moral position for slaves." The truth lies between Paley and Kant. To fulfil moral obligations simply and solely because they are apprehended as divine commands, without any inward assent to their validity, is legalism and not morality – an inferior type of religion; if fear of the consequences or hope for the rewards, and not reverence for, and recognition of, the authority of God be dominant, it is indeed a slavish morality. The sincerity of the moral motive is not in any way corrupted if man recognises that in and through the authority of conscience – the validity of its commands for moral discernment – there is the challenge not merely to outward submission, but to inward conformity, of the eternal moral perfection – the categorical imperative as personal reality. A man is freely moral as he does *God's will* because he reverences and recognises in it the authority of the *good will*. Comte not only expressly, but even vehemently, repudiates any theistic implications in morality. The theological is the lowest of the three states through which the mind of man has passed. Worship of God as the Giver of Good is in his judgment ingratitude to humanity, which is the sole benefactor of man. As he recognised that morality needs the reinforcement of religion, he invented his religion of humanity, not embracing all men, but composed of such men as Comte approved as deserving a place in such an object of human worship. His selection shows many surprises. Since Comte there have

been various attempts to detach morality from religion, and to relate it more closely to science. Where evolution is so interpreted as to exclude divine agency, then necessarily another basis for morality must be found. To a few illustrations of this latest phase of thought we now turn.

(2) While the Cyrenaic school was a challenge of the current Greek morality, and made pleasure, even in its grossest forms, the sole moral end, that charge cannot without qualification be brought against Epicureanism ; it recognised that moderation in self-indulgence was necessary to an enduring self-satisfaction. Epicurus himself laid stress on the pleasures of the mind and of friendship. The materialism of France in the eighteenth century advocated the gratification of the senses. But utilitarianism, as has already been mentioned, accepted the current morality, and tried to show, by a consideration of *sanctions*, that it is for a man's own interest to be moral, that a man promotes his own happiness in promoting the happiness of others. In this attempt it was not successful. Mill not only recognises this social claim, but also qualitative differences in pleasures. In so far as there was such acceptance of the current morality, the hedonistic principle was not consistently carried out to its logical issues ; the inconsistency is greatest in utilitarianism. The Cyrenaic school and the French materialists show what morality becomes when detached from, and opposed to, the standards of a society in which the development of morality has been constantly and potently influenced by religion. In most of the non-theistic morality of the thought of to-day these standards are still for the most part acknowledged, although there are already manifest tendencies to a dangerous laxity, especially as regards the relation of the sexes.

(a) A book which I have not read, but to which I have seen a reference,¹ is a sign of the times. Powys offers us a *Defence of Sensuality*. He desires a mental gesture which can be reproduced automatically, and that gesture is an absorption in momentary sensations, with their psychic overtones and undertones. That rigorism and asceticism may not have accorded to the pleasures of sense the place that the completeness of human experience demands may be conceded ; but to make sensual indulgence the guiding principle is to invite moral disaster.

(b) Julian Huxley is directly concerned with morals.

¹ *Congregational Quarterly*, IX., p. 477.

God, if we may speak of God, emerges in the mind of man,¹ evolution discloses a cosmic trend towards ideals and values, and it is man's duty and privilege, his morality and religion, to co-operate with it. For him, as for Alexander, evolution is not a mode of creation ; it is itself Creation ; God is not the Author, but the product, of the universe.

(c) A fuller treatment may be accorded to a book the title of which is a challenge – *God, Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology*, by J. Middleton Murry. This author's book on *The Life of Jesus* showed such a measure of appreciation that it is disappointing to learn that he himself has no need, and no use, for God. To him God is "the hypostatisation of values, that is, their detachment from the significant variations in which they emerge and which they are."² God the Father is the focus of the significant variations of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, which emerge in, but are detached from, the process of evolution. The immediate human experience is in like manner hypostatized as the Holy Spirit ; and God, conceived as incarnate in Jesus, is also hypostatized as the Son. As an interpretation of significant values emergent in the evolution of the universe the author admits the value for religion of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity ; but its truth he brushes aside. Instead of the belief in God he offers his *metabiological science*. He has, however, his own quarrel with the mechanistic naturalism, and the biology which tends to mechanistic views. He probably avoids the use of the term psychological as suggesting the dualism of body and soul ; but *metabiological* life is something more and higher than biological life. Life in this higher sense is the achievement by man of his own coherent unity, and then of his coherent unity with the universe as an organism. The man who achieves this can be regarded as a significant variation emerging in the continuous process of this organism. "What are, in the common language of the day, distinguished as 'values' are the qualities of those variations to which the individual consciously and deliberately responds."³ The variations themselves are objective in the universe ; but the choice of them

¹ Dawson, in his *Progress and Religion*, p. 240, quotes two lines from one of his earlier sonnets ("God and Man" in *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 234) :

*The Universe can live and work and plan,
At last made God within the mind of Man.*

² *Op. cit.*, p. 211.

³ *Idem*, pp. 206–207.

as significant is subjective, and yet the individual usually finds himself one of a large company. He expressly refuses to recognise any standard. "The choice which are the 'higher' and which the 'lower' variations is a personal matter ; that choice is simply the record of the variations to which the individual investigator consciously responds."¹ "Conscious response, conscious refusal to respond, deliberate perpetuation, deliberate refusal to perpetuate — these are the facts concerning values."² Although such choice may be called man's moral duty, yet he is not free in it. "He is merely a self-conscious organism responding by metabiological modes to previous or present variations."³ There is no ideal, and no freedom to realise it. "You need not worry yourself about the existence of the ideal. Simple inspection will show you that it has existed and does exist, only not as ideal. When the ideal exists, it is simply the real ; it is embodied in some thing or some person. What you imagined to be a response to the ideal is simply a response to the real, and you who respond are part of the real."⁴ Within one cosmic evolution occur objective variations, which, if subjective variations respond, become significant ; these are the only values ; but as the objective variation is not ideal, only actual, so the subjective variation necessarily responds. The metabiological science is, after all, mechanism of a more complicated kind. There is neither divine purpose nor human freedom in the world ; and man takes the place of God as a significant variation in the process of evolution, capable of responding to the variations of Truth, Beauty, Goodness. On the basis of this reasoning we must not even call man the most significant, because where the ideal is the actual, and necessity displaces freedom, comparison of any kind seems out of place. Yet the author regards Jesus as a significant variation ; he judges D. K. Lawrence as like the founder of Christianity ; he disclaims making any such comparison for himself, but it is evident how significant a variation he must regard himself as being, that in his book he summons man to abandon morality and religion, as hitherto understood, as variations which have lost, if ever they had, any significance. When all variations are actual and necessary, why argue or contend for one view or another ? The majority of significant variations in the history of mankind have believed in the ideals of Truth,

¹ *Idem*, p. 207.

² *Idem*, p. 208.

³ *Idem*, p. 291.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 308-309.

Beauty, and Goodness, and in the freedom of man to realise those ideals as the purpose of God.

(d) On a detailed discussion of Mr. Bertrand (now Earl) Russell's writings I do not intend to enter. Mr. Arnold Lunn, in his book *The Flight from Reason*, has with justification described his attitude as *theophobia*. The arguments advanced by him against theism in his book *What I Believe* are stated by Herbert G. Wood¹ as follows : " Mr. Bertrand Russell, in summarising the reasons why he does not believe in God and immortality, commits himself to three propositions which he clearly regards as important and conclusive. First of all, these beliefs find no support in science ; secondly, they are not essential to religion, as they are not part of original Buddhism, and Buddhism is a religion ; thirdly, there is no more reason to believe in the God and Father of Jesus Christ or in the Jahweh of the Jews than there is to believe in Zeus or Osiris or Marduk. All are equally imaginary figures. For these reasons, then, Mr. Russell feels justified in leaving them on one side. Yet to a genuinely critical intelligence these reasons must seem either irrelevant or, if not actually untenable, then certainly disputable and inconclusive." The acute criticism which follows need not now be reproduced. But it may be pointed out as regards the first proposition that, while science cannot prove the existence of God, many men of science of the greatest eminence have found no incompatibility between their science and their faith in God. And the preceding pages here have aimed at showing that there is no incompatibility. The second proposition is sufficiently confuted by the historical consideration discussed in a previous chapter of this volume that the original or *Hinayana* form of Buddhism was transformed into the *Mahayana* form, which includes belief in deified beings as well as a future life, before it became generally effective as a religion. The form of the third proposition shows how little the writer appreciates the theistic standpoint. The Christian theist will recognise Zeus, Osiris, and Marduk as genuine, if imperfect, human conceptions of the one divine reality, but will prefer the Jahweh of the Jews as a less inadequate conception, and he will give the supreme place in human thought to the idea of the God and Father of Jesus Christ as the best expression the human mind can give to the universal and permanent religious consciousness of mankind, the significance and

¹ *The Expository Times*, Vol. XLIII., p. 301.

value of which the first part of this volume seeks to exhibit. What moral standard does this *theophobia* lead to? As has already been said, the standard on sex relations seems to me crucial. Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his book *A Preface to Morals*,¹ supplies the following quotation from *The Companionate Marriage*, by Judge Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, p. 210: "Writing to Judge Lindsey during the uproar about companionate marriage, Mr. Russell said: 'I go further than you do; the things your enemies say about you would be largely true of me. My own view is that the State and the law should take no notice of sexual relations apart from children, and that no marriage ceremony should be valid unless accompanied by a medical certificate of the woman's pregnancy. But when once there are children, I think that divorce should be avoided except for very grave cause. I should not regard physical infidelity as a very grave cause, and should teach people that it is to be expected and tolerated, but should not involve the begetting of illegitimate children – not because illegitimacy is bad in itself, but because a home with two parents is best for children. I do not feel that the main thing in marriage is the feeling of the parents for each other; the main thing is co-operation in bearing children.'" It must be added at once, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, that Mr. Lippmann rejects this view. However eminent as mathematician or logician the writer of the above statement may be, his views, apart from moral and religious scruples, must be utterly repellent to those who hold fast the ideal of marriage as a supreme and necessarily exclusive devotion in love of one person to another. The wife no less than the husband in this case rejects the Christian tradition, but she recognises "that intelligence is to be in some respects the master as well as the servant of instinct."² It would be unjust to other writers to leave the impression that all who reject a theistic reference in morality would find themselves led to such "a trans-valuation of moral values."

(e) Mr. Lippmann comes to an entirely different conclusion on the subject of marriage, even although he sets aside all divine authority in morals. "If it is the truth that the convention of marriage correctly interprets human experience, whereas the separatist conventions are self-defeating, then the convention of marriage will prove to be the conclusion which emerges out of all this immense experimenting.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 298–299.

² *Idem*, p. 163.

It will survive not as a rule of law imposed by force, for that is now, I think, become impossible. It will not survive as a moral commandment with which the elderly can threaten the young. They will not listen. It will survive as the dominant insight into the reality of love and happiness, or it will not survive at all. That does not mean that all persons will live under the convention of marriage. As a matter of fact, in civilised ages all persons never have. It means that the convention of marriage, when it is clarified by the insight into reality, is likely to be the hypothesis upon which men and women will ordinarily proceed. There will be no compulsion behind it except the compulsion in each man and woman to reach a true adjustment of his life."¹ A hypothesis does seem a less solid basis for morals than "Thus saith the Lord," or even Kant's categorical imperative. How crucial this issue is this author recognises. "It is in this necessity of clarifying their love for those who are closest to them that the moral problems of the new age come to a personal issue. It is in the realm of sexual relations that mankind is being schooled amidst pain and worry for the novel conditions which modernity imposes. It is there, rather than in politics, business, or even in religion, that the issues are urgent, vivid, and inescapable. It is there that they touch most poignantly and most radically the organic roots of human personality. And it is there, in the ordering of their personal attachments, that for most men the process of salvation must necessarily begin."² What is the supreme moral principle which in this author's view is to be applied? This principle is *disinterestedness*, by which he means such a detachment from, and transcendence of, the passions as to understand them and to control conduct by considerations of life as a whole, and the reality of the world to which a man must relate himself. To indulge the passions is to be at the infantile stage of human development; to attain this disinterestedness is to have reached maturity. Taking into account all that psychology can teach regarding the development of human personality, the aim of education should be to secure in due course this transition from infantilism to maturity. "The child's philosophy rests upon the assumption that the world outside is in gear with his own appetites. . . . The world is full of semi-adult persons. . . . The adult has to break this attachment to persons and things. His world does not permit him to remain fused with it, but

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 312.

² *Idem*, pp. 312-313.

compels him to stand away from things. For things no longer obey his wishes. And therefore he cannot let his wishes become too deeply involved in things. He can no longer count on possessing whatever he may happen to want. And therefore he must learn to want what he can possess."¹ As the reality of the world is indifferent, if not hostile, to his wishes, he must conform his wishes to what that reality allows as possible for him. After quoting from *The Confucian Analects*, Book II., chapter iv., a passage in which *Confucius* describes his own growth in wisdom, closing with the words, "At seventy I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right," Lippmann continues: "To be able, as *Confucius* indicates, to follow what the heart desires without coming into collision with the stubborn facts of life is the privilege of the utterly innocent and the utterly wise. It is the privilege of the infant and of the sage who stand at the two poles of experience; of the infant because the world ministers to his heart's desire, and of the sage because he has learned what to desire. Perhaps this is what *Jesus* meant when he told His followers that they must become like little children. If this is what He meant, and if this is what *Buddha*, *Confucius*, and *Spinoza* meant, then we have here the clue to the function of high religion in human affairs. I venture at least to suggest that the function of high religion is to reveal to men the quality of mature experience, that high religion is a prophecy and an anticipation of what life is like when desire is in perfect harmony with reality. It announces the discovery that men can enter into the realm of the spirit when they have outgrown all childishness."² This humanism offers thus not a morality only, but a religion also; it is, however, a religion without God. In making its appeal to the wisdom of the past, it raises a doubt as to its own sufficiency. Let us allow that *Gautama* was a humanist who had discovered truth for himself, but the insufficiency of Buddhism as a religion has been pointed out. In the passage from the *Confucian Analects* already referred to, *Confucius* says that "at fifty I knew the decrees of heaven"; he was no mere humanist. *Spinoza* was the "god-intoxicated man." *Jesus* as the Son revealed the Father, and called men to be the children of God. In the wisdom of the race to which this humanist makes his appeal, religion as belief in God has been a factor; and in the moral standard he proposes he is more

¹ *Idem*, pp. 190-191.

² *Idem*, pp. 192-193.

indebted than he knows to the Christian environment in which he has developed from infantilism to maturity. While his practical ethics is not below the average Christian morality – not the Christian ideal – yet what its guiding principle is may be without injustice stated thus : Get all the good you can out of life which the world as it is will allow ; be moderate in your demands on the world, and prudent in securing them. Will such a principle, or the desire to do God's will from love to Him in love for man, most surely yield the life " when desire is in perfect harmony with reality " ? Why does this serious writer offer us such a moral principle instead of the Christian morality ? He holds that the Christian morality has lost its authority, because science makes impossible this belief in God. In the first part of his book he describes, not exultingly but regretfully, " the Dissolution of the Ancestral Order," the break-up of the morality based on what he calls theocracy. In this description he seems to me to generalise the mental, moral, and religious situation in certain circles of America beyond what facts allow, ignoring the hold that " the ancestral order " still has on the people generally, and still more ignoring the reconciliation with modern knowledge which the progressive Christian theology is effecting. He does not give an altogether unprejudiced representation even of the popular Christian religion : God is not merely the wish-fulfiller in answer to prayer ; He is not only the ruler by rewards or punishments. We cannot deny that these aspects are often prominent on a superficial view ; but not only among mystics is there a hunger and thirst for the living God Himself which finds satisfaction in the Father as revealed by Christ ; and not only among theologians is there an adaptation of religious beliefs to current knowledge. I do not minimise the seriousness of the situation when so many among cultured youth have altogether lost their moral chart and their religious anchor. That " the Acids of Modernity " have eaten deep into the religious and moral inheritance of many is a fact that the Christian Church cannot ignore nor neglect. But his conclusion that for cultured youth there is no other alternative than humanism to the theocracy which he holds has lost its authority is in my judgment unjustified by all the facts. I must challenge his confident assertion, " With all its difficulties, it is to a morality of humanism that men must turn when the ancient order of things dissolves. When they find that they no

longer believe seriously and deeply that they are governed from heaven, there is anarchy in their souls until by conscious effort they find ways of governing themselves."¹ I turn to the constructive statement which should justify this challenge.

III

(1) The relation between morality and the belief in God has had a thorough and able treatment in one of the series of Gifford Lectures, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, by Dr. W. R. Sorley, and, as I find myself at many points in close agreement with him, I shall first in this section give an account of his argument, of which in his last lecture he himself supplies a summary.

(a) The first step in his argument is the distinction between science, which is concerned with the universal or the general, and history, which is interested in the individual – a relative distinction, as the generalisations of science are based on individual instances, and history uses universal principles “as ancillary to its purpose.” Next in the study of the individual, we proceed from the first apprehension as a whole thorough analysis of the different elements and factors to a synthesis grasping its differences in a unity. In this analysis and synthesis there are two ways of dealing with the object; we correlate it to other objects, and its parts to the whole, by the principle of causality, and we compare it with other objects to determine its value. In these two realms different laws hold. An object may have no value, and yet it has a cause, and, if it has value, that value may only be a means to an end – that is, *instrumental* and not *intrinsic*. “Intrinsic values – at any rate, intrinsic moral values – belong to persons only.”² The appreciation of values is no less objective than the apprehension of causes. So important is this fourth step in the argument, that a quotation from an earlier lecture may be given. “The appreciation of value is on the same level as knowledge of things, their qualities and relations. We have no more reason for saying that value is relative because it is appreciated by us than we have for saying that facts are relative because they are apprehended by us. If we take any particular moral judgment, as that this man, or this character,

¹ *Idem*, p. 139.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 507.

or this attitude is good, let us call it 'A is good' – then what I mean when I assert 'A is good' is not that I like or desire A, or even that I feel approval in contemplating A, but that this predicate 'good' does, as a matter of fact, characterise A. The assertion may be wrong or invalid; but that is its meaning. It is certainly possible to argue that this assertion, thus understood, and all assertions like it, must always be without objective foundation, that they are always based merely on subjective preference. But, if this line of argument be adopted, it is important to remember that it is on all fours with the argument for the subjectivity of knowledge."¹ Clearly and firmly Sorley asserts that "the denial of an objective morality, equally with the denial of an objective science of nature, follows from the rejection of the plain meaning of the primary judgments of experience."²

(b) While truth and beauty are also values, the argument at this stage is narrowed down to moral values. These are necessarily realised in persons, and not things, and are as objective as any other qualities which they may possess. Further, in the realisation of these values the individual is conscious of an ideal or standard to guide his endeavour, and an obligation to be so guided. This consciousness carries with it this consequence. "Accordingly," says Sorley, "we are compelled to form the conception of an ideal good or of a moral order, which, as the condition of actualised goodness, must also be regarded as in some sense having objective reality." This step takes us, as it were, from conscience to cosmos, from ethical to metaphysical objectivity. If moral values are objective, they must be rooted in reality. "A comprehensive view of this ultimate reality," Sorley argues, "must include an account of things and persons, laws and values. If we are unable to reach a view of it as a whole, then we have attained no philosophy; if we can reach such a view, then we must be able to see how existing beings and the laws or orders of their behaviour on the one side, and the realm of moral values on the other side, harmonise so as together to make a unity."³ Things and persons, causes and values – all must be included in "a synoptic view of reality." We must see not only life, but the world also, steadily, and see it whole. Here the most serious problem for such a view emerges – "the divergence between the order of existence and the moral order." "Their laws are entirely different: causal connectedness on the one hand,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

² *Idem*, p. 136.

³ *Idem*, p. 509.

ideal valuation on the other. Their phenomenal appearances diverge : a law which is indifferent to morality produces effects of one kind ; the inexorable categorical imperative requires action of another. Man, in whom the two meet, seems in the grip of conflicting powers, and unable to reconcile his allegiance to both."¹ It is this problem, in its individual aspect, which Kant seeks to solve in the postulate of the practical reason : God exists to harmonise character and condition.

(c) Before offering his own solution, Sorley shows the inability of naturalism, pluralism, and monism to explain the divergence. It is obvious that "naturalistic theories" can offer no solution of the problem except a blank negation, "owing to their inability even to explain law in nature and the facts of psychical existence, as well as because they are obliged to deny the objectivity of moral and other values."² Naturalism refuses to assign consciousness and purpose to the ultimate reality, and regards finite minds as the only conscious and purposeful beings. Pluralism regards these finite minds as "the ultimate constituents of reality," and monism or pantheism treats them as merely "modes or appearances of the one ultimate reality."³ Against pluralism, Sorley maintains that finite minds, even in co-operation, have not and cannot have produced the objective natural and moral order which they recognise as "valid before and independently of their recognition." The pluralist who feels the necessity of finding some explanation of this cosmic order in its double aspect will pass over to some kind of monism.⁴ For a consistent monism the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad, must be lost in the ultimate reality. I cannot but regard as justified Sorley's conclusion to the lecture in which he deals with monism. "Reverence for the moral order may possibly lead the pantheist into the mystic way ; but morality itself is lost on the road. For all things point to the One ; all lofty things terminate there ; and there is no path so foul but that, if we understand its essence, it will lead to the same goal. And, when the goal is reached, we are absorbed in a Being beyond good and evil ; and, knowing that all things are in essence one, we may well be indifferent to the claims of one event rather than another in the illusion which we call the world."⁵

¹ *Idem*, p. 510.

² *Idem*, p. 511.

³ *Idem*, p. 359.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 381.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 404. Monism as an alternative to monotheism will be discussed in the last chapter.

(d) The two conditions of a solution of the problem are to be sought in the explanation of man's imperfect realisation of his values, and of "the apparent indifference to the standard of good and evil that the order of the world as a causal system displays." The failure of man to realise his ideals lies in his freedom; and yet moral values are possible only if there is freedom. The discrepancy of the moral values and causal order can be relieved only as we recognise the kind of purpose which is being realised in the world. If we view the world as it is, its purpose cannot be regarded as being "the production of the greatest happiness" or "distributing happiness according to merit," or "making a fit environment for perfect beings," for the facts are contrary to any such assumption. The moral view of the world is that it is "a medium for the attainment and realisation of goodness by free persons."¹ This view removes the difficulty of the discrepancy between character and condition. "The struggle and pain of the world are the lot of the good as well as of the evil. But if they can be turned to the increase and refinement of goodness, to the lessening and conquest of evil, then their existence is not an insuperable obstacle to the ethical view of reality; it may even be regarded as an essential condition of such a view. Account for it how we may, the fact remains that the heroes and saints of history have passed through much tribulation, and that man is made perfect only by suffering."² To this subject we shall return in the chapter on *Theodicy*.

(e) Since there is purpose in the natural as the moral order, and since the first is subservient to the second, there must be in the universe "intelligence and will to good as well as the ultimate source of power. In this way, the recognition of the moral order, and of its relation to nature and man, involves the acknowledgment of the Supreme Mind or God as the ground of all reality."³ Deserving of further consideration is Sorley's reply to the objection that such reasoning about God is anthropomorphic and analogical. He repels the first objection thus: "We have not argued that God is good because we find goodness in man, but that He is good because we find the idea of goodness to be valid for that universal order which we are trying to understand. And we speak of His wisdom and His power, not because man has some share of these qualities, but because they are implied in that conception of the world as

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 513.² *Idem*, p. 346.³ *Idem*, pp. 513-514.

purposive which is necessary to explain the relation of the order of nature to the moral order. This method of argument is not anthropomorphic, any more than are arguments concerning causal processes or mathematical relations. The latter depend on our apprehension of certain objective connections just as the former proceed from our ideas of objective moral values. The knowledge in both cases is due to our power of knowing, but this does not make it anthropomorphic, for it is a knowledge of relations and of values where validity is independent of their manifestations in human beings."¹ As regards the second objection, he admits that "the inference from the human manifestation to the divine is limited by the analogy of the spirit of man to the spirit of God." But God's wisdom cannot be regarded as implying "the human method of knowledge, with its precarious advance from step to step and its restricted range," for, while man must attain truth, it belongs to God's nature. God's love must exclude imperfections of the human, and include perfections which the human does not possess; but love "does in both cases mean the will to the good of others and the will to communion with them."² In conceiving the co-operation of God and man we must avoid the dualism which separates the divine and the human activity, and the monism which so subordinates man's to God's will that man becomes the puppet of omnipotence, even if that be disguised as grace. "In meeting and welcoming the divine grace, man's spirit is not passive, but responsive; and the divine influence comes as a gift and not by compulsion. . . . The spirit of God is conceived as working in and through the spirit of man, but in such a way as not to destroy human freedom."³ This argument from the moral consciousness thus leads us to the distinctively Christian theism.

(2) Another series of the Gifford Lectures – *The Faith of a Moralist*, by Professor A. E. Taylor – as the title indicates, deals with the advance, and necessary advance, of thought from morality to religion. The argument as a whole need not for our purpose be so closely followed as that of *Dr. Sorley's* book. But there are passages which lend confirmation to that argument. The second lecture, for instance, deals with *Actuality and Value*, and claims for values an equal reality with facts, for all values are always the activity of a real individual. Values are facts, and facts have values; there is a mutual implication. The moral and religious life

¹ *Idem*, pp. 496–497.

² *Idem*, pp. 498–499.

³ *Idem*, p. 503.

throws light on the kind of world in which we are. "On any theory the real must always remain very mysterious to our apprehension, but it *may* be that we come nearer to understanding its character when we know that it is the environment of organic life, than when we merely know – if we do know it – that it is a closed energetic system, and nearest of all when we know that it is at once the stage and inspiration of the artist, the hero, and the saint."¹ In the third lecture, on *Eternity and Temporality*, what is insisted on is that a complete good is the goal of the moral advance from a merely animal acquiescence in the succession in time, and that complete good must be an eternal, even God, who alone can give unity to our character, for, as Plato taught, the soul is what is its desired good. "If it has many goods, it is itself many, its personality is loose-knit and incipient. It will only have a real, and not merely an ideal, inner unity of personality when its good is one and all-embracing, a real and living single good which is the source of all goodness and leaves nothing of the good outside itself. That is to say, unity of personality and interest will only be attained, if at all, by a soul which has come to find its principal good in God."² If God is thus the good, the person whose aim is the fruition of that good is assured of an eternal destiny. "If the effort is to reach its goal, the *possession* of the supreme good on our part must also be itself final; we must be able to look forward to having the infinite good, and to having it in perpetuity."³ The fourth lecture⁴ shows that this moral life of which God is the complete good is a progress from *nature* to *supernature*. Accordingly, as man's personality, including his practical reason, is in the making, man cannot be the ultimate source of the moral law. That law must be communicated gradually and practically as it is obeyed loyally as the will of God. We do our duty as we walk by faith; and we know the doctrine as we do the will. The next two lectures may for our immediate purpose be passed over as dealing, to put it briefly, with sin and grace from the Christian standpoint, which I fully share. In dealing with the *Destiny of the Individual*, in the seventh lecture, the author bases the hope of immortality on the conviction that "the destruction of human personalities would make the moral end unattainable"; and accepting the Christian conception of the last things, recognises the possibility of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

² *Idem*, p. 101.

³ *Idem*, p. 105.

⁴ This has the title, *Further Specification of the Good, Nature and Supernature*.

purgation and progress on the one hand, and of a final reprobation on the other. His standpoint is clearly expressed in these words : " The world does not become unethical because it contains potentialities of tragedy ; there is the possibility of the tragic in all ethical situations. It would become an unethical world if it were so constituted as to make human choice merely frivolous."¹ In the eighth lecture, on *Other-worldliness*, the author insists that human society must not be made the *supreme* object of loyalty if social virtues are to be at their best, nor will humanity be best served by being made a " god." The present must take account of the future ; and " secular " duties must be done in a " religious " spirit. All these are variants of the author's insistence that morality must pass over to religion, and goodness be completed in God as the Good. The last lecture, as concerned with *The Goal of the Moral Life*, is an attempt to gain a glimpse, as it were, of " the beatific vision, a forecast of the life where there is no longer progress *to* fruition, but progress *in* fruition, ' practice ' as well as ' contemplation ' " ; an irreducible element of succession and temporality, " in the life of creatures, but a decreasing indefinitely " as the soul rose towards God the Eternal. This attainment is, however, a *gift*, God's grace in man. I have not been able to confine myself closely to matters rigidly relevant to the argument of this chapter ; but my justification is that the volume as a whole illustrates the thesis of the necessity of religion to the fullest and highest moral life, of faith in God to goodness at its best. Few, if any, of the other Gifford Lectures have dared to be so frankly and fully Christian ; for me this is no reproach, but a commendation.

(3) There remains only the need of putting as briefly as I can my own view, which is in substantial agreement with, and considerable indebtedness to, the two writers just discussed.

(a) Let us recall that, in dealing with epistemology, an idealist realism similar to that of Dr. Kemp Smith was advocated. The mind as intelligent is capable of apprehending reality as intelligible. While there is a mediation physical, physiological, and psychological, we perceive objects and persons as they are. The *sensa* are as real as the *sensing*. From this the ontological inference was drawn that reality is of such a kind as to be known, as, indeed, to reach its completeness only as known. In human consciousness

¹ *Idem*, p. 330.

the universe becomes conscious of itself. Accordingly, the cause of the world-order (the cosmos) may reasonably be regarded as intelligent will. Even in organic evolution, purpose can be traced : adaptation of the organism to the environment for its self-preservation and self-propagation. This purpose, however, is not disclosed fully in life ; the mind that is directive of life finds its full self-expression in human consciousness, and its purpose in the values and ideals, which we shall not describe as human, because, as will be shown, by their very nature they point above and beyond man's recognition and realisation of them. We may confidently affirm, with the two writers mentioned, the equal reality and mutual implication of facts and values, ideal and reality. It is in the same consciousness that facts are apprehended and values appreciated. Regarding these values there are two considerations already mentioned elsewhere which here must be emphasised. With Croce, I regard *utility* as a value, though subordinate, and not needing further consideration now, and I regard *religion* as the supreme value because the conservation of all values, as well as much more.

(b) Of the three commonly recognised values, the most significant is the moral value. For the completeness of human personality, the pursuit of truth and the appreciation of beauty are essential, and accordingly there is a moral obligation to make both, so far as is possible, objects of interest and effort. But not all men have the ability or the opportunity to give to these ideals a dominant place in their life. There can be no doubt whatever of the universality of the moral demands. Not all men are bound, or able, to be intellectual or artistic – although they would be more fully men if they were – but all men ought to be moral, and can be. Why has morality this superior claim ? Because it relates to the personal relations of self, others, and God. Its obligation is absolute in a way the others are not. A man's vocation is his function in the community of persons to which he belongs. If he be a student, teacher, writer, then the pursuit of truth is invested with this absolute obligation. If he is an artist, the appreciation of beauty. But, whatever a man's vocation, he cannot escape moral obligations. We can, therefore, now confine our discussion to morality.

(c) What needs to be emphasised, in view of what we may call the ethics of evolution, is that these values or ideals are not opinions which a man may share or leave alone, but

commands which call for his acceptance and obedience. It is the authority with which, for the conscience or the practical reason, these values or ideals are invested which is their distinctive feature. Their significance does not lie, as Mr. Middleton Murry holds, in the human response to them, but in the response which they impose. The categorical imperative has sounded from generation to generation in human history. Men have not only judged their own worth, but also the worth one of another in accordance with the response given. It is certain that mankind generally has not, with Kant, regarded the categorical imperative as autonomous, but has recognised in it some higher authority than social compulsion or inward constraint. There is no doubt that conscience bears witness to God, and that progressive moral discernment has been regarded as divine illumination. Again, these values and ideals indicate some reality above and beyond any human realisation. Their claim to be realised by man is that they are reality in God. God's purpose for man in them discloses the character of God Himself. Religion always relates man to reality above and beyond himself, the *numinous*, infinite, eternal, divine. But the object of moral insight and religious aspiration is, and must needs be, the same. Not only so, but, as values are personal values, the supreme value must belong to the reality in which all the other values or ideals are combined in their perfection, and which, as personal, can in communion give the full personal satisfaction to the soul of man.

(d) If man is to realise these ideals in himself, the world around him must be recognised as being no insuperable obstacle to their realisation, as, indeed, so constituted as to provide the conditions for such realisation. A superficial view of the world suggests that it is not only indifferent, but even hostile, to man's moral aspiration and endeavour. It does not seem to promote human happiness, it does not seem even to reward virtue and punish vice with impartial justice. If that were what the realisation of the ideals required, then certainly the natural order of causes would appear a constant challenge of the moral order of values. But a closer scrutiny, with moral discernment, does show that the world is suited to be "a vale of soul-making," that even what appears its hostility has proved the condition of human development. Both of the writers whom we have been discussing emphasise this aspect of reality. In man's moral and

religious experience it has been proved that "all things work together for good to those who love God" (Rom. viii. 28). God is the link of the two orders ; one divine purpose runs throughout the universe. As physical and chemical processes are conditions necessary and subordinate to life, so is the natural order necessary and subordinate to the moral. This is the solution of one of the problems which emerges when we seek to interpret the world ethically.

(e) The other is this : man is capable of recognising and realising these ideals and, in so doing, of co-operating with God's purpose ; but in this he has failed and fallen short. The abuse of his freedom has resulted in sin, a frustration of the divine purpose. And, therefore, that purpose not only is the will that man should be good, but also the will which, as grace – the divine enabling – makes it possible for man to become good, as in faith he receives and responds to that grace. The advance from morality to religion thus leads us step by step to the revelation of God in Christ, as not only the reality of all ideals, and the purpose that man should realise those ideals, but the source of the power which, as perfected in man's weakness, makes that realisation progressively possible for the renewed human personality.

(4) In closing, I may summarise what I have more fully stated elsewhere about the mutual relation of religion and morality. Morality serves to give moral content to the conception of God, exercises a moral criticism of religious belief and life, and in moral action affords an expression to the religious motive. Religion, on the other hand, as we have just seen, invests morality with the higher authority of God ; it presents a loftier ideal in the perfection of God ; it provides a deeper motive in the love for God which the love of God evokes ; it opens wider the horizon of obligations beyond the human society and the present life ; and accordingly, in assuring man, because of his personal relation to God the Eternal, of his own eternal life, it is a pledge of an unending personal progress. Could this argument be more fully expressed than in Browning's lines from "Christmas Eve" ?

*You know what I mean : God's all, man's nought :
But also God, whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stands away
As it were a handbreadth off, to give
Room for the newly-made to live,*

*And look at Him from a place apart,
And use His gifts of brain and heart,
Given, indeed, but to keep for ever.
Who speaks of man, then, must not sever
Man's very elements from man,
Saying, "But all is God's" – whose plan
Was to create man and then leave him
Able, His own word saith, to grieve Him,
But able to glorify Him too,
As a mere machine could never do.*

CHAPTER VI

ÆSTHETICS

I

(1) THE etymology of the word Æsthetics (from αἰσθησις αἰσθάνομαι to perceive by the senses) would lead us to assign to it the meaning of the study of sense perception. Kant adheres to this meaning in entitling that portion of his *Critique* which deals with the intuitions of time and space as *Transcendental Æsthetics*. The term is now, however, applied to that branch of philosophy which is concerned with the third of the values or ideals, Beauty. It was first so used by Baumgarten, who still associated beauty with the sensations as inferior to "clear thinking." The epithet of Beauty is not now entirely restricted to the sphere of the sensuously apprehended ; but is, as we shall afterwards see, extended to mental and moral activities, although in a strict use of the word it should be so restricted. Man recognises and appreciates Beauty in nature ; he endeavours to create and does create Beauty in art. While not excluding the Beauty of nature, the theory of æsthetics concerns itself mainly with the arts. We shall not at this stage attempt a definition of Beauty, as the data for such a definition will emerge in the subsequent discussion. The first question which arises in regard to beauty is this : Is it an *objective quality* of the world around man or is it a *subjective feeling* in man contemplating that world ? Does the discussion of the subject belong to *metaphysics* which is concerned with the nature of reality, or to *psychology*, dealing with man's psychic processes ?

(a) Ancient philosophy regarded beauty as objective ; Mediæval, while retaining the objectivity, enquired also about the subjective impression, the pleasure given by the contemplation of the beautiful. Since Kant the tendency has been to treat æsthetic appreciation as subjective. Ancient philosophy presents two contrasted theories. For Plato and Aristotle beauty resides in order – unity and multiplicity – proportion and symmetry as illustrated by sculpture and architecture. This conception has a mathematical basis. To this rather austere view popular sentiment added the charm of colour. Further the beautiful was

identified with the good. For Plato beauty was in the transcendent sphere of the ideas ; Aristotle found it in the world around, where form is immanent in matter. Both regard imitation of nature as the function of art, whether the object be beautiful or not. Plotinus criticised the view that beauty resides in the relation of the parts to the whole, and insisted that the parts also must be beautiful. He so far identified beauty with reality, as to affirm that the reality of any object – its nearness in the series of emanations to the ultimate reality – measures its beauty. Light especially is identical with Being, Goodness, Beauty. Accordingly the artist's work is beautiful, not as it closely imitates nature, but as it rises above nature to the *λόγοι* or archetypal ideas.

(b) The Church Fathers were influenced by Neo-Platonism in their views of beauty. Augustine inclined more to the Platonic-Aristotelean theories. But Basil and the Pseudo-Dionysius revert to the Neo-Platonic tradition ; and this influence was continued during the Middle Ages. A theological interest leads Chrysostom among other Fathers to depreciate the achievements of man's art in comparison with God's handiwork in the beauty of nature. Although the only treatise on the subject *de Pulcro* has been wrongly assigned to Aquinas, yet it is in his writings that the æsthetic doctrine of the Middle Ages can be best studied. He lays stress on the *subjective aspect* of the Beautiful. Æsthetic activity is "a disinterested contemplation by the eye, the ear and the intelligence" and is contrasted with the ethical activity, which seeks to take possession of its object – the Good. As regards the objective aspect he follows the Platonic-Aristotelean tradition, but adds other elements – "*ordo, magnitudo, integritas, debita proportio, æqualitas numerosa, commensuratio partium elegans.*" He specially emphasises due proportion, and relates the æsthetic order to the *formal* principle on the one hand and the *final* principle on the other hand of the Aristotelean philosophy – plan and purpose. This objective order must, however, be such as to make the subjective impression – to give satisfaction in its contemplation.

(c) Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the study of beauty has had a larger place in modern philosophy. This is due to two causes : the revival of interest in art at the Renaissance, and the more subjective or psychological character of philosophy. Baumgarten, a disciple of Leibnitz, in the first treatise on Beauty detached æsthetics as a separate

branch of knowledge from general philosophy. The empirical school, as might be anticipated, laid all the stress on subjective impression. Shaftesbury makes beauty as harmony the basis of truth and goodness. N. Home distinguishes *intrinsic* beauty which is immediately felt, from *relative* beauty as means to an end, which is apprehended by reflection. Burke in his *Inquiry into the Origin of the Sublime and the Beautiful* is the first to formulate this distinction; and he does it thus. The beautiful is that which awakes love, tender and social emotions and inclinations in us. "We call beauty a social quality" (i. 10). On the contrary "whatever is fitted in any sort to create the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or disconcertant about terrible objects is a source of the sublime" (i. 7).¹ Rationalism, as represented by Leibnitz for instance, depreciated æsthetic impression as "*confused perception* of the order and the harmony of things," and thus inferior to the clear and distinct ideas which Descartes and his followers regarded as of supreme importance. For Wolff, beauty is such a perfection in objects as gives us pleasure, but in classifying the sciences æsthetics becomes an inferior logic. Two characteristic quotations from this school must be reproduced.² "Beauty," says Mendelssohn, "vanishes away as soon as we try to analyse it." – "The cheeks of a beautiful woman are beautiful as long as they are seen with the naked eye. Look at them with a magnifying glass and their beauty departs."

(2) With Kant we enter on a much more fruitful development of the subject. To his more generally known *Critiques*, that of the *Pure Reason*, dealing with cognition, and that of the *Practical Reason*, dealing with conation, he added a third, the *Critique of Judgment*, which deals with the Beautiful and the Sublime. His own words may first of all be translated. "The beautiful is that which without a conception, is represented as *universally* well-pleasing" (*Krit. d. Urte.* I., §6). "That is beautiful, which without conception, pleases everybody" (*l.c.*, §9). He makes a distinction between two kinds: "free beauty (*pulchritudo vaga*) and the merely dependent beauty (*pulchritudo adhærens*). The first does not pre-suppose any conception of what the object should be, the other does this, and the completeness of the object in accordance therewith" (*l.c.*, §17). This satisfaction is

¹ Quoted Eisler, *op. cit.*, pp. 667, 210.

² Quoted *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., p. 447.

necessary (*l.c.*, §22). "Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object in so far as it is apprehended in it without representation of a purpose."¹ Some of his descriptions of the sublime may be added. The sublime is "what without qualification is great . . . that in comparison with which all else is small" (*l.c.*, p. 102) and "to be able to think which proves a faculty of the mind (*Gemütes*) which transcends all measuring standards of the senses" (*l.c.*, p. 103). Sublime is "Nature in those of its appearances, the contemplation of which brings with it the idea of infinity." (*l.c.*, p. 109).² Although this faculty is the *a priori condition* of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, the judgment is regulative of our apprehension, not constitutive of reality, and so is subjective, "not merely as a *fact* but as a *law*."³ "The beautiful and the sublime," says Carr, "Kant held to be the objects of a satisfaction quite distinct from those which give us the satisfaction of truth and the satisfaction of goodness. Æsthetic qualities are distinguished from, and raised above, all others by their character of disinterestedness and universality. They are disinterested, for the satisfaction we desire from a beautiful object is impersonal, it is not agreeableness or goodness. They are universal, for when we judge a thing beautiful we mean not merely that it is to our taste but that it is beautiful to all beholders. The basis of the æsthetic judgment Kant held to be the discernment of end or purpose, and its highest attainment was to become the symbol of the moral good. Æsthetic was therefore for Kant the highest realm of the activity of the mind."⁴ It need only be added that, according to Kant, the sublime, while it humbles man by the sense of his incapacity to grasp the object, yet exalts him by pointing him to the supersensible reality to which he belongs. How far the subjectivity of the æsthetic judgment may be modified on a wider view of Kant's philosophy, Caird's statement shows. "Art and science," he says, "imagination and reason, may thus be contrasted as subjective and objective; though in so far as Science always exists for us in a more or less abstract form, the poetic consciousness of the whole as present in the part must be regarded as an anticipative grasp of a truth which is beyond ordinary knowledge, and of which philosophy is a continual but never completed verification. In this sense it is more

¹ Eisler, *op. cit.*, pp. 667-668.

² *Idem*, p. 210.

³ *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., p. 447.

⁴ *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, pp. 41-42.

than a jest to say that Science is a fiction which looks like truth, while Art is a truth that looks like fiction. If in one place Kant asserts that in recognising beauty in the object the mind is conscious only if its own subjective harmony with itself, we must remember that in another place he speaks of it as involving a reference of the phenomenal object to its noumenal reality. But the noumenal reality of the individual phenomenal object lies just in the fact that potentially it involves the whole world, and so is a kind of world in itself. And the illusion lies only in this that to Art it seems complete in itself without regard to these relations. Its *mere* subjectivity could be asserted, only if the judgments of ordinary knowledge or of science were taken as absolute truth."¹ As a *microcosm* in its completeness art mirrors the *macrocosm*, the completeness of which knowledge and science only partially demonstrate.

(3) The mind of which beauty was, according to Kant, a creation in the post-Kantian philosophy, became the new creative principle of the universe. We can pass over the other thinkers and come at once to the greatest of them all, Hegel, who gives to Art a very high place in the evolution of Mind, Reason, Idea, or Spirit. This cosmic principle reaches full self-contemplation in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. Art presents the identity of the ideal and real in sensuous forms (*Anschauung*) ; Religion presents it as image (*Vorstellung*) ; and Philosophy as conception (*Begriff*). Against this metaphysical objectivity there was a reaction to psychological subjectivity in Herbart, who on the bases of observation as opposed to speculation reduced Beauty to a perception of *relations* or forms (a *form-æsthetic* instead of a *content-æsthetic*).

(4) We may reserve the notice of Cousin for the next section, dealing with the theistic inference from æsthetics ; and will close this section with a fuller account of the less familiar theory of the founder of the Italian Neo-Hegelian school, *Benedetto Croce*. The first volume of his *Philosophy of the Spirit* deals with *Æsthetics as the science of expression and general linguistic*, and has been translated by Mr. Douglas Ainslie. Carr in the work already quoted discusses this volume more fully ; but here I shall confine myself to a summary of his small volume *The Essence of Æsthetic*, which Mr. Ainslie has also translated. (a) The article on "Beauty" in the *E.R.E.* by Maurice de Wulf in the one quotation it gives seems to me

¹ *Op. cit.*, II., pp. 466-467.

to give a false impression of Croce's view. "Beauty does not belong to things; it is not a psychic fact, it belongs to man's activity, to spiritual energy." The short statement of his position does not correct this false impression: "He holds that æsthetic activity is the imaginative and concrete intuition as opposed to the logical and general conception."¹ The apparent subjectivism of Croce's theory disappears when we put his æsthetics in the context of his philosophy. For him history as the spiritual energy, as man's activity, is the sole reality; and philosophy, not as a metaphysic, leading to a reality beyond the world as it appears, but as a methodology, a way of interpreting history, may be identified with history. He has summarised his philosophy very clearly and distinctly in the following passage.² "In the philosophy which I have sketched, Reality is affirmed as Mind, not a mind which stands above the world or runs through the world, but a mind which coincides with the world. Nature is shown to be a moment and product of mind itself. Dualism, therefore (at least that form of dualism which has tormented thought from Thales to Herbert Spencer), is surmounted, and surmounted with it is transcendence, whether of a materialistic or of a theological principle. Mind, which is the World, is the mind which is evolving, and therefore it is both one and diverse at the same time, an eternal solution and an eternal problem. The self-consciousness of this mind is the philosophy which is its history—its history which is its philosophy, both substantially one and identical. And the consciousness is identical with the self-consciousness, that is, they are distinct and yet one, like life and thought." Art is not the product of the subjective individual mind, but of the objective universal mind (at least so I understand this philosophy), although the Mind must express and realise itself in minds.

(b) Mind has a twofold aspect, thought and will, for Croce has no place for feeling, emotion, sentiment in his philosophy; corresponding to thought is the *theoretical*, and to will the *practical activity* of mind. But each of these has two moments: thought is active as intuition or as conception, in art or in philosophy (æsthetic or logic); will is practical in securing the natural good, or the moral good (economics or

¹ *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., p. 449. I gratefully recognise my indebtedness to this article in the preceding paragraphs, as æsthetics is the branch of philosophy to which I have hitherto given least study.

² *Storiografia*, p. 286, quoted by Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

ethics). To the three generally recognised values, truth, beauty, goodness, Croce thus adds utility. Each of these moments is related to the others. Intuition as the first moment is independent of conception, but conception is dependent upon it as its condition. In like manner the economic activity is independent of the ethical, but the ethical is dependent upon it as its condition. So also willing depends on knowing; there is thus a hierarchy, intuition the lowest and independent moment, moral action the highest and dependent on the other three moments. This order he describes as that of *the twofold degree*. Intuition or art thus comes first of all. Between it and conception or philosophy, Croce does not place religion, as does Hegel, for as he has no use for feeling, so he feels no need of religion. "It is for him a hybrid activity, partaking now of æsthetic, now of logic. Religion is mythology, and mythology is in part art and in part philosophy."¹

(c) Concentrating our attention on Art we begin with his definition of it. "Art is *vision* or *intuition*. The artist produces an image or a phantasm; and he who enjoys art turns his gaze upon the point which the artist has indicated, looks through the chink which he has opened, and reproduces that image in himself."² This definition "denies that art is a *physical fact*," for "physical facts *do not possess reality* as they are a *construction of our intellect for the purposes of science*"; and "art, to which so many devote their whole lives and which fills all with a divine joy, is *supremely real*."³ Further, art has nothing to do with "the *useful* and with pleasure and pain," nor is it a *moral act* as such, although "the moralistic doctrine of art was and is and will be perpetually beneficial . . . it was and will be an effort, however unhappy, to separate art from the merely pleasing, with which it is sometimes confused, and to assign to it a more worthy part; and it has also its true side, because, if art be beyond morality, the artist is neither this side of it nor that, but under its empire, in so far as he is a man who cannot withdraw himself from the duties of man, and must look upon art itself – art, which is not and never will be moral – as a mission to be exercised, a priestly office."⁴ Most important of all the negations, art has not "the character of conceptual knowledge," for ideality is characteristic of art, realism of philosophy; it shares with philosophy the *theoretic* character, and

¹ Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

² *The Essence of Æsthetic*, p. 8.

³ *Idem*, pp. 9–10.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 11–16.

there is a relation between imagination and logic, claiming consideration.¹ Having set aside what art is not, the closer definition of it demands a scrutiny of the term *intuition*. "The intuition is certainly the production of an image, but not of an incoherent mass of images obtained by recalling former images and allowing them to succeed one another capriciously, by combining one image with another in a like capricious manner."² The principle which has been here applied has been that of *unity in variety*. But in the application of such a principle there has emerged "the strife of *romanticism* and *classicism*." "Giving the general definition, here convenient, and setting aside minor and accidental definitions, romanticism asks of art, above all, the spontaneous and violent effusion of the affections, of love and hate, of anguish and joy, of despair and elation; and is willingly satisfied and pleased with vaporous and indeterminate images, broken and allusive in style, with vague suggestion, with approximate phrases, with powerful and confused sketches; while classicism loves the peaceful soul, the wise design, figures studied in their characteristics and precise in outline, ponderation, equilibrium, clarity; and resolutely tends towards representation, as the other tends towards *feeling*."³ The conclusion regarding this controversy is "that what gives coherence and unity to the intuition is feeling; the intuition is really such because it represents a feeling, and can only appear from and upon that." . . . "What we admire in genuine works of art is the perfect imaginative form which a state of the soul assumes; and we call this life, unity, compactness and fullness of the work of art. What displeases us in the false and imperfect forms is the struggle of several different states of the soul and yet unified, their stratification, or mixture, their vacillating method, which attains apparent unity from the will of the author, who for this purpose avails himself of an abstract plan or idea, or of extra-æsthetic, passionate emotion."⁴ This emphasis on feeling as the motive in art Croce indicates by adding to the term intuition the explanatory epithet *lyrical*.

(d) After thus answering the question, What is Art? Croce seeks to get rid of certain "prejudices relating to Art." He sets aside the controversy about *content* and *form* (as between the Hegelians and the Herbartians) by asserting that "art is a true *æsthetic synthesis a priori* of feeling and

¹ *Idem*, pp. 16-21.

² *Idem*, p. 24.

³ *Idem*, p. 28.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 30-31.

image in the intuition, as to which it may be repeated that feeling without image is blind, and image without feeling is void."¹ No less does he reject the separation of *intuition* from *expression*, the image from the physical translation of the image, the soul of the artist from the media of his art, colour, sound, etc., for "in reality we know nothing but expressed intuitions ; a thought is not thought for us unless it be possible to formulate it in words ; a musical image exists for us, only when it becomes concrete in sounds ; a pictorial image only when it is coloured." He admits, however, that "it is possible to be a great artist with a bad technique."² In this connection he makes a statement on the beauty of nature which is very challenging. "It is evident that, besides the instruments which are made for the reproduction of images, objects already existing can be met with, whether produced by man or not, which perform such a service – that is to say, are more or less adapted to fixing the memory of our intuitions ; and these things take the name of 'natural beauties,' and exercise their fascination only when we know how to understand them with the same soul with which the artist or artists have taken and appropriated them, giving value to them and indicating the point of view from which we must look at them, thus connecting them with their own intuitions. But the always imperfect adaptability, the fugitive nature, the mutability of 'natural beauties' also justify the inferior place accorded to them, compared with beauties produced by art. Let us leave it to rhetoricians or the intoxicated to affirm that a beautiful tree, a beautiful river, a sublime mountain, or even a beautiful horse, or a beautiful human figure, are superior to the chisel-stroke of Michael Angelo or the verse of Dante ; but let us say, with greater propriety, that 'nature' is stupid compared with art, and that she is 'mute' if man does not make her speak."³ We must reserve for later discussion the qualifications this statement demands. Croce regards as a "labour to distinguish the indistinguishable" the division of the æsthetic expression "into the two moments of expression strictly considered, or *propriety*, and beauty of expression, or *adorned expression*, founding upon these the classification of two orders of expression, naked and ornate." For expression must be adequate, but not excessive ; the imagination must have its body, but must not be obese. Lastly he deprecates in

¹ *The Essence of Æsthetic*, p. 39.

² *Idem*, pp. 42–43, 46.

³ *Idem*, p. 47.

artistic criticism the divisions of the arts into different kinds with their proper laws ; and, acknowledging the practical convenience of some classification, insists on spontaneity in the production and the contemplation of art as art, whatever its medium may be.

(e) While discussing the Place of Art in the Spirit and in Human Society he maintains the independence of Art as one of the moments of the activity of Mind, but insists on their interdependence, the need of the artist, the philosopher, the practical man, the moralist one for another. All the moments are so related as to form a circle ; but a circle which is not a mere revolution returning upon itself, but "progress . . . the perpetual growth of the spirit and of reality in itself, where nothing is repeated, save the form of the growth."¹

(f) In the Criticism of Art he recognises three moments: *art*, the material on which it is exercised, *taste*, the experience of art in the critic, and *interpretation* or comment. "This experience would be wanting without exegesis, without the removal of the obstacles to reproductive imagination, which supplies the spirit with those presuppositions of historical knowledge of which it has need, and which are the wood to burn in the fire of imagination."² Criticism is thus a creative factor in the History of Art as an appreciation of art, a discrimination of art from what is not art. "True and complete *criticism* is the serene *historical narration of what has happened* ; and history is the only true criticism that can be exercised upon the doings of humanity, which cannot be not-facts, since they have happened, and are not to be dominated by the spirit otherwise than by *understanding them*." This history of art is part of the complete history of mankind as the activity of the Spirit or Mind.³ I may be excused for treating so fully this theory, on the ground that this thinker is not so well known as are our English writers on the subject, such as Bosanquet in his *History of Æsthetic*, or Knight in his *Philosophy of the Beautiful*, to both of whom I refer in other connections.

II

In the preceding treatment, greater prominence has been given to art than to beauty in nature, and the theistic inference has also been absent. We now turn to some instances

¹ *Idem*, p. 79.

² *Idem*, p. 90.

³ *Idem*, p. 104.

of an argument for the existence of God from the datum of beauty.

(1) Professor A. Caldecott, in his book *The Philosophy of Religion*, calls attention to the fact that beauty as a value received little attention till the eighteenth century. "If French genius," he says, "could so far suppress it, Englishmen would hardly be likely to stand up in isolated guardianship over it. But the resuscitation of this idea for the purposes of philosophy came not from France, but from Scotland, where Hutcheson and Reid made it prominent, and from Germany, where Kant gave it considerable room, though not a place in the front rank. Gradually over the modern spirit admiration for the beautiful recovered its influence, and in the romanticism of the early nineteenth century Shelley and Byron, Scott and Wordsworth, Chateaubriand and de Stäel, Goethe and Schiller, caused literature to glow with it once more, although in British philosophy recognition still lagged, in spite of Coleridge. In all this the course of theism in England was parallel with that of philosophy generally. Every other aspect of things divine could raise up advocates and devotees save this. From many theisms it was altogether omitted; in some it received a few chill words; in scarce any a genuine welcome."¹ Caldecott refers to the Cambridge Platonists as extolling "the exceeding beauty of the Eternal," to Shaftesbury as basing his theism mainly on his appreciation of the beauty of the world, to Hutcheson as recognising the universality and immediacy of the æsthetic sense but not relating it to his theism, and to Reid as vindicating both the objective and subjective factors, "the belief that the objects have some perfection or excellence belonging to them" and the "agreeable motion or feeling in the mind."²

(2) In the article on "Beauty" in the *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., a depreciatory reference is made to Cousin, who described his own philosophy as eclecticism, and who in writing on "Beauty" echoed Hegel and the Scottish school. "In his well-known book *Du Vrai, du beau et du bien* (1818) he gave prominence to an æsthetic made up of fine phrases and pompous homage to the Ideal, which he identified with the Infinite or the perfection of God."³ But his argument may be briefly stated. He recognises Beauty in the soul and in objects. The sense of Beauty is a specific sentiment; the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

² *Idem*, pp. 188-189.

³ *E. R. E.*, Vol. II., p. 448.

full appreciation of Beauty is Taste, and "Art is Taste set in action." In objects we may distinguish Beauty, Physical, Intellectual, and Moral or Spiritual, the last being the greatest of the three. Beauty is not utility, nor adjustment of means to ends; but proportion, order, and unity-in-variety are elements in it. Actual beauty points beyond itself to ideal. "The ideal recedes as we approach it; the last term is in the Infinite; that is to say, in God; or, to express it better still, the true and absolute Ideal is no other than God himself. . . . He is the principle of the Beautiful, both as the Author of the physical and the Father of the intellectual and the moral worlds. It is simply to be the slave of the senses and of appearances if a man stops at the movements, forms, sounds, and colours which by their harmonious combinations produce the Beauty of the visible universe, and fails to conceive behind this scene, magnificent and well-ordered as it is, the Author of Order, the Geometer, the Artist supreme." But God is not only the Beautiful; He is also the Sublime. "If He extends the horizon of our thought, it is to confound us in the abyss of His magnificence. If the soul expands before the spectacle of His goodness, does it not at the same time feel awe when it thinks on His justice, as it stands before the soul with no less clearness than His goodness? God is both gentle and awful."¹ This eloquence must be admitted to be "somewhat remote from reality"; but, duly moderated, it can be accepted as valid argument.

(3) From Cousin we may pass to John Ruskin, with whom Caldecott deals at some length.² The wide extension which he gives to the term beauty, and the direct witness to God he finds in all its forms, may be indicated by a few sentences from chapter iv., section 1, Part III., of *Modern Painters*.³ "This subject matter [of the theoretic faculty] is referable to four general heads. It is either the record of conscience written in things external, or it is a symbolising of divine attributes in matter, or it is the felicity of living things, or the perfect fulfilment of their duties and functions. In all cases it is something divine, either the approving voice of God, the glorious symbol of Him, the evidence of His kind presence, or the obedience to His will by Him induced and supported. All these subjects of contemplation are such as we may

¹ *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, pp. 308-311.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.

³ Popular edition, George Allen, 1906, II., pp. 143-144.

suppose will remain sources of pleasure to the perfected spirit through eternity. Divine in their nature, they are addressed to the immortal part of man." It is not improbable that many exponents of art to-day would regard the moralist as discrediting the art-critic. Even if we should regard his extension of the term as too wide, enough would be included of what would be generally regarded as legitimately described as beauty to justify this quotation in this connection.

(4) Professor Wm. Knight, in his book *Aspects of Theism*, devotes chapter xiii. to dealing with *the Beautiful in its Relation to Theism*. The argument may be traced in a few sentences: "Beauty is as ultimate as anything that is known in the spheres of the true and the good." One characteristic of Beauty is its prodigality—"its being diffused in quarters where it is not at first recognised." "If in the constitution of every molecule there is a symmetry, in the arrangement of every atom the most consummate accuracy, and in the adaptation of each group of inorganic forms a perfect adjustment of means to ends, they may all be regarded as a world-wide disclosure of the Beautiful." . . . "These material forms, in which Beauty is mirrored to us, have been gradually evolved, and are incessantly changing, and so the Beauty disclosed is a transient apparition which vanishes as the organic products of the world pass away. Evidenced in the laws, rather than in the forms of Nature, and in its movements and moving forces, Beauty changes as they change; but so far as, and so long as, it is discerned, our apprehension of it is a knowledge of the very essence of things, and therefore of that which transcends Nature." Accordingly "the Beauty of the Universe may be philosophically construed as a direct disclosure of the Infinite in man. . . . It is a sign to us that the Infinite has need of the finite, the Absolute of the relative; that there is not a great gulf fixed; but that beneath the difference which separates there is a deeper unity underlying. This may be more fully realised when the apprehension of the Sublime is added to that of the Beautiful, and when its realisation—not in space dimension or area, but in power intension and degree—is awakened in us." Sometimes nature seems to be unlike and alien to us, at others akin and kind. "Mr. Hinton used to say that the laws of nature corresponded to the habits of a friend." These contrasted experiences "are indeed but the two sides of the knowableness and the unknowableness of the

Infinite." . . . "The evidence of theism which reaches us from this region of the Beautiful comes and goes ; and it is meant to come and go. . . . When we keep company with the poets, who have been seers and prophets of the Beautiful, we find that we are taken very much nearer to the heart of things than when we follow the chemist or the physicist – great as is our indebtedness to them."¹ A wide extension is here given to the idea of Beauty. Indeed, all appreciation of nature, order, law, purpose, as well as Beauty and Sublimity, are here embraced in the description of man's discovery of, and communion with, God in nature, the Infinite with the finite. There is not a logical demonstration here, but rather a mystic intuition ; but that too is an approach to reality.

(5) A sustained argument is offered by Mr. J. H. Kennedy in his *Natural Theology and Modern Thought*.

(a) His starting-point is human art. Beauty is produced only when it is intended. "The worker in any beautiful art has to select and choose between possibilities as much as an engine-builder or a shipwright ; and the frequency of failure in this kind of work would seem to show that the number of possible combinations whose result is ugliness as far exceeds the number of those which result in a beautiful work of art as the number of chance combinations which would have produced nothing useful exceeds the number of those whose result is a useful machine."² Should we not, he argues, for the beauty in nature assert a like cause – an intelligent will ?

(b) Next he meets an objection that "natural selection" affords an explanation of the beauty of the world. "The colours of flowers render them conspicuous in contrast with the green leaves which surround them, so that they may be more easily discerned by the insects which fertilise them ; and the beauty of butterflies and of birds is due to sexual selection, the more beautiful having been preferred by their fellows, and their race preserved, whilst others perished."³ This objection is met in three ways. *First*, its adequacy is challenged by some writers. "They have contended that it credits the birds and butterflies with a delicate appreciation of colour which is very improbable ; and that in the case of the flowers, which owe their fertilisation to their conspicuous colour, it would only account for their bright and strong colours, not for their beautiful pencillings and delicate

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 191–196.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

³ *Idem*, pp. 142–143.

shades."¹ *Secondly*, Kennedy points out that the theory of natural selection itself has been modified in this use of it. "A new element has come into action, the element of consciousness and also of a rudimentary form of choice and will ; and without this element the theory will not work."² Thus design is recognised. *Thirdly*, the explanation is not wide enough, for "there is other beauty in the world beside that of birds and flowers. There is the beauty of mountains and valleys, of forests, of sea and shore, the hues of sunrise and of sunset, and the midnight sky."³ Must there not be choice and will here also ?

(c) From this objection Kennedy passes to discuss at length Kant's argument for the subjectivity of beauty and sublimity. Anxious to base the belief in God on the postulate of the categorical imperative, he *firstly* sought to exclude even the possibility of a theistic argument from the Beauty and the Sublimity of the World, by excluding design here on the ground that "the reason through its axioms guards as much as possible against the unnecessary multiplication of principles." This objection Kennedy counters by insisting that the principle of design is admitted already in works of art, and all that a theistic argument would do would be to extend the application of that principle. *Secondly*, Kant tries to refer objects which evoke the exercise of our æsthetic judgment to a mechanical tendency in nature, although to us they may appear purposeful. "There would have been considerable force," Kennedy argues, "in an argument of this kind, had the more elementary processes of nature, which science has only recently disclosed to man, shown no indications of a tendency to beauty ; and as the state of the case is the very reverse of this, and nature here, as Kant truly says, shows everywhere a tendency to beauty, it becomes a far more hopeless task to account by any alternative cause for the beauty of the universe ever manifesting itself to man in new departments, and in a wider range."⁴ Using crystallisation as an illustration, he shows that "any interference on our part with the process will mar this result (the regular and beautiful forms), just as artistic work would be marred by similar interference."⁵ *Thirdly*, Kant excludes the possibility of any purpose in beauty on the ground that "in judging beauty we invariably seek its gauge in ourselves *a priori*, and our æsthetic power of judgment itself acts

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

² *Idem*, p. 144.

³ *Idem*, pp. 144-145.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 152-153.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 154.

in a legislative capacity."¹ Kennedy replies that this dictum would apply no less to works of art than to objects in nature, and yet we do not deny the design of the artist in his work. He quotes Kant himself: "Genius can only furnish rich material for products of beautiful Art; its execution and form demand cultivated talent, in order to make such a use of the material as will bear examination by the judgment" (*Kr. d. Ur.*, §47). Kant is inconsistent, for, explaining the beauty of art by design, and the beauty of nature by a mechanical tendency, he yet says of both that beauty is the expression of æsthetic ideas. As regards the sublime, he does not admit any external cause, such as a mechanical tendency. "The sole cause of the latter, according to him, is to be found in ourselves and in our way of thinking; the sublime is shapeless or deformed; and it is an improper way of expressing ourselves when we call any object of nature sublime."² The feeling of the sublime combines the pain of our inability to measure an object in our imagination and the pleasure of recognising "the disproportion between the greatest power of sense-perception and the ideas of the reason; the object which we call sublime simply furnishing the occasion for this play of the powers of our imagination and our reason."³ Kant distinguishes the *mathematical sublime* (vastness) from the *dynamical sublime* (power). As he finds the sublime in nature "in its chaos, or in its wildest, most lawless disorder and desolation, if only vastness and power appear there . . . he concludes that the Sublime is in Nothing of nature, but only in our spirit."⁴ Kennedy concedes that "sublimity belongs to the spirit and the ideas of the mind," but denies that on that account it has no objective basis in nature, and enforces his plea by appealing to our recognition of sublimity in the character and conduct of others. Even if the possessor is unconscious of the qualities that arouse this sense, the qualities are and must be there. Kant himself is inconsistent, when he ascribes sublimity to morality, conformity to law, and so finds in it order, not confusion, and when he associates beauty and sublimity in the moral sphere. Kennedy argues that we cannot, as Kant does, contrast nature and human life in this regard; but must recognise resemblance. "There is the same contrast between the beautiful and the sublime, and the same effect produced in the percipient mind by each

¹ *Idem*, p. 157.² *Idem*, p. 163.³ *Idem*, p. 164.⁴ *Idem*, p. 168.

respectively.”¹ In the arts, sublimity is not produced by mere lawlessness and violence in the artist, and so also in nature there is a proportioning and harmonising principle. Kant himself inconsistently recognises this when he places the starry heavens alongside of the moral law as supreme instances of sublimity. His argument that the blending of sublime and beautiful proves, not their likeness, but their opposition, as black and white blend in grey, Kennedy counters by the assertion that “beauty and sublimity may be combined in the same object, with the result of enhancing the effect instead of weakening it, because they are not really opposites ; but to attempt to combine in the same object beauty and ugliness, or sublimity and meanness, would be to weaken or destroy the beauty or the sublimity, for ugliness is the true opposite or contradictory of beauty, and meanness of sublimity.”² As Kant associated beauty with form and not with colour, he denied that the sublime as formless could be beautiful, and held that colour was only agreeable, and beautiful only in so far as enhancing the impression of coloured forms ; he based this view on a now discarded view of light. Modern science, Kennedy urges, in disclosing the physical causes of the Beautiful and Sublime in nature, only confirms the conception that they evidence objectively design, a mind at work. This book by Kennedy thus supplies the best contribution I know to the argument for the Beauty and the Sublimity of the world as a datum for a theistic argument.

(6) While the way of reasoning is trod by the philosopher and the theologian as such, the poet and the artist have a more immediate awareness of God in the beauty and the sublimity of nature. Wordsworth’s confession, however familiar, must be recalled in this connection. He felt

*A Presence that disturbs us with the joy
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.*

While his opinions hindered Shelley from giving this same intuition a theistic reference, it is no less there in his personification of nature :

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

² *Idem*, p. 183.

*Earth, ocean, air, beloved brotherhood!
 If our great mother has imbued my soul
 With aught of natural piety to feel
 Your love, and recompense the boon with mine.*

*Mother of this unfathomable world!
 Favour my solemn song, for I have loved
 Thee ever, and thee only.*

(“Alastor.”)

The value of such awareness has been recognised by Dr. John Oman in his book on *The Natural and the Supernatural*, although the illustration he uses does not bear directly on the sense of God. He prefers the poetic vision or the child response to nature to that of the thinkers. “We shall not betake ourselves,” he says, “to the scientist and philosopher as authorities on what is known by awareness and apprehension, because they are precisely the persons whose eyes are most turned to the backs of their heads, looking for understandings and explanations, and who, even when they do look at their environment, are most in danger of seeing it only with the eyes of their judgments and theories, but to the poet and the child whose gifts are for perceiving and not for explaining.”¹ While I do not fully share this author’s depreciation of intellectual activity in making the world more intelligible, yet, especially as regards the awareness of God in nature, the sense of beauty and sublimity must be regarded as of primary importance. In the next chapter we shall discuss this immediate intuition in all its aspects, but here it seemed specially necessary to call attention to it,

(7) Although I have been constructing my own argument while commenting on, and criticising, the views of others, I may at the close of this chapter draw together the truths which in my judgment have emerged in a series of brief affirmations.

(a) It is a loss that theistic thinkers generally have not paid more attention to this datum for a theistic inference, as it would have an appeal not only to poets and artists, but to all who have any æsthetic sensitiveness and responsiveness.

(b) In a previous chapter an idealistic realism was expounded and adopted, and on this basis we may rest the affirmation that as the *sensa* are real, so the qualities of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

beauty and sublimity, which the world presents to us, are objectively real, and, as the sensing is real, so is the sense of these qualities subjectively real.

(c) It is often maintained *de gustibus non disputandum*, "as many men, as many tastes," and from this variety of appreciation it would follow that there can be no standard of judgment. It may be impossible to maintain that certain combinations of colour, and these only, afford æsthetic satisfaction through the eye because of a special adaptation to it as the organ of vision, or that there is a restricted range of sounds in which the man who has "music in his soul" can delight; for it would seem that under the sway of fashion men can accustom themselves to be pleased, or to profess themselves pleased, with what to others is *bizarre* painting or music. But, allowing for necessary modifications in the development of human culture, it may surely be maintained that for those who by natural endowment are adapted, or by training have equipped themselves, for æsthetic appreciation, there is a consensus of judgment; and some men are better qualified to say not only what is admired, but what ought to be admired. There are two reasons why there is less general agreement here than in regard to truth and goodness. *Firstly*, there is greater social pressure to produce agreement as regards knowledge and conduct than as regards æsthetic appreciation or production; men could not have intercourse or co-operate with one another unless they had common standards of truth and goodness. *Secondly*, education is much more directed towards securing the same knowledge and the same morals than the same tastes. If æsthetic education became more general, familiarity with the masterpieces of the past the inheritance of all, and an appreciation of nature more widely spread,¹ we might expect a much more general agreement in taste.

(d) What beauty is has already been often indicated. It is in its sensuous aspect unity-in-difference, harmony, perfection, symmetry. It is not a mere *imitation* of nature, a reproduction of nature's colours, shapes, and sounds. Although Croce's depreciation of nature in comparison with art seems to me to be almost perverse in its exaggeration, yet human music and song do excel any of nature's sounds, and man can by cultivation of plants and domestication of animals produce what must be regarded as improvements. Probably it is in its appeal to the sense of sight that

¹ For this end "hiking" is much to be preferred to cycling or motoring.

nature can rival, if not excel, human art. The beauty of art depends on expression, and inspired expression – “*lyric intuition*,” as Croce calls it. The imagination produces the intuition, the complex of images which constitute its beauty ; from the emotion springs the lyric quality. The picture must not only be imaginatively *seen*, or the melody imaginatively *heard*, but the one or the other must be *felt*. If classicism over-emphasises the unity of the intuition, romanticism exaggerates the volume and the intensity of the lyric moment. The artist must put himself into his art, but not his peculiar, individual, it may even be eccentric, self, but his universal self, the range of his apprehension and the reach of his appreciation of what is significant and valuable in the life of man and nature. A portrait is often a better likeness than a photograph ; for it has this element of expression, and that in this wider range is interpretation. There is no art where personality does not shine in colour, or soar in sound.

(e) This may bring us to consider the theistic approach. Kennedy seems to lead us by a more circuitous route than is absolutely necessary. Human art discloses design. The beauty and sublimity of nature also disclose design. From design we pass to the designer, God. Thus the argument becomes an instance of the teleological, and its form is analogy. Knight chooses a shorter path. The Beauty and Sublimity of nature directly lead the mind to God. It is by induction, if any reasoning there be, and not analogy, that we reach our conclusion. Sublimity in which beauty is not so coherently complete, but breaks bounds into the Beyond, raises our minds from the finite to the Infinite. What it lacks in perfect sensuous expression it gains in spiritual suggestiveness. Greek statuary was beautiful, and represented finite gods. Early Christian art was often defective, but it did suggest the Infinite Beyond. We must, then, recognise that Beauty, and still more Sublimity, may for many sensitive souls be a straight and open highway to God.

(f) Although we may generally apply the terms to the sensuous presentation or the natural reality, yet they may also be legitimately transferred to the inner life. A character may be beautiful ; a sacrifice may be sublime. Hence, though God is Spirit, and no man hath seen God at any time, we may regard Beauty as well as Sublimity as an attribute of God. It is the blending of the many diverse

elements in His perfection ; goodness and righteousness, tenderness and severity, holiness and love, which are His Beauty – or, rather, the Scriptures would say, His Glory.

*The heavens declare the Glory of God,
And the firmament showeth His handiwork. . . .
The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul :
The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.*
(Ps. xix. 1, 7.)

God is Light, and God is Love.

CHAPTER VII

MYSTICS

I

(1) THERE is a growing opinion among psychologists, biologists and philosophical thinkers generally in favour of the view that mind and life cannot be separated from one another as has hitherto been often assumed, but that both as phases of one intrinsically directive energy should be contrasted with physical energy where the direction is extrinsic. In any case we may regard the development of the organism and of the personality as so intimately related that we may apply to the latter the ruling conception of the progressive adaptation to the environment. In its three aspects, cognitive, affective, and conative, the personality develops as it is receptive of, and responsive to, its environment, adapting itself to that environment and adapting that environment increasingly to itself as it comes to understand and control it actively and not merely to submit to it passively. What then is the environment?

(a) If we distinguish body and soul as the dualism which has still many authoritative supporters does, the most immediate environment of the soul is the body, of the personality its vital organ. Even if we take the monistic view, and condemn "the absurdity of the body-soul relation," on the ground that there can be no relation where there is identity, enough distinction remains to justify the statement that the consciousness at least regards its physical functions as an environment. Next there comes the physical environment of the body, the material world around us, known to us in the *sensa*. For consciousness the relation appears immediate. For the psychologist and the epistemologist there is a process of mediation, physical, physiological, psychological; yet we may affirm that we do know the world (objects or events, however we may describe them) as it is. Some psychologists would maintain that our consciousness of space is due to the mobility of our organ of sight, of substance to the resistance offered to our movements, and of causality to our exercise of will. Others would regard such a way as too circuitous, and claim a more direct apprehension.

However it be, we have an immediate and effective commerce with the world in our impressions from it (knowledge), our affections by it (feelings) and our expressions to it (actions). This intercourse is mediated in the organism by organs of sense, afferent nerves, brain, efferent nerves, muscles of movement.

(b) Of the world around us the most important elements are other persons. Are they too known first of all as objects of sense, and do we from the similarity of their activities to our own infer that they are personal as we are, and distinguish them from inanimate objects and even all vital organisms which show less resemblance? Is this circuitous route necessary? If animism be the primitive philosophy, the process was the reverse. All objects were deemed alive, *ensouled*, and the discovery was not of the distinction of the animate by the sensuous signs from the inanimate, but the reverse because of the absence of these signs. But must the intercourse of persons be always mediated by sense and inference? If telepathy be a proved theory, and not a tentative hypothesis, we should be entitled to answer that sense is not always necessary. Is it merely a poet's licence, when Browning represents a husband as addressing his wife in these words?

*When, if I think but deep enough,
You are wont to answer, prompt as rhyme;
And you, too, find without rebuff
Response your soul seeks many a time
Piercing its fine flesh-stuff.*
("By the Fireside," xxiv.)

Without committing ourselves to the methods of spiritualism, are we to dismiss as fond fancy the conviction held by intelligent, responsible persons that they do sometimes become aware of the spiritual presence of their beloved, not dead, but alive in God? Are they not perfected without us, and are we "compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses" (Heb. xi. 40, xii. 1). Let me here repeat words already quoted in another connection from Clement C. J. Webb. "In the case of our relations with our fellows it will be readily apparent on consideration that our recognition of them as persons cannot be explained as merely an 'inference' from our perception of their bodily shape and movements by analogy with our own. Such inference may

indeed play a part in the recognition, but a direct *rapport* transcending anything that such an inference by itself could give us is absolutely necessary.”¹ Is there communion of souls without the mediation of the body? But are body, world, persons, the whole of the environment?

(c) If religion is not a delusion, man is conscious of a divine environment; he rises above, reaches beyond himself, his body, his world, his fellows to that which is still as real as all these are. He is aware of the *numinous* presence, which inspires him with terror, awe, reverence, as he comes to know – not It, but Him – not apart from all else which makes up his environment, but in and through it all. The vague awareness of the religious consciousness generally becomes a vivid apprehension in the poet and the artist through beauty, in the thinker through truth, in the saint through goodness. Unless founders of religion, prophets, apostles, Jesus Himself, have been deceived or deceivers that environment reveals itself to receptive and responsive persons.

(2) In my judgment the distinctive value of Dr. John Oman’s book *The Natural and the Supernatural* lies in his exposition of these truths: (1) the relation of human personality to environment; (2) the extension of this relation from the natural to the supernatural as interpenetrating and interfused; (3) his insistence on awareness and apprehension as modes of knowing more important than conception and explanation, however valuable these are to give man command over the world by his understanding of it. Accepting the definition of man as “a rational animal, a tool-using animal, a laughing animal, and a religious animal,” he discovers a common root for these characteristics. “All alike show that man does not accept his environment in the way it is accepted by all other animals. To be rational is to think no longer of things merely as they happen, but to enquire about their permanent relations; to use tools is to accept no more the arrangements life made for him, but to think of altering them to suit himself; to learn to laugh is not to submit to the immediate impression of what threatens but to determine his own impression by twitching off its mask; to be religious is to face the immediate and the convenient, even when he could not reason, or work, or laugh himself out of them, and to look for something more reliable in them and more permanent beyond them. Thus all

¹ *God and Man*, p. 564.

are phases of the one peculiarity in man, that, somehow, he was able to gain a footing amid the mere flux of his experiences."¹ Man has in all these ways risen above, and reached beyond his environment, until in the environment disclosed in religion he did gain and hold the ultimate, which gave him footing above the flux. It is with the nature of this supernatural, and not our mode of knowing it, that religion is concerned. "Just as we are concerned, in our daily life, with the natural world, and not with our way of knowing it, so are we concerned with the supernatural. Yet both the Natural and the Supernatural are distinguished by the way in which they make themselves known, which is by the meaning, or, in other words, the value they have for us. As the natural world is known by sensation and its varied comparative values, so the supernatural world is known by the sense of the holy and its sacred or absolute values ; and for practical purposes, the distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural is between comparative value and absolute."² A passage has already been quoted to illustrate Dr. Oman's preference of awareness and apprehension to conception and explanation. Religion is not concerned with *how* we know God, but *that* we do know Him, and *what* we know. He would not deny that as in sensuous perception, so in spiritual, there is a process of mediation, natural, psychic, historical ; but what matters is the immediate consciousness of the divine environment, and the receptivity and responsiveness of the soul to God.

(3) Man can and does receive from, and respond to, his environment in these manifold ways because he has a native, or as the philosophers prefer to say, an *a priori* capacity for such relation to it. The capacity must be there antecedent to the experience ; it is the condition of the possibility of the experience, just as in the experience the capacity finds its fulfilled function. Kant's criticism may need modification as regards details, but his main contention, apart from the scepticism at its base (that the thing-in-itself is not known) and at its summit (that the ideas of reason are not constitutive but regulative) stands firm. Human personality has a constitution of its own, which makes possible a development and experience all its own. In that constitution, as original as any of the others, is the capacity of religion. By the same necessity as man relates himself to the world in knowledge of it, and control over it (truth and

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

² *Idem*, p. 69.

utility), and enjoyment of it (appreciation of beauty in nature or art), to his fellow-men in his social relations (goodness, etc.), does he relate himself to God in religion. What is distinctive of man's religious capacity? Is there an *a priori* of the spiritual reason as there is of the theoretical, practical, or æsthetic? What exactly is it?

(a) It was Troeltsch who in recent years brought this question in this form into prominence, and it has been discussed fully and ably by one of my former students, Dr. Rees Griffiths in his thesis for a doctorate, entitled *God in Idea and Experience*. Even if the reality of revelation, that is, of an active, communicative divine environment is admitted, that does not dispose of the question. For Dr. Griffiths argues, "an experience of revelation is still an experience and a source of knowledge, and, in order to declare its validity and vindicate it against the attacks of science and philosophy, it must be shown how this knowledge, like every other kind, expresses the very nature of reason itself. For 'revelation is, in any case, not a simple God-depicting effect of God's activity on the soul, but in it the human and the divine co-exist in a complex mutual interpenetration' (Troeltsch's *Theory of Religious Knowledge*, *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. XXIII., by Macintosh, p. 279). Revelation comes to us, not from the void, but through the medium of concrete experience of natural objects and the play of social intercourse. Experience of God is always interwoven with other forms of experience, so that religious knowledge and the powers behind it are in some vital way expressive of the mind's general structure, and related to every other form of knowledge. This means that the psychology of religion, even of religion based on revelation, leaves on our hands the epistemological problem of how such religious knowledge is possible."¹ Troeltsch did not himself formulate the religious *a priori*. But Dr. Griffiths finds two indications of the direction of his thought, "that the *a priori* character of religion must be sought at the point where the finite subject knows itself united to the infinite as an inner necessity of consciousness," and "that the religious *a priori* would probably prove to be not unrelated to the other categories acknowledged to condition scientific, moral, and æsthetic experience." He indicates his own intention in this sentence: "Following these clues we may not unreasonably conclude that, according to Troeltsch, the

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 15, 16.

finite subject is already aware of the infinite as organically determining its own self-estimate as a human being, and that the sense of the infinite, or God, is also the basic and fundamental unity of self-consciousness and therefore the fountain head of all the categories of thought.”¹

(b) The conclusions for which he contends, as I understand him, may be briefly stated : *First* religion is original, underived, rooted in the constitution of human personality. For this reason he rejects Dr. John Baillie’s derivation from morality, of religion as a basis in reality of the moral ideal – an argument not consistently carried out, as Dr. Baillie is led to admit that “the seed of religion is in every man’s heart.”² Against Höffding’s description of religion as the conservation of values, Dr. Griffiths insists that religion has a value of its own, not dependent on its function in relation to other values. *Secondly*, it is not the impression of the world around that first stimulates man’s religious capacity ; it is man’s consciousness of himself, which has implicit in it his sense of God and dependence on God. *Thirdly*, while the content of revelation may be mediated by nature and history, the divine environment acting on man’s consciousness through the natural and the human, yet the religious *a priori* is more basic, lies, as it were, nearer the roots of human personality than the theoretic, the practical, or the æsthetic, and is so organic with them that there is no interpretation of reality in truth, goodness, beauty, adequate unless as religious also. His attitude may be expressed in the words of Scripture, “in Thy light we shall see light clearly.” In other words, the theistic setting is necessary for all man’s other activities. Hence in many respects agreeing with Otto’s view of *The Holy*, he rightly criticises him for so detaching the *numinous*, and so exaggerating its difference from the other contents of human consciousness, that he afterwards finds it difficult to show its rationalisation and moralisation. On the contrary, from the very beginning religion is so organic with man’s other activities, and even basic to them, that this rationalisation and moralisation is not something artificial – imposed, but normal – developed. The independence of religion from other capacities of human personality, and its dominance over them in a complete development – these are the guiding ideas ; and I entirely share them.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

² *Interpretation of Religion*, p. 348, quoted *idem*, p. 99.

(4) In thus insisting on the *a priori*, original and independent capacity for religion, and on the immediacy of the religious consciousness, I may appear at first sight to depreciate the value of what I have been attempting in the preceding chapters. In the first chapter of Part II., however, it was made quite clear that, as there cannot be any sensible evidence, so there cannot be any logical demonstration, of the existence of God. The religious belief in God is the *datum*; of this affirmation we seek confirmation in the other activities of human personality. For the preceding discussions two cogent and valid reasons can be given.

(a) By its very nature religion as the relation to God – the ultimate cause, essential reality, final purpose, of the Universe – must not be isolated from these other activities. These, too, are channels of His activity in man, and channels of man's receptivity and responsiveness to Him. Truth, Beauty, Holiness are disclosures of God as well as the intimate personal communion man may have with God in religion; hence the pursuit of Truth, the appreciation of Beauty, the endeavour for Holiness, are approaches to Him even as are faith and prayer. A restricted, disproportionate pietism must result from a detachment of religion from other human interests, efforts and relations. Life must be fully lived to be life in God.

(b) But if, as has been contended in the previous paragraph, the religious *a priori* is basic, religion must be regulative of all the other activities; they are incomplete without it. As we have tried to show, the problems of ontology, cosmology, teleology, ethics and æsthetics are not adequately solved except in theism.

(5) We must bring these two considerations to bear on *mysticism*, the type of piety which makes this immediate contact, this intimate communion with God, its distinctive, dominant interest, aspiration and effort; and often proposes a particular method of attaining thereto. A personal relation to God is necessary to, and characteristic of, all religion, which is *first-hand* experience, and not *second-hand* reliance on creeds, codes, rituals, etc. But mysticism makes, as it were, a speciality of this relation, with more or less detachment from the other contents of a full human life. We have only the one term – mysticism – to cover this more general and this more special type of religion. The German language has the advantage of having two terms – *Mystik*

and *Mysticismus*. *Mystik* expresses the general type, in which the personal relation to God is no less real because not thrown into special prominence. *Mysticismus* describes the more special type, where the cultivation of the relation becomes the dominant, if not the exclusive, concern. I have headed this chapter with the word *Mystics* as parallel to æsthetics or ethics, and not as the plural of mystic, as I want to emphasise the fact that *mysticism* is not the only type of personal religion, genuine and intense. For mysticism as a religious specialism I feel very little attraction ; and the mystical writers have not impressed me. It is an unfortunate accident of language that in criticising mysticism one runs the risk of appearing to depreciate *Mystik*. For the reasons given above I want religion to be the dominant, but not the exclusive, interest, for I believe in as large a personal life as man's capacities and God's resources allow.

II

(1) The difficulty in dealing with Mysticism is the elusiveness of its exponents and advocates. They claim for it what is common to all genuine and intense Christian spirituality as if that were its exclusive possession ; and when defects and dangers which its history discloses are pointed out, they escape by declaring that this is an aberration, that this is not true, but false mysticism. Much could be gained if we could distinguish even by a separate term, as the German does, what in the movement is accepted as an aberration. For under cover of what is excellent, even repellent features have been allowed to slip into this movement. Dean Inge is one of the most learned and able of its exponents and defenders ; and yet often he has to be one of its severest critics. Would that we had a winnowing fan which would separate the chaff from the wheat ! Dean Inge regards it " as a type of religion, though it must always be remembered that in becoming such it has incorporated elements which do not belong to its inmost being." He enumerates the following characteristics : " First, the soul (as well as the body) *can see and perceive*. We have an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which in its proper sphere is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensation in theirs. . . . The second proposition is that, since we can only know what is akin to ourselves, *man in order to know God must be*

partaker of the divine nature. . . . The divine spark already shines within us, but it has to be searched for in the innermost depths of our personality, and its light diffused over our whole being. This brings us to the third proposition 'Without holiness no man may see the Lord'; or as it is expressed positively in the Sermon on the Mount, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.' Sensuality and selfishness are absolute disqualifications for knowing 'the things of the Spirit of God.' . . . There is one more fundamental doctrine which we must not omit. Purification removes the obstacles to our union with God, but our guide on the upward path, *the true hierophant of the mysteries of God, is love.*"¹ This is his description of the mystic: "The mystic makes it his life's aim to be transformed into the likeness of Him in whose image he was created. He loves to figure his path as a ladder reaching from earth to heaven, which must be climbed step by step. This *scala perfectionis* is generally divided into three stages. The first is called the purgative life, the second the illuminative, while the third, which is really the goal rather than a part of the journey, is called the unitive life, or state of perfect contemplation. We find, as we should expect, some differences in the classification, but this tripartite scheme is usually accepted."² Beneath this doctrine and this practice within Christianity lies the universal principle of mysticism in religion. "Religious mysticism may be defined as the attempt to realise the presence of the living God in the soul and in nature, or more generally, as *the attempt to realise, in thought and feeling, the immanence of the temporal in the eternal, and of the eternal in the temporal.*"³ Similar is the description given by Rufus Jones in his *Studies in Mystical Religion*: "I shall use the word mysticism to express *the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion at its most acute, intense and living stage.*"⁴

(2) In the preceding pages I have again and again maintained a spiritual realism. (a) By an original endowment of his nature – the religious *a priori* – man can know the

¹ *Christian Mysticism*, pp. 6–9.

² *Idem*, pp. 9–10. The return of the soul, distant from God, is, according to Harnack, by *purification, illumination, and essential unification*. The soul must be *entbildet, bildet, and überbildet* (unformed, formed, transformed). (*The History of Dogma*, Eng. trs., VI., p. 101.)

³ *Idem*, p. 5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

reality of God, be conscious of the divine presence within him, and the divine activity upon him, and can respond in belief, worship, and obedience, in faith, hope, and love. No life is completely human in which this capacity is undeveloped, and in which religion is not dominant over all other interests and activities. To what extent the culture of religion as a distinctive interest should be carried in relation to other interests, so that the proportions in a fully developed personality may be preserved, is a difficult question, and must be individually answered. Religion at its "most acute, intense, and living stage" may sometimes be disproportionate to an all-round human development, as God wills it. Even religion must not become a luxury, interfering with the proper economy of life. If this be called the mystic element in life, then the term mystic expresses an essential feature of religion, an urgent necessity for the health and wholeness of life. The insistence on *holiness* as the condition of communion with God, and *love* as the mark of that communion, cannot be properly claimed as characteristic of mysticism alone; a genuine Christian life cannot be lived without them. There is no adequate reason to distinguish this feature as peculiarly mystical.

(b) What remains in Dean Inge's statement is the claim of the possession of "an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth," and its basis in a claim to be "a partaker of the divine nature," this divine part being often described as the divine spark (Fünkeln). This is a very crude psychology and epistemology. Baron von Hügel very wisely distinguishes from their psychological explanation "the great Mystics' chief and direct test, upon which they dwell with an assurance and self-consistency far surpassing that which accompanies their psychological argument from the spiritual content and effect of such experiences" – as still retaining "its cogency." He recognises that our present knowledge has superseded that explanation. "Now this particular argument derived from their supernaturalness, derived from the psychological form – from the suddenness, clearness, and apparent automatism of these locutions – has ceased to carry weight, owing to our present, curiously recent knowledge concerning the subconscious region of the mind, and the occasionally sudden irruptions of that region's contents into the field of that same mind's ordinary full consciousness. In the Ven. Battista Vernazza's case we have a particularly clear instance of such a long accumulation – by

means of much, in great part full, attention to certain spiritual ideas, words, and images – in the subconscious regions of a particularly strong and deeply sincere and saintly mind ; and the sudden irruption from those regions of certain clear and apparently quite spontaneous words and images into the field of her mind's full consciousness."¹ On closer scrutiny many of the alleged "revelations" to the mystics prove reproductions, sometimes in grotesquely fanciful forms, of current ideas. This part of mysticism we may dismiss as an anachronism to-day. Man was indeed made in God's *image* – personal, rational, moral, spiritual, and can through faith receptive of, and responsive to, divine grace, grow into ever greater *likeness* to God, the children imitating the Father's perfection. But there is no special organ of religion, no special part of man divine. The whole human personality is exercised in religion, and the whole of it has been created in that image and is destined for that likeness. The Johannine and the Pauline interpretation of the Christian experience – the communion of the believer with his Saviour and Lord, and his consequent increasing conformation to His holy love by His grace – which Dean Inge claims for *mysticism* has no essential resemblance to this superseded psychology ; we may call it *mystic*, or why not intimate and intense personal religion ?

(c) On the objective (epistemological) as on the subjective (psychological) side this mysticism is defective, but some forms of it more than others. Dr. Caldecott distinguishes *exclusive* from *comprehensive* mysticism. "With some," he says, "religious life means a unique order of experience into which the soul is permitted to rise from out of the ordinary life, carrying nothing up, and bringing nothing down. There is the life of the body, the life of the mind as affected by the body, the purely mental and moral life, and then this higher range, spiritual life, in which the soul is absorbed in converse with the Ideal, the Perfect, the Infinite. This is the *ἐκστασις* of the extreme Mystics ; we emerge from the life of Nature and stand out into the life of pure spirit." This is the Exclusive Form. "*The Comprehensive*, declares for the upper realm of the supersensible, but it insists on articulating the lower realm with it ; the life of sense and reason is to be elevated and hallowed by the higher life of spirit."² The state of trance or ecstasy is characteristic

¹ *The Mystical Element of Religion*, II., p. 48.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

of the one ; the divine spark is the organ of religion in the other. The one is speculative, and has a non-Christian view of God as its basis ; the other is more devotional and practical, and may hold fast the Christian theism, although it may also tend to pantheism. The common fault of both is this : that they narrow the range of the knowledge of God ; and the argument of preceding chapters has had as its aim the disproof of any such reduction of the channels of divine activity or the avenues of human approach. Along with the abnormal condition of trance and ecstasy we may mention *vision* and also *locution* or abnormal psychic conditions of seeing and hearing. Dean Inge describes ecstasy or vision in the following terms : " Ecstasy or vision begins when thought ceases, *to our consciousness*, to proceed from ourselves. It differs from dreaming, because the subject is awake. It differs from hallucination, because there is no organic disturbance : it is, or claims to be, a temporary enhancement, not a partial disintegration, of the mental faculties. Lastly, it differs from poetical inspiration, because the imagination is passive."¹ Perfectly sane people have had these experiences. There seems to be no doubt, if we trust the records, that prophets and apostles, and Our Lord Himself had visions and locutions as means of divine revelation. Dean Inge states, regarding ecstasy, " that it belongs not to the essence of Mysticism, and still less to Christianity, but to the Asiatic leaven which was mixed with Alexandrian thought, and thence passed into Catholicism." Whether of the essence of mysticism or not, ecstasy was an experience of Christian as well as non-Christian mystics. " As regards visions in general," he continues, " they were no invention of the mystics. They played a much more important part in the life of the early Church than many ecclesiastical historians are willing to admit. . . . But we do not find that the masters of the spiritual life attached very much importance to them, or often appealed to them as aids to faith."² What we must here insist on is that these abnormal modes of communion with, or communication from, God must not be regarded as superior means, to be preferred to the exercise of the whole man in apprehending God in the manifoldness of nature and history.

(d) As regards the *scala perfectionis*, and its elaboration in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 17. Dr. T. H. Robinson claims that the prophets were *ecstatics*. *Prophecy and the Prophets*, pp. 35-36.

² *Idem*, pp. 15-16.

the literature dealing with it, one cannot but feel that it is artificial, specially adapted to monks and nuns. Repentance from sin and amendment of life are the duties of all Christians ; but this purgation was often interpreted as a depreciation of the whole range of human personality, a detachment from the daily life and the world around, an unnatural asceticism. Of the illumination as "the concentration of all the faculties, will, intellect, and feeling, upon God," and the special means of enlightenment, we have already spoken. The unification must necessarily be "the continual but unending approximation" to "complete union with God," to which the term *deification* is from Irenæus onward applied. The idea often went beyond the bounds of Christian judgment, and claimed more than man may. The kind of unification sought will depend on the conception of God. If this is pantheistic, the unification will be the discovery that the difference was never real, and the recovery of the original identity with God. This is Brahmanic mysticism. If God is conceived negatively, the inconceivable, the ineffable, as in Neo-Platonism, then the unification will be an absorption into God, a loss of personal consciousness in this negative Infinite and Absolute. If the Christian idea of God is maintained, then the unification cannot go beyond ever clearer vision, closer communion, and greater conformity : and, God being apprehended in Christ, Christ may become the object sought, and God in Him. Under the influence of pagan types of mysticism, the Christian mysticism might leave the historical mediation of Christ behind. Even in Christian mysticism there is a further distinction between what has been called the *acting* and the *reacting* mysticism.¹ In the one the ascent to God is a human achievement, is of works ; in the other there is a divine condescension ; man climbs up to God, or God stoops down to man. The mystical element in the New Testament is reactive, of divine grace ; the Mediæval mysticism might become *active*, of works. These general considerations may be historically illustrated.

(3) In the highest type of Hindu piety, Brahman alone is real ; all else is *Maya*, illusion. The goal of the *Atman*, or soul is to lose the false sense of separation and to gain the

¹ "Paul's 'mysticism,'" says Deissmann, "is not acting mysticism, but reacting mysticism, not a mysticism which strives after absorption into the Deity but a mysticism which receives communion with God as a gift of grace" (*Paul, a Study in Social and Religious History*, p. 79).

true sense of identity. Meditation and asceticism are means of attaining this condition.

(a) The negative conception of God, which is found in the Neo-Pythagoreans, and also in Philo, who describes God as qualityless (*ἄποιος*), is carried still further by Neo-Platonism. God is absolutely transcendent, above mind itself as the principle of plurality, which by necessity proceeds from Him. "This One, τὸ ἓν, precedes all thought and Being; it is infinite, formless, and 'beyond' (*ἐπέκεινα*) the intellectual as well as the sensuous world, and therefore without consciousness and without activity." While Plotinus still describes God "as the One, which is the cause of all thought and of all Being, and as the Good as the absolute end of all that comes to pass,"¹ Jamblichus and Proclus set above the ἓν "a completely ineffable One." As the world of sense is the lowest of a series of emanations from God, each possessing a lower degree of perfection, the ascent to God can be made only by leaving behind all that belongs to that world, sense and thought, good and bad, in a state of ecstasy, which Plotinus claimed to have enjoyed several times, and Porphyry only once. While Dean Inge gives a more sympathetic account of the system of Plotinus than do other scholars, yet the quotation he gives from Plotinus regarding ecstasy shows clearly how negative the Neo-Platonic conception is. "'The soul when possessed of intense love of Him divests herself of all form which she has, even that which is derived from Intelligence; for it is impossible, when in conscious possession of any other attribute, either to behold or to be harmonised with Him. Thus the soul must be neither good nor bad nor ought else, that she may receive Him only, Him alone, she alone.' While she is in this state, the One suddenly appears, 'with nothing between,' 'and they are no more two but one; and the soul is no more conscious of the body or of the mind, but knows that she has what she desired, that she is where no deception can come, and that she would not exchange her bliss for all the heaven of heavens.'"² This is not profound philosophy or intense piety, but rhetorical absurdity. How can a soul without consciousness of mind or body know, feel, or desire anything? The union of a God without attributes and a soul without any attribute means nothing. This condition of ecstasy was what some Christian mystics aspired after – a *damnosa*

¹ Windelband, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–238.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

hereditas. As Dean Inge points out, St. Juan of the Cross claims a similar experience.

(b) It was through the Pseudo-Dionysius that Neo-Platonism found entry into Mediæval Mysticism. Into his fantastic speculations it is not necessary to enter ; but he, too, while sometimes representing God as " a Unity comprehending, not abolishing, differences," and avoiding the pantheistic conclusion of a merging of all individual existences in God, yet treads this negative road. He, too, insists that the mystic " must leave behind all things both in the sensible and in the intelligible worlds, till he enters into the darkness of nescience that is truly mystical."¹ Of this tendency Dean Inge writes : " Nearly all that repels us in mediæval religious life – its ' other-worldliness ' and passive hostility to civilisation – the emptiness of its ideal life – its maltreatment of the body – its disparagement of family life – the respect which it paid to indolent contemplation – springs from this one root."² This extreme negation in the conception of God, and the consequent approach to God, is not pantheism in the sense of identifying God with the world, since it states the difference between God and world in an exaggerated form. If it is not pantheistic in its base, it is pantheistic in its *apex*, inasmuch as the goal is the absolute unity of the soul and God beyond all differences. The unity is not a recovery of the eternal reality from the illusion of the temporal ; it is an achievement of the eternal above time. Augustine has a mystical tendency without these aberrations.

(c) John Scotus Erigena introduced the Pseudo-Dionysius to the Western Church, and shared his negative theology. God is " Essence," and yet He is not " Being," for Being is in opposition to non-Being, and in God there is no opposition. He is above all categories, and even altogether unrelated. Evil is non-existence. No more need be said on this word-play with abstractions which have no contact with reality.

(d) Of the mystics who tried to combine mysticism with scholasticism, this peculiar type of piety with the dogma and ritual of the Church, we need here only mention Bernard of Clairvaux, who turned from the speculative side of mysticism to the devotional. It was not God as a negation of all attributes who was the object of his contemplation, love, and devotion, but Christ Crucified. An unwholesome

¹ Quoted *idem*, p. 109.

² *Idem*, p. 112.

element was, however, introduced by him in the conception of Christ as the Bridegroom of the soul, and the use of the Song of Solomon to describe the relation of the soul to Him. But this is an unsavoury aspect of mysticism, with which for our present purpose we need not concern ourselves. There was much to be admired and commended in the devotional and practical mysticism of the Middle Ages ; but it also had its darker sides in the intrusion of pantheistic tendencies and of Neo-Platonic doctrine and practice.

(e) As an instance of the later speculative mysticism we may take Meister Eckhart. He distinguishes the divine essence (*Nicht*) from the divine existence (*Icht*). Creation is not a free act of God in time ; it is an eternal necessity to Him, for God was not God before creation. Man is as necessary to God as God is to man. "The eye," he says, "with which I see God is the same eye with which God sees me. My eye and God's eye are one eye, one vision, one recognition, one love." It is by the uncreated spark, or *Fünklein*, that the soul recognises the identity with God. He prays "to be rid of God, that is, that God by His grace would bring him into the Essence, that Essence which is above God and above distinction."¹ Not all his followers, however, went to such extremes.

(4) It is not necessary to continue the historical illustrations, as those given have supplied a sufficient indication of what mysticism is, and we may draw some conclusions.

(a) Of the motives and intentions, the consequent experience, character, and service of many mystics one can speak with sincere admiration. The hunger and thirst of the soul for God, the seeking and finding in Him the Supreme Good, the entire dependence on Him, and complete submission to Him, and, in the distinctively Christian mysticism, the loving communion with Christ and the devoted imitation of Him, the confession of man's insufficiency and dissatisfaction apart from God, and his sufficiency and satisfaction in God – these are permanent and universal elements in any fully Christian life ; but none of them needs to be bound up with the peculiar features of mysticism, and it is quite unnecessary, in the interests of a vital, vigorous Christianity, to try to galvanise mysticism into an unreal appearance of life to-day. Dean Inge truly says : " 'God reveals Himself in many ways,' and the

¹ See Windelband, *op. cit.*, pp. 334–337.

spiritual Christianity of the modern epoch is called rather to the consecration of art, science, and social life than to lonely contemplation.”¹ Von Hügel’s estimate may be added : “ On this whole matter the European Christian mystics, strongly influenced by, yet also largely developing, certain doctrines of the Greeks, have, I think, made two most profound contributions to the truths of the spirit, and have seriously fallen short of reality in three respects. . . . It is Christianity, and in particular Christian mysticism, which have fully experienced and proclaimed that ‘ God ’ is Love, and that the greatest of all the soul’s acts and virtues is Charity, Pure Love. And hence the Pure Act of God, and the Action of the God-like soul, are conceived, not, Aristotle-like, as acts of pure intelligence alone, but as tinged through and through with a noble emotion. But in three matters the mystics, as such and as a whole, have, here especially under the predominant influence of Greek thought, remained inadequate to the great spiritual realities, as most fully revealed to us by Christianity.” This is due to this acceptance of Aristotle’s conception of God, “ as Dr. Caird strikingly puts it (*Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, 1904, Vol. II., pp. 12-16), a God necessarily shut up within Himself, ‘ of purer eyes than to behold, not only iniquity, but even contingency and finitude, and His whole activity is one act of pure self-contemplation.’ ‘ The ideal activity which connects God with the world appears thus as in the world and not in God.’ ” Although “ the mystics avoid Aristotle’s elimination of emotion from man’s deepest action, and of emotion’s equivalent from the life of God,” yet “ they are for the most part influenced in their speculations by this intensely Greek, aristocratic intellectualist conception, in the three points of a disdain of the contingent and historical ; of a superiority to volitional productive energising ; and of a presentation of God as unsocial and as occupied directly with Himself alone.”² Discounting these defects, the mystics emphasise that God is love, and that man is godlike in loving.

(b) Despite the exaggerations of the negative road, it is not altogether error. “ There is a negative side in religion, both in thought and practice. We are first impelled to seek the Infinite by the limitations of the finite, which appear to the soul as bonds and prison walls. It is natural first to think of the Infinite as that in which these barriers are done

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 244-245.

² *Op. cit.*, II., pp. 250-252.

away. And in practice we must die daily, if our inward man is to be daily renewed. We must die to our lower self not once only, but continually, so that we may rise on stepping-stones of many dead selves to higher things.”¹ The mystics had learned with Paul that we must be crucified with Christ, that with Him we may be raised in newness of life. Self-denial is the way of self-fulfilment – “dying to live.” This is the method of love, self-finding through self-giving.

(c) In previous chapters we have been considering God’s disclosure of Himself in truth, goodness, beauty ; in this chapter we are led to add love and sacrifice. But the mystics also teach us that :

*At present we only see the baffling reflections in a mirror,
but then it will be face to face ;
at present I am learning bit by bit,
but then I shall understand, as all along I
have myself been understood.*

1 Cor. xiii. 12 (Moffatt’s translation).

It is well to remind ourselves that our apprehension of truth, our appreciation of beauty, our achievement of goodness, and all that through these our minds discover and God discloses, are only finite symbols of infinite reality, imperfect images of perfection divine. “Our Father, which art in heaven,” the highest truth about God, is “truth embodied in a tale,” the supreme “creed of creeds in loveliness of perfect deeds.” Often the mystics are overbold in their claims of knowledge and oneness with God ; yet their very quest emphasises the mystery of God’s being, the excess of light that blinds us. We must not abate our efforts to use our reason to the uttermost ; but we must then admit that the Beyond and the Above still baffle, and yet allure us. But, further, there is not only the mystery of what we recognise as beyond our understanding ; there is the mystery of much of God’s ways and works falling within our knowledge, which challenges what we believe we know of Him. The clouds and darkness of His transcendent greatness are round about Him, veiling Him in mystery. But often, also, whether “righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne” is a mystery so distressing to the mind as to lead to doubt and even denial, so agonising to the heart

¹ Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

as to bring to despair of God. We must, in nearing the end of our mental pilgrimage to the reality of God, turn aside to Doubting Castle to meet and overcome, if we can, Giant Despair. This we shall attempt to do in the next chapter, on "Theodicy."

CHAPTER VIII

THEODICY

I

IN the preceding pages the endeavour has been made to show what support reason – theoretical, practical, and æsthetic – gives to religion in its belief in God, its realisation of the presence of God (Mystics). But it must be admitted that that testimony is not unchallenged. If the data of experience on the whole justify reason in the theistic interpretation of reality, there are data which at least cast doubt on, if they do not compel disbelief in, that interpretation. A theism which in its mystic certainty sought no confirmation from reason might simply defy that challenge ; but a theism which seeks to place religion in the context of all other human interests, activities, and relations must accept the challenge. If a religion claims to be rational, it cannot shirk the obligation to show that the evil in the world, if not altogether explicable, can at least be so related to the purpose of God as not to afford adequate reasons for the denial of such a purpose.

(1) The starting-point of any discussion must be a consideration of the data of experience ; next, on this basis an estimate of the general character of the world and life, whether predominantly good or bad, must be formed ; then an explanation of that judgment, favourable or unfavourable, must be offered ; and, lastly, that explanation must be examined in its relation to the religious belief in God.

We must distinguish two kinds of evil : physical, or pain, the evil men (and animals) suffer ; and the moral, or sin, the evil man does (an evil to which some kinds of animal behaviour show a similarity).

(a) There is not a little of the physical evil which can be regarded as directly the consequence of moral evil – its punishment under the moral order of the world, which, in some respects at least, the natural order seems to subserve. The innocent as well as guilty, owing to human solidarity, are involved in such consequences, although for the innocent they cannot be properly regarded as penal. But a great deal of the evil cannot be so explained. Animals share pain

with man, and they have no share in his transgressions. Further, we know that there was physical evil in the world long before man's advent. Man's transgression cannot have brought about so vast a change in the order of nature consequent on, or – as some theologians held – anticipatory of, that transgression. The story of the Fall, in Gen. iii., is now accepted as an attempt in the form of a myth to offer a solution of the problem, which must be set aside as altogether inadequate. While there is, as we shall see, a relation of the natural order to the moral order as a condition of the possibility of the development of moral personality, we must recognise that a solution of the problem of sin would not in itself supply a complete solution of the problem of pain.

(b) There is pain only where there is life, and life with enough sensibility for any evil which affects the organism to be *felt* (how far down the scale of life that sensibility may reach we have no certain knowledge). As an organism has some capacity to adapt itself to its environment, it may be said that a great deal of the pain of living organisms is the inevitable consequence (of penalty we can only speak when there is conscious choice) of their failure to adapt themselves. To this function of pain in the process of organic evolution we must return. But, at this point of the discussion, what we need to note is that there is pain (and even death) inflicted on men (and animals), not as a result of mal-adaptation to environment, but on account of the operation of physical forces under natural laws, to which no organism has the capacity to adapt itself. Non-adjustment of organisms to their environment does not account for all the physical evil, nor does transgression of moral law in conjunction with it.

(c) For we must recognise three sources of physical evil, natural, organic, and social. There are evils inflicted on men and animals by nature in its ordinary course as well as in exceptional occurrences (such as earthquakes, floods, etc.) ; there are evils inherent in any living organism, as liable to disease and subject to death ; and, as has already been suggested, men inflict evils on one other (and animals), either unwittingly or wantonly, through ignorance, indifference, indolence, as well as folly and wickedness, and bring evils, not on themselves only, but on others also. Here the connection between physical and moral evil is direct.

(d) We assume the distinction between personal action and natural process. Rejecting alike *indeterminism* (choice without motive) and *determinism* (only apparent choice between motives), we assume *self-determination* (an internal direction in man to so great a degree as personal liberty, and in animals so far as there may be a measure of spontaneity or a rudimentary conscience). The present reality of sin in the individual and the race is unaffected by any conjecture anthropology may offer of the emergence of sin in the evolution of life, or by the analysis psychology may give of individual moral development. Should it be assumed that the problem of moral evil disappears altogether, if we accept the account of racial evolution or individual development which modern science offers, that is a profoundly mistaken judgment. The blameworthiness of the race in its moral beginnings, as of the child at its moral start, may be lessened ; but, for theism, the problem is in no way mitigated, for God remains responsible for the conditions which make the emergence of sin possible.

(2) The existence of good (physical and moral) is no less a reality in human experience ; the extent of each cannot be accurately measured by any science so as to admit of any exact calculations of the proportions in which both are blended in life, human and animal ; and even so involved are both that it is impossible to separate the consequences of the one from those of the other ; good intentions may have bad results, and the transgression may, by the reaction which it evokes, promote individual amendment or social reform.

(a) In the estimate of the character of the world as predominantly good or bad, *the personal equation* counts for a great deal. Dangerous situations, unfortunate circumstances, unhappy relations, natural temperament, personal experience and character, are all factors which will affect the judgment. There is truth in the jest in *Punch* which appeared many years ago : "Is life worth living ? It depends on the liver." Be the physiology accurate or not, such terms as sanguine, melancholic, jaundiced, indicate physical conditions of the estimate which is formed of the world and life.

(b) A consideration which is often overlooked calls for mention. As long as a man is in health, he does not think about it, or thank God for it ; but, let some minor ailment come to him, and at once his attention is arrested. So, also, most men enjoy their good fortune without reflection ;

but, should adverse circumstances befall them, they begin to wonder why this evil has come to them. As Mrs. Browning in one of her poems puts it, "More lips say God be pitiful than e'er said God be praised," and tear-dimmed eyes are more often turned to heaven than eyes that shine with gladness. So it is, also, in the estimate men form of the world, its evil and good. The dark shadows claim notice more than the bright sunshine, especially in some philosophic minds, for even philosophers have not always been detached enough to take an impartial view. In a previous chapter Sir J. Arthur Thomson was cited as dissenting from the exaggerated gloom of J. S. Mill's picture of human life, and, as a field naturalist, qualifying the view of so eminent a biologist as Huxley regarding nature as "red in tooth and claw." If, in the animal world, happiness predominates, so, in human life, good seems to prevail and persist more than evil. With some of these problems we must later deal in detail.

(3) The estimate of life in experience and practice does not with most men lead to any explanation. Changing moods affect the world-view. But there have always been those who have tried to offer some theory of the character of the world as predominantly good or bad; in religion and in philosophy, dealing as they do, however differently, with the world and life as a whole, some theory must and does emerge. The terms which are used to distinguish the opposed theories are in my judgment inappropriate, as they overstate the case, indulging in superlative where comparative or positive degrees would serve. Taken literally, *optimism* would seem to affirm the world to be the best conceivable or possible, and *pessimism* the worst, whereas, surely, sober thought should be content with saying that, despite the evil, good predominates, or, despite the good, evil prevails, or that there appears to be more good or more evil in the world. To say that the world is either the best or the worst possible is surely to display an arrogance of thought, for can our mind measure what is or is not possible above or beyond the actual? To say that a world better or worse than the world that is cannot be, is to abandon the safe ground of experience for the shifting sands of speculation. Again such an absolute estimate must often force the facts to fit them into the framework of theory, and also assume a *static* instead of a *dynamic* view of reality, i.e. that the whole reality to be judged is before us, whereas in an

evolving world it is not ; and what must be considered is not what the world now is, but what it has been and whither it is tending. Without attempting to strike a balance between the credit and the debit sides of the account at any moment, we are wiser to ask, even if the world seems bad now : Was it worse ? Is it getting better ? If of the problem of reality itself it is true, *solvitur ambulando*, then we cannot advance any final solution. Enough if we have sufficient ground for hope. Accordingly the attitude that seems to me the most reasonable is neither *optimism* nor *pessimism*, but one which has been described as *meliorism*. The actuality of the past and the possibility of the future as indicated in the promise or peril of the present must all be taken into account.

(4) In relation to the belief in God these theories will necessarily differ. If pessimism were to assign personality in any sense to the cause or source of the world, its god most men would call devil. If a religion or philosophy halts between two opinions, and does not come down on either side of the fence, it must end in a dualism – a conflict of God and devil. Optimism does not necessarily issue in theism. It may, as in *pluralism*, assume the concurrence towards the good end of a number of independent factors – a conception which to me seems to offer no assurance. Optimism, if theistic, may take the *a priori* road, and infer from the goodness of God the necessary goodness of the world which He has made ; or it may in the modified form, of meliorism, take the *a posteriori* road, and recognise that, even if it cannot demonstrate God's goodness from the facts of the world and life, yet it may offer such an interpretation of the facts as will show that, while the good in reality confirms the religious belief in God, the evil does not so contradict it as to make belief impossible.

II

(1) A brief historical review will afford us material for the constructive statement.

(a) Confucianism may be described as optimistic. Heaven wills the good of man ; man is by nature good ; evil comes from bad education or bad government, and the individual and the society can be amended by good education and good government. While Confucius believed that former days

were better than his own, yet he was confident that, given the opportunity, he could bring back his age to the better ways. Regarding Mencius, "the Plato of our Chinese Socrates," Dr. Soothill writes: "In his day a great discussion had arisen as to the nature of man, whether it was good or evil, whether man was born with a good or an evil nature. Mencius, following the implied lead of his master, maintained the innate goodness of human nature. This was a natural corollary of the doctrine that man's nature was divinely conferred, for it was impossible to maintain that Heaven, being good, could have conferred an evil nature on man. That men were evil was recognised, but this was due to their bad upbringing. By nature they were good, in practice they left this inborn goodness."¹ Where Buddhism has not produced a pessimistic tendency, the Japanese display an optimistic nature. "Kurozumi," says Dr. Tasuku Harada, "the founder of one of the popular Shinto sects, says: 'Our lives are already happy and peaceful. There is neither anxiety nor pain. Mankind, indeed, lives in such a world. Should there, then, be any other thing for us than to be filled with gladness and joy both day and night?'"²

(b) India presents a contrast. Brahmanic thought is necessarily pessimistic. If *brahman* alone is real; if the world is *maya* (illusion); if man is bound by the law of *karma* to the misery of metempsychosis (the ceaseless cycle of death and birth); if redemption is not in life in the world, but by escape from life in the recovery of the identity of the *âtman* (soul) and *brahman*—then assuredly the world must be worthless and life futile. "To this doctrine," says Dr. Cave, "the sombreness of Indian thought seems chiefly due."³ In Buddhism this pessimism is accentuated. God and soul disappear; but *karma* remains. Life follows life, linked only by this iron chain of the inevitable consequence of previous action; and life is always and only misery. It is desire which continues existence in this misery, and escape can be only by suppression of desire. "The four Noble Truths may be summarised as follows," says Geden⁴: "All existence involves suffering; suffering is caused by desire, especially the desire for continuance of existence; the suppression of desire, therefore, will lead to

¹ *The Three Religions of China*, pp. 243-244.

² *The Faith of Japan*, p. 15.

³ *Redemption, Hindu and Christian*, p. 64.

⁴ *Studies in the Religions of the East*, p. 512.

extinction of suffering. These are the first three Noble Truths, the fourth and last is the doctrine or path by which this deliverance is effected." Into the details of this "Noble Eightfold Path" we need not enter. But, as in Brahmanism, it is not a redemption from evil in this world and this life which is offered, but an escape into *Nirvana*, whatever that may mean. No attempt is made in either case to solve the problem of evil theoretically, only a practical escape from the unexplained evil is offered.

(c) One of the most striking instances of the influence of external conditions on racial modifications is the contrast of Indian and Persian thought, as both people sprang from the same stock. For Zoroastrianism the world is a battlefield of good and evil, and life a constant conflict. There is a physical as well as moral dualism, and it has a metaphysical source. Ormuzd and Ahriman are in conflict, and religion and morals demand that men take sides for the one against the other. While later Zoroastrianism was more dualistic probably than was Zoroaster himself, who, as the prophet of Ormuzd, taught that Ahriman was subordinate to him, yet even later Zoroastrianism looked forward to a triumph of good over evil. We may apply to it the term previously mentioned, *meliorism*.

(d) Islam has no original contribution to offer on this problem, as it has borrowed, and debased in borrowing, Jewish and Christian eschatology. In the Old Testament it is generally assumed that life is good, and that, therefore long life and a large family are desirable. The righteous prosper and the wicked suffer, although the reward or the punishment may be delayed, and the children reap what the parents have sown. The experience of the ills of this life is not compensated by the expectation of a future life, unless in a few late passages. The Book of *Job* grapples with the problem of the suffering of the righteous, but the only solution it offers is submission to the mystery of God's will. *Ecclesiastes* shows a belief in God which offers no relief from the ills of life. In the days of national disaster, faith inspired the hope of a divine intervention in human history on behalf of God's chosen people. An irreflective optimism gives place to a reasoned meliorism. As the constructive treatment of the subject will assume that only in the Christian faith can the problem find its solution, it will at this stage suffice to state that the Christian standpoint is expressed in two sayings of Paul's: "Where sin abounded

grace did abound more exceedingly" (Rom. v. 20); "To them that love God, all things work together for good" (viii. 28).

(2) From the religious contribution we turn to the philosophic.

(a) Plato, as might be expected, goes the high *a priori* road. Because God is good, the world is good also; the perfect must needs produce the perfect, although the surviving dualism in his thought did modify the unqualified optimism in respect of things of sense. The Stoic, with the same fundamental conviction, took account of facts, and subjected the world to moral judgment; he must argue as well as assert. Dr. Fairbairn has given a concise summary of Stoic opinion. "He [the Stoic] did this by affirming, in spite of his belief in an invincible fate, that there were limits to divine power which could as little keep man from moral evil as from physical disease (Cleanthes' Hymn, 17 ff., Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repub.* xxi. 44; xxxvi. 1); that it was as irrational to think that God could connive at wickedness as that law could be guilty of crime (Chrysippus in Plut. *De Stoic. Repub.* xxxiii. 2); that, like the vulgar jest in the play, evil might be offensive, but, blended with the whole, it heightened the general effect (Marcus Aurelius, vi. 42, with the reference to Chrysippus, Plut. *Adv. Stoic.* xiv.); and that it was here to train character and to be, therefore, finally transmuted into good (Chrysippus in Plut. *Adv. Stoic.* xiii.; cf. *De Stoic. Rep.* xxxv. 3)."¹ In the chapter on Teleology the inconsistency of the attitude of Marcus Aurelius to God as Creator, and the world as created, was indicated.

(b) The dogma of the Christian Church regarding man – his natural depravity and total corruption, his inheritance of original sin (including not only Adam's perversion of his nature, but also the guilt of his transgression) and the increase of sin through sinfulness being made the penalty of sin – threw a dark shadow over the life of man, which the glory of the Christian redemption did not altogether succeed in dispersing, so that the estimate of man and his world tended to pessimism. This dogma does not rest – as Dr. Tennant has conclusively shown – on the teaching of the Scriptures,² but on foreign philosophical presuppositions. In inflicting this grievous burden on the Church, Augustine

¹ *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 99.

² See *The Origin and Propagation of Sin* and *The Fall and Original Sin*.

bears the main responsibility. As it would be impossible for me to state Augustine's position as authoritatively or as eloquently as Dr. Fairbairn, I feel compelled to quote him fully ; and this reason must be an excuse for the length of the quotation. " It was no mere ironical Nemesis, but an inexorable law of logic, that laid upon Augustine, the Father who was mainly responsible for this doctrine, the duty of vindicating the Providence whose ways it seemed so seriously to impugn. His apology followed several distinct lines, some of which were more germane to the notion of evil than of sin, having been suggested by the Greeks themselves, who had chiefly influenced him. Thus, he argues, after Plotinus, that evil is nothing real, but is simply negative, a negation of being, and especially of God who is the most real of all beings. Hence he boldly formulated the position '*in quantum est, quidquid est, bonum est*' (*De Vera Rel.* ix. ; cf. *De Civ. Dei*, xii. 6, 7 ; *De Ord.* ii. 20). There is but one God, one supreme essence, from whom whatever is holds its existence. As He is good, all His works, i.e. all created beings, must be the same ; and so evil ought to be conceived as negative, an attempt to deny or abolish the works and the acts of God. The more being abounds, the more abundant becomes the good ; the more it is restricted or encroached on by the unreal, the more evil prevails. But Augustine knew that metaphysics of this sort could do little to comfort those to whom misery was an actual experience, and sin a profound reality. So he argued, as the Stoics had done, that evil is needed to enhance the beauty and the glory of the world (*De Civ. Dei*, xiv. 27). It is like the barbarisms which the poets like to use now and then as a foil to their own elegance (*Ibid.* xi. 18). Time is like a picture which needs the shadows as well as the light for its loveliest effects (*Ibid.* xi. ; *De Ord.* i. 18). Even the eternal fires of hell, however penal to the sinner, tend to magnify the beauty of the whole, and exalt the glory of the mighty Artificer (*De Civ. Dei*, xii. 4). But Augustine's contribution as a theologian to the solution of the problem was of a nobler and more satisfactory order. Over against the potency of sin he placed the omnipotence of God ; over against its power to ruin he set the grace that saved. Sin must be conceived through an antithesis, without which it never could have been. Christ was not because of Adam, but Adam was because of Christ. Man had not been allowed to sin that God might be free to punish, but that He might

have the opportunity to save. Sin entered that grace might abound. Through sin as occasion, though not by means of it as cause, God was brought nearer to man, suffered with him, endured sacrifice for him, and lifted him out of his evil to a higher glory than he could without it have attained. But it was a dangerous if a daring feat to raise evil into a means of good ; it invited a damaging retort as to the bungling character of the workman who had to mar his work in order that he might find some way of perfecting it."¹ We must disagree from Augustine in making God as omnipotent responsible for the existence of sin in the world, but we may agree with him in finding the solution of the problem of sin and evil in the purpose of redemption which God is fulfilling in human history, and we must recognise, as he failed to do, that Divine Omnipotence limits itself to allow human freedom.

(c) No contribution to the problem in the Patristic or Scholastic period calls for notice. At the Renaissance there was an emancipation of human thought from ecclesiastical authority. Nicholas of Cusa combined a keen appreciation of nature in its beauty and a deep passion for the majesty of God in a pantheism which identified God and world as both necessarily perfect. And Giordano Bruno more fully developed this pantheism. So also for Spinoza at a later date (the seventeenth century), sin and evil must needs be negations, since the world was God in the parallel modes, *realiter* and *idealiter*, of His two attributes of extension and thought. So too also for Hegel at a still later date (the early nineteenth century), as the real is the rational, sin and evil are the necessary antithesis of innocence and happiness, if the synthesis of the full realisation of reason is to be attained. While he thus speculatively sacrificed his ethics to his dialectics, yet he practically recognised "the incongruity (*Unangemessenheit*) of what is with what ought to be."² It may be said generally that just as pantheism cuts, and does not unloosen, the Gordian knot of the relation of God and world by identifying them, so it arbitrarily disposes of the problem of evil and sin by affirming its negativity in relation to reality as a whole. Any monism must raise the Absolute above the contrast and conflict of good and evil, as we shall see in the next chapter.

(d) We owe the term theodicy to Leibnitz, and his work,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 100-101.

² *Idem*, p. 111.

entitled *Essais de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal*, 1710, must be regarded as a classic on this subject. His was a synthetic mind, a reconciling spirit. If his thought is not profound, his sympathies are wide. He tried to mediate between rationalism and empiricism, the causal and the teleological view of the world, and even Protestantism and Catholicism. It was in accord with his "mentality" that he should essay a solution of this problem of evil. In his formula "this is the best of all possible worlds" the emphasis falls on the word *possible*. He does not undertake to prove that this is the best world which man can imagine or conceive. God can conceive worlds other than this world is ; He can achieve this world only because it alone is possible. God's omnipotence is not unlimited, for the Infinite cannot without limitation transfer His mind and will to the finite ; the created cannot, as such, fully share the perfection of the Creator. The first kind of evil which limits the range of possibility for God in creating is this *metaphysical* evil, the necessary imperfection of the finite and created. From this imperfection results the second kind of evil – the *physical* ; and this is either privative, the lack of the divine beatitude, or positive, the pain or the misery that in their interaction these finite causes inflict on one another. From the necessary imperfection of the creature, endowed with freedom, and yet limited in knowledge and experience, the third kind of evil – the *moral* – results in the disobedience of man to God. Thus if God was to create at all, He must create the metaphysical evil, with the consequent physical evil, and at least the possibility of the resulting moral evil, if freedom were abused. This conclusion is, however, modified in two ways. God has not ceased to be active in His creation ; He is ever working in it for good, and His activity is producing a growing good. Any hindrance or delay in realising God's purpose is due to man, not God. The Christian redemption idea is present, if not in its full range, in his thought.

(e) This serious grappling with the problem is in striking contrast with the shallow optimism of English deism, as versified by Pope. Since "whatever is, is right," he finds no more difficulty in accepting moral than physical evil :

*If plagues or earthquakes break not heaven's design,
Why then a Borgia or a Cataline ?*

From the evils of the present he takes refuge in the promise of the future, although the words in which he states this principle of compensation might suggest that the promise will never be fulfilled, hope being illusive.

*Hope springs eternal in the human breast ;
Man never is, but always to be, blessed.*¹

Against this comfortable acquiescence in things evil, Voltaire was in ardent revolt ; and "there is more faith in *his* honest doubt" than in this creed, as there was more of the Christian spirit in Shelley's atheism than in the orthodoxy of his time. Without undue generalisation we may say that the nineteenth century cast off the complacency of the eighteenth ; and pessimism lifts up its voice.

(f) Kant insists on the *radical badness* in human nature. Man "is conscious of the moral law, and yet has adopted into his maxim (occasional) deviation therefrom. . . . This holds of him considered as a species ; not as if such a quality could be inferred from the specific conception of man (that of man in general) (for then it would be necessary), but by what is known of him by experience he cannot be otherwise judged, or it may be presupposed as subjectively necessary in every man, even the best."² Into the explanation of how man came to be bad we need not now enter. Kant also recognises an incongruity between character and circumstance ; the holy are not always the happy, nor the wicked the miserable. The reasonableness of the expectation that the Good should include both holiness and happiness he acknowledges, and accordingly the Practical Reason postulates the existence of God as the guarantee of final harmony.

(3) While Greek cynicism and Christian ascetism both showed a contempt or even a condemnation of earthly goods, the pleasures the world offers, both recognised a higher good attainable by man, the value of which depreciated all others, and neither can, therefore, be described as pessimistic.

(a) Schopenhauer is the first consistently pessimistic philosopher. He attaches himself to Kant. Kant, in exalting the practical over the pure reason, gave to will a

¹ For these quotations from Pope I am indebted to Fairbairn, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

² Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 339.

place in philosophy which intellect alone had held. What man does matters more than what he thinks. Fichte made the practical reason the dominating principle of his metaphysics, as Hegel did the pure reason. Schopenhauer, in his chief work *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, translated into English by Haldane, *The World as Will and Idea*, makes will the ultimate principle of all reality. In presentation – objects as known – we have only its superficial aspect ; will alone discloses its secret. Man is to himself object of knowledge and subject of willing. “The action of the body is the objectified act of the will. Called at first the immediate object of presentation, the body may now, from the other side, be called ‘the objectivity of the will.’”¹ By analogy we infer similar wills to our own in other persons and animals. “This inference from analogy, universally admitted in the case of human and animal bodies, must be extended to the whole corporeal world. . . . By this is not meant that a falling stone, for example, acts from a motive ; knowledge and the consequent action from motives belongs only to the determinate form that the will has in animals and men ; but the reality in the stone also is the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in ourselves.”² Even force in nature is to be subsumed under will, “an unknown under a known.” We know will as individualised in time and space, the “principle of individuation,” but “in itself the will is not individualised,” as thing-in-itself it is universal, and all individuation is only phenomenal. The universal will as undetermined in time and space is free, but “it is in itself mere activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the accompaniment of its ascending stages.”³ Borrowing the Platonic doctrine of ideas, Schopenhauer teaches that in all objects and persons there is a progressive objectivation of the will, and a characteristic of this process is struggle. (This view is pre-Darwinian.) “Knowledge or intelligence he seeks to explain as an aid to the individual organism in its struggle to subsist and to propagate its kind.”⁴ Despite this struggle, there is a teleology of the universe, for “the unity of the will shows itself in the unison of all its phenomena as related to one another. Man, its clearest and completest objectivation, is the summit of a pyramid, and

¹ *Schopenhauer*, by Thomas Whittaker, p. 30.

² *Idem*, pp. 31–32.

³ *Idem*, pp. 33–34.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 38.

could not exist without it.”¹ Yet “the harmony described does not get rid of the conflict inherent in all will.”

(b) The exponent of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, from whom I have been so far quoting, in criticism points out that “at two points the discontinuity can scarcely be concealed. First, the relation of the universal will to the individual will is not made clear; and secondly, the emergence of the world of presentation, with the knowledge in which it culminates, is left unintelligible, because the will is conceived as mere blind striving without an aim.”² In his later writings Schopenhauer relieved the first difficulty to a certain extent, but not the second. The details do not concern our present purpose. Pantheistic³ as is his tendency, although he does not like the name, he yet inclines in his later writings to allow “some permanent reality to the individual,” and, unlike other pantheists who ascribe the divine perfection to the world, for him the production of the world by the will is a lapse from which redemption is necessary. His view of the world, however, is not consistent, as Whittaker points out, with the beginning he assigns, or the end he advocates. “Starting though he does with blind will and ending with the flight of the ascetic from the suffering inherent in the world that is the manifestation of such a will, he nevertheless, in the intermediate stages, makes the world a cosmos and not a chaos.”⁴ The presentation of this world would be more consistent with the recognition of an immanent reason than with his derivation of it from a blind striving, and does not sustain his pessimism. His pessimism is also mitigated by his *æsthetics*. In æsthetic contemplation the mind finds an escape from its bondage to the will. His writings on this subject are of acknowledged value. Music as the supreme art expresses the substance of reality, while the other arts only the shadow. Yet even in music the deliverance is temporary. As in Buddhism, ethics indicates the way of redemption. “Permanent redemption from the suffering of the world is to be found only in the holiness of the ascetic; but to this there are many stages, constituting the generally accepted human virtues. Of these Schopenhauer has a rational account to give in terms of his philosophy; and if the last stage does not seem

¹ *Schopenhauer*, pp. 39–40.

² *Idem*, p. 40.

³ As Pfeiderer has described Hegel’s system as a *panlogism*, so we might describe Schopenhauer’s as a *pantheletism*.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 47.

to follow by logical sequence from the others, this is only what is to be expected ; for it is reached, in his view, by a sort of miracle." Art and morality should lead to this goal " a voluntary and complete chastity as the first step in the denial of the will to live " ; but few reach it thus. " Most arrive through personal suffering, which may be deserved."¹ There is much that is valuable in his ethical exposition ; but this is independent of the conclusion to which it leads. Of all the religions he has most kinship with Buddhism ; the extra-mundane God of Judaism and Christianity he rejects, although claiming likeness to the ethics of the New Testament.

(c) Dr. Fairbairn, while recognising a similarity of principles between Schopenhauer and Buddha, finds a contrast in their characters. " The heart of Buddha's pessimism was pity ; he loved man, and because of his love of man he hated the existence that was sorrow. The heart of Schopenhauer's pessimism was more contemptuous than pitiful ; his scorn was not so much for life as for the men who lived it. There was nothing so alien to Buddha as cynicism, nothing so native to Schopenhauer."² The unattractive description of Schopenhauer's character which follows need not be reproduced. There can be no doubt whatever that the personal equation must be largely allowed for in his estimate of the character of the world as bad. This metaphysics is, however, very vulnerable. In the *first place* the separation of will and intelligence in the ultimate principle is a false abstraction ; in human personality there is no such separation, but, in individual development and racial evolution, reason increasingly becomes the guide of action. *Secondly*, even if we abstract will from intelligence, will is not a vain striving, the end unattained, the desire disappointed. The progress mankind has made from barbarism to culture and civilisation shows that, despite defeats and delays, the battle has been not a losing but a winning one. *Thirdly*, the beauty and the order which he allows the world to display as cosmos and not chaos, as possessing an inward teleology, and the possibility of æsthetic appreciation and ethical discernment which he concedes to man, can find no explanation in a blind will, a vain striving. *Lastly*, as a moralist and philosopher, he in his teaching seeks and hopes to persuade men of the truth of his view of the world and of the duty which it imposes on them – a surprising

¹ *Idem*, p. 65.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

product of the will which for him is the ultimate principle of reality! The arbitrary and false initial assumption discredits the system based upon it.

(4) Schopenhauer had few disciples; the most distinguished of them was von Hartmann. His ultimate principle is not Will alone, but the "Unconscious; or Over-Conscious," from which intelligence is not excluded; thus there is in it a dualism; the Will is producing the misery of the world, the Intelligence is striving to undo this mischief; and as the universe will have an end, so far this Over-Conscious is good. The suffering of life is not to be shunned, but accepted, as only this can advance this world-process. The renunciation which Schopenhauer recommended, his disciple condemns as a cowardly shirking of the duty which the world as it is lays on each man. He paints a picture of unrelieved gloom, and the future for him holds no promise of improvement until the end comes. Human history is a process of continuous disillusionment. In the childhood of the race happiness in this life was hoped for; then the hope reached out to the life to come; lastly the expectation of a better future for the race displaced the individual hope for this life and the next; but disillusionment has fallen on each of these imaginations in turn. The only reasonable desire is that the vain show should close.

(5) The conclusion which may be drawn from both these systems is that the man without God, if thoughtful enough, is likely also to be without hope. The metaphysic of both these thinkers is so arbitrary that it need not detain us as an argument for pessimism. Yet, even if we set the philosophy aside, the estimate of the world and life which it seeks to justify has some basis in facts, and thus the problem of evil remains. We may now turn to two thinkers whom the evil in the world has led, not to the denial of God's existence, or even of His goodness, but to an assertion of the limitations of His power, a God in this respect at least finite.

(a) Although John S. Mill modified hedonism – the doctrine that pleasure is the good – in two respects – an extension from self to others in the aim to be sought, and a recognition of qualitative differences in pleasures – yet for his utilitarianism pleasure, "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," remained the test to be applied to the world and life. This limitation of his outlook must be remembered in considering his indictment of Nature, which he personifies that he may pass sentence of condemnation

upon it ; but can a moral judgment be passed upon an abstraction ? However, let us hear this vehement advocate for the prosecution. " Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of justice."¹ Did religious reverence prevent his using the term God, or is the personification of Nature an indication that for the world as it is God is not solely responsible, and that matter and force limit His activity ? Agnosticism and atheism he rejects, and accepts what must be described as only a quasi-theism. In his last *Essay* in this volume he " raised some surprise in his finding more cogency in the Design argument than he had ever found before. The survey of external nature and human history yields considerable evidence for design ; not complete, and with some grave exceptions, but still a preponderating probability ; and this evidence is of a really scientific character and deserves to have influence in the region of belief. And so he follows it up to the position of belief in a creative mind."² This creative mind must be, in view of what Nature is, limited in power, and may be also in knowledge and even benevolence, although he would fain keep his belief in the benevolence. " If there are any grounds for the belief in such a creative God, this kind of theism may aid and fortify the purely human religion which, with or without supernatural sanctions, he cannot doubt is destined to be the religion of the future."³ Both indictment and conclusions will be fully discussed in a later section.

(b) In a more recent book, *The Problem of God*, Dr. E. S. Brightman, from a much more positively theistic standpoint, finds a solution of the problem of evil by ascribing finitude to God. I have already quoted him elsewhere in this volume, as offering a concise summary of the evidence for God. Realising the extent and intensity of contemporary doubt, he examines carefully and rejects decisively the substitutes for God which are being offered to-day. Having shown how modern thought has on the one hand expanded

¹ *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 29.

² Caldecott, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

³ *Comte and Mill*, by Thomas Whittaker, p. 77.

and on the other contracted our conception of God, he offers us as "the Resultant Idea of God" the following (his conception must be given in his own words): "God is a conscious Person of perfect good will. He is the source of all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of all other persons and gives them the power of free choice. Therefore His purpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and His nature must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence there is in God's nature something which makes the effort and pain of life necessary. There is within Him, in addition to His reason and His active creative will, a passive element, which enters into every one of His conscious states, as sensation, instinct and, impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for Him. This element we call the Given. The evils of life and the delays in the attainment of values, in so far as they come from God, and not from human freedom, are thus due to His nature, yet not wholly to His deliberate choice. His will and reason, acting on the Given, produce the world and achieve value in it."¹ The grounds for such a conclusion in "the effort, difficulty, and suffering" which experience discloses, "the evils of life and the delays in the attainment of values" will be later examined; but here and now we may challenge the hasty and sweeping conclusion as a *non sequitur*. What follows if reasons can be shown – or at least the attempt be made to show that a higher good can thus be attained, not in spite of these, but even by means of these, than could in any other way be attained – that ease, comfort, happiness must not be applied as the test of the values in the world, or the measure of God's fulfilment of His purpose? There are other alternative explanations, and the "hence" in the middle of the paragraph is a bridge which will not bear the weight cast upon it. Is it not overbold to assume that God would have made the world according to our wish and plan, if He could have done so? May there not be in His character and purpose a reason for His denial of our demands, or disappointment of our expectations of what the world should be, other than His impotence? Who has by searching so found out God, or discovered Him unto perfection, as to wrest from Him the secret of His nature, a something that hinders and hampers His good will? It were indeed

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

a strange, even startling paradox, if in His nature as God there were this Given, which bewilders, benumbs, and baffles His "self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control." It is certainly a more tolerable solution that the limitations are in God Himself than that they are imposed on Him by an alien power. But we must afterwards show cause why faith cannot acquiesce in a finite God.

III

We turn from these solutions of the problem to offer that which Christian belief in God allows and demands. In Martineau's *A Study of Religion*, II., pp. 49-130 (2nd ed.) and in Fairbairn's *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, pp. 132-168, the subject is fully and admirably discussed; but the treatment here must be very much more summary. The distinctions made at the beginning of this chapter between physical and moral evil, and the description of the three kinds of physical evil in respect of its source as natural, organic, and social may be recalled.¹ It is no solution of the problem to ignore the extent and the intensity of the suffering in man and the lower animals, as though faith in God demanded so ostrich-like a policy.

(1) Dr. Fairbairn confines his consideration of physical evil to man, but Dr. Martineau properly takes full account of animal suffering. He finds it necessary to disprove the theory of the Cartesian school, which Descartes does not appear to have held himself, that animals are automata and are not conscious of pain. While fully recognising the sufferings of animals, we must beware of exaggerating the range and the acuteness of these, because it is probable that their sensibility is not so keen as man's, and, as they live in the present without memory of the past or expectation of the future, the pain is confined to the immediate experience, without a shadow from the past falling on it, or a shadow from it being cast over the future. How much human

¹ In estimating the amount of suffering, we must not in imagination add together in a tragic total all individual sufferings, for suffering must be felt, and, unless it be God's, there is no one consciousness, in which that whole suffering, distributed in individual consciousnesses, can be felt. The maximum of suffering we can conceive is that of the most sensitive and sympathetic consciousness we can imagine. That definitely sets a limit to the amount of suffering of which we should think.

suffering would be lessened could it be so confined ! The wants which stimulate the organism to the effort which meets them cannot be regarded as evil, even if for a time painful ; and on the whole nature makes a bountiful provision, or soon ends the suffering by death. We may admit on the other hand that disease among animals is a bewildering fact, which we cannot fully explain, and yet it is exceptional and soon ended, and does not outweigh the more enduring and widespread health in animal life. The preying of animals upon one another, if we commit the psychological fallacy of transferring to them the passions which lead to human conflicts, presents a more serious problem. But we must beware of regarding as vice in animals what would be so in man. We are not justified in assuming that even predaceous animals are wittingly and wantonly cruel, even if their conduct may so appear to us. As Sir J. Arthur Thomson contends, nature is not a universal and permanent battlefield. Many animals are herbivorous, and even the carnivorous prey only on those on which they depend for their subsistence. "The immunities," says Martineau, "from the cruelty of appetite are large ; its crises are short ; and by far the greater part of life, both to the hunter and the hunted, is untroubled by it. And among the modes of death, there is no reason to suppose that to become the victim of animal voracity is more painful than to perish by disease, or pine away by exhaustion. Sharp and quick extinction may shock the observer by its startling contrasts ; but to the sufferer, the surprise is an economy of pain."¹ If all animals were herbivorous, would nature's supply suffice, and how would the dead be disposed of ? With some humour Martineau states a truth to be recognised. "Nature, in her predatory tribes, has appointed a sanitary commission, and in her carrion-feeders a burial-board, far more effective than those which watch over our villages and cities ; and one of the great difficulties of our crowded civilisation is due to the fact that there is nobody to eat us."² Nature is prodigal of fresh life ; and the earth would not be able to sustain that increase of life, did not death remove one generation to make room for another by such means as these. If we recognise, as we are entitled to do, that there is a minimum of suffering and no motive of cruelty, but only the impulse of necessity, the economy of nature will need no apology. Few Christian moralists hold the opinion that it is wrong for man

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

² *Idem*, p. 90.

to take animal food ; all demand only that death shall be inflicted as painlessly as can be. Most would also give their consent to the suppression by hunting of the wild animals which endanger life, but many would condemn such forms of sport as stag and fox hunting, where for their own enjoyment men inflict cruelty on the lower animals. It is not regarded as cruelty to inflict suffering when necessary ; only when there is not any justification in necessity, and where care is not taken to reduce the suffering to a minimum. As men share with animals any suffering that the natural forces may inflict, we need not discuss this source of pain separately in this paragraph, but may at once pass to consider human suffering.

(2) No problem arises regarding the course of nature so long as we confine our regard to physical forces and natural laws as such. That the evolution of the universe should have involved destructive as well as constructive processes is no challenge to faith in God. It is only in so far as that course of nature – normal or abnormal – involves suffering for sensitive organisms – animal or human – that there is a problem. When earthquakes, floods, and plagues were regarded as direct interpositions of the Divine Providence, the problem should have been more acutely felt, although most theologians were ready to accept God's mysterious will as an adequate solution.

(a) Most thinkers to-day, however, recognise an order of nature, not independent of God, but God's habitual mode of activity, from which it is only reasonable to believe that He will not arbitrarily depart. From this standpoint it may then be pointed out that the destructive no less than the constructive processes are the operations of the same forces under the same laws, and have resulted so far as man is concerned in a universe in which life and mind and all the values of mind have become, not only possible, but have been provided with a physical environment which is generally beneficent, and only exceptionally injurious. Further, we must carefully distinguish between evils against which man can protect himself, and those which are altogether beyond his control. Flood, famine, pestilence, are calamities, against which men could, if they would, set a barrier. Human ignorance, indifference, or indolence, must be held responsible for such evils. The danger of them is a constant, and, in its ultimate result, beneficent compulsion to man to exercise his intelligence and industry in using all the resources

which are at his command, if he will but discover and employ them. The earthquake, the volcano, the geyser – are not under man's control, they are due to the fact that our earth is still in the making. The question arises : Should the appearance of life have been delayed until the earth's evolution was completed, or was life a good to be bestowed as soon as ever the conditions for its emergence and continuance were reached? I give the answer in the words of Martineau : “ Is it not better for organic nature to occupy its territory at once, and make good the earlier stages of its history, even though here and there one of its battalions should perish on the way? Even in the countries most exposed to them, these catastrophes are so infrequent that scientific travellers have often exhausted their patience and spent half their lives in the faint hope of seeing them ; and the sum total of their injuries sinks into insignificance, compared with the measureless amount of the unimpaired vitality from which it is a deduction. There is nothing in it to deter a beneficent Creator from opening the story of sentient existence ere yet the crust of the earth has settled in its last security.”¹ It is a singular and yet significant fact that the inhabitants of regions so visited by calamity are ready to return to their former lives and labours, and as quickly as possible to repair the damages, and to restore such prosperity as they had previously enjoyed.

(b) Natural necessity would be a very inadequate solution of the problem. For that we must look rather to the response man makes to the severity and apparent cruelty of his environment. Culture, civilisation, society, are man's endeavour to understand and to control the world around him, to avoid evil and to attain good. A safer and an easier world would not have provided more favourable, but less favourable, conditions for the mental, moral, and social development of mankind. Not the most genial climate nor the most fertile soil produces the best type of man. Such a calamity evokes sympathy, service, succour, sacrifice, which not only relieve the suffering, but ennoble human character and relations. The earth does not afford a pleasure resort for a holiday seeker ; but it does offer a home for the valiant, the loyal, the loving. If, as far as we can see, the making of man is the end of the making of the atom and the making of the star, while we may vainly imagine that the one and the other might have been otherwise made, yet

¹ *Idem*, pp. 84–85.

could we desire that man should be otherwise made than he is being made?

(3) All men die, and many suffer from disease. (a) That death is a natural necessity, since dissolution is inevitable for any organism, is true, but it is not the whole truth as regards man. "He thinks he was not made to die." Death seems to challenge the purpose of personality, since the ideals which it is called to realise are infinite, incapable of complete attainment in the bounds of earthly life. Kant recognised this claim in one of the postulates of the practical reason, but what he claimed for the achievement of holiness can be claimed no less for the pursuit of truth, or the satisfaction of love. The argument is not that we expect immortality because we desire it; but because it is necessary for us to become all our ideals command us with an absolute authority to be. We may reasonably maintain that personal life will survive death, because it deserves, and in the measure it deserves. Apart from the hope of immortality, death remains an inscrutable mystery. And the hope, when it is based on reasons such as these, encourages the realisation of the ideals. An eternal life demands and encourages a finer quality of life than an evanescent would.

(b) That an old man should die, when his life course is run, and his life work done, is no cause for vain regrets or unavailing complaints. Even the bereaved can find in their sorrow a consecration of their love. What does not find so ready an acquiescence is what in our limited vision we often venture to call premature death. There is the natural explanation of disease, accident, or it may be violence (as in war or crime). But even here we ask for its significance. And significance there often is, even discoverable now; for what the significance may be "within the veil" we must wait in faith. Dr. Fairbairn, whom those who knew him intimately loved more for his large tender heart than even they admired his great mind, has written out of that heart concerning a friend of his youth. "He who writes these things once knew a man who was to him companion, friend, and more than brother. They lived, they thought, they argued together; together they walked on the hillside and by the seashore; they had listened to the wind as it sighed through the trees, and to the multitudinous laughter of the waves as they broke upon the beach; together they had watched the purple light which floated radiant above the heather, and together they had descended

into the slums of a great city, where no light was nor any fragrance, and had faced the worst depravity of our kind. Each kept hope alive in the other and stimulated him to high endeavour and better purpose ; but, though the same week saw the two friends settled in chosen fields of labour, the one settled only to be called home, the other to remain and work his tale of toil until his longer day be done. But the one who died seemed to leave his spirit behind in the breast of the man who survived ; and he has lived ever since, and he lives still, feeling as if the soul within him belonged to the man who died. And, may we not say, this experience is common and interprets the experience of the race.”¹ If the experience is not common, it has been shared by many who have been “ baptised for the dead ” to more abundant labour, to more aspiring life, to more abounding love. As one who was a pastor, seeking to minister comfort and hope at the bed of death, the home of bereavement, I can testify that while murmuring and rebellion are not altogether unknown, yet many a family has been purified and consecrated by “ the treasure in heaven.”

(c) Disease is in some respects a more bewildering problem than death itself, especially disease which is accompanied by prolonged and acute suffering.

(i.) That pain itself has a vital function as a warning of danger to the organism which, if heeded, may avert greater mischief, may be acknowledged ; but this does not explain the continuance of the suffering when the disease is incurable. Here also there are compensations in the organism, as extreme suffering may lead to insensibility : but not always. No doubt a great deal of disease is brought by man upon himself through stupidity, neglect, and other personal defects. There are some diseases the direct consequences of vice ; and these consequences fall on the innocent as well as the guilty. I shall never forget a visit I paid to one institution near Berlin, for children and young people who are deaf, dumb, and blind – not one affliction but all three together falling on them as the consequences of parental vice. Not only as inheritance does disease smite the innocent : a bad environment for which society is responsible is the cause of a great deal of human suffering which might be averted. How much suffering there is among women who have been mothers, because when they were rendering the supreme service appointed to womankind by nature they were not

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 145–146.

protected as they should have been against the dangers which threaten at that physical crisis, and were not provided with the care and skill that would have made the birth of the child a happy event and not a ghastly tragedy. Assuredly, if we could deduct from the tale of human suffering all preventable disease, the record would not be so dreadful.

(ii.) Not to blunt the edge of sympathy, not to weaken the motive of succour and service to relieve suffering, but to see the whole matter in its proper proportion, we may consider what can be stated on the other side. Just as in the struggle with nature, so in the campaign against disease, man has developed in knowledge and skill, in compassion for others, in often sacrificial efforts to remove the causes or to alleviate the miseries of disease. Let us imagine, if we can, a world from which all the pity, the labour, the courage, the sacrifice, evoked by suffering, were taken away—dare we say it would be a better world for all that man values most? My experience as a pastor, often in the homes of the people, where there was sickness or suffering, has taught me that “sweet are the uses of adversity.” A commonplace home is ennobled by the care of an imbecile son, the centre of interest, the object of solicitude, the bond of a closer affection among the other members of the family. Only one sister remains with what the world calls this burden resting on her, but, when he passes, she complains that now life seems to have no object for her. Or to have watched day after day, month after month, a painful and wearisome disease with a love that was agony, and yet to have seen through it all a sufferer being made “meet for the inheritance of the saints in light,” is to have passed through an experience that evokes “thoughts too deep for tears,” too deep for words to disclose its secret of the discovery of God in the depths, the soul’s Calvary followed by its Bethany. Browning, in his poem “Mihrab Shah,” discusses this problem; and here is his conclusion:

*In the eyes of God,
Pain may have purpose and be justified;
Man’s sense avails to only see, in pain,
A hateful chance no man but would avert,
Or, failing, needs must pity; thanks to God
And love to man—from man take these away,
And what is man worth?*

(*Poetical Works*, xvi., p. 38.)

Yet, when our philosophy has spoken its truest, and our experience has done for us its best, to reconcile our minds and hearts to pain, all we can do is to make the venture of faith and wait its verification.

(4) In some ways moral evil seems a greater challenge to God as morally perfect than physical, and yet the problem of the physical can have light thrown upon it by such solution as we can offer of the problem of moral evil.

(a) Human personality cannot be made, but must make itself, for its goal, "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control," cannot be reached without its own purpose and endeavour. At the summit of the creative process stands a creature in regard to whom the Creator has so limited Himself as to allow the creature to share the prerogatives and responsibilities of creator. Experience must be acquired, and cannot be imparted; character must be formed by choice, and cannot be shaped by fate. Personal relation to God must be willed freely by man, and cannot be omnipotently imposed by God. Love cannot be commanded by authority; it can only be constrained by love's appeal. Human destiny can be fixed only by man's decision, not God's decree. Personality without liberty and responsibility is inconceivable, and liberty is inconceivable without the possibility of choice, the evil being preferred to the good as well as the good to the evil.

(b) In order to have as the object of His holy love a human race, capable of responding to His love and reproducing His holiness, it was necessary for God to take the risk of man's choosing wrong and not right, of refusing and not yielding obedience. When that first choice was made in the race we cannot tell, neither can we fix the moment at which in the individual child the first choice is made. What we do know is that, from the start of the moral course in the race or the individual, the odds have not been even; there has been a handicap from the beginning. The animal appetites and impulses, which, when in opposition to man's higher endowment of reason and conscience, are the occasions of sin, are in possession of the field before conscience and reason enter, and need to be, as it were, dislodged. What facts compel us to admit, so making the problem more difficult of solution, is that the liability to the wrong choice gets the start of the capacity for the right. What we have to reckon with is not an abstract equal possibility for the one and the other. God is not only responsible for making man free, but also for

placing him in his racial evolution or individual development under conditions which tend to turn the scale against the right choice. Without affirming any superseded doctrine of natural corruption and total depravity, we must admit that man's physical heredity (due to his animal as well as his human ancestry) and his social inheritance in his environment incline him to the downward rather than the upward path. The race is a sinful race ; each individual shares that common sin ; there is a universal need of redemption.

(c) However hampered or hindered by heredity and inheritance, by the habits and the character resulting from previous choices, man still retains a consciousness of liberty, and recognises the responsibility which the use of that liberty imposes. The conscience acquits God of responsibility for the free acts, even when the philosopher or the theologian must still hold God responsible for not only the perilous dower of freedom, but also for the difficult conditions under which it must be exercised. Accordingly, the ways of God with man can be vindicated only as God continues active in redeeming men from the sin which has resulted from this gift and these dangers to which it has been exposed. It is only the holy love of God as Redeemer which can meet the challenge of His wisdom and goodness as Creator of man as free to sin, and as Preserver of man in his sinfulness. And God can be justified in exposing mankind to all the sufferings which are the consequences of sin only if that very suffering in man can be made a means of his redemption from sin as an enlightening, cleansing, and renewing discipline, and, even more, if God in His redeeming activity shares with man the suffering which in Him is a means of redeeming. Man's sin has evoked the sacrifice of the holy love of God, in recognising and appreciating which man's own suffering is transfigured into a fellowship with God in likeness to Him. For me at least there is no adequate response to the challenge which the evil of the world offers to theism as belief in God, unless in the Christian revelation - the redemption of man from sin through the sacrifice of God in Christ. For the individual, too, evil must remain evil only, unmitigated and unrelieved, if it is not met with that personal response in moral character and religious experience which in the preceding pages have been described. If happiness be the end of life, the shadows over the world hang dark and lowering. Only if holy love with God and like God's is man's duty and destiny have the

clouds their silver lining from the sunshine of God's presence, purpose, and activity in the history of man. We see not yet the end of God's ways, but we have in Christ the assurance that He will meet His responsibility as Creator by His resources as Redeemer to bring satisfaction out of the world's travail, and His travail in and with the race He loves.

(5) In dealing with this problem in relief of doubt, it has been necessary to recognise that there are limits to the possibilities in the creation of nature and of man, means necessary towards ends, and means incompatible with ends. It would seem as if an order of nature, on the whole beneficent, cannot exclude dangers and risks of injury ; that a free personality cannot be made without the opportunity of the wrong as well as of the right choice. In short, the divine omnipotence is not altogether unconditioned. Hence, as we have seen, some thinkers have drawn the conclusion that we should speak of God as finite. Such a question cannot be discussed by itself, but must be dealt with as part of the question of the nature, character, and purpose of God in His relation to the world and man ; and this, as the conclusion of the argument of this second part of the volume, will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IX

THEISM

(1) WHAT is the conception of God which the history of religion on the one hand, and the philosophy which seeks to interpret all reality on the other hand, offer us? Is there one conception, or must we be content with divergent conceptions? As I tried to show in the *Introduction*, Religion and Reason, although often at war with one another, may dwell together in peace. The purpose of this last chapter must be to present a conception which not only satisfies the religious soul, but meets also the demands of the enquiring mind.

*That mind and soul, according well,
May make one music as before.*

It is evident that *agnosticism*, which denies that God can be known, or *pluralism*, which does not recognise one unifying principle in the world, or the *evolutionary deism* which treats God as the product of the process, such as Professor Alexander's metaphysics, cannot satisfy the religious soul; and in my judgment none of these meets the demands of the enquiring mind. As regards these, at least, we are not in the dilemma of choosing either religion or reason. The deism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is an anachronism to-day; the theory of evolution has put it out of date altogether; this is not a finished world with an outside God. Whether we can affirm transcendence or not, we must, in the world as science discloses it, assert immanence, if we are to preserve the belief in God at all. The succession to this deism in its opposition to a special divine revelation, to any supernatural activity of God in the world, to the distinctively Christian doctrines of Incarnation and Redemption, has fallen to what claims to be a *rational theism*; it affirms immanence, as it needs must to have any intellectual footing to-day. With its quarrel with Christianity we are not at present concerned, although in the *Conclusion* of this volume the question will be raised whether the Christian belief in God does not lead on to the *Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, the subject treated in a volume with this title, which

is intended to be the logical sequel to the present volume, although it has preceded it in publication.

(2) The theism with which we are in this chapter concerned is the *Christian monotheism*, not based on philosophical reasoning, though consistent with what I believe to be the true philosophy, but on the blended divine revelation and human religion, of which the record is written in the Christian Scriptures and which is still present and active to-day in the Christian Church. It seems necessary, in offering a constructive exposition of this Christian belief in God, to take account of some rival conceptions of God – that of the pantheism which identifies God and world, and its successor, the monism which substitutes the Absolute for God, and treats God, as with world and man, a finite element in the totality of reality ; and that of the modified theism which ascribes finitude to God in one form or another.

I

(1) Pantheism is an ambiguous term, and, like the chameleon, changes colour according to its environment, or, like Proteus, alters shape according to its circumstances. The etymological meaning, God is all, or all is God, allows a dual interpretation, of All through God, or God through All. In the first case we have pantheism, in the proper sense of the word ; in the second we have *pancosmism*, which can claim to be theism of a sort only by verbal accident. Haeckel claims that his monism is a pantheism like Spinoza's ; but he cannot substantiate that claim. It is really a materialism, although by the confusion of spirit with energy, and the consequent endowment of each atom with *soul* quality – likes and dislikes, pleasures and pains – it has the appearance of a *panpsychism*, similar to that of Clifford's mind-stuff. If we confine the term pantheism to such a mode of thought as makes the conception of God determinative of the conception of the world, there are degrees in which the identity of the world and God may be affirmed. *Stoicism* so far distinguished God and world as to describe the one as soul and the other as body. *Neo-Platonism*, which is an imperfect pantheism, relates the world to God, not as a creation, but as an emanation. Deussen distinguishes in Indian thought the pantheism, for which God has been transformed into the world from the *idealism*, for which Brahman alone is reality

and the world is illusion (*Maya*) – a form of pantheism sometimes described as *acosmism*.¹ Although the system of Spinoza is generally regarded as the most important pantheistic system, it seems to me that the identity of world and God in it is not complete. The world is constituted by the modes of the two attributes – extension and thought – of God as the only substance, possessed of an infinite number of other attributes, although these two alone are known to us. The world is not the whole of God ; it is only that part of Him which we know. In his philosophy he is compelled by his logic to deny the reality of evil, the validity of moral distinctions, the personal liberty of man. As a philosophy his system is a contradiction of the religious belief in God. But inconsistently with his philosophy his own piety rises to, not a reciprocal personal relation of God and man, but a personal attitude of man to God, a knowledge and a love of God which is virtue and blessedness. A further evidence that pantheism cannot supply an object for religious belief is this – that Indian pantheism has compromised with, and been tolerant of, polytheism as religion for the common people. In what modified sense the identity of God and world can be affirmed a modern exponent of pantheism as a religion shows. “ If pantheism affirms God to be All in all, it does not follow that pantheism must hold a man, or a tree, or a tiger, to be God.” It is not “ the aggregate of the finite objects ” which constitutes the unity of God.² If the parts are not divine, how can the whole be altogether God ? In none of these forms can pantheism be regarded as satisfying the religious consciousness.

(2) The formidable challenge to the monotheistic conception of God which contemporary philosophy offers is in *monism*, the continuation of the Hegelian tradition as represented by Mr. Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality* and Professor Bosanquet’s *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.³ To these systems Dr. Pringle-Pattison devotes the twelfth lecture in his Gifford series on *The Idea of God*. The former insists that the *totality* of existence (the plurality in unity) alone is *reality* ; all less than this is only *appearance*. His criterion is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

² *Pantheism*, by J. Allanson Picton, p. 10.

³ I have read these books, but am content to let the philosophers contend with one another. The logical method, the speculative interest, and the metaphysical conclusions are so alien to my mental habits, moral convictions, and religious experience that I cannot, with the best will, appreciate them as solving the problem of God, world, and man.

inclusiveness (all) and harmony (one). The latter accepts this criterion. The totality alone has *individuality*, and *value* as reality. "The character of the real," says Bradley, "is to possess everything phenomenal in a harmonious form." "The supreme principle of value and reality," says Bosanquet, is "wholeness, completeness, individuality," and "the appeal to the whole is the same thing with the principle otherwise known as the principle of non-contradiction."¹ Dr. Pringle-Pattison condemns the principle as formal and abstract, and asserts that "we must argue from the specific modes of our finite consciousness of value." Bosanquet and Bradley practically recognise the need of such an extension in the application of the criterion of value, but no adequate justification of such an extension is offered. The real defence of such an extension Pringle-Pattison himself finds in recognising that man in the values he recognises is therein an organ of reality itself, and quotes Leibnitz in illustration: "Souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, but spirits are also images of the divinity or of the author of nature himself, capable of knowing the system of the universe."² Rejecting this abstract formal principle as a criterion of reality and value, the important question for us is, How in such a system are God, man, and their mutual relations conceived? For it is evident that these fall within the totality, the Absolute. Can God be regarded as personal? "So far as the terminology goes," says Professor Webb, "it is not Lotze, but Mr. Bosanquet, that agrees with the tradition of Christian theology in calling God an *individual*, but not a *person*."³ But on closer scrutiny the agreement is discovered to be only apparent: for this *individuality* is found to be not personal, since "the Absolute of Mr. Bosanquet's and of Mr. Bradley's philosophy transcends the sphere of morality," while "the moral life of human beings does not fall altogether outside of the Absolute Experience; on the contrary, is wholly comprehended within it," yet it is only "as transmuted, one may say, beyond all recognition." . . . "In this philosophy the Absolute transcends the sphere of morality, and therefore cannot be called a person."⁴ When we call God, not a person, but personal, we do not ascribe finite personality to Him; but what we affirm is that there is sufficient affinity

¹ Quoted by Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.

² *Idem*, p. 237.

³ *God and Personality*, p. 100.

⁴ *Idem*, pp. 105-106.

between God and man to allow of reciprocal personal relations. Can these monistic systems provide for such personal relations? Professor Webb gives an adverse answer: "No doubt Mr. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley have been at pains to make clear that they do not consider the Absolute to be another name for God (see Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 445 ff.; *Truth and Reality*, c. 15; Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny*, pp. 255 ff.). The God of religion, they say, is or may be thought of as standing in a personal relation to his worshipper; and they would, I think, be inclined to add that there are aspects of reality which of course fall within the Absolute but are ignored by religion, or, if not ignored, are regarded by it as antagonistic to God."¹ A result which follows from this view is that the God of religion must be regarded as finite, as appearance, as not the individuality which has value. "I do not know," says Professor Webb, "whether I am right in detecting a certain distinction here between the views of Mr. Bosanquet and Mr. Bradley. It appears to me that on the whole Mr. Bosanquet, though holding that to think of a God with whom we could be in personal relations is to think of a merely finite being and not of the Absolute, yet finds in the contemplation of the Absolute the satisfaction of his religious aspirations, while Mr. Bradley dwells rather on the thought that philosophy must recognise the God to whom religious devotion is directed to be not the Absolute, but, like all else in our experience, an appearance of the Absolute. God, he would say, the object of religion, must be finite, and therefore cannot be the Absolute; but religion is a real experience; there is an intercourse between oneself and God; yet neither in oneself nor in God can one find ultimate reality; both are appearances of that which is ultimately real, but it, the Absolute, transcends them both."² We are led by monism as well as by other philosophical tendencies to the conception of God as finite. Before discussing this conception, we may ask whether religion has any interest in identifying God and the Absolute. That it should attach any value to the term as such is out of the question, and that it should avoid the use of the term for God with the same meaning as monism does is certain. But does the term stand for something religion must preserve? Professor Pringle-Pattison, in a note,³ admits his occasional use of the terms

¹ *God and Personality*, p. 102.

² *Idem*, pp. 132-133.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 430-435.

God and Absolute as interchangeable, but maintains that he does not "expressly identify them," and that as his argument proceeds he more and more differentiates them. And yet he defends the use of the term as suggesting "a self-contained and internally organised whole, beyond which there is nothing," and his theism "finds it impossible to take God and the world as two separate and independently existing facts." In this I find myself in agreement with him, although I should be more chary of using the term Absolute owing to its close association with the monisms we have been discussing. We must form such a conception of God as will distinguish, without separating the world from God, and will so relate God and the world as derived from, and dependent on, God, that no reality above or beyond God will be possible for our thought.

(3) We must turn now to consider the varied views which in one way or another involve the idea of God as finite.

(a) The Greek philosophy, which never quite escaped the dualism of *nous* and *hyle*, necessarily involved this idea; so in some sense did deism, which, while it acknowledged God as Maker, assigned such a measure of independence to the world which He had made that He was in bondage to the nature He had willed. While Leibnitz regarded God as the monad of monads, the maker of the other monads, perfectly reflecting the All in Himself, and establishing the harmony of the monads, so that one world emerged from their independent activities, yet the conception is essentially pluralistic, and is saved from pluralism by an artificial relation of God to the other constituents of reality. *Panpsychism* has already been mentioned as an unintelligible pluralism. In recent years two systems of pluralism have been advocated; that of James is theistic, that of McTaggart atheistic. As the evil in the world had led J. S. Mill to deny the almightiness of God, so James seeks the solution of the problem of evil on the lines of Zoroastrianism, and claims the support of the religious consciousness for his view. He affirms an unfinished world and a finite God. God is the *primus inter pares* of all who are striving for good against evil, and their helper. I have elsewhere used the term *meliorism* to express the belief in God's progressive redemption of the world from evil. James uses it for what he claims to be a "more moralistic view" than is "religious optimism." But morality is incomplete without religion. The morality which emphasises the struggle needs the religion which

assures the victory. What has been said in the preceding chapter on "Theodicy" undermines this moral basis of pluralism. The first part of this volume shows how religion has always raised men to some other solution of the problem than that which is here offered. Even such plausibility as James's pluralism may claim Dr. McTaggart's lacks. He attempts to combine idealism and optimism with a pluralism which can only offer a conjecture that somehow out of the multitude of independent subjects into which he resolves the world, despite the appearances of conflict to the contrary, a harmony will emerge, since "*sub specie æternitatis*, every self is perfect," although "*sub specie temporis*, it is progressing towards a perfection as yet unattained." On this statement, which he quotes, Professor Pringle-Pattison comments: "This conclusion was no doubt inevitable, seeing that each self was already defined as an Absolute. But such a heroic multiplication of deities appeals to me rather as a *reductio ad absurdum* of Dr. McTaggart's doctrine of eternal substances than as calling for further discussion."¹ Professor Pringle-Pattison also criticises the tendency in Dr. Rashdall's theism to place God and finite spirits on a level, as by their activity limiting His. Although Dr. Ward is regarded by him as falling under the same condemnation,² yet the conclusion Dr. Ward reaches in his lectures on *Pluralism and Theism* is clearly theistic. The sympathetic exposition of pluralism which he gives in his first series of *Gifford Lectures* cannot be regarded as agreement in view of his "careful discussion of theism" as promising "to effect much in resolving the difficulties of pluralism"³ in the second series. One sentence to prove his final rejection of pluralism will suffice: "If we stop at a plurality of finite selves in interaction we have no guarantee, cannot even reasonably expect, that such a totality will ever attain to perfect organic unity."⁴ In the previous chapter Dr. Brightman was quoted as finding a solution of the problem of evil in assigning finitude to God; but the distinctive feature of his position was shown to lie in this – that the limitation is not imposed from without, but is found within God Himself; in His nature there is the Given which hampers His will and hinders His purpose.

(b) It is not the existence of evil – physical and moral – which alone raises this question of God's finitude. The existence of the world as a fixed order, and of men as having

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 393.

² *Idem*, p. 183.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 447.

free will, seems to set limits to God's freedom of action. Even if God has brought into existence, and keeps in existence, reality derived and dependent on Himself, does not that make it impossible for us to regard Him as the Absolute, the harmonious totality of reality? This is the question that the fact of creation itself – apart altogether from the presence of evil in it – forces upon our thought. In passing to the discussion of this question, I desire to associate myself as indicating my standpoint at the start with the conviction expressed by Professor Webb: "I am convinced that religion cannot, when once it has reached the stage at which the question has become intelligible, give any but an affirmative answer to the question whether God is the Absolute. I see no more, if also no less, difficulty in allowing that the Absolute may be the object of personal religious devotion than in allowing that the Absolute may be the object of metaphysical speculation; and I should say that the existence of religion (in some of its highest manifestations), and the existence of philosophy, prove that the Absolute can be, because it is, both the one and the other."¹ As regards the better approach to the subject, the *a posteriori* from the world to God, or the *a priori* from God to the world, it seems to me that, as in the previous chapters we have been following the former, here in the constructive conclusion we may allow ourselves to take the latter. The conception of God we must attempt to expound will not be the theology of religion apart from philosophy, but the theism which seeks to reconcile religion and reason, even God as the object both of "personal religious devotion" and of "metaphysical speculation."

II

(1) In seeking to give a description of the divine object of religion, the phrase was used, "the Above and Beyond man and the Akin to and Within man." And this contrast must be our starting-point. God has for religion, and still more for the philosophy which reflects on religion without rejecting it, this dual aspect. He is both "unknown and well known." The Heavens of the heavens cannot contain Him, and He dwells in the humble and the contrite heart. No man by searching can find out God, and yet His secret is

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

with them that fear Him. No man hath seen God at any time, but the Son has declared Him.

(a) Turning from the concrete symbols of religion to the abstract terms of philosophy, we may find the contrast expressed in the terms *personal* and *supra-personal*. Spencer rejects the term *personal*, and prefers to think of God as *supra-personal*; but then he gives an exposition of the Known that would lead us to think of the Unknowable as *infra-personal*.¹ For this reason I have hitherto been led to assert without qualification the personality of God; but my latest reflection has forced on me the conclusion that we must recognise this dual aspect in God. While the philosophy which described God in negations as indeterminate, indescribable, ineffable reality, and the mysticism which aspires to discover this deity of negations, are perversions of thought and life, yet on the other hand a facile, superficial, anthropomorphic theology is speculatively untrue and religiously unsound. God is not in all respects "the Other of ourselves," but He is in many respects other than we are. The worldward, manward aspect of God as He discloses Himself in His world to man is personal. The God whom man in the world is compelled, in religion and by reason alike, to confess as transcending all in which He manifests Himself may be described as *supra-personal*, so long as the negative confession is not allowed to obscure or distort the positive affirmation. This is but a modification, and not a contradiction, of the position held by Lotze, to which I myself have hitherto closely adhered, namely, that the limitations which we find in human personality do not belong to personality as such, since man is imperfect personality – personality in the making – while God alone is perfect personality. I am, however, beginning to have my doubts whether the category of personality, conceive it as we will, is quite adequate to the total reality of God; whether, even if we attained perfect personality, there would not be vast reaches of reality and ranges of activity in God that could not be included. So long as what we describe as *supra-personal* is not conceived as an embarrassment, but as an enhancement, of what we call the personality

¹ "Though the attributes of personality as we know it cannot be conceived by us as attributes of the Unknown Cause of things, yet duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality in the conviction that the choice is not between personality and something lower than personality, but between personality and something higher" (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1884; quoted, *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXX, p. 573).

of God, the demands of the dual aspect will be met, while difficulties of speculation will also be relieved.

(b) In this development of my thinking I have been stimulated by what Professor Webb writes about the use of the terms *persona* and *prosopon* regarding God. He points out, and the facts deserves consideration, that these terms were first of all used, not to describe God in His unity, but in His tri-unity. The *prosopa* are present in the substance of God, and in their immanent relations constitute His unity as God. The personality of God was first urged in opposition to the doctrine of the Trinity. "The *personality of God* (as distinct from the acknowledgment of *persons in God*) is affirmed by no Christian creed or confession of faith which has not so far departed from the normal type as to abandon the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity."¹ This important consideration demands qualification in so far as the psychological analogies Augustine uses in his exposition of the Trinity do point to God as personality. Passing over what Professor Webb has to say regarding the influence of the Greek term *ὑπόστασις* in modifying the meaning of the two terms *persona* and *prosopon* in the direction of the sense now given to the word person, for our purpose it is interesting to revert to the original meaning of each of these older terms. "It is a well-known fact that, in its original use, the word *persona* was the designation of the *mask* worn by the actor on the ancient Roman stage and came to be used of the *actor* himself and his *part* in the play; and hence of the *part* that a man plays in social intercourse generally, and especially those forms of social intercourse in which, as in legal transactions or in the official relations of public magistrates, a definite task is assigned, just as in a play, to a particular man, to which all that he is or does, when not engaged in the performance of that task, is irrelevant."² The corresponding Greek word still less bore the meaning which the term person has now. "*Πρόσωπον*," says the same writer, "had (principally, as one may suppose, because it had not acquired the legal association of *persona*) made still less progress than *persona* towards the modern philosophical use of *person*. Primarily, indeed, it meant the *face*, not, like *persona*, the actor's mask, which was properly in Greek *προσωπεῖον*. So far as it had come to be used at all for an individual human being it was probably rather through taking the 'face' to stand for the man, as we speak of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

² *Idem*, p. 35.

counting *heads*, than through being used for a *dramatis persona*, although it is found also in this sense. This being the history of the term *πρόσωπον*, we are not surprised to find that, even more than *persona*, did it suggest a mere *aspect* or *rôle*. Several such aspects might be presented, several such rôles discharged, by the same individual at different times."¹ The terms *persona* and *πρόσωπον* would indicate an *economic* trinity, while the terms *ὑπόστασις* and *subsistentia* would affirm more unequivocally an *ontological*, and, even where the original identity of *ὑπόστασις* with *οὐσία* was retained, would incline thought towards tritheism. In view of these meanings one can understand why Cyril with his tendency to monophysitism was not satisfied with Nestorius's confession of the one *πρόσωπον* of Christ, and why Nestorius refused to use the recently introduced term of *ὑπόστασις* for person, as a denial of the distinction of the two natures.

(c) What, for the immediate purpose, this discussion leads to is that in speaking of God as personal we are indicating, not so much what He is in Himself, or in His otherness from men, in His Absolute and Infinite Reality, as what He is, shows Himself to be, and does, in His relation to the world and men. When we affirm, as we do, that God is personal, we do not profess to have sounded the depths of the divine ; but what we do assert is that God is such that personal relations and intercourse are possible between Him and man – that He thinks the truth, feels the beauty, wills the goodness, imparts the love, which in religion men not only ascribe to Him, but are conscious of experiencing from Him. In our *sub-* or, rather, *supra-conscious* relation to Him as the Creator and Preserver of our life, as not only once for all deriving our existence from Him, but as always sustained by Him, there is something more and other than what we call the personal. In recognising our affinity of nature with God as personal, as the condition of such personal community of interest, purpose, effort as we consciously experience, we must also recognise such difference as there is and must be between the Creator and the creature, the Preserver and the preserved, the original and the derived life. Hence it seems to me to be confusing for thought, as well as irreverent in feeling, to talk about the divinity of man or the humanity of God. However great the likeness as personal between God and man may be, and however

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

close the fellowship this likeness makes possible, God is not an infinite man, nor man a finite god (the words themselves are contradictory). If with the unreflective religious consciousness we separate God and man as persons, and unite them only in personal relations, we cannot escape the reproach of conceiving a finite God, nor can we claim the right of regarding God as the Absolute. We can affirm that God is infinite, that He is the Absolute only as we recognise that He alone is ultimate reality, and that such reality as we ascribe to the world or to man is so derived from and dependent on Him as to be no extrinsic limitation or relation imposed upon Him. In my judgment, it might conduce to clearness and distinctness of thought (to apply Descartes' criterion of truth) if we thus recognised the personal relation of God to man in religion as having as its background, not so disclosed to our consciousness, His supra-personal reality – that which is not included in, and yet is necessary for, God's personal relation to man. The personal and the supra-personal are not differences within God, but only aspects of His reality when our speculative intellect tries to think out the implications of our religious consciousness.

(2) We may recall that, in the first part of this volume, attention was called to Otto's *Idea of the Holy*; and the terms he uses of God, the *numinous*, the *mysterium tremendum*, were translated into the terms of reflective thought: God as *Infinite*, *Absolute*, and in relation to the conditions of created reality, – *Time* and *Space*, – as *Eternal* and *Immense*.

(a) The literal meaning of the words infinite and absolute, *unlimited* and *unrelated*, on which Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer rely for their *agnosticism*, must be set aside as meaningless; for what the argument amounts to is that God is, to use homely words, so much everything in general that he cannot be anything in particular. I have till now claimed that the terms may be properly defined as self-limited and self-related, and argued accordingly that only if we conceive God as personal can we give such an intelligible content to the words, for such also is man's ideal of personality that in self-control he shall become increasingly independent of external conditions. While I should still contend that, as so defined, these attributes are consistent with ideal personality, yet now I would insist on such an interpretation only in what I have called the personal aspects of God, and would recognise that the supra-personal in God remains so great a

mystery that the terms may be allowed to convey to us a sense of the indefinable reality of God in His total Being. We must recognise, however, that in His worldward, manward manifestation, in creating a world with a fixed order of nature, and man with a freedom of will which can disobey as well as surrender to His will, God has limited His activity in relating it to the natural forces and human wills, derived from Him, and dependent on Him, and nevertheless allowed by Him a sphere of relative independence. It is thus not only the conception of God as personal which is inconsistent with infinitude and absoluteness as often defined, but the conception of a relative reality, distinct from God's, of the world and man. Even if we minimise, as much as thought which is not avowedly pantheistic will allow, the conception of creation ; even if we maximise, as far as is possible, God's immanence in the world and man, – yet physical forces are infinite power in finite exercise, and natural laws are infinite wisdom in finite expression, and men are persons and not puppets.

(b) The limited and dependent reality which God has brought into being is subject to two universal and permanent conditions, *space* and *time*. Dr. Alexander, as we have seen, in their unity as Space–Time, regards these conditions as forming the creative principle of the world ; Professor Lloyd Morgan agrees with common reflection in regarding them as conditions of the reality of the world, as objective, and not subjective, as Kant held them to be. The religious consciousness refuses to think of God as extended in space, or prolonged in time. It ascribes to Him *immensity* and *eternity*. In affirming His *omnipresence* it does not represent Him as filling space as the hypothetical ether does, but as all present in every point of space as also moment of time. It expresses the joyous confidence that at no time and in no place is He far off from the believing soul which seeks to realise His Presence. The metaphysical idea can be translated into a personal experience. More significant for religion than God's immensity is God's eternity. This is an ambiguous term and deserves closer scrutiny. So important does Professor Pringle-Pattison consider this subject that he devotes a whole lecture to it. He distinguishes three senses of the term “ eternal ” : (1) endless duration, (2) essential timelessness, (3) “ that which includes time but somehow transcends it.” The first sense is clearly due to a confusion of the ideas of time and eternity ; the second has been applied

to truths which belong to no one age, but are valid for every age (the claim made for the Platonic ideas) ; the third is the proper use of the term. We may pass from the idea of time to the idea of eternity by the way of the idea of *duration*.

(c) When we think only of the succession of past, present, and future, the present seems like a knife-edge, a line without any breadth dividing past from future. The present is instantly becoming the past, and the future the present. Time is a ceaselessly flowing stream. A Chinese poem, rendered by Schiller into German, may be thus reproduced in English :

*Threefold the step of time, 'tis said :
The future cometh with slow tread ;
The present speeds as arrow fast ;
For ever still standeth the past,
Her course impatience cannot speed,
Whene'er she doth delay ;
No wish, no prayer her flight impede
When she hasteth away.*

The last verse expresses the truth only partially, for in *duration* the mind of man is exercising a control over the *succession*. It is a familiar experience that the time seems, as we say, long or short, as we are indifferent or interested. The present does speed as arrow fast, when our attention is absorbed in any pursuit or pleasure. The future cometh with slow tread, as we wait, e.g. for the specialist's opinion regarding a loved life. The physical measure of time by hours, minutes, and seconds is not the personal measure of it in our experience.¹ Subject to time as we are as *succession*, we have some control over time as *duration*. The line which divides past and future may gain a present breadth. Professor Pringle-Pattison gives a quotation from William James which is so important that it must be reproduced. "The practically recognised present is no knife-edge, but a saddleback with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a *duration*, with a bow and stern, as it were – a rearward- and a forward-looking end; it is only as parts of this *duration block* that the relation of *succession* of one end or the other is

¹ If I remember rightly, Bailey, in his *Festus*, expresses this truth in some such words : "We live in heart-beats, not in moments."

perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole with its two ends imbedded in it."¹ He calls this the "specious present" – past, present, future, held in one experience. Theologians have described God's eternal consciousness as a *totum simul*, past and future merged in a constant present. The human experience of *duration* just described affords an illustration of the possible transition from mere temporal succession to eternal simultaneity. In appreciating a drama, or a novel as a whole, in apprehending a mathematical demonstration or a logical argument in its unity, we have a further suggestion as regards the conception of eternity. For, as Professor Pringle-Pattison insists, *simultaneity* merely is inadequate to express what is meant by eternity. "The stages must be seen not merely simultaneously, but as elements of a completed purpose."² The content of the eternal consciousness must be a significant whole, in which "the temporal facts appear simply as the vehicles of a meaning or value."³

(3) While thus we insist, and rightly, that God is not subject to, but transcends temporal as well as spatial conditions, we must at the same time assert the complementary truth, that as the relation of God to the world is a real relation, so the conditions of the existence of the world, as in time and space, have a relative reality for God, and that His personal relations with men are thus conditioned.

(a) God knows, cares for, and deals with a man in *this* place at *this* time. His past sins, his present conversion, his future amendment of life mean something to God, if not as a temporal succession merely, yet as a duration in time. God's transcendence of time and space is not an obliteration, but a comprehension. God's *omnipresence* is not a mere negation of time and space, it is an affirmation that God all in all is altogether here and now; every point and every moment bears His full being. The full significance of this consideration appears when we apply it to God's *omnipotence* and *omniscience*.

(b) In many discussions of the problem of evil it is assumed that *omnipotence* means that God can do anything that we may imagine or desire that He should do: e.g. that fire should warm, but not burn; that, in short, all the processes of

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I., pp. 609–610, quoted *op. cit.*, pp. 352–353.

² *Idem*, p. xv.

³ *Idem*, p. 356.

nature should under all circumstances be beneficent, and under none injurious ; that men should be free, and yet debarred from sinning ; that contradictions should become affirmations, and inconsistencies harmonies. Leaving out of account at present the wise and good reasons already mentioned in the previous chapter why man should be disciplined and developed by pain, and should attain virtue by struggle, so that on a closer and higher view it is not desirable that God should exercise His omnipotence to prevent pain and sin, we confine our regard to what God's omnipotence does mean. God's nature as *supra-personal*, as the mystery that exceeds our comprehension, may impose limitations on His activity that we do not know. But as man is free in his self-determination, so God is free in acting according to His nature. But this supra-personal aspect of God, if such there be, is not our present concern. In His personal relation to the world and man, God's character and purpose may, and do, determine His action in ways contrary to human desire and expectation. What we need now to recognise is that, as God has given a relative, if derived and dependent, reality to the world and man, His action within that reality is conditioned by the nature that He has given to it. God's omnipotence in this connection means that God can do, and does, only what the world as it is, and man as he is, willed and made by God, allows. There is an order of nature, although our science may not have discovered all its secrets, and there may be reserves of divine activity in relation to it, in accordance with its constitution, which have not yet been disclosed. The conception of *emergent evolution* itself suggests this. There is a capacity of man which sets limits to what he can be and do, and there are laws of the development of that capacity, although, here too, who can answer finally the question, "What is man that Thou art mindful of him?" There is an unreasoning supernaturalism which is irreverent. To describe miracles as violations of natural law, or interruptions of natural order is not only irrational, but irreligious. There are a constancy and consistency in God's activity which are evidences of His wisdom and His goodness. What would be the mental and moral confusion for man, if God were a God of caprice, not to be relied on in maintaining a natural and a moral order, law in the world and in man ! I have elsewhere¹ more fully developed the analogy, but it may here be more

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, pp. 251-252.

briefly mentioned, between God's and man's activity. The order of nature and history may be described as God's *habits*, miracles as *original acts*, when the purpose of God demands such a modification of His regular activity. God, in creating the new, conserves the old, and the old is a condition of the new. Professor Lloyd Morgan in his book on *Emergent Evolution* shows that the physical and the chemical processes are *involved* in the vital functions of the organism, and that neural processes are *involved* in mental activity. This is the scientific statement of what religion states in more personal terms. Without committing ourselves to Leibnitz's speculative opinion regarding metaphysical, and consequent physical, evil, we may, with more modesty and less confidence, at least urge the consideration that God's omnipotence means that God can do and does, within nature and history, all that is possible within the constitution He has given created reality. To ask further, why God did not create reality otherwise, is presumption, is applying the measure of man's knowledge and insight to the unfathomable wisdom and goodness of God, of which the world, as God has made it, gives sufficient evidence for faith and confidence, and a patient waiting for that vision, when we shall not see as in a mirror in a riddle, but face to face, when we shall no longer know only in part, but know as we are known (1 Cor., xiii. 12).

(c) I venture to apply the same mode of reasoning to God's *omniscience*. God knows objects in space, and events in time under their conditions. In His personal relation to man, past, present, and future have significance for Him as for man. History is for God also a progressive fulfilment of His purpose for man in the world. Greatly daring, may I confess my conviction that revelation and redemption are an experience for God as for man? The Incarnation was the consummating event for God of His relation to man. The Cross is not merely a temporal symbol of an eternal reality – the sacrificial love of God – but the symbol is significant for, necessary to, the reality. The *economic* Trinity is not accidental to the *ontological*. If time has no value for God, how do we empty the history of God's relation to man in time of reality! It becomes, as in Brahmanism, *Maya*, illusion. If for God all created reality exists in an eternal now (contradictory as such a phrase is), is the whole drama of man's life in earth – tragedy or comedy – for God “sound and fury, signifying nothing”? Let us boldly

set aside whatever our speculations about God's eternity may involve in making time unreal for Him, and hold the conviction that God's personal relation to man in time means much for Him ; we shall not dare to say all, because His relation to man does not exhaust His reality. If we were convinced it meant nothing for Him, how little it would mean for us, even if it did not lose all meaning ! Somehow His eternal consciousness so relates itself to His knowledge of events in time, that they are known under the conditions of time. Let me apply this general principle to a particular instance, which has not only perplexed the minds, but also distressed the hearts of Christian thinkers and believers in all ages. As a boy in Scotland I was brought up under the shadow (drear and dreadful it sometimes was) of Calvinism with its twin doctrines of prescience (fore-knowledge) and predestination. The doctrine of predestination, as too flagrantly in opposition to the belief in human liberty and responsibility, has been generally abandoned ; but the doctrine of fore-knowledge still keeps its hold on many minds. When the difficulty is urged that a fore-known act cannot be thought of as a free act, a refuge is often sought in affirming the mystery of God's relation to man. As the preceding pages have again and again shown, I allow all that can reasonably be allowed for the *numinous*, the *mysterium tremendum*, the *supra-personal* in God which may be beyond the personal as known to us. But this alleged mystery is, I submit, a human invention, due to a dogmatic use of the Scriptures, which some theologians who consciously profess to have accepted the modern view of the Bible – its function and authority – still subconsciously practise, and to the dominance of the great intellect of Calvin down to the present day in many of the churches. For the historical significance of Calvin I have the fullest appreciation ; but that continued dominance I regard as disastrous for theology. The revival of Calvinism by Barth is to be regarded as a tragic theological reaction. We do not honour the Reformers by galvanising what is dead in their theology, but by developing what is still living. I cannot admit that in any other than a dogmatic use of the Bible, the Scripture evidence is conclusive. The *argumentum ad hominem* – the rebuke of human arrogance, of Rom. ix., needs to be corrected by the moral judgment of Rom. x., and still more by the inspired vision of Rom. xi. The revelation of God in Christ, for me relegates the doctrine of predestination to the

scrap-heap of superseded superstitions. The term fore-knowledge is to me a contradiction : what is known is the actual, and the future is only possible, and can be forecast only as possible, if we are dealing with free acts, and not the inevitable consequences of the natural order. There is here a confusion of two distinct conceptions, the eternal and the temporal : the eternal consciousness of God is interpreted in terms of temporal succession. If, as has been already urged, God knows events in time as past, present, and future, then man's free acts, until they are done, are known as not actual in the present, but possible in the future. The religious conception of God's relation to man forbids our assuming that sin, repentance, and amendment, are not for God distinguishable as successive, and known in their succession. As Jesus told the parable to illustrate God's ways with man, we may use it to enforce this consideration. Would the shepherd have grieved for the loss of his sheep had he already known it as found ? Unless human freedom, experience, and character, have no reality for God, there is for God's knowledge a *contingency* in history. It is not a timed programme, which God as a good Chairman carries through to the exact minute. This may sound irreverent ; but there is no irreverence to the divine reality, but a legitimate exposure in its absurdity of a human invention about God.

(d) It must be admitted that this human invention is not wanton ; that it is a mistaken attempt to satisfy what is a real interest for, an urgent demand of, the religious consciousness. Admit *contingency*, it is argued, what assurance is left that God can and will fulfil His purpose in the world for man ? We must somehow reconcile individual liberty and historical contingency with God's direction and control of His creation. Reverting to Professor Pringle-Pattison's discussion of the relation of time and eternity, we may note his contention, that the successive stages must be seen by God not merely as simultaneous, but as elements in a completed whole ; and putting this abstract principle more concretely, God's omniscience may be conceived as a knowledge of all the possibilities of individual action, and consequent historical contingency, and also of all the resources at His command so to deal with every situation as it arises, as to secure the fulfilment of His purpose. The following illustration may serve to make the conception plainer. The captain of a ship has a chart of the ocean before him ; he knows his destination, and the shortest and best course to

it ; but to avoid a collision with another vessel, or to render aid to one in distress, to keep out of the track of icebergs, to make such use as is possible of currents or of winds, his course cannot be uniform, but must allow for variations with changing conditions. God's Providence is not a machine wound up to run a certain way. He takes account of, and adapts His dealings to, the works and the ways of man. Thwarted, hindered, delayed, He is never defeated finally, or diverted permanently from the course His wisdom and goodness appoint. Dr. Martineau¹ has stated the matter so admirably, that I must indulge myself in a long quotation, but not too long for the importance of the subject. "The prescience required by philosophical Theism is not of this definite and individual kind, except in the domain of physical nature, where choice has no place. Beyond this, in the world of intelligence, a margin of freedom being allowed, the lines of possibility are not rectilinear, but divergent, and open a way into innumerable hypothetical fields, among which, as yet invisible, lies the actual. In the outlook on this realm which embraces the future, what is needed, in order that the intending causality of God, and His moral government, may secure their ends and shape their means ? Simply, that no one of the open possibilities should remain in the dark and pass unreckoned ; and that they should all, in their working out, be compatible with the ruling purposes of God, not defeating the aim, but only varying the track. An infinite Mind, with prevision which is extended beyond all that is to all that can be, is lifted above surprise or disappointment, and able to provide for all events and combinations ; yet, instead of being shut up in a closed and mechanised universe, lives amid the free play of variable character and contingent history, into which there is room for approval, pity, and love to flow. Is this a *limitation* of God's foresight, that He cannot read all volitions that are to be ? Yes ; but it is a *self-limitation*, just like His abstinence from causing them ; lending us a portion of His causation, He refrains from covering all with his omniscience. Foreknowledge of the contingent is not a perfection ; and if, rather than have a reign of universal necessity and stereotyped futurity, He willed, in order to prepare scope for a gift of moral freedom, to set up a range of alternative possibilities, He could but render some knowledge conditional for the sake of making any righteousness attainable ; leaving

¹ *Op. cit.*, II., pp. 263-264.

enough that is determinate, for science ; and enough that is indeterminate, for character. ' There is no absurdity in supposing,' says Dugald Stewart, ' that the Deity may, for wise purposes, have chosen to open a source of contingency in the voluntary action of His creatures, to which no pre-science can possibly extend ' (*Active and Moral Power*, Hamilton's ed. of *Works*, VI., p. 401)."

(e) If God, in His willing and His knowing, limits His infinitude in omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience we may ask : Is there any corresponding limitation of His feeling? or indeed : Can we ascribe feeling to God? It has been already mentioned that Croce and Alexander both confine human personality to the two aspects of cognition and conation. But here we may follow the current psychology, which corresponds with general thinking, and add feeling. The Fathers at Chalcedon regarded it as a monstrous error to ascribe passibility to the divine nature of the Incarnate.¹ God was thought of in ancient philosophy as above emotion. But the religious consciousness would feel itself robbed of a precious consolation, if denied the assurance that God feels for and with men, that there is sorrow for man's loss, and joy in man's recovery (Luke xv.). Recognising that God in His eternal perfection must possess eternal blessedness ; yet that blessedness, even as its imperfect counterpart in man, need not exclude compassion and sympathy. Hence I have dared in a previous work to add to the three current descriptions of God's relation to the world the fourth of *omnipatience*, using the word patience in the wider sense of any kind of feeling.² " In the midst of the throne there is a Lamb as it had been slain " (Rev. v. 6). We dare not exclude sacrifice from the fullness of the being of God, as it is the loftiest reach of the soul of man. But the recognition of these self-limitations of God at once raises the problems of the character and the purpose of God, to which we must now pass.

(4) Here we are concerned with distinctively personal qualities, which are God's in eternal perfection, man's only in progressive attainment.

In thought there correspond to Kant's theoretical and practical reason the *truth* and the *wisdom* of God ; His truth as the thought of reality as it is, His wisdom as the thought of what He wills reality to be. Although the term *holiness* had not originally any distinctively moral connotation, yet,

¹ See *De Fide et Symbolo*, p. 26.

² *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, p. 246.

as religion has become moralised, the term has come to express the personal perfection of God in its wholeness and in its difference from man's imperfection. The self-preservation of God's holiness in relation to man is His *righteousness* as expressed in the moral order of the world and the moral witness of man's conscience, and its self-impartation is His *goodness* as bestowal of His gifts, or His *love* as the gift of Himself in personal relations to man. In that personal relation God shares His life with man not only in communion with man, but also the consequent progressive conformation of man to the holiness of God. As the organism in responding to the environment is changed, so men, in reflecting or beholding the glory of God, are transformed into the same likeness (2 Cor. iii. 18). This love of God for a sinful and suffering race must needs be sympathy, service, succour, sacrifice. Without assigning any dogmatic authority to the Scriptures, we may maintain that the theistic conception of God, resting on the broad basis of the previous chapters dealing with God's self-manifestations in the world and man, finds its inevitable completion for the human heart in the Christian conception of God as Saviour in Christ and His Cross. The exposition of this truth belongs to Christian dogmatics. Here we can only give this indication of it. If love be the motive of God's dealings with men, we may extend the range of our thinking, and claim that love is the motive of the creation and the conservation of the universe, and of the revelation of God and the redemption of man of which earth has been the historical scene.

III

(1) The question has been often raised, Why should the eternally perfect and blessed God make a world at all! Is He not so complete in Himself as to be satisfied with Himself? Having no need of any other to complete or satisfy Him, why should He undertake the responsibility of the creation of a world that has needed redemption by Him? Can there be any need or desire in the Infinite? (a) I have found an interesting answer to this question in a book in which East meets West, and a Christian theosophy appears in an Indian mythological dress – *Satyakama*, or *True Desires*, by S. E. Stokes. "I have come to feel," he says, "that a deep sense of inherent and essential *need*, finding its expression

in *desire*, is the primary mode of experience. This sense of inherent need or incompleteness expressing itself as desire is the dynamic at the back of all effort and growth. . . . More and more I find that the highest levels of my experience are inexpressible except in terms of need and love. . . . Love implies *dependence*. . . . Love longs for love, longs for a consciousness of need for it in the beloved. That which knows itself as 'I' needs to feel that it is needed by the object of its love. If love is a *personal* relationship, then the possibility of its subsisting between a personal God and a personal self is not out of the question. . . . At the root of all *becoming*, I see the divine desire, springing from a need timelessly inherent in God's nature."¹ How then must we conceive God, if a sense of need is to be shown as consistent with His infinitude? "The conception towards which I have been working in the foregoing pages," writes Mr. Stokes, "is of a divine nature that is self-subsistent, timeless, and infinite in its perfection, and yet *infinitely needing*. Its perfection does not consist in independence of anything that is not essentially itself, but in unlimited power to satisfy its need. It is conceived as the *only* self-subsistent reality, upon which depends whatsoever else has any existence, and in which subsidiary categories of being have their reality, their meaning and their timeless cause."²

(b) The truth expressed in this last sentence is what is meant by the assertion of Christian dogmatics – that *God created the world out of nothing*. It is an assertion that God alone is self-subsistent reality ; that no other reality exists, underived from or independent of Him ; and that it is His causality alone to which all derived and dependent reality is due. Man in his making uses, and must use, the material the created world provides. God alone makes the material also which He uses in the making of the world. If it is true that *ex nihilo nihil fit* – and in my judgment theories of *creative* or *emergent evolution* do not disprove the dictum – then we must not take the words "out of nothing" literally, but qualify them thus : "other than what is in Himself." What is evident in the temporal reality must be in some form involved in the eternal reality. It is stretching our thought beyond its reach to say, as is sometimes said, that what becomes actual in the universe is potential in God, for can we ascribe potentiality to God ? The relation between God and the world must be more intimate than that which deism

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 15, 18, 19, 22, 33.

² *Idem*, p. 36.

conceived, and yet in that relation there must be more difference than pantheism admits. And even monotheism must beware of allowing the word *creation* to suggest a greater distance between God and the world, and a less dependence of the world on God, than so intimate a relation demands.

(c) Although disguised in the garb of Hindu mythology, the writer I have just been quoting indicates what seems to me to be the truth, as nearly as our minds can grasp it. Here is the metaphysical truth ! "The Divine Nature has inherent within it the means for the perfect satisfaction of its essential need, but were it possible to conceive the Divine Nature as apart from that which its need impels it ever to sustain in being, we should not be able to think of it as perfect or self-sufficient. . . . The perfect unit of experiencing life is the divine timelessly self-sustaining Existent One *plus* that complementary and subordinate area of reality timelessly sustained in being by it."¹ And this is the mythological dress : "Though *being* has timelessly subsisted under three modes, nevertheless the second and third of these (Púrusha and Prakṛti) exist timelessly by reason of the necessity for them inherent in the first—in Paramâtmán. His nature, then, is the timeless cause of the being of these other two."² The author admits his indebtedness here to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. What he does present to us is such a conception of Brahman as includes in it the personal God Paramâtmán, and the two dependent cosmic principles Púrusha, or Mind, and Prakṛti, or Matter.

(2) Christian thought cannot accept this mythological dress. If in God there is an eternal need and an eternal satisfaction, the alternative seems to be a conception of God such as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity offers, in which lover, loved and love (to use Augustine's analogy) are eternally a tri-unity, or we must assume that the universe as the object of God's satisfied need is itself eternal as God is.

(a) This common assumption may, however, be challenged, as it is by Professor Pringle-Pattison. "The God of popular Christian theology," he says, "is still the far-off, self-involved, abstractly perfect and eternally blessed God of pure monotheism, inherited instincts combining with the potent influence of Greek philosophy to stifle what was most characteristic of the world-view of the new faith."³ To this he opposes, as the conclusion of his reasoning, "a God who

¹ *Idem*, pp. 56-57.

² *Idem*, p. 59.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 409.

lives in the perpetual giving of Himself, who shares the life of His finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect.”¹ This is a doctrine of *immanence*, which acknowledges transcendence only as the unrealised future in contrast with the actual present, or the “ought to be” in contrast with the “is.” It is very definitely asserted in the following sentence: “God has no meaning to us out of relation to our own lives or to spirits resembling ourselves in their finite grasp and infinite reach; and, in the nature of the case, we have absolutely no grounds for positing his existence out of that reference.”² Professor Webb recognises a danger in this mode of thinking – the tendency to deny Divine Personality and Transcendence; and thinks it well to combine the conception of creation as expressing the sense of a distinction between God and man with the conception of generation, as indicating the community of nature. It seems to me to be necessary to preserve the sense of the *numinous* – God as *above* and *beyond* as well as *akin to* and *within* man – or what I have called the supra-personal as well as the personal aspect. I must, therefore, adhere to the doctrine of the Trinity as ontological, while insisting that the doctrine of the Trinity as economic needs to be brought into much closer relation to our conception of the world and man so as to bring out more clearly the immediacy and the intimacy of the relation between God and man.

(b) Although it must be recognised that, if God is in His eternal nature love, there must be an eternal object of that love, there is a difficulty in thinking of mankind on earth as that object. Not only is the universe we know in time, but science discloses that it had a beginning and will have an end in time, and, many as may be the ages between, it is not, and by its constitution cannot be, eternal. When we limit our regard to human history, we do discover a teleology within it, a goal towards which mankind is moving, although the course may be very much longer than our imagination can picture. The hopes of the prophetic spirits would be a Tantalus mockery, if that goal were never reached. We may set aside the pictorial form of Jewish Apocalyptic; but Christianity does stand for a glorious consummation, the coming of the Kingdom of God in some final manifestation of God, even if the perfected Kingdom can be thought of only in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 411.

² *Idem*, p. 254.

eternal supersensuous world. As regards what lies beyond that future limit of our earthly vision, it may be such that the society of the redeemed and perfected will be the object of that eternal love of God.

(3) If we look back to the past limit of our universe, however, we must ask : Had God no object of His love before He began to make our world ? The common answer is that within God Himself as Father, Son, and Spirit there are subject, object, and the relation of love itself. But in that inward relation, however we conceive it, can there be the same generous, gracious, compassionate and sacrificial love as has been manifested to men ? Here we can only speculate, and must not be overbold. We can conceive a succession of worlds, but would "an oft-repeated tale" preserve its full significance and value ? Or we may believe, as many thinkers have believed, that never was God, Father, Son, and Spirit, solitary, but that there is in the realm beyond time and space an eternal society of spirits. According to the speculation of the book previously mentioned by Stokes, the *Pûrusha*, which is the source of souls, is eternal in *Brahman*, and in eternal relation to *Paramâtmân*. The control we have over matter (*Prakrti*) makes it easy for us to conceive matter as *made*, the sensible emergent from the supersensible, but is it so easy to conceive *life* or *mind* as made ? (a) While in the Christian Church, three theories of the soul have been held – *traducianism*, which taught that the parents generated the soul as well as the body of offspring ; *creationism*, which asserted that God created a soul as each body was generated ; and *pre-existence* – the last has been regarded as the most credible by many great thinkers. This was Origen's view. Wordsworth's "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality" is familiar ; to the thought Tennyson often returned.¹ Although we can distinguish life and mind, we cannot separate them, and, while rejecting the *panpsychism* of a Clifford or a Haeckel, we may with Ward affirm that wherever life is, there mind also is, for the directive principle of every living organism is within, and not external to it as in a machine. "In the dead machine," says Ward, "this mind is outside and independent ; in the living machine or organism it is 'inside,' and so far identical."² Such being the difference, we may also agree with him.

¹ *When that which drew from out the boundless deep
Turns again home.*

² *Op. cit.*, I., p. 294.

"There is no physical theory of the origin of life."¹ If in God not only we, but all organisms, live, may we not conceive the relation of life and the directive mind within, as in more immediate relation to God the eternal Life and Mind than the term *creation* would suggest?

(b) It is undoubtedly difficult for us to conceive the rudimentary mind in the plant, yet so impossible is it to separate animal and plant life as to deny to the latter what in the course of development becomes more manifest in the former. Can there be directive mind which is altogether unconscious? Is the rudimentary consciousness sensitivity? Does instinct show only automatism, or is there behind it any teleology, a self-adaptation of the organism to the environment that becomes, as it were, permanently registered? When we come to the higher animal organism, there is fuller consciousness, although not self-consciousness; there is association of perceptions, and perceptive inference. Within the child we can follow the development of self-consciousness; and it is only in the mature personality that there is fully manifested "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control." While there is intimate relation with, and constant dependence on, God, it would seem that the inner directivity becomes more and more conscious and voluntary; God, as it were, increasingly delegates His control to His creatures. In man His control becomes moral government and religious inspiration. With this view may be compared the theory which is developed by Mr. Stokes. He accepts the Indian conception of the transmigration of the soul, but seeks to meet the difficulties it presents to a Western mind by some modifications. I may quote a few sentences I had written in a review of his book²: "Instead of a soul for every insect, he is prepared to recognise one soul for a species, and an individual soul only where there is some sense of self; he seems to admit also the possibility of the elimination of a soul when conditions of survival are not fulfilled; and in a very suggestive argument he shows how such a stage of development may be reached that memory will survive death, and so the progress of this life be continued in the next." In other words, where soul develops into personality, transmigration may give place to personal immortality – not absorption in Brahman, but communion in love with Paramâtmân – the personal God. The initial oneness of all souls in Pûrusha is reproduced in a final

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

² *The Congregational Quarterly*, X., p. 366.

oneness of persons in love, without loss of personality. The eternal destiny of the communion of saints with God and one another he bases on the origin of all souls in the one divine principle. Stripped of its Hindu mythological dress, this speculation is suggestive even for Christian thought. The resemblances and differences may be noticed : "The conception of creation is rejected, and for it is substituted the dual yet complementary evolution of the two subordinate yet necessary modes of Púrusha and Prakrti. If we set aside the Christian idea of creation and the Trinity as personal, we might assimilate the Christian doctrine of the Trinity to this speculative construction by regarding the Logos and the Spirit as impersonal subordinate factors in God, which by interaction, as final and efficient cause, evolve personality in the universe, capable of responding to God the Father as personal."¹

(4) In agreement with Professor Webb I do not reject the idea of creation altogether, as it points to God's transcendence, the difference of Creator and creature ; but I should supplement it by the term *generation* as affirming immanence, the resemblance of Creator to His creatures, as the evolution manifests increasingly Life and Mind, till in man, God's offspring (Acts xvii. 29), the divine image appears in increasing measure as man realises his personality in truth, beauty, goodness, and love. It is a transcendent intelligent will which controls the evolution of the physical universe. It is a personal immanent activity within life and mind which sustains and directs, and yet leaves spontaneity and liberty to the living organism and the conscious mind. With Hegel we may think of the transcendent God as Father, the immanent God in life and mind as Logos, or Son, and the God who, when conscious personality responds to the Logos, or Son, imparts fullness, freshness, freedom of life in and with God as Spirit. In the whole process there is divine *kenosis*, self-limitation, and also divine *plerosis*, self-realisation in a progressive revelation of the divine nature, character, and purpose in Creation, Conservation, Government, Revelation, Redemption. As the *kenosis* results in the *plerosis*, this self-limitation does not warrant us in thinking of a finite God, limited from without, or from within, and, even if we cannot now fully resolve the problem of evil and sin, and the delay and the difficulty in the fulfilment of His purpose which seems to be imposed on God, as the *plerosis* is not

¹ *Idem*, p. 367.

completed, it is rash for us to come to any such conclusion on what is incomplete evidence. The Creation, Conservation, and Government of God find their interpretation in the Revelation of Him, and that Revelation is an incomplete vindication until we reach Redemption in Christ and His Cross. Hence we may pass to the "Conclusion" of this volume in what may serve as a transition to the second volume of this series, although already published — *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* — of which the First or Historical Part is called "The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ."

CONCLUSION : REVELATION AND INCARNATION

(1) BISHOP WESTCOTT in his commentary on *The Epistles of St. John* has an essay entitled "The Gospel of Creation," in which he presents the historical evidence for an idea, which has never been incorporated in generally orthodox theology, but which seems to me to be not only genuinely Christian, but also to afford the appropriate, if we may not go so far as to say the necessary, completion of theistic thought. God's Revelation is consummated in the Incarnation ; God gives Himself increasingly to the World and Man until in one historical personality there is as clear and full a manifestation and communication of God as under the conditions, and with the limitations of perfect humanity, was possible. The manward movement of God in Revelation and the Godward movement of Man in Religion meets in the Word who became flesh, the Son of God and the Son of Man. The Incarnation – God as Man – as we knew it, was, and needed to be, redemptive – God saving from sin by sacrifice. What Westcott seeks to prove, and I fully accept his conclusion, is that there would have been an Incarnation as the fitting completion of Creation, even if there had been no sin. Before quoting his words, let me recall the statement, already quoted, that against Incarnation the naturalistic science of *Emergent Evolution*, as Professor Lloyd Morgan understands it, can offer no objection. Professor Alexander finds deity as an ideal emerging in human evolution. But is it not credible and intelligible that deity should emerge as actual in one historical personality, so completing the progressive revelation of God ? But to return to Westcott, we may quote his brief statement : " In order to gain, however imperfectly and transiently, this conception, we endeavour to present to ourselves humanity made in God's image, and advancing in harmonious co-operation with His Grace towards His likeness. We look upon men and man, upon the race as well as upon the individual, as far as we can, growing perfect as God is perfect, holy as God is holy. We follow the progress to its consummation ; and then, having so gained a conception of manhood, answering to what is made known of the divine idea of man, we go on to say that it is most consonant to what God has revealed to believe that it was His pleasure

that humanity, so consummated in its proper development in many parts, should find its true personality by union with His Son. According to this view man's self-will by which he fell was not the occasion of the supreme manifestation of the love of God in the 'taking of manhood unto God'; that was the end of Creation from the beginning."¹

(2) We dare not with Augustine speak of the *beata culpa*, sin as blessed, because the occasion of a redemptive incarnation of sacrificial love, and yet the glory of the Incarnation, as Westcott describes it, must fade before the surpassing glory of Christ and His Cross, for here not only is Creation completed, but the problem of evil and sin in that Creation solved, if not in final actuality, yet in promise and in potency. Greater than the scholar's conclusion is the poet's vision :

*Would I suffer for him that I love ? So wouldst thou – so wilt thou !
So shall crown thee the topmost, ineffablest, uttermost crown –
And thy love fill infinitude wholly, nor leave up nor down
One spot for the creature to stand in ! It is by no breath,
Turn of eye, wave of hand, that salvation joins issue with death !
As thy Love is discovered almighty, almighty be proved
Thy power that exists with and for it, of being Beloved !
He who did most, shall bear most ; the strongest shall stand the
most weak.*

*'Tis the weakness in strength that I cry for ! my flesh that I seek
In the Godhead ! I seek and I find it, O Saul, it shall be
A Face like my face that receives thee ; a Man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever : a Hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee ! See the Christ stand.*

(Browning's "Saul," xviii.)

Christ Crucified Creation's Consummator.

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1886, p. 287.

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